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Abstract 
 
This thesis interrogates the relationship between Mexican nationalism, maize 
agriculture and contemporary technoscience. My aim is to unlock a phenomenon 
that can at times take the shape of a reactive nationalism, while positioning itself 
as a defense of maize agriculture. Since 1999, a growing coalition of Mexican and 
international activists has denounced the transgenic "contamination" of Mexican 
maize agriculture. In the process, activists have identified transgenic maize as the 
instrument of a foreign assault on a sovereign entity, namely the nation itself – 
which "native maize" symbolizes in a very tangible way. Rather than being 
positioned as a mere instrument of foreign powers, in my argument agricultural 
biotechnology is seen as a non-deterministic event that calls for a critical 
assessment of national narratives around agriculture, science, technology and 
technoscience. In addition to developing such a critical assessment, I set out to 
explore the ethical and political promises of refiguring the activist use of the term 
"contamination" so that the latter is understood to pertain genetically to identity 
itself, including the maize-based identity that some Mexicans invoke in their 
nationalistic opposition to transgenic maize. Drawing on specific contributions from 
post-Marxist political theory, media and cultural studies and feminist 
technoscience, I position "genetic contamination" as a critical and creative 
alternative to the reproduction of nationalist identifications. An acknowledgment of 
the ineradicability of antagonism, a rigorous attention to contextual specificities 
and a materialist commitment to the pursuit of democracy in the technoscientific 
world all inform my engagement with the nationalist narratives in the context of 
technoscience, understood here as "a form of life, a generative matrix" (Haraway, 
Modest_Witness 50).  
 4 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Introduction, p. 6 
 
Chapter I. Maize in Mexican Cultural Politics: A Critical Review 
  
1.1 Introduction: What Kind of Biotechnology? p. 23 
1.2 The Place of Maize in Narratives of National Identity, p. 28  
1.3 The Nation in Political Economy: A Cultural Problematic? p. 39 
1.4 Technoscientific Mutations in Maize Nationalism, p. 52 
1.5 Conclusion: Mexican Maize and the Struggle for Technoscience, p. 64 
 
Chapter II. A Theoretical Approach to Mexican Nationalism 
 
2.1 Introduction: What is a Nation? p. 66 
2.2 Nationalism and the Politics of Community Production, p. 71 
2.3 The Nation as Subject, or the Ontological Legacy of Colonialism, p. 75 
2.4 Post-Marxism and the Ontological Legacy of Modernity, p. 83 
2.5 Regional Intellectuals and a Retreat from Theory, p. 90 
2.6 Conclusion: The Nation in Psychoanalysis, p. 98  
 
Chapter III. Revolutionary Science Meets Biotechnology 
 
3.1 Introduction: Science, Technology and Technoscience, p. 102 
3.2 Revolutionary Science: an Anti-Technological Fantasy, p. 107 
3.3 Revolutionary Nationalism Meets Science Policy, p. 113 
3.4 Against Neoliberalism: Revolutionary Science Strikes Back, p. 118 
3.5 The Idealistic Spirit of "Third World Biotechnology," p. 126 
3.6 Conclusion: Local Knowledges and Postmodern Technoscience, p. 130 
 
Chapter IV. The People of Maize and the Technoscience of Culture  
 
4.1 Introduction: Postmodern Apocalypse or Postmodern Knowledge? p. 134  
4.2 Nation and Heritage: Unstable Materializations of Power/Knowledge, p. 138  
4.3 Intangible Heritage: Nostalgia, Postmodernism and Technoscience, p. 147 
 5 
4.4 The People of Maize and the New Technoscience of Culture, p. 155 
4.5 Conclusion: Seed of Unity, Seed of Discord or Seed of Change? p. 171 
 
Chapter V. The Genetic Contamination of Mexican Nationalism  
 
5.1 Introduction: A Textual Contamination of Biotechnology Debates, p. 174 
5.2 Faces of Maize: Why Culture Matters in Technoscience Activism, p. 179 
5.3 Becoming Subjects, Becoming Myths: Always Already Material, p. 192 
5.4 Scientists Before the (Biosafety) Law: In Search of the Origin of Maize, p. 206  
5.5 Not a Thing but a Myth: Autonomy and its Discontents, p. 215 
5.6 Conclusion: Contamination as a Bioethical Perspective, p. 226  
 
Conclusion, p. 231 
 
Bibliography, p. 239 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 6 
 
Introduction 
 
What might be learned from personal and political pollution? 
(Haraway, Modest_Witness 174) 
 
A broad consensus exists in Mexico today that ancient agriculture was a 
pioneering form of biotechnology. Maize, for instance, is a crop plant developed by 
ancient Mesoamerican farmers through the domestication of a wild grass called 
teocintle (or teosinte). Yet controversy keeps growing around the differences 
between this kind of biotechnology, which survives in the subsistence practices of 
small-scale farmers, and genetic engineering, which is performed by scientific 
experts in the service of a powerful transnational industry. In this thesis I explore 
the tension between these different practices of biotechnology as a vital issue in 
technoscience. By technoscience I mean not just the actual inseparability of 
knowledge production from capitalist industry in the contemporary world (Lyotard). 
I also understand it philosophically as a complex set of challenges that confront 
the whole world with the need to develop "something like an ethico-onto-epistem-
ology – an appreciation of the intertwining of ethics, knowing, and being" (Barad, 
Meeting the Universe 185). My exploration of biotechnology debates attempts to 
develop an ethico-onto-epistem-ological appreciation of the current predicament of 
a nation embodied in multiple ways by maize agriculture.  
As a center of origin and genetic diversification of maize, Mexico is 
regarded today as being under threat of full-scale contamination by transgenic 
maize, a biotechnological product first imported as food into Mexico from the 
United States and more recently sown in experimental fields prior to its 
commercial release. "Contamination" is a term used by opponents of transgenic 
maize in order to assert that, once transgenic and native maize cross-fertilize, 
transgenes will prevail and displace "native maize" to the point of extinction. When 
in 2001 scientists found transgenes in maize plants from the Mexican state of 
Oaxaca, an anti-GM movement was born which quickly became articulated in 
terms of a defense of cultural identity and national sovereignty. An intuitive 
scepticism I felt about the nationalist rhetoric of this movement led to a series of 
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questions that eventually developed into the argument of this thesis: What is at 
stake, ethically and politically, when a biotechnological product is figured as a 
threat to national sovereignty? In what ways is reactive nationalism problematic in 
the context of Mexican debates around maize agriculture and biotechnology? Is it 
possible to develop an alternative response to the very real threats of corporate-
led biotechnology that is critical, creative and ethically responsible? What can the 
theoretical trajectories of media and cultural studies contribute to such a project? 
In this thesis I approach these questions through a careful reading of texts 
concerning the history and current status of Mexico as a national project 
precariously founded on the modern political narratives that are being rendered 
vulnerable today, among other factors, by technoscientific capitalism.  
At first sight, Mexican opposition to transgenic maize appears as just 
another example of popular resistance against neoliberal globalization. It is, after 
all, no secret that biotechnological products such as transgenic maize are 
designed to aid the expansion of profit-driven agro-industry, entailing a very real 
threat to independent, subsistence-oriented agriculture. Since 1982, neoliberal 
policies have progressively eliminated the Mexican state's commitment to land 
redistribution and to local economies. Medium and small-scale Mexican 
businesses collapsed as soon as they were exposed, in 1994, to international 
competition under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). As 
Mexico became dependent on imports of heavily subsidized, cheap maize from 
the US, maize re-emerged as “the symbol of nationalism and the country's political 
and cultural resistance” (Antal, Baker and Verschoor 2). Unsurprisingly, the 
Mexican defense of maize quickly became a popular subject among Northern 
academics studying the impact of neoliberalism globally. Empirical research has 
been extensive, and various critical perspectives have been deployed in the 
analysis of the Mexican debates on maize biotechnology, from actor-network 
sociology (Verschoor) and international political economy (McAffee) to Gramscian 
theory of science as culture (Wainwright and Mercer), science and technology 
studies (Kinchy) and cultural anthropology (Fitting). Drawing on the above listed 
research and on my own prior philosophical training, I found myself preoccupied 
by the seeming absence of an adequate method that could authorize the kind of 
open-ended interrogation of contemporary Mexican nationalism that I wanted to 
pursue. Such a concern was made even more acute by an increasing awareness 
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(as I researched the topic) of the vital issues at stake in the Mexican biotechnology 
debates. 
Issues of life and death such as global economic war and environmental 
racism would seem to demand first and foremost a realistic empirical investigation 
of the defense of maize in Mexico. I nevertheless kept on wondering what I could 
contribute to agricultural and biotechnological debates by drawing on a 
background and orientation that have been, and continue to be, distinctively non-
empirical and non-scientific. From a post-foundational philosophical perspective, 
the problem I still find in "empiricism first" approaches is that they more often than 
not tend to leave nationalism unquestioned or frame it implicitly as a rational or at 
least reasonable position in the face of global capitalism. At the risk of sounding 
melodramatic, I have persisted in eschewing the empiricist blackmailing attempts 
of my metaphysical superego. Drawing inspiration from Donna Haraway's 
injunction to change the stories we live by, I have set out to interrogate the stories 
that some Mexicans tell about "us" as we try to elaborate a critical relation with 
neoliberal technoscience. This thesis has therefore evolved as a theoretical 
experiment in situated knowledges, that is, as an attempt to “become answerable 
for what we learn how to see” (Haraway, "Situated Knowledges" 583). 
It was an invocation of national history that first drew my attention to the 
Mexican defense of maize. In October 2009, Greenpeace staged a theatrical 
protest in which activists covered emblematic monuments in Mexico City with 
black mourning cloths and placards. Over the statues of the national Heroes of 
Independence one could read phrases such as “Our maize first, traitors!” The 
traitors in question were Mexican legislators who had allegedly betrayed the nation 
by ending a ten-year moratorium on the experimental sowing of transgenic maize 
in Mexico. When I read about this protest, I thought that Greenpeace's rhetorical 
strategy struck all the right cords in a country that extracts its sense of national 
identity not so much from the love of traditional agriculture as from a deep sense 
of injury in the face of external powers. The vast majority of contemporary Mexican 
citizens now live in urban areas and feed themselves with industrial products, yet it 
seemed likely that many of them would identify themselves as the victims of 
traitors who were selling "our maize" to a foreign enemy. My spontaneous reaction 
at the time was to ask myself, rather skeptically, whether the nationalist rhetoric 
was faithful to the reality of contemporary Mexican life as I had experienced it so 
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far. Encouraged by my then recent introduction to technoscience studies during an 
MA in Digital Media at Goldsmiths College, I decided to transform such a 
spontaneous skepticism about Mexican nationalism into an academic research 
enterprise in which I could test my own inclination for philosophical approaches. 
My question thus became formulated as to whether a nationalist rhetorical 
strategy, relying as it did on modern political narratives, could responsibly face up 
to the challenges that technoscience posed to human beings.  
In this thesis I use the term "cultural politics of biotechnology" to refer to my 
exploration of the ethical and political implications of a deconstructive approach to 
national identity in the context of debates around transgenic maize in Mexico. 
Without claiming that my work consists in "a deconstruction of Mexican 
nationalism," I find it important to acknowledge deconstruction not just as a vague 
philosophical inspiration but rather, more fundamentally, as a constitutive 
orientation of my work on Mexican biotechnology debates. By contrast with familiar 
research methods aiming to produce accurate representations of the world, 
deconstruction seeks an “opening to freedom, responsibility, decision, ethics and 
politics” (Derrida, "Before the Law" 200). My interrogation of nationalism and 
biotechnology in Mexico is indeed orientated towards an opening of ethical and 
political questions – as opposed to unproblematic assertions or positive answers 
that seem more acceptable for an established academic discipline. If we think of 
deconstruction as “a name for experience itself, which is always experience of the 
other” (Derrida, Echographies 11), the first implication is that nothing familiar or 
reassuring can result from it. I would therefore ask: What remains unthought in the 
Mexican biotechnology debates, from an ethical and political perspective?  
One crucial premise of thinkers attuned to deconstruction is the notion that 
identity, as being in time, can only be constituted precariously in relation to time 
itself. In this sense, Derrida argued that “the at-home has always been tormented 
by the other, by the guest, by the threat of expropriation. It is constituted only in 
this threat” (Derrida, Echographies 79). It is the radical threat of temporality that in 
my view constitutes the unthought in the Mexican debates around transgenic 
maize. It is also what I attempt to think through by means of a semantic 
displacement of "contamination." I want to suggest that the Mexican nation has 
always been "contaminated" or rendered vulnerable by its own constitutive 
temporality. However, I do not mean by this that the "genetic contamination" of 
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Mexican nationalism is a fundamental truth that can be verified empirically or 
transcendentally. I want to position it instead as a deconstructive myth, the 
acknowledgment of which might actually help to diversify both the content and the 
orientation of the Mexican biotechnology debates. If conceived as a sort of genetic 
engineering at the philosophical level, the aim of my "contaminating" intervention 
would be to release cultural myth-making from cultural nationalism in order to 
create conditions for the emergence of more critical and more creative 
engagements with technoscience understood as "a form of life, a generative 
matrix" (Haraway, Modest_Witness 50). As the following overview of chapters 
already suggests, maize biotechnology is a multi-dimensional, non-deterministic 
process in which the biocultural origin of maize appears to be as important as it is 
impossible to grasp.  
The search for the origin of maize is ongoing, yet the dominant scientific 
theory holds that it was in the Mexican Balsas River Valley, between 12,000 and 
7,500 years ago, that the wild grass teosinte (Z. mays parviglumis) first "mutated" 
into maize (Zea mays mays) (Buckler and Stevens 81). While the genetic 
difference between the two plants is very small, its phenotypic expression is as 
dramatic as the significance that maize acquired in the biocultural history of the 
Americas. Unlike teosinte, maize produces large, nutritious and abundant seeds 
that can be stored for long periods of time. Unlike those of teosinte, the seeds of 
maize grow tightly packed together in the ear and are prevented by the husk from 
dispersing into the air. This characteristic makes maize dependent on human 
cultivation, and it is one of the reasons why scientists agree on at least one point, 
namely, that maize originated through the domestication of teosinte by pre-
Columbian farmers (Bennetzen et al.). Ever since the first domestication of 
teosinte, farmers throughout the American continent have been selecting and 
sharing seeds from different plants in order to produce virtually endless varieties of 
maize. In pre-Columbian societies maize symbolized fertility and the substance of 
human beings; it provided articulation between human beings and the cosmos as 
well as symbolic legitimation to political power (Florescano 36). After the conquest 
of the Aztec empire by the Spaniards (1519-1521), maize remained the staple 
food of the colonized majorities, bearing a stigma that lasted well beyond the 
colonial era (1535-1821). It was in fact only 20 years after the Mexican Revolution 
(1910-1920) that the Mexican government officially acknowledged the nutritional 
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and cultural value of maize. Ever since, maize has been officially celebrated in 
Mexico through a rhetoric of cultural nationalism.  
In Chapter I, Maize in Mexican Cultural Politics: A Critical Review, I review 
the cultural politics of maize, from its historic role in modern narratives of national 
identity to the technoscientific conjuncture in which it is being reclaimed by 
campesinos1 in alliance with scientists and environmental activists. In this 
conjuncture, it seems easy to justify nationalist rhetoric as the way to demand 
retribution for centuries of cultural colonialism. In my account of Mexican cultural 
politics, however, I develop a more critical position about the use of nationalism as 
a means of cultural decolonization. One of the main arguments I develop is that 
the nationalist celebration of maize is historically indissociable from the 
devaluation of maize agriculture as a culturally specific form of biotechnology. 
Under the modernizing imperative of Mexican revolutionary nationalism, maize 
was transformed into a standardized consumer item that would perform effectively 
as a homogenizing metaphor for a "developing" capitalist nation. In the same 
process, peasants and rural life in general were figured nostalgically as folkloric 
remnants of "underdevelopment." Through the developmental discourse and the 
Green Revolution (Escobar, Encountering Development; Saldaña-Portillo), 
Mexican nationalism in fact undermined the vitality of maize agriculture, its 
diversity and its public valorization as a culturally specific form of biotechnology. 
Thus, far from simply or transparently celebrating maize as biocultural legacy, 
Mexican nationalism operated, as historian Jeffrey Pilcher has pointed out, as “a 
means of transforming elements of lower class and ethnic culture into symbols of 
unity for an authoritarian regime" (Que Vivan 124). My critical history of maize 
nationalism poses the question of whether and how it would be possible for 
Mexican nationalism to reconfigure itself as part of a democratic agenda. I argue 
                                                
1 In Mexico, the term campesino refers not just to a small-scale or subsistence-oriented farmer, but 
also to a political category within the narratives of the Mexican Revolution. As I explain in Chapters 
I and II, the Revolution attempted to de-indigenize and de-politicize campesinos by reducing them 
to modern economic subjects, that is, commercial farmers. Its success was limited, and the term 
campesino is still widely used in Mexico to refer to a revolutionary subject, either in a cultural sense 
(as communitarian indigenous campesinos) or in a liberal political sense (as members of the 
National Campesina Confederation, more often classified as mestizos). Even though the term 
campesino is generally not offensive or pejorative in the Mexican context, I use the English term 
"peasant" as a translation of campesino throughout this thesis. I do this following most of the 
English documents dealing with rural issues in Mexico; yet I find it important to clarify from the start 
that in Mexico campesinos have a very public existence and are not ashamed of being called 
campesinos. Therefore, any negative connotation carried by the current usage of "peasant" in 
English does not apply in my own use of the term.  
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that such a possibility was indeed activated towards the end of the 1980s by 
nothing less than neoliberal globalization.  
Only since the neoliberal turn have indigenous peasants been refigured as 
"experimenters" and "improvers" of biological resources to be economically 
exploited as well as protected by the Mexican nation. In 1988, Mexican 
anthropologist Arturo Warman wrote that maize was the result of “…a prolonged 
effort that required the interest and the passion of thousand of anonymous 
agricultural experimenters over dozens of generations” (33). A high-ranking official 
of Mexico's neoliberal government (1989-1994), Warman also asserted that maize 
was “a unique resource for the construction of a new reality, for change and social 
transformation” (234). The core of this transformation turned out to be 
neoliberalism, defined by philosopher Wendy Brown as a political rationality that 
makes the market into “the organizing and regulative principle of the state and 
society” (Edgework 41). In Mexico, the neoliberal policies that Warman helped to 
craft included an end to constitutional restrictions on land commodification and the 
North American Free Trade Agreement, which eliminated tariffs on industrial 
imports, including food imports. Exposed to international competition, Mexican 
businesses collapsed, while the country became dependent on heavily subsidized, 
cheaper maize from the US. The devastating effects of neoliberalism probably 
shocked Warman and everyone else who had entertained wild expectations of 
"progress" and "development" through world commerce. Whereas an important 
trend in the academic literature has been to foreground the series of catastrophes 
that neoliberalism brought to Mexico and the world, I want to focus on the rebirth 
of cultural politics that neoliberalism also brought about. Only in the neoliberal era 
did indigenous peasants take to the stage in popular and academic discourse as 
an active part of the present rather than a negligible "problem" from the past. 
While the Zapatista insurrection of 1994 has justly taken most of the credit for this 
change, I suggest in my critical review of maize nationalism that there is another 
ingredient to it which is distinctively neoliberal and even technoscientific; hence I 
call this political shift a "technoscientific mutation" in Mexican cultural politics. 
In Life as Surplus, Melinda Cooper argues that contemporary industrial 
biotechnology is “inseparable from the rise of neoliberalism as the dominant 
political philosophy of our time” (19). While neoliberalism makes capitalism into 
“the organizing and regulative principle of the state and society” (Brown, Edgework 
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41), biotechnology extends such a principle to life itself qua “the specific power of 
life activity of cells, molecules, and genes” (Thacker 40). Yet feminist critics of 
technoscience such as Sarah Franklin and Donna Haraway have highlighted the 
ambivalent potential of technoscientific practices such as biotechnology. While the 
latter indeed signals a dangerous penetration of capitalism into the core of life 
itself, it simultaneously provokes a welcome re-politicization of everything 
previously associated with "nature." For instance, it provokes a reaction against 
“the separation of expert knowledge from mere opinion as the legitimizing 
knowledge for ways of life” (Haraway, Modest_Witness 23). From this perspective, 
transgenic maize appears not just as an instrument of capitalist corporations but 
also as a breeding ground for a more democratic life in technoscience. In view of 
the complex threats posed by neoliberal capitalism, Mexican farmers of diverse 
provenances formed a coalition with environmental activists and urban scientists in 
a crusade against the transgenic "contamination" of "Mexican" maize varieties. If 
their struggle amounts to more than reactive nationalism, this is because it 
involves a critical revalorization of the technical knowledges of small-scale maize 
farmers. Since I am interested in theorizing this re-valorization as a potential 
challenge posed to Mexican nationalism, my initial questions become more 
precise in this chapter: What is the role of nationalism in the Mexican defense of 
maize? Is nationalism a necessary component or a structural aspect of such a 
defense? How can we better understand its role, its potential advantages and its 
limitations? 
In Chapter II, A Theoretical Approach to Mexican Nationalism, I argue that 
the deconstructive turn in political philosophy and cultural theory can help us to 
interpret the historical trajectory of Mexican nationalism in a way that allows us to 
imagine how such a nationalism might be reconfigured in more or less democratic 
directions in the present technoscientific conjuncture. Theories of nationalism have 
oscillated between explaining the nation as an ideological function of capitalist 
nation-states and positing it as a necessary expression of specific cultures (Torfing 
192). While ideology and material conditions are both important aspects of 
nationalism, postcolonial theorist Homi Bhabha has argued that unless they 
incorporate a deconstructive perspective, they will tend to fix or totalize a sign that 
is “always multi-accentual and Janus-faced” (3). In other words, they will end up 
asserting, like nationalism itself, an impossible unity of the nation as a symbolic 
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force. From Bhabha's perspective, what matters are not self-consciously held 
political ideologies but larger cultural systems out of which the nation comes into 
being as a transitional narrative (19). As a narrative, Bhabha explains, the nation 
lives in the ambivalence between histories that speak of a national "origin" and a 
social temporality that upsets the "totalization," or fixation, of such histories. In 
Chapter II I explore the larger cultural systems that have nurtured the transitional 
narrative of Mexican nationalism. My necessarily partial account of such systems 
relies on the work of Mexican and non-Mexican historians, such as Claudio 
Lomnitz and Edmundo O'Gorman. I have chosen to foreground these two 
historians on the basis of their critical orientation, which resonates strongly with 
the basic insights of deconstructive philosophy. Through a post-Marxist 
interpretation of the history of Mexican nationalism as recounted by Claudio 
Lomnitz and Edmundo O'Gorman, I prepare the ground for a more targeted 
discussion, in subsequent chapters, of the cultural politics of biotechnology in 
contemporary Mexico. 
Drawing on Ernesto Laclau's political elaboration of poststructuralist 
philosophy, Lacanian psychoanalysis and Gramscian hegemony, I interpret the 
history of Mexican nationalism as a series of attempts to overcome what Laclau 
calls “structural dislocation” (New Reflections 63). Structural dislocation follows 
from the ontological postulate that “the real (...) is in the ultimate instance 
temporal” (42). From a psychoanalytic perspective, the temporality of being is a 
traumatic fact in response to which the subject emerges as an attempt, always 
already failed, to overcome dislocation. The nationalist defense of maize in Mexico 
can be interpreted as a political response to the threats of neoliberal globalization, 
but it can simultaneously be interpreted as a subjective attempt to overcome the 
"structural dislocation" that is merely exposed by an economic conjuncture. Activist 
discourse would attempt to "suture" this more fundamental dislocation through "the 
constitution of a new space of representation” (61), which would be nothing but the 
myth of maize as the origin and condition of possibility of the Mexican nation. From 
Laclau's strategic vantage point, maize does need to articulate a unifying myth of 
political identity in order to effectively take part in the actual contest for the 
definition of Mexican social life. However, the deconstructive and psychoanalytic 
components of his theory also warn us that any identitarian myth remains 
precarious in the face of structural dislocation. Moreover, it is just as important, 
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ethically and politically, to remember the precariousness of identitarian myths in 
order to avoid the neutralization of a social movement's democratic potential. This 
is indeed why I am interested in what a deconstructive or anti-essentialist political 
theory can contribute to the analysis and evaluation of Mexican nationalism in the 
current technoscientific conjuncture. 
Laclau contends that contemporary capitalism has fully exposed “the 
contingent and precarious nature of any objectivity” (New Reflections 4). In the 
case of Mexico, the nation is literally dependent on both food imports and 
remittances sent by former peasants who are now migrant workers in the U.S. Oil 
reserves are in decline, and the national tourist industry has been hit by 
unfavorable global reconfigurations, such as the biologization of global security 
and the state's inability to contain the social and economic power of transnational 
organized crime. When in 2008 Stratfor Global Intelligence popularized the image 
of Mexico as a "failed state," the Mexican population had long realized how 
contingent and precarious the Mexican nation indeed was. In 2003, the Mexican 
Director of Popular and Indigenous Cultures, Griselda Galicia, stated that maize 
was of national interest at a time when there was an "urgent need" to reimagine “a 
national project that satisfies all” (Esteva, Marielle and Galicia 9). Taken literally, 
such a project would require the satisfaction of a series of empirical demands, 
including a definitive ban on transgenic crops, the economic protection of Mexican 
agriculture and the cultural promotion of local food and traditions. Taken 
metaphorically, the project would signal “a [desired] fullness that cannot be 
granted by the reality of the present” (Laclau, New Reflections 63). While 
overcoming structural dislocation is by definition impossible in a post-Marxist 
framework, Laclau accords decisive importance to the metaphorical content of 
empirical demands. It is in order to articulate such necessarily heterogeneous and 
conjunctural demands that the metaphorical content constitutes itself into a new 
space of representation, or a myth of political identity. Whether maize mythology 
will be able to achieve the necessary strength to re-define social life in Mexico 
remains an open question. All we know, as Griselda Galicia put it in Sin Maíz No 
hay País, is that maize is a “central protagonist of the future that comes close to us 
simultaneously as hope and uncertainty” (Esteva, Marielle and Galicia 10).  
Despite being experienced as traumatic capitalist dislocation opens new 
opportunities for a radical politics that stem from a “new liberty gained in relation to 
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the object” (Laclau, New Reflections 4). The post-Marxist project of radical 
democracy, for example, is premised on a recognition of “the historicity of being” 
and of the “purely human and discursive nature of truth” (Laclau New Reflections 
4). It is therefore a project that points beyond the routine liberal procedure of 
extending new rights to new subjects and towards “an all-embracing subversion of 
the space of representability in general, which is the same as the subversion of 
spatiality itself” (79). What would this imply for the Mexican defense of maize? In 
line with my overall argument in this thesis, I argue that the project of radical 
democracy necessitates a renunciation of nationalism as an objective or truthful 
position. Yet in view of the tangible social, political, economic and environmental 
devastation that neoliberalism has caused in Latin American nations since the 
1980s, some Latin American scholars have publicly lamented the demise of 
national identity as a political category (Sarlo). In their view, the demise was 
promoted by cultural studies – including post-Marxism and deconstruction – as a 
Northern academic discipline that they see as complicit with neocolonial 
capitalism. As a critical rejoinder to these diagnoses, I end Chapter II with a 
reflection on whether nationalism is really necessary for the construction of a 
democratic project that counters neocolonial capitalism. Can Laclau's political 
analysis provide a definitive answer to this question?  
Not just Latin American critics of globalization but also cultural and political 
theorists outside Latin America have observed a problematic inclination in 
Laclauian post-Marxism to present itself as a "sutured" political theory above and 
beyond the "dislocation" that it detects in everything else (Valentine; Bowman). 
Others have cautioned against the potential authoritarianism that might be implicit 
in Laclau's tendency to reduce the field of politics to a logical formula (Arditi, 
"Populism is Hegemony..."). A mere rehearsal of Laclauian formulae would indeed 
make it hard to see how anything new might emerge from my critical engagement 
with biotechnology debates, or “how new social and political articulations could be 
wrought form the subversion of the natural attitude in which we live” (Butler, 
"Restaging the Universal" 26). Whereas the post-Marxist theory of hegemony 
serves well its analytic and diagnostic purpose in Chapter II, from Chapter III 
onwards I try to illuminate the more pluralistic orientation of cultural studies as an 
interventional practice that is also informed by deconstructive philosophy (Hall and 
Birchall; Bowman; Gilbert, Anticapitalism and Culture).  
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In "What is Deconstruction?" Nicholas Royle argues that it is only in a 
“stupidly formalistic” sense that deconstruction operates as a procedure or a 
method of critical analysis (5). A more rigorous approach, he suggests, would start 
by focusing on the performative capacity of language to produce effects beyond 
representation (8). Cultural studies has been described in a performative sense as 
an anti-disciplinary project in which “readings reach from within artefacts to the 
paradigms that govern their interpretation and beyond these paradigms to the 
structures of disciplinary power that support them” (qtd. in Bowman 64). Rather 
than merely representing popular cultures, cultural studies has challenged the 
paradigms that govern what gets to count as "culture" in specific contexts and with 
specific political implications. In close spirit, feminist theorists of technoscience 
have drawn attention to the material import of epistemic boundary-making 
practices in technoscience (Haraway, "Situated Knowledges" 595). Echoing Martin 
Heidegger's proto-performative account of technology as world-making rather than 
a set of tools ("The Question Concerning Technology"), Donna Haraway invites us 
to consider contemporary technosciences in non-instrumental fashion, as “ways of 
life, social orders, practices of visualization” ("Situated Knowledges" 587). Her 
feminist “no-nonsense commitment to faithful accounts of a ‘real’ world” (579), 
however, allows her to eschew Heidegger's metaphysical nostalgia of pre-modern 
worlds and affirm contemporary technoscience as “a form of life, a practice, a 
culture, a generative matrix” (50). Can cultural studies, in alliance with post-
Marxism and feminist studies of technoscience, contribute anything to the Mexican 
biotechnology debates, beyond a purely negative or purely celebratory 
representational critique of the relationship between the nation and biotechnology? 
Under the dominant orientation of technoscience, the success and 
legitimacy of nation-states seems to reside in their ability to exploit knowledge and 
life in order to compete in the global market. In Chapter III, Revolutionary Science 
Meets Biotechnology, I develop a critique of Mexican nationalism's historical 
response to such a capitalist imperative. Through an examination of the recent 
emergence of the "science policy" discourse in Mexico, I draw attention to the 
false polarization between a nationalist opposition to, and a nationalist celebration 
of, technoscientific links between national science and corporate business. If I 
challenge the nationalist subject-position at both ends of the polarity, this is 
because I see a problem with the wider cultural narrative that both of them fail to 
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address. Both nationalist rejection and nationalist celebration of technoscience fail 
to question not just the universality and superiority of "Western" science and 
technology (Harding) but also its instrumental role in the attainment of national 
"development" and sovereignty. The failure to challenge scientific rationalism, 
universalism, humanism and instrumentalism amounts, I argue, to an uncritical 
relation with the metaphysical legacy of Western colonialism.  
As a point of contrast with mainstream or official narratives of national 
progress through Western science and technology, I draw attention in Chapter III 
to the work of Mexican historians and philosophers of science who have in recent 
years explicitly and systematically challenged the metaphysical legacy of 
revolutionary nationalism. Among other contemporary phenomena, they have 
studied the singular trajectories of "local knowledges" on the basis of a 
sociocultural understanding of science (Gorbach and López). In my argument, 
such work constitutes a creative political engagement with technoscience in 
Mexico. Its politicality, however, does not consist in stepping outside of the 
university or another learned institution to speak in the name of the oppressed. 
While in certain circumstances such a step might seem the right way to intervene 
politically, my argument is that a radical questioning of interpretive paradigms 
within the university already constitutes a highly consequential political act. As the 
neoliberal reorganization of social labor renders the divisions between "mental" 
and "manual" labor increasingly untenable (de Bary 6), we might take the 
opportunity to expose the metaphysical structure of such divisions and clear the 
way for renewed political articulations across traditional academic boundaries. To 
contest the dominant framing of biotechnology chiefly in terms of “the genetic 
informationalisation of life itself” (Kember 236), for example, appears as a 
destabilization of what counts as the proper experience and practice of 
biotechnology inside and outside academia. This is a necessary condition, I argue, 
for a critical imagination and a viable practice of different forms of biotechnology – 
including media and cultural studies as one among multiple forms of 
technoscientific practice. 
What, then, can media and cultural studies contribute to the analysis of 
biotechnology debates in Mexico? If it seems strange to assert that media and 
cultural studies is a kind of biotechnology, it might seem less so to assert that food 
practices are indeed biotechnologies and directly relevant to media and cultural 
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studies. In Chapter IV, The People of Maize and the Technoscience of Culture, I 
analyze the story of cultural activism that led to the recent inscription of Traditional 
Mexican Cuisine in UNESCO's List of Intangible Cultural Heritage (2010). That is, 
having expanded the field of biotechnology studies through an understanding of 
technoscience as a sociocultural process, I turn my attention from science policy 
to cultural policy. For Mexican defenders of maize, intangible cultural heritage 
became a key platform via which to articulate and expand their cause through 
international organizations such as UNESCO. In my account of intangible heritage 
discourse, I figure it as the institutionalized offspring of a "postmodern" critique of 
cultural essentialisms on the one hand and contemporary neoliberal rationality on 
the other. Intangible heritage appears as a paradigmatic embodiment of the 
ambiguous operations of technoscience, where the boundaries between science, 
culture and industry seem to have collapsed forever. In my reading of the 
"nomination files" and other texts composed by Mexican activists involved in the 
promotion of "Traditional Mexican Cuisine," I suggest that the success of the 
activist enterprise depended on a contamination of activist discourse by the 
technoscience of culture. I disagree with activists who see this process as a dead 
end for Mexican cuisine, highlighting instead the political productivity of 
"contamination" as an inescapable condition in technoscience. In Chapter IV I 
understand "contamination" through the lens of the technoscientific genealogy of 
intangible heritage and as the non-totalizable or temporal terrain on which activists 
deployed their efforts at hegemonizing their cause. In the story of "Traditional 
Mexican Cuisine," precisely at the moment when everybody seemed to converge 
around the urgency to preserve maize as the essence of Mexican identity, multiple 
disagreements cropped up regarding what exactly the preservation was to involve. 
The disagreement precluded the desired totalization of the national text. However, 
I argue that coming to terms with the impossibility of totalization is what 
contaminated life is all about. It is not an apocalypse, I argue, and it continues to 
be vital for activists to deploy contamination subversively within the ongoing 
"gastronomification" and "heritagization" of Mexican indigenous cuisines. 
In Anticapitalism and Culture, Jeremy Gilbert undertakes an exemplary 
demonstration of how cultural studies can be relevant to the strategic and tactical 
concerns of social movements. Already in Chapter IV, but even more so in 
Chapter V, The Genetic Contamination of Mexican Nationalism, I borrow and 
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adapt Gilbert's arguments to my own critique of reactive nationalism and 
oppositional thinking in the Mexican defense of maize. My overall line of argument 
in this last chapter points towards an affirmative re-figuration of the term that 
activists denounce as their enemy, namely, "genetic contamination." Opponents of 
transgenic organisms speak of contamination as the cause of an apocalyptic 
scenario. While I give serious attention to the many reasons why such a term is 
associated with an invasion by corporate biotechnology, I also place the term in 
the philosophical context of anti-essentialism in order to try to imagine different 
possibilities for the thinking and doing of biotechnology in Mexico. In this vein, I 
understand my own textual intervention, which is performed through a close 
reading of theoretical, scientific, activist and corporate texts, as a deliberate 
"contamination" of emancipatory narratives that risk falling into the objectivist traps 
of the metaphysical tradition (Derrida, "Structure, Sign..."). This is not meant to 
imply that human politics, and particularly the discursive dimension of human 
politics, is all that matters in the Mexican debates on biotechnology, as some 
recent critiques of "textual approaches" in general seem to suggest (Coole and 
Frost). Some versions of "new materialist" scholarship would seem indeed to 
underestimate the critical value of textuality in the analysis of phenomena such as 
the Mexican defense of maize. My criticism of "new materialisms" in Chapter V is 
motivated less by a desire to dismiss such concerns and more by an attempt to 
keep open the question whether textual approaches can effectively intervene in 
the ethical and political controversies sparked by technological novelty. While I 
agree that capitalism threatens both human and nonhuman lives in a way that 
clearly exceeds the scope of a "merely human" cultural politics, I want to argue 
that the lessons of textuality are important for both the Mexican defenders of 
maize and for contemporary materialist thinkers. Their importance resides in 
particular philosophical insights with regard to the impossibility of a pure, 
uncontaminated state of being.  
My adoption of the trope of genetic contamination seeks to undermine 
naturalized representations of "Mexican nature" and "Mexican culture" as pre-
given entities by drawing attention to the ethico-onto-epistemological framework of 
the Mexican biotechnology debates. Yet the aim of my critical reading of textual 
interventions in the Mexican biotechnology debates is not simply to expose their 
metaphysical assumptions. I also want to foreground the dynamism, indeterminacy 
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and nonhuman agency of the maize-human complex understood as a material 
process that includes but is not exhausted by language and texts. From a 
perspective such as Haraway's, the textual figuration of the origin and 
diversification is not merely a linguistic representation that must be described as 
true or false. More fundamentally, it is a contested plan for the construction and 
maintainance of material boundaries ("The Biopolitics..." 204). Alongside the 
feminist insistence on the agentic materiality of boundary-making practices 
(Haraway, "Cyborg Manifesto"; Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway), the more 
recent elaborations of deconstructive philosophy inform "genetic contamination" as 
a trope within critical, post-foundational materialism. In Technics and Time I, the 
philosopher Bernard Stiegler argues that the being of the human being is to be 
outside of itself, or rather in a process of exteriorization in which the human and 
the nonhuman are technically compounded and indissociable (158-163). Taking 
inspiration from Stiegler's philosophical anthropology, "genetic contamination" 
seeks to foreground the idea that Mexican maize-beings are “without qualities, 
without predestination: they must invent, realize, produce qualities, [but] nothing 
indicates that, once produced, these qualities will bring about humanity (…) they 
may rather become those of technics" (194). Rather than figuring maize and the 
human as individual agents interacting with each other or "civilizing" each other, 
"genetic contamination" locates their shared agency in the unstable relations 
through which they constitute each other as they both take part in a wider 
technical process which it is impossible to calculate or appropriate as a whole or 
once and for all. Such a process is the world understood as "a doing, a congealing 
of agency" (Barad, "Posthumanist Performativity" 822) and therefore it includes 
everything I address throughout my thesis: agricultural histories, cultural 
nationalism, academic research disciplines and anti-disciplines, psychoanalysis, 
science policy, cultural policy, popular gastronomies, tourism, democratic 
struggles, political disappointment and “the deepest personal and collective 
experiences of embodiment, vulnerability, power, and mortality” (Haraway, "The 
Biopolitics..." 204).  
As a critical rejoinder to the some recent calls for "more empirical 
approaches" to materiality, I argue that the point at which material processes 
threaten to annihilate our traditional conception of agency as a property of 
individual human beings (or individual crops) is not something that we discover by 
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invoking empirical facts or data. Witnessing and investigating empirical causes 
and effects might be indispensable for human survival, yet the point at which we 
humans transform our ethical relation to the nonhuman (including the nonhuman in 
us) involves a deeper and perhaps unconscious aspect of our being that I locate in 
deconstruction as an “experience of the other” (Derrida, Echographies 11). In this 
vein, agential realist Karen Barad, who would otherwise sympathize with "new 
materialist" demands of empirical evidences, declares that "ethicality entails non-
coincidence with oneself" ("Quantum Entanglements" 265). It is in this experience, 
neither empirical nor transcendental, that I locate the bioethical promise of an 
acknowledgment of genetic contamination in the Mexican defense of maize. 
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Chapter I  
 
Maize in Mexican Cultural Politics:  
A Critical Review 
 
 
Introduction: What Kind of Biotechnology? 
 
The greatest difference between corn and maize (...) lies in the symbolic 
freight that each word carries. If north of Mexico, European immigrants built an 
industrial kingdom and a global empire on the economic power of corn, in 
Mesoamerica the Olmec a thousand years before Christ founded a complete 
universe – a language, calendar, mythos, and cosmos – on the symbolic 
power of maize. If the one culture diminished a staple food to merchandise, 
the other sanctified it as divine (Fussell, "Translating Maize into Corn" 58). 
 
In an essay titled "The Western Redeemer and His Technical Fantasies," 
Mexican historian Guy Rozat complained that most colonial and post-colonial 
accounts depicted pre-Columbian societies as fundamentally "lacking" technical 
skills and achievements. Among the typical assumptions made by those who 
identified themselves with "the Western redeemer" was the notion that pre-
Columbian technology was structurally impossible due to an alleged unfamiliarity 
with the wheel and a failure to cast iron weapons. Denouncing both the historical 
inaccuracy and the absurdity of this notion, Rozat pointed to maize agriculture as a 
paradigmatic example of pre-Columbian technology. Yet he took great care to 
stress that this is not a "technology" in the modern European sense of the term, 
that is, in the sense of dominating, exploiting or enslaving Nature in the service of 
Man. In the geographic area known as Mesoamerica, covering Southern Mexico 
and Central America, maize had been cultivated for millennia according to the 
principles of the milpa, a method of mixed cropping that operates cyclically with 
minimum labour and input requirements. Yet in order to understand the technical 
sophistication of pre-Columbian maize agriculture, it was necessary to challenge 
the capitalist framework of "the Western redeemer." As Rozat explained:  
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Maize is a Mesoamerican “invention,” everybody knows this very well, in the sense 
that it does not appear spontaneously in nature and human care is needed so that 
the ridiculously small wild grass [teosinte] can turn into that biological monster that 
is the corn on the cob. Thus, while the pre-Columbians achieved this invention as 
a kind of “social security” plant, the problem for these communities – who certainly 
did not participate in the curse of labor, presented itself thus: we need a plant that 
requires little labor (both in land preparation and throughout growing), that gives 
high yield, that can adapt to many climates and every kind of soil and, finally, that 
produces a fruit that can be stored for a long time and be prepared in various 
ways. The result of their centuries-long investigation is maize, a plant that then and 
now has demonstrated its extraordinary capacity to adapt to every soil and latitude; 
endowed with a multi-factor plasticity which has permitted nearly every local 
community –from Nicaragua to Labrador – to possess its own varieties of maize 
adapted to their own climatological and soil conditions (294). 
 
What is striking about Rozat's argument is that the survival of indigenous 
peoples after the European invasion was made possible by a technically 
successful refusal of the “curse of labour.” American food writer Betty Fussell has 
made a very similar point in her study of the English translation of maize into 
"corn." In the colonial world "corn" signified grain of all kinds, including grains of 
salt as in “corned beef” (Fussell, "Translating Maize into Corn" 42). According to 
Fussell, such a translation carried with it the mindset of British colonizers, for 
whom agriculture was about the exploitation of the land for the maximization of 
profit. Judging what they saw as insufficient exploitation of the land, colonizers 
decided to take over indigenous territory. Once in possession of it, they harnessed 
indigenous labor in order to produce and exchange "corn" in the market according 
to principles of abstract equivalence. Fussell suggests that it was the Western 
understanding of agriculture as “a closed and fixed system” governed by principles 
of abstract equivalence that led colonizers to misunderstand indigenous 
agriculture. Pre-Columbian techniques such as slash-and-burn, inter-cropping and 
crop-rotating methods were dismissed because agriculture was thought to be 
“planting fields with crops to feed flocks to supply fields with manure for more 
crops” (54). Such techniques were designed to foster the subsistence of small 
communities rather than the growth of profit. They were premised on on 
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adaptation to a dynamic, open-ended ecological environment, including 
unpredictable weather and multiple forms of nonhuman life. Whereas the capitalist 
mindset prevails in the contemporary assessment of small-scale agriculture 
(including the Mesoamerican milpa) as less technological than industrial 
agriculture, it was in fact the technological sophistication of pre-Columbian 
agricultural methods that allowed indigenous and mestizo majorities to survive 
centuries of colonial and neo-colonial capitalism in Mexico. Biotechnical practices 
such as milpa agriculture gave Mesoamerican societies and their colonized 
descendants healthy and diverse diets, especially compared to the diet of most 
Europeans of the early modern period. Since such societies could actually boast 
thousands of vegetable and animal species in their culinary repertoire, it seems 
significant today that they accorded maize such a privileged role in their symbolic 
organization.  
Starting with the representational work of the Olmecas, a civilization that 
flourished between 1500 BC and 300 BC alongside the Gulf of Mexico, maize 
acquired three characteristic functions that would endure throughout successive 
Mesoamerican cultures: maize symbolized fertility and the substance of human 
beings; it articulated human beings and the cosmos, and it gave symbolic 
legitimation to political power (Florescano 36). The Mayan saga Popol Vuh 
famously recounts that the gods first tried to create human beings with wood and 
soil, yet the creatures resulting from those experiments could not think or feel, that 
is, they could not remember their creators. For this reason they were destroyed, 
and human beings were only born when the gods, after patient and careful 
deliberation, decided to use maize to make their flesh and blood. Divine creators, 
including the god of maize, were depicted as adult men and women related to 
each other in heterosexual lines of kinship (Florescano). According to early 
colonial records, it was the Aztec god Cintéotl who generated the different crops 
out of his (human) body parts, with maize growing out of his nails (López-Austin). 
However, it was a Promethean-like figure named Quetzalcóatl who took maize as 
a gift for human beings, so that they could survive and flourish through its 
cultivation. The harvest of maize cobs was understood as a beheading of Cintéotl, 
whose life, like that of maize, was governed by cyclical death and resurrection. A 
historian enthusiastic about food culture in contemporary Mexico, Jeffrey Pilcher 
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has described the Aztec practice that horrified the Spaniards when they first 
arrived to Mesoamerica in the 16th century in somewhat romantic terms: 
 
(…) before farmers could cultivate maize, priests had to fertilize the soil with 
sacrificial victims. The flesh of young warriors revitalized the fields and their free-
flowing blood assured steady rains. [Obviously, people] did not see this 
relationship in scientific terms of decomposing bodies providing nutrients to the soil 
(…) [rather, t]heir perception was much more direct: corn really was "our 
sustenance, our flesh.” They called babies “maize blossoms,” young girls were 
“tender green ears,” and a warrior in his prime represented “Lord Corn Cob” (Que 
Vivan 17). 
 
It seems pertinent to introduce here some kind of a prophylactic against a 
potential romanticization of pre-Columbian societies, which I detect in Pilcher's 
description of human sacrifice. Such an extreme identification between 
Mesoamerican human beings and maize surely made sense in the context of that 
particular cosmogony. Whereas Pilcher focuses on the "tender" aspects of the 
cosmogony, one need not forget that at the time of the Aztecs, the symbolic 
appropriation of maize by the ruling classes was in the service of their imperial war 
and its accompanying territorial expansion. It was no accident that the cob, the 
most popular figure for representing the god of maize, had lent its shape to both 
agricultural tools and weapons of war. Aztec warriors and priests based their 
theocratic hegemony on claiming privileged access to the highest virtue of the god 
of maize, namely, that of resurrection. Maize agriculture, in other words, was 
always already a technical and political phenomenon, rather than something that 
existed in a pure or uncontaminated state of cultural purity.2 To say this is not just 
to raise a merely factual point with regard to the ancient societies. Rather, this 
statement forms a central part of the argument I want to make in relation to the 
contemporary defense of maize. In due course I shall explain how I understand the 
technicity and politicality of maize agriculture in terms of "genetic contamination." 
For the time being it seems enough to observe that Pilcher's professional 
                                                
2 I do not mean by this that Western concepts of politics and technology should be applied in 
retrospective to Mesoamerican societies. I want to claim precisely the opposite: we should be 
careful not to assume that the separation between the cultural, the technical and the political which 
came to dominate Western modernity (including Mexican modernity via American neo-colonialism) 
is also applicable to ancient Mesoamerican societies.  
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enthusiasm about Mexican food3 leads him at times to establish romantic 
continuities between Aztec practices and contemporary maize nationalism, in a 
gesture that construes both the Aztec past and Mexican modernity in a rather 
benign way. 
Even though the vast majority of contemporary Mexicans live in urban areas 
and do not directly participate in agriculture, many of them regard themselves as 
privileged heirs of maize. Since the plant does indeed remain a staple of the 
Mexican diet, we often hear is said about Mexicans that maize “provides the 
essence of their identity” (Pilcher, Que Vivan 11). In this chapter I explore the 
ethical and political problems behind using maize as such a signifier of human 
identity in general, and of national identity in particular. Nationalism, I argue, tends 
to construe unproblematic continuities between the plant's significance for 
Mesoamerican societies, the hegemonic role of maize in modern narratives of 
"national development" and contemporary "native maize" as a signifier of 
resistance to corporate biotechnology. If there is anything that can unify these 
contingent actualizations of the relationship between maize and human beings, it 
is perhaps the framing of maize as an object of dispute among particular human 
groups. Through my critical review of contemporary accounts of the link between 
maize and Mexican identity, I want to prepare the ground for the more general 
argument that there is an ethico-political promise in thinking both maize and 
Mexican identity otherwise, that is, as nothing but technical inventiveness in the 
face of death. In other words, I attempt to argue in different ways throughout this 
thesis that a recognition of the technical and political status (or what I call, in the 
last chapter, the "genetic contamination") of maize (agri)culture is indispensable to 
articulate the contemporary defense of "native maize" with a (bio)ethics of radical 
democracy. 
 
                                                
3 Pilcher's historical account of Mexico's food culture is titled Que vivan los tamales! ("Long live 
Mexican maize dumplings!")  
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The Place of Maize in Narratives of National Identity 
 
It will give me great pleasure to see the geneticists imprisoning your noble 
organs with cellophane papers.  
They will force you to be more generous.  
But even in the hands of scientists you are a troublesome and traitorous plant.  
Only science, with all of its power, is capable of chaining you a bit.  
And you will have to go back to being the slave of man. 
   (A Mexican poem, qted. in Pilcher, Que Vivan 114) 
 
Since the defeat of the Aztec empire by the Spaniards (1519-1521), 
throughout the colonial centuries of New Spain (1535-1821), and for most of 
Mexico's national history (1821-present), maize bore the stigma of defeat. As the 
European staple, wheat, became a sign of superior status in New Spain, maize 
remained the province of impoverished and increasingly racialized majorities. 
Wheat farms employing forced indigneous labour served as the foundation for 
colonial usurpation of indigenous lands in Mesoamerica. The evangelization of 
indigenous peoples by Catholic missionaries included constant encouragment to 
replace maize with wheat, the only authorized grain for the Holy Communion. After 
the first colonial century, 9 out of every 10 people in New Spain had died due to 
the negative impact of the conquest on the indigenous population's capacity to 
produce their own food (Esteva, Marielle and Galicia 19). Yet against the odds, 
maize agriculture survived. By contrast with European wheat agriculture and 
European stockbreeding, maize did not require complex equipment or too much 
space for cultivation and consumption (Warman 20). The colonized were able to 
keep themselves and maize alive because the technical legacy of pre-Columbian 
agriculture was based on adaptation to the changing, and for the most part 
adverse, ecological conditions.  
Following Independence from Spain in 1821, Mexican Creole elites defined 
national culture in strictly European terms. All maize products were excluded from 
the national cuisine, reflecting the continuing exclusion of the lower classes from 
citizenship, particularly those of indigenous descent. Such an association of maize 
with racialized poverty was rearticulated, towards the end of the 19th century, in 
response to the troubling developments in the European scientific discourse. 
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Against Social Darwinism, which postulated a biological inferiority of non-
European populations, nationalist intellectuals argued that the real cause of 
Mexican “backwardness” was nutritional rather than hereditary, and that it was 
located in the population's consumption of maize (Pilcher, Que Vivan 78). Taking 
heed of these ideas, dictator Porfirio Díaz (1876-1911) launched a series of 
campaigns to educate poor women about the importance, for national progress, of 
eating wheat bread instead of maize tortillas. Thus maize became a target for 
modern state biopolitics, a scientifically oriented regime that seeks to exert “(...) a 
positive influence on life, that endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, 
subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations” (qtd. in Thacker 
23). The biopolitical attempt to replace maize with wheat lasted well beyond the 
Mexican Revolution (1910-1920), a bloody civil war that put an end to Díaz's 
regime. The winning factions of this war set out to rebuild the Mexican nation 
around a cultural politics called "revolutionary nationalism." Revolutionary elites 
used cultural nationalism as a way to create consensus around an imperative to 
modernize through industrialization and urbanization, neither of which could be 
achieved if the vast majority of the people lived and worked in small, isolated 
communities.  
Mexican historian Guillermo Palacios recounts that post-revolutionary elites 
insisted from the beginning that rural inhabitants must produce for urban markets 
and not for local consumption. Their initial project was to create, by means of rural 
education, a new class of entrepreneurial farmers who would assimilate the new 
technical knowledge and the behavior appropriate to contemporary economies 
(Palacios 321). Urban educationalists went out to the countryside in order to teach 
rural peoples the Spanish language and the consumption of wheat bread, on the 
assumption that “our customs and lifestyle (...) are unquestionably superior to 
theirs” (Pilcher Que Vivan 91). At the same time, a new class of professional 
agronomists learned to apply genetics and chemistry to produce high-yield 
varieties of maize, fertilizers and pesticides (Esteva, "Hosting the Otherness"). Yet, 
given the state's privileging of large-scale, intensive agriculture, both rural teachers 
and agronomists failed to accomplish their initial project of producing a mass of 
entrepreneurial farmers. Most rural dwellers ended up migrating to the cities in 
order to engage in waged labor. In time, as Mexican society became increasingly 
urban and consumer-oriented in the mid-twentieth century, it became imperative 
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that the state should reallocate the symbolic emphasis it originally gave to the 
countryside (Joseph, Rubinstein and Zolov 11). It was in the context of this 
transformation that maize was welcomed by nationalism. Whereas for centuries a 
tiny elite of Creoles and European immigrants had judged the rural life of the 
majorities as barbaric and "Indian,'" working class Mexicans of the post-
revolutionary era would finally boast about urban modernity and embrace, at the 
same time, a rural culture that had been conveniently mesticized and 
mainstreamed (11). In his fascinating examination of this phenomenon, Pilcher 
recounts: 
 
[t]amales and other antojitos, once deemed fit only for the “lower orders,” provided 
the subject for entire volumes. [Authors] recognized indigenous contributions in the 
name mole, which came from the Nahua “molli,” meaning sauce, rather than the 
Spanish “moler,” to grind. Maize also lost the former stigma of its Indian origins 
and came to be seen as the most civilized of the world’s grains because its tough 
outer husk allowed it to reproduce only with human assistance. In the early 1950s, 
one newspaper announced the end of antagonisms between corn and wheat, 
explaining that sociologists no longer considered the European grain essential to 
Mexico’s development. A leading nutritionist, Alfredo Ramos Espinosa, formulated 
the simple equation that people who ate only corn were Indians, those who only 
ate wheat were Spaniards, while Mexicans were fortunate enough to eat both 
grains (Que Vivan 131). 
 
The emergence of "Mexican cuisine" in the twentieth century seems 
indissociable from the biopolitical project of industrial capitalism, which required 
the production of urban subjectivities positioned in a particular way in relation to a 
rural "past." As Pilcher points out, cultural nationalism was “a means of 
transforming elements of lower class and ethnic culture into symbols of unity for an 
authoritarian regime” (Que Vivan 124). A very similar point was made by Mexican 
sociologist Roger Bartra, who was perhaps the first to critically examine the 
ideological role of the nostalgic myths of peasant heroes and of "lost" paradisiacal 
countrysides that proliferated in the writings of post-revolutionary intellectuals. He 
argued that a construction of peasants as melancholic beings in fact supported the 
normalization of a society subjected to brutal processes of modernization. What 
makes Bartra's work especially relevant for my argument is that he focused on 
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Mexican agrarian myths as embedded in “a modern network of cultural and 
political mediations” (19). In order to intervene critically in this network, Bartra 
organized his study, titled The Cage of Melancholy, around the peculiar figure of 
the axolotl, an amphibian endemic to the lakes surrounding Mexico City. Taking as 
his starting point an anthropological understanding of modernity, he proposed to 
emulate the techniques of the “savage mind” described by Lévi-Strauss in order to 
understand, in an ironic way, the biological properties of the axolotl “as signs, as a 
message that is transmitted to Mexicans in order to instruct them on their 
condition, their origin, and their future” (8).   
In The Country and the City, Raymond Williams proposed to understand the 
age-old contrast between the country and the city in terms of a “structure of 
feeling,” which, depending on the perspective adopted within a specific context, 
conveys a particular kind of “reaction to the fact of change” (48). Melancholy, 
Bartra argued, could only arise from an urban experience of solitude, that of the 
post-revolutionary intellectual, who then projected the sentiment onto rural 
inhabitants.4 While the literary corpus of an urban elite might seem too narrow 
today as a window into the cultural politics of the Mexican nation, it is worth 
remembering that at a time still dominated by a reductionist kind of political 
economy, Bartra's work was innovative in taking seriously the role of cultural 
narratives in creating hegemony, or political consensus, around an oppressive 
regime. According to Bartra’s reading of post-revolutionary literature, the 
intellectual's gaze fixed the peasant as an apathetic or melancholic being, one 
belonging to the past (Cage of Melancholy 49-50). Since this was a past “in which 
present and past are confused in order to exclude the future” (18), Bartra's 
argument suggests that the postrevolutionary reaction to the fact of change was a 
highly conservative one. Yet for Bartra what is really at stake in any figuration of 
national identity (including his own axolotl metaphor) is not how people are, but 
how they are dominated. He writes: "…the Mexican character is an artificial 
entelechy. It exists principally in the books and speeches that describe or exalt it, 
and it is possible to find there traces of the original: a powerful nationalist will 
bound to the unification and institutionalization of the capitalist state" (3). 
                                                
4 Bartra explains: “(...) the modern form of solitude is generalized as a feeling of isolation with 
respect to the Other. Given this feeling, the suffering caused by solitude is frequently transferred to 
the Other: the solitude of neighbors, of peasants, of the savages of the Third World” (Bartra R., 
Cage of Melancholy 38). 
 32 
Among the characteristics of the axolotl that Bartra uses as metaphors of 
post-revolutionary subjectivity, he foregrounds its “mysterious dual nature 
(larval/salamander) and its repressed potential for metamorphosis” (7). Through a 
series of humourous vignettes featuring the axolotl and interspersed with literary 
analyses of “the Mexican character,” Bartra argues that the post-revolutionary 
“structure of feeling” is thoroughly modern, in the sense that it is construed as a 
tension between “the dynamic, active subject, involving the idea of metamorphosis 
and change, the notion of the questioning Self” on the one hand and “the passive 
and hidden Other, the melancholy and static object” on the other (9). Yet what this 
"repressed potential for metamorphosis" is ultimately about in Bartra's playful mix 
of sociology and literature is the unification and institutionalization of a capitalist 
state.  
Scholars working more recently in the tradition of cultural studies (Joseph, 
Rubinstein and Zolov) have avoided reducing cultural artifacts to mere ideology in 
the service of capitalism, and have looked instead for a subversive potential in the 
popular appropriation of such artifacts. Since the 1980s, social and cultural 
research has tried to understand commodification by addressing the social 
relations, assumptions and struggles related to meaning and power that create a 
situation in which a thing is or is not treated as a commodity (Joseph, Rubinstein 
and Zolov 49). Today, a critical cultural history would involve showing how 
capitalist hegemony is currently “shaped, resisted, and ultimately negotiated by a 
multitude of actors and interests,” and how “lo mexicano [comes] to serve 
counterhegemonic impulses as well as regime projects” (Joseph, Rubinstein and 
Zolov 8). In this spirit, Pilcher concludes his own history of Mexican food with an 
assertion that the nationalist celebration of maize “owed as much to capitalist 
development as to a search for lo mexicano” (Que Vivan 133). By contrast, 
anthropologists Lind and Barham recently analyzed the social history of the maize 
tortilla with the purpose of exemplifying that the struggle for meaning plays a 
primary role in commodification processes.  
By dividing the social history of maize tortillas into four distinct “epochs,” 
Lind and Barham seek to bring “a finer degree of analysis to the question of how 
everyday food practices connect us to broader market-oriented assumptions about 
living in society” (48). Drawing on Margaret Radin's work on commodification, Lind 
and Barham understand commodification as a “worldview” that depends on the 
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degree to which the monetary principle of abstract equivalence has come to 
dominate the more complex social processes (49-50). For commodification to 
become a “worldview” it must first cross “a threshold or sacred boundary” imposed 
by “the human perception that certain aspects of our lived experience should be 
set apart and protected” from it (51). Food often embodies such a sacred 
boundary because, as Lind and Barham explain, it “is itself a powerful metaphor 
that blurs the boundaries between ‘things’ and persons, linking nature, human 
survival, health, culture and livelihood” (51). The first epoch in Lind and Barham's 
social history of the tortilla is described as a cultural situation in which the role of 
woman is that of “a gatekeeper to the inside meanings of culture, the family, the 
home, and the meal” (54). In this setting, the preparation of tortillas begins with 
maize kernels typically grown and harvested by men. Once at home, the kernels 
are nixtamalized5 and ground by women on a three-legged metate, or grinding 
stone. The resulting dough is then shaped by hand into flat disks that are cooked 
for less than a minute on each side on a comal, or griddle, placed over three 
stones encircling the fire. Each time a woman kneels in front of the metate to work 
the nixtamal, she is said to reenact a cosmogonic story. The three stones of the 
comal symbolize the “three hearthstones of creation” placed by the Mesoamerican 
gods on the center of the earth, while maize dough is called by its indigenous 
names which signify “our flesh” – hence Lind and Barham's understanding that 
“maize and the people who consume it are joined in one continuum of divine 
creation” (53).  
In the second epoch, Europeans invade Mesoamerica and subject the 
people's flesh to commodification processes. Progressively assimilated into the 
political economy of colonialism, maize becomes the food of the world's poor. 
Wherever it goes it is given new names, often reflecting the attitudes “of fungibility 
and commensurability” with which Europeans approached the newly discovered 
grain (54). After centuries of localized resistance to the commodification processes 
                                                
5 The nixtamalization of maize kernels is a Mesoamerican technique that consists in boiling the 
kernels in an alkaline solution (usually limewater) prior to their grinding. Since the technique makes 
available the amino acids that raw maize lacks (niacin, tryptophan, and lysine), Mesoamerican 
peoples never developed nutritional diseases, such as pellagra, associated with high consumption 
of maize in other contexts. In combination with beans and chilli, nixtamalized maize provided a 
complete, high-quality dietary basis that protected Mesoamerican people from malnutrition up until 
the arrival of industrial food, which has resulted in a much publicized epidemic of obesity and 
diabetes among the Mexican population.   
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imposed by European colonialism, the third epoch inaugurates a new kind of 
“sacredness” for maize. That is, in this epoch maize is longer just the food of the 
poor; rather, it is a symbol of modern national identity under a capitalist regime. 
According to Lind and Barham, welfare policies implemented after the Mexican 
Revolution (1910-1921) reinforced the idea that maize was somehow special and 
even incommensurable with the other food commodities. In order to negotiate with 
the new urban populations, the post-revolutionary Mexican state embraced maize 
as a protected agricultural product and a subsidized urban consumer item 
(Ochoa).6 It offered price supports and marketing assistance to maize farmers as a 
way of encouraging them to supply urban consumers.7 Alongside the traditional 
gender roles associated with maize agriculture, the pre-Columbian “sacredness” of 
maize was largely transferred from the stone and hearth of the peasant household 
to the link between urban populations and their modern rulers (Lind and Barham 
55). Both a network of small tortilla factories and a large industry of maize 
products developed under the aegis of welfare programs that subsidized maize. 
The first large, state-owned factories were established in 1949 as Molinos Azteca 
(Maseca) and Maíz Industrializado (Minsa). They collaborated for more than a 
decade until they arrived at a maize-based flour that could be transformed into 
dough with just the addition of water (Pilcher, "Taco Bell" 72). By the 1970s, 
Maseca flour accounted for 5% of the maize consumed in Mexico. Sales grew 
steadily over the next two decades until Maseca alone held 27% of the national 
market, yet the subsidy on maize supplied to small-scale tortillerías slowed the 
firm's expansion (72).  
A third epoch started when Mexico defaulted on its external debt in 1982 
and joined the global turn to neoliberalism.8 As a consequence of the debt crisis, 
                                                
6 Ochoa examines the rise and fall of government intervention in the economy of basic foods in 
Mexico, which lasted from the 1930s to the 1980s and included subsidies for farmers, a chain of 
over 20,000 retail stores and numerous food processing plants to stock the stores with low-cost 
foods. These state interventions were not ad hoc, Ochoa argues, but were closely intertwined with 
political, social, and economic goals, which were internally contradictory (1). 
7 The Mexican government also owned factories to process and sell basic foods such as sugar and 
cooking oil. In the final stage of this integration, just prior to the debt crisis of 1982, the Mexican 
government introduced CONASUPO, a system of local shops in poor areas (Friedmann 44). 
8 Harriet Friedmann explains that the debt crisis started with a grain deal between the US and the 
Soviet Union which removed so much food from world markets that prices tripled between 1972 
and 1974. The resulting “food crisis” coincided with the tripling of oil prices. Western banks that 
wanted to capitalize on the profits made by oil-exporting countries pressed Third World countries to 
borrow that money regardless of how they would use it or of the likelihood of repayment. Governing 
elites of such nations took the money as a way to avoid dealing with structural economic issues, 
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the Mexican state withdrew much of its support for small and medium-scale 
agriculture. Social programs started distributing small amounts of cash instead of 
maize, and the government sold the parastatal company Minsa to Maseca. 
Roberto González Barrera, owner of Maseca-Gruma who was locally known as 
“the tortilla king,” became the world's leading producer of maize flour and a Forbes 
billionaire. When in 1999 the subsidies were finally eliminated, small-scale maize 
producers were unable to compete with the large producers. Large producers 
quickly cornered an estimated 80% of the domestic tortilla market, three quarters 
of which were claimed by Maseca (Pilcher, "Taco Bell" 72). It is precisely in the 
context of a globalizing capitalist hegemony that Lind and Barham ask us to 
situate the contemporary valorization of traditional foods, particularly the aspects 
of them that are considered “sacred.” Their own position, however, is not so much 
about dogmatically re-asserting the “sacredness” of Mesoamerican maize culture 
as it is about asking how contemporary struggles for the meaning of maize culture 
can contest its all-pervasive commodification. Their concluding example, however, 
suggests to me that there can hardly be a straightforward answer to such a 
question. 
In February 2001, Mission Foods, a division of Maseca-Gruma and the 
largest tortilla manufacturer in the US, partnered with Disneyland to build an 
“authentic tortilla factory attraction.” As Lind and Barham describe it, the 
attraction's tour started with the ancient Mayans and their “primitive stone ground 
methods” and led straight to the modern techniques that rely on industrial corn 
flour. Visitors were shown an actual tortilla production line, at the end of which they 
were invited to sample fresh tortillas from the conveyor belt (57). While 
industrialized ready-made foods might be attractive in the context of urban time 
constraints, they move us one step closer to commodification as worldview (57).9 
For Lind and Barham, the problem with this worldview is that it ignores “the social, 
economic and cultural contexts in which Mexicans exist” (56). For instance, the 
majority of tomato workers in Mexico cannot afford to buy the fruit they pick and 
pack for US and Canadian markets. They cannot produce their own food either. 
                                                                                                                                              
such as low productivity. In 1982, less than ten years after the food and oil crises, Mexico defaulted 
on its loan payment and Mexico's debt crisis was officially on (45). 
9 Wraps are the modern descendants of the tortilla and are made of wheat flour, which is more 
popular outside Mexico because it lends itself better to additives and flavors such as tomato basil, 
pesto garlic, blueberry, and so forth. They can be stuffed with anything and thus live up to the 
standards of the global social order, namely: versatility and convenience.  
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Moreover, they increasingly face the world as individual competitors for low-paid 
jobs. Women can be hired more cheaply than men, and young people more 
cheaply than women. Labor organization is undermined and everyone's economic 
wellbeing is deteriorated (Friedmann 52). While this is clearly a problem of political 
economy, the status of commodification as a worldview indicates that such a 
problem has a cultural dimension which must be addressed, and this is where my 
own question comes in: will a renewed cultural nationalism be able to contest, 
effectively and radically, the unrelenting ideological expansion of neoliberal 
capitalism?  
Pilcher concludes his cultural history of Mexican food by suggesting that 
modern maize nationalism meant that popular sectors of Mexican society had 
finally achieved their place in the national culture (Que Vivan 133). In a more 
recent article, however, he condemns the international valorization of “peasant 
cuisines” as a “postmodern apocalypse,” and calls into question the reasons why 
Mexico has done so well through the Slow Food movement ("Taco Bell" 77).10 
Founded in Italy in 1986 as an ecogastronomic crusade against the global rise of 
fast food, Slow Food supports projects in which private organizations and 
independent scientists help small farmers create brands for artisanal products. By 
reviving the prestige of artisanal techniques of local food production through 
technoscientific "certification" and branding, Slow Food helps indigenous subjects 
position themselves in regional and international markets. In Pilcher's view, Slow 
Food instrumentalizes the Western logic of fascination with the native, that is, a 
logic of consumption of an exoticized and folklorized “other.”11 The logic in 
question would divert Mexican popular struggles towards “middle-class agendas 
with little relevance to the needs of common people” (75).  
Even though the logic of exoticization and folklorization of the countryside 
was already at work in Mexican revolutionary nationalism, Pilcher's judgment of 
the Slow Food phenomenon is far more severe and pessimistic. His earlier work 
                                                
10 In the first four years, Mexicans received five out of fifty nominations, worth €3,500 each, and 
three out of twenty jury prizes, providing an additional €7,500. The first prize, in 2000, went to Raúl 
Manuel Antonio, from Rancho Grande, Oaxaca, for establishing an indigenous vanilla-growing 
cooperative to supplement the incomes of small coffee producers. In 2003, the jury honored 
historian José Iturriaga de la Fuente for organizaing a fifty-four-volume series documenting 
Mexico's regional and indigenous cuisines (Pilcher, "Taco Bell" 75). 
11 With a touch of contempt, Pilcher says that “it is unclear how much of [Slow Food's] attention is 
due to [Mexico's] rich culinary heritage and how much to the Zapatista rebellion in Chiapas”, since 
“stylish, balaclava-clad guerrillas held particular fascination for the Italian left” ("Taco Bell" 75). 
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had bent towards emphasizing the role of popular agency within a capitalist 
regime, while his more recent essay on the “postmodern apocalypse” of peasant 
cuisines concludes rather categorically that “the fate of the tortilla resulted more 
from questions of political economy than of consumer choice” (Pilcher, "Taco Bell" 
71). Yet Pilcher's initial vindication of Mexican food nationalism was based 
precisely in the power of urban consumption to generate cultural valorization as 
well as political hegemony and, from that particular point of view, the role of 
contemporary organizations such as Slow Food is arguably more ambiguous than 
Pilcher seems willing to consider. Without downplaying the ideological aspects of 
the "gastronomification" of peasant cuisines, in Chapter IV of this thesis I pay 
attention to how a particular section of the Mexican defense of maize has 
attempted to harness the growing popularity of artisanal food production in order to 
gain support for its cause from cultural organizations such as UNESCO. In my 
analysis of this phenomenon, I take heed of Richard Wilk's caution against 
describing food culture through linear narratives leading up to a single point in the 
present ("From Wild Weeds" 18), that is, to capitalism conceived as a single 
monolithic system.  
The global spread of corporate capitalism has drawn attention to the fact 
that food production and consumption everywhere are linked to imaginaries of 
place and tradition that must now negotiate with the technoscientific discourse. For 
example, a 2007 special issue of American Anthropologist focused specifically on 
how the discursive opposition between technoscience and artisanal know-how 
mediates food production and consumption in paradoxical ways. A number of case 
studies –including American foie gras, French cheeses and Georgian beer – 
illustrate the widespread tendency to oppose local or "traditional" ingredients and 
techniques on the one hand, and technoscientific "risk control" and "food safety" 
measurements for mass-produced food commodities on the other. What 
contributors to the special issue of American Anthropologist highlight, however, is 
the fact that most artisanal foods are in fact deeply imbricated in global industrial 
production processes, including technoscientific testing for risks and safety (Heath 
and Meneley 594). In the case of American foie gras, artisanal producers even 
invoke technoscientific discourses to defend their techniques from the accusations 
of animal rights activists. They insist that force-feeding is “safe” for geese because 
such animals have a physiological capacity to fatten their own livers in preparation 
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for migration. While industrial producers could well endorse the same argument, 
artisanal producers have succeeded in differentiating themselves from the industry 
by invoking culture, locality and sustainability. Through a combination of cultural 
and technoscientific arguments, they have attracted a level of consumer support 
that surpasses the popularity of animal rights activists (594). This and other 
examples show that the deployment of tradition and identity can be deeply 
imbricated in processes of globalization and industrial standardization (596).12 
Therefore, rather than uncritically re-position revolutionary nationalism as a 
genuine alternative to global capitalism, in this thesis I want to think about how 
technoscientific "mutations" within the national imaginary might open (necessarily 
ambiguous) opportunities for cultural struggle. In the world of technoscience, as 
Wilk points out, people usually do find “ways to decommodify food, to make it 
personal, meaningful, cultural, and social” (20). To recognize such a fact need not 
render us blind to the paradoxical ways in which the very acts that decommodify -
for instance, “identifying a food as part of an inalienable heritage” -re-commodify it 
for “high-end gourmets and cultural theorists” (20).  
What kind of approach would be useful in order to understand the complex 
imbrication of the defense of Mexican maize with technoscientific globalization? 
Even though the institutionalization of cultural studies has come to be regarded by 
its critics as complicit with the triumph of capitalism, Jeremy Gilbert has argued 
that cultural studies remains informed “by a resolutely political critique of 
capitalism, individualism, patriarchy, colonialism and hierarchy in general” 
(Anticapitalism 66).13 Among the various trends in cultural studies that Gilbert 
considers in his book Anticapitalism and Culture, I am most interested in anti-
essentialism, which he defines as a position that "refuses to acknowledge any 
essential absolute, final, objective reality to social and political identities” (51). As 
                                                
12 As an instance of the modernizing drive that capitalism installs in “peripheral” countries, the 
branding of beer in post-socialist Georgia uses traditional landscapes as a symbolic legitimation for 
the use of technoscience at the level of production. In the case of olive oil, while current regulations 
of the International Olive Oil Council mandate specific technoscientific standards for grading an oil 
as “extra virgin,” artisanal techniques are more than ever invoked as markers of distinction of a 
high-status commodity (Heath and Meneley 599).  
13 Cultural studies, Gilbert reminds us, was born from the British New Left's attempt to understand 
the political aftermath of 1968. While the new social movements eventually succeeded in 
challenging cultural hierarchies, global capitalism proved better than the traditional Left at 
accomodating their pluralist demands. As a result, such demands were transmogrified into a cult of 
individualism that remains hegemonic today. In the British context, early practitioners of cultural 
studies tried to understand the electoral triumph of Margaret Thatcher in terms of the Left's failure 
to move beyond their exclusive emphasis on class-based identity.  
 39 
Gilbert explains, anti-essentialism was decisive for cultural studies to transform 
militant ideology critique into more nuanced forms of cultural analysis, including a 
theorization of agency in the realm of popular culture. More precisely, the legacies 
of anti-essentialism were “an unwillingness to oversimplify, to assume that power 
relationships operate across simple binary divides” and an “attentiveness to 
complexity as an important dimension of any effective political analysis” (138). It 
seems to me that the question of whether a renewed cultural nationalism would be 
able to contest, effectively and radically, the unrelenting expansion of neoliberal 
capitalism calls for a more profound interrogation of the complex workings of 
maize-based nationalism. By taking account of the multidirectionality of power 
relations and of the subversive potentials in consumer pleasures, cultural studies 
also develops a critical force that will hopefully be capable of interrogating the 
different forms of violence at work in consumerist definitions of nationhood.  
 
The Nation in Political Economy: A Cultural Problematic? 
 
To reveal the original meaning of an act (...) is to reveal the moment of its radical 
contingency – in other words, to reinsert it in the system of real historic options that 
were discarded (...) (Laclau, New Reflections 34). 
 
According to cultural historian Arthur Schmidtt, there are two dominant 
interpretations of Mexico's trajectory from the economic model of import-
substitution industrialization (1940-1982) to neoliberalism (1982-present) (25). The 
“Revolution to Evolution” interpretation derives from the ideological legacy of the 
Mexican Revolution coupled with the post-World War II development policies 
coming from the United States. Such policies were part of a strategy launched by 
the US in the process of consolidating its global hegemony. The henceforth called 
"developing world"14 was merely a means for expanding and deepening markets 
for US products, for the investment of its surplus capital, and for securing its 
access to cheap raw materials. Given their fear of Soviet expansion, anticolonial 
struggles in Asia and Africa, and growing nationalisms in Latin America, American 
                                                
14 Only since the 1950s have the free industrialized nations, the Communist industrialized nations, 
and the poor, nonindustrialized nations, constituted the “First,” “Second,” and “Third World” 
respectively. After the demise of the Second, the notions of First and Third worlds continued to 
articulate the dominant regime of geopolitical representation (Escobar, Encountering Development 
31). 
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economists described the Mexican experience as “a preferred solution for the 
hemispheric problem of change and development” which “had much to offer the 
world” (25). The whole world's faith in Western science and technology as a 
means of economic progress also played a role in shaping "development" as a 
friendly face of US capitalist expansion. Thus, the dominant “Revolution to 
Evolution” narrative emphasized Mexico's political stability and material progress, 
as well as the new patterns of friendship and cooperation with U.S. administrations 
and social scientists during the Cold War.  
By the 1970s, an alternative “Revolution to Demolition” narrative had 
emerged which interpreted Mexico's “Golden Age” of capitalist development as a 
betrayal of revolutionary ideals. New cultural historians of the Mexican nation 
(Joseph, Rubinstein and Zolov) tend to agree with this “Revolution to Demolition” 
narrative, yet they try to rectify the latter's underestimation of popular agency 
within capitalism – for instance, through “consumer choice.” An important source 
of my own approach to food nationalism in Mexico, Pilcher's work is ambiguously 
aligned with the project of new cultural historians. In order to eschew Pilcher's 
relapse into economic reductionism and moralistic condemnation of contemporary 
cultural consumption (which leads him to uncritically vindicate earlier forms 
Mexican nationalism), I want to construct a more nuanced account of the 
imbrication of the Mexican defense of maize, international political economy and 
the cultural legacy of European colonialism. Here I follow the road cleared by 
Arturo Escobar, who has argued that it is necessary to approach political economy 
not as an objective domain of facts but rather as a “socially constructed” domain 
that can be both analyzed and transformed. In his important book Encountering 
Development Escobar investigates “development” as a domain of thought and 
action created by the modern framework informing development studies, policies 
and practices, with the aim of understanding why 
 
…so many countries started to see themselves as underdeveloped in the early 
post-World War II period, how ”to develop” became a fundamental problem for 
them, and how, finally, they embarked upon the task of ”un-underdeveloping” 
themselves by subjecting their societies to increasingly systematic, detailed, and 
comprehensive interventions (6). 
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In order to theorize "development" as a domain of thought and action, 
Escobar draws on Foucault's theory of biopolitics, according to which “populations” 
emerged in 19th-century discourse as biological entities in need of scientific 
management. Such an epistemic event also marked the emergence of “the social” 
as a new domain that included “the poor” in a special category or class. In order to 
examine the racializing workings of development, Escobar draws on Edward 
Said's (Foucauldian) theory of orientalism, according to which the scopic regime of 
modernity framed non-Western societies in 19th century exhibitions as a particular 
kind of spectacle. In biopolitical and orientalist fashion, post-war development 
discourse framed the “Third World” as “usually dark and lacking in historical 
agency, as if waiting for the (white) Western hand to help subjects along and not 
infrequently hungry, illiterate, needy, and oppressed by its own stubborness, lack 
of initiative, and traditions” (8). In this regard, it is interesting to note that several 
decades before World War II, the Mexican revolutionary gaze had already 
"discovered" peasants and decided their fate. Indeed, the modernizing project that 
started before the ascent of U.S.-led developmentalism already suggests the 
discursive continuities between the modern history of biopolitics and orientalism 
and the economic paradigms that would come to dominate Mexican development 
after World War II. 
It was specifically during the political and ideological consolidation of the 
Mexican postrevolutionary regime (1921-1940) that the peasantry came to be 
constructed as a national problem, one of a primarily cultural nature that was to be 
tackled by rural education. In his analysis of El Maestro Rural [The Rural Teacher], 
a magazine edited by the Ministry of Public Education (SEP), Mexican historian 
Guillermo Palacios describes the construction of “the peasant problem” as the 
urbanites' discovery of a whole new universe of knowledge, and indeed a whole 
new way of looking at themselves. He writes: “It was as if there had been a 
sudden unfolding of 'national reality', a new dimension, as if the reflection of a 
double could be seen in the light of a recently discovered perspective” (321). Rural 
inhabitants came into clear focus only to be asked to learn “our customs and 
lifestyles, which are unquestionably superior to theirs” (Pilcher, Que Vivan 91). 
Apathy, passivity, ignorance and backwardness are only a few in a long list of rural 
sterotypes which are by no means exclusive to the Mexican context but which in 
fact reflect the biopolitical and orientalist legacy of modern Western colonialism. 
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As a set of theories, policies and practices, development would merely reinforce 
the revolutionary project to “map people into certain coordinates of control” not 
only to discipline them but more fundamentally in order “to transform the 
conditions under which they live into a productive, normalized social environment: 
in short, to create modernity” (Escobar, Encountering Development 156). Situating 
Mexican nationalism in this larger cultural (and, I dare say, philosophical) context 
can help us to avoid maintaining the simple oppositions between economy and 
culture, or the popular sectors and the middle classes. 
In The Revolutionary Imagination of the Americas, María José Saldaña-
Portillo demonstrates that Latin American revolutionary movements were 
“captured” by the discourse of development. Like Escobar, Saldaña-Portillo 
conceives such a discourse as a “regime of subjection” that re-articulated and re-
deployed the logics and structures of colonialism (21). In Saldaña-Portillo’s view, 
both developmentalism and revolutionary nationalism tried to push subaltern 
populations into modernity on the basis of “a theory of human perfectibility that 
was itself a legacy of the various raced and gendered subject formations 
animating colonialism” (7). In the Mexican case, post-revolutionary elites 
formulated the “Indian problem” on the basis of the assumption that "Indians" were 
incapable of generating modernity by themselves (210). Only mestizos, or 
Mexicans of “mixed blood,” could construct a modern nation-state by harnessing 
indigenous labour and redirecting its energies against a “pure-blooded foreign 
class” (paradoxically, the American friends of "development"). Mestizo nationalism 
aimed at the constitution of a homogeneous citizenry that would be “an agent of 
transformation in his own right, one who is highly ethical, mobile, progressive, risk 
taking, and masculinist, regardless of whether [it] is a man or a woman, an adult or 
a child” (Saldaña-Portillo 9). In other words, Mexican nationalism itself was already 
driven, at the discursive level, by “a particular rendition of fully modern masculinity 
as the basis for full citizenship in either a developed or a revolutionary society” 
(43). Since it incorporates an analysis of how gender and race are produced 
through economic narratives, Saldaña-Portillo's perspective seems to me much 
more sophisticated than Pilcher's moralistic condemnation of transnational middle-
classes. Moreover, Saldaña-Portillo’s analysis identifies the problem of domination 
in the constitution of nationalist subjectivity as such. I want to argue that it also 
allows us to construct a singular approach to current debates around maize 
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biotechnology in the context of the deeper articulations between revolutionary 
nationalism and global capitalism. 
In his cultural analysis of the Green Revolution, Escobar emphasizes the 
role of assumptions regarding science, progress and the economy, as well as the 
authorial stances of “a father/savior talking with selfless condescension to a 
child/native” (Encountering Development 159). As part the of the American global 
“war on poverty," the Green Revolution came to Mexico in order to increase 
agricultural production through the use of high-yield seeds in combination with 
chemical fertilizers and pesticides. Since the 1920s Mexican agronomists had 
been working on raising output in wheat farms, yet their research achieved only 
modest results before the arrival, in 1943, of a team of American scientists 
supported by the Rockefeller Foundation. Dr. Norman Borlaug, a graduate of the 
Iowa Agricultural College, developed hybrid wheat varieties resistant to stem rust, 
a parasite that had long plagued Mexican farmers. By crossing seeds gathered 
from several different countries, Bourlaug developed a highly resistant strain, 
Lerma Red, which alleviated stem rust but attracted other parasites, thus requiring 
heavier use of pesticides. Dr. Bourlaug asserted that “in provoking rapid economic 
and social changes (…) [the Green Revolution] was (…) displacing an attitude of 
despair and apathy that permeated the entire social fabric of these countries only 
a few years ago” (158). For this Nobel Peace Prize winner, anything outside the 
market economy, particularly activities of subsistence and local networks of 
reciprocity, were equivalent to a threat of engulfment and irrationality (159). As it 
actually turned out, whereas the Rockefeller Foundation and the World Bank 
declared the Green Revolution a success, in practice it caused a polarization 
between agricultural entrepreneurs, who were able to concentrate the most 
resources (irrigation, machinery, agrochemicals, improved seed), and the majority 
of small-scale, subsistence farmers, who were forced to migrate to the cities.  
In a sui generis account of the Green Revolution, Mexican activist and 
development critic Gustavo Esteva contextualizes the latter's failure to “host the 
otherness of the other” by placing it in a larger historical process of cultural 
colonization that explains why it was long before monoculture, agrochemicals, and 
mechanization that a “final sentence” was pronounced for Mexican peasants. In 
other words, Esteva understands the modern imperative to “develop” above all as 
an epistemic and cultural kind of imperialism: “the imperialism of one knowledge 
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system over the others.” In his essay "Hosting the Otherness of the Other," Esteva 
argues that the Green Revolution was premised on reductionism and 
simplification: first, by abstracting agricultural activities from their social and ethical 
context and second, by attributing a privileged role to productivity disarticulated 
from the overall dynamics of agricultural life (269). He develops this argument 
through an account of the historical context in which the Green Revolution came to 
operate.  
In the 16th century, Spanish conquistadors had received land grants, or 
haciendas, from the Spanish Crown in return for their services. Such a payment 
included an allocation of indigenous peones, or peasants, who would work the 
land as indentured servants. Until the 1930s only hacendados and peasants were 
cultivating land in Mexico. Between 1935 and 1938, president Lázaro Cárdenas 
met the Mexican Revolution's promise of agrarian reform and redistributed 20 
million hectares in the form of communally owned lands, or ejidos, which became 
an emblematic institution of the post-revolutionary regime. In the same period, 
rural schools were set up everywhere with the goal of training ejidatarios for 
modern agricultural practices. Since at first the schools had no particular 
agronomic credo, both the ejidos and the remaining haciendas kept on relying on 
peasant skills and techniques rather than on those of professional agronomists.15 
“It was purely Indian techné,” Esteva says, or “knowledge dating from past 
millennia transmitted through differentiated cultural patterns. Or it was techné 
mestiza, Indian techné exposed to the practices introduced by the Spaniards and 
mixed with them” (254). By the 1940s, the government had decided that only 
agronomic science would provide the models, the instruments, and the technical 
expertise for the development of the Mexican countryside. Soon there were more 
agronomists than peasants working in rural projects, yet their attempts to develop 
the countryside failed. Imported machines could not harvest the crops due to local 
soil conditions; the dependence on fertilizers and irrigation turned out to be both 
expensive and useless, and peasants were reduced to passive observers of an 
expert-driven process, in which their only role could be to carry bags of fertilizers 
to the land (257-264).  
                                                
15 Haciendas were legally abolished after the Mexican Revolution, but they continued to exist due 
to a pact between the hacendados and the emerging capitalist regime. 
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It is possible, Esteva says, that agronomists were right that a technical 
change could bring about an increase in production, yet they were blind to the real 
situation and the prospects of the majority of peasants. In his view, it would have 
been more realistic to consider “the human creativity of alternatives, the multi-
directionality of developments, and the multiplicity of time and rythm of diverse 
social groups” (269). What was required instead was “a conception of non-
determinist, irreducible, and dialectic approaches to take on the specific context” 
(269). In order to illustrate this conception, Esteva compares the discourse of Dr. 
Norman Bourlaug with that of Mexican scientist Efraín Hernández Xolocotzi, who 
was the first to advance a critique of the devaluation of peasant knowledge. 
Bourlaug saw his role as as that of a leader whose goal was to “disseminate the 
benefits of science to all mankind in the shortest possible time and at a minimum 
cost” (263). By contrast, Xolocotzi acknowledged the limitations of his own 
knowledge, and tried to produce new knowledge “[t]hrough a dialogue with the 
peasant” (263). By recognizing that the peasant has a different field of 
observation, Xolocotzi “hosted the Otherness of the Other." Unfortunately, 
Xolocotzi’s approach did not succeed in preventing the disastrous effects of the 
Green Revolution. However, as anthropologist Cori Hayden points out in her 
important study of bioprospecting in Mexico (When Nature Goes Public) we should 
not underestimate the legacy of scientific advocacy in contemporary disputes 
around the future of the Mexican countryside.  
Decades after Bourlaug, the use of physicalist and probabilistic discourse, a 
purely instrumental conception of nature and work, and the use of statistical 
calculations and models unrelated to social conditions continued to guide 
development policies (160). In view of explosive urban growth and increasing 
problems of rural productivity in the 1970s, the World Bank launched “Integrated 
Rural Development” (IRD), a strategy that blamed rural poverty on excessive 
concern with economic growth. Still, the experts of IRD “would not entertain the 
idea that too much interaction with the modern sector was the source of peasants' 
problems, nor would they give up the belief that modern-sector and 
macroeconomic policies continued to be the most important for development 
theory” (Escobar, Encountering Development 16). In Escobar’s interpretation, the 
discursive consolidation of modernity meant that the economy had become “a 
seemingly ineluctable reality,” so that it was “no longer capital and labor per se 
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that were at stake, but the reproduction of the code” (203). At any rate, since the 
mid-1960s a nationalist current of dependency theory had been seriously 
challenging development's ahistorical treatment of "underdeveloped" areas.16 
Dependency theorists focused on the "modern" vs "traditional" dichotomy, which 
obliterated the extractive role of urbanization and falsely implied that almost two 
thirds of the world's population lived in static, archaic societies (Saldaña-Portillo 
84). They also showed that "underdevelopment" actually emerged hand in hand 
with capitalist development, as industrial growth displaced and impoverished rural 
communities.17 When dependency theory made clear that the traditional and the 
modern depend on each for their mutual constitution, dependency theory began to 
expose the fallacy of development's “masculinist regime of subjection.” The 
modern developed subject as an autonomous, self-controlling agent was shown  
to be in fact thoroughly dependent on the labor and "underdevelopment" of the 
rural subject (52). Yet as Saldaña-Portillo argues, dependency theory ultimately 
fell back under the spell of developmentalism. Dependency theory, she says, “also 
construct[ed] two kinds of subjects in the periphery who oddly resemble the 
recursive subjects of underdevelopment: bourgeois elites (reactive nationalists) 
and victims of their machinations (abject masses)” (59). Instead of extending its 
argument to the dichotomy of "center" and "periphery," it lamented the economic 
dependency of the latter and prescribed more industrial development as a global 
emancipatory solution. As in the “Revolution to Demolition” narrative of Mexico's 
political economy, dependency theory still figured the Mexican population as an 
incomplete subject awaiting national revolution.  
Escobar argues that contemporary agricultural problems confront us with 
the task of “decolonizing representation.” In his view, peasants are motivated “not 
by acquisition but by material activities the central principle of which is to care for 
the base,” the latter including not only natural resources but also “culturally known 
ways of doing, people, habits, and habitats” (168). Theirs is “above all a struggle 
                                                
16 Saldaña-Portillo reminds us that dependency theory grew out of a Latin American tradition of 
South-South intellectual exchange in the social sciences. Its intellectual predecessors were Latin 
American economists, such as Raúl Prebisch, who worked in the 1940s at the Economic 
Comission for Latin America (ECLA), a UN agency with the mission of promoting modernization 
(47). 
17 Rodolfo Stavenhagen demonstrated that rural subsistence economies have been instrumental 
for capitalism by supplying flexible seasonal labor to monocultural commercial agriculture and by 
helping to depress industrial wages by providing cheap food to urban centers (Saldaña-Portillo 86). 
 47 
over symbols and meanings, a cultural struggle” (167), a struggle that matters 
because "culture" does not merely reflect structural power relations but is also a 
mechanism for materializing them (162).  While Escobar recommends taking the 
cultural struggle of peasants seriously, he warns us against two predictable 
approaches to “peasant worlds.” Activists would tend to embrace them uncritically 
as an exit from all oppression, while sceptical academics would tend to dismiss 
them “as romantic expositions by activists or intellectuals who see in the realities 
they observe only what they want to see” (Encountering Development 170). Since 
the world of peasants is no more “natural” or innocent than modern worlds, 
Escobar says, we should avoid “the temptation to ‘consume’ grassroots 
experiences in the market for ‘alternatives’ in the Western academe” (170). Yet, 
rather than evaluating peasant worlds as true or false representations of reality, 
we should explore them as cultural struggles against the modern imperialism of 
representation. Such a struggle is urgent because imperialism in representation, 
as seen, for instance, in development discourse, does not merely “reflect” 
structural power relations but is also a mechanism for producing them (162). 
Therefore, a cultural affirmation of peasant worlds (such as it is found in Esteva's 
account of “grassroots postmodernism”) might play an important part in the 
ongoing battles over the meaning of social and biological life under global 
capitalism. 
In the 1980s, the developmental gaze was turned from "underdeveloped" 
human subjects to a depleted nature supposedly threatening the continuity of 
economic growth. The notion was born out of “sustainable development,” a 
paradigm that Escobar situates within an “ecological phase” of capital. Ecological 
capitalism, he says, entails an even more pervasive "semiotic conquest" of nature, 
which it seeks to "conserve" as "the system of capitalized nature closed back on 
itself" (Encountering Development 199). Escobar explains that environmental 
concerns emerged among the global elites who had espoused a modern 
conception of the human agent with selfish interests and purposes. He diagnoses 
that “as long as grassroots environmentalists accept this conception, they will also 
accept the imperatives for capital accumulation, material growth, and the 
disciplining of labor and nature” (197). For instance, the activist defense of 
"biodiversity" already tends to construe biodiversity as a reservoir of value, which 
is the main reason why indigenous peasants in tropical regions of the world are 
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finally being recognized “as owners of their territories (or what is left of them), but 
only to the extent that they accept to treat it – and themselves – as reservoirs of 
capital” (203). While "ecoliberals" assume that all humans are equally responsible 
for environmental degradation, mainstream ecological discourses have in fact 
tended to shift visibility away from industrial polluters to poor peasants and their 
"backward" practices. Ignoring the historical specificity, and hence contingent 
character of Western capitalism, ecoliberals and ecodevelopmentalists have failed 
to notice the cultural limits that  "other" societies place on production. It is in this 
context that he calls for us to take seriously the cultural and political affirmation of 
“peasant worlds” (169). Peasants, Escobar says, “continually innovate and attune 
their [livelihood] practices through trial and error, in a manner more akin to art than 
rationality” (169). I want to suggest that we need to develop a biotechnological 
understanding of peasant "art." More generally, perhaps "biotechnology" can be 
understood as an art practice that refuses to be reduced to a commercial 
transaction or to the exploitative manipulation of "life itself." If “peasant worlds” 
constitute one example of a more ethical kind of biotechnology, can a "mutated" 
nationalism join the peasant struggle for "hosting the otherness of the other" in the 
face of neoliberal and technoscientific challenges? 
So far, a cultural affirmation of peasant worlds has been carried out not by 
modern nationalism but rather by "postmodern" radical pluralism alongside 
"postmodern" organizations. In "Re-embeding Food in Agriculture," for example, 
Esteva concerns himself with the invention of a discourse that effectively 
challenges the gigantic forces and institutions created by modernity, in particular 
the development apparatus. He elaborates a critique of the economic assumption 
that “man's wants are great, not to say infinite, whereas his means are limited 
though improvable” (11). Such an economic problematic is construed by turning 
the assumption of scarcity into a fact that requires intervention from experts, the 
ones to make decisions about the allocation of resources. Food, for example, is 
today immersed in “the economic world, the world of scarcity.” The industrialized 
world thinks that hunger is a problem pertaining to backward countries because of 
its “lifelong addictions to food services” which are thought to be “magnificent 
conquests of civilization” (6). Yet what people in the industrialized world eat is an 
“illusion of abundance,” an illusion that conceals a hunger for a “complex cultural 
relationship with the earth” (6). Esteva thus postulates the existence of a world 
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where scarcity has no discursive place because there are mechanisms to prevent 
it. In the peasant world there are practices such as impostura, “a kind of uneven 
reciprocity which cannot be quantified and whose basic rules are not evident or 
stable in time and space” (8). People support each other with labor and often with 
raw food, and help each other with cooked food or prepared meals on a regular 
basis. In this world, the giving away of food is understood beyond the act itself, to 
express social sentiments of unity, consideration, togetherness and kindness (7). 
Impostura, however, can only take place in a particular cultural community 
including kinship ties and a gendered organization. Echoing Lind and Barham's 
description of the context in which maize is fully “sacred,” Esteva describes: 
 
The fire is at the center of the warmest room of the house. And Doña Refugio is 
there, every day, at the very center, surrounded by her whole family, talking with all 
her sons or her husband, discussing personal difficulties or the predicaments of 
the community. That fire and Doña Refugio are the center of the conversation, and 
in fact the very center of family life, and family life is the center of the community. 
The whole community’s life is in fact organized around such fires, the center of 
kitchens, the source of comida (5). 
 
Community and family life is what the milpa is about for Esteva. It is not 
about the technical activity of producing maize, as the milpa is more frequently 
described (5). He asserts that the essence of the milpa is "not in the corn 
emerging in the fields" but rather "precisely here, around the communal fire, in the 
very heart of the family (5). By invoking the fire, Doña Refugio and family life, 
Esteva tries to identify and revindicate attitudes and behaviors different to those of 
“a middle-class student in Mexico City.” While the middle-class student would 
presumably be satisfied with being fed with food commodities provided by 
institutions, in a rural context people would prefer to share home grown food as a 
meaningful event that constitutes the togetherness of a cultural community. It 
might seem that Esteva's judgment of urban dwellers is unnecessarily dismissive, 
yet the most interesting part of his essay suggests that the milpa can be found 
even in the heart of the cities, where there “are also reminiscences, a step back, a 
form of underdevelopment, or strictly postmodern practices” (8). Unlike Pilcher, 
Esteva believes that there is something like a “grassroots postmodernism” (Esteva 
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and Prakash) that is able to articulate diverse reactions, in both city and 
countryside, to the cultural hegemony of Western modernity.  
In order to illustrate the above point Esteva tells us the story of a popular 
quarter in downtown Mexico City called Tepito. Tepito was flooded with rural 
immigrants when the Green Revolution took hold of the countryside. After 1945, 
the government of the city froze the rent of low-cost housing, and so Tepito 
flourished and became famous as "a creative and recreative space" of informal 
trade and gadget recycling. A third of Tepitans, says Esteva, made a living in 
producing and selling food, and yet this was not only another line of business or an 
income-generating activity, but rather it was the top layer of a far from frozen, 
extended web of very complex activities. In fact, something like impostura was 
operating there, since Tepitans maintained close connections with their rural 
communities of origin and used those connections to operate the channels for a 
constant flow of people and goods in both directions. After the earthquake in 
Mexico City in 1985, new development projects were promoted for inhabitants of 
Tepito. One promoted by FAO consisted in distributing subsidized food and 
teaching the people about balanced diets. The people were not only offended at 
being told how to eat, but they were also concerned about being “ruined” by the 
competence of subsidized, industrial food. Many of them, including Esteva himself, 
decided to “escape from this foolishness” (10).18 By re-embedding food in 
agriculture, they enacted an example of “grassroots postmodernism.” 
According to Esteva, re-embedding food in agriculture has nothing to do 
with recovering a lost paradise, or falling into nostalgia or revivalism ("Re-
embedding Food" 2). Neither has it anything to do with “the world campaign for 
healthy food, natural products, organic coffee or holistic diets” (3). Like Pilcher, 
Esteva is outraged by these trends, which have transformed a legitimate claim into 
“another turn of the screw of economic society” (3). In a view inspired by the 
Zapatista rebels, Esteva argues that “a single global discourse is both impossible 
and preposterous” (2). A supportive community based on kinship ties is therefore 
just one among many possible roads for international anticapitalism. As Esteva 
emphasizes, many different discourses are already emerging from the “social 
                                                
18 Esteva abandoned a career in the development apparatus and moved to the countryside, where 
he founded the Universidad de la Tierra, an open-access institution based on radical pluralism. 
Esteva is now a full-time activist and promoter of “grassroots postmodernism.” 
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majorities” of the world, and what they have in common, according to Esteva, is 
“their post-modernity, (…) not only something that comes after modernity, but 
something that happens against modernity” (2). Whereas the ethical imperative of 
“grassroots postmodernism” would reside in “hosting the otherness of the other,” 
my own question concerns the extent to which a renewed Mexican nationalism 
would be able to take responsibility for the other in precisely in that way. 
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Technoscientific Mutations in Maize Nationalism  
 
For some, corn is a fluke, even a monstrosity.  
For others, it is the most evolved member of the plant kingdom  
and occupies a position comparable to that of 
human beings in the animal kingdom.  
The analogy is appropriate,  
because corn is clearly the offspring of humans, 
 a gradual and impressive product of human invention,  
much closer to them, in a certain sense,  
than to any other living beings.  
(Warman 26) 
 
In Corn and Capitalism: How a Botanical Bastard Grew to Global 
Dominance, Mexican anthropologist Arturo Warman celebrated the “bastard” 
botanical properties of maize, echoing stories about Mexican identity being a 
product of racial hybridity, or mestizaje. Warman did not hide his nationalist pride 
about the fact that in time maize proved colonial prejudices wrong by going abroad 
to become, as an individual plant, one of the world’s leading crops. At present, 
approximately one fourth of the world's population depends on direct consumption 
of maize, while more than half of the global maize harvest goes into animal feed 
(25). By consuming meat, milk and eggs, wealthy populations consume many 
times more maize than people whose diet is based on direct consumption of it. In 
addition, maize is being increasingly used as a source of biofuel, a controversial 
alternative to fossil fuels.  In his book, Warman describes affectionately how the 
adaptability of maize to diverse ecological conditions, its high productivity and its 
multiple applications led to its quick spread and global acceptance, with the result 
that “[t]oday corn's patrimony is universal” (14). Yet it is precisely the central role of 
maize in contemporary global capitalism that prompts me to interrogate Warman's 
call to regard maize as “a unique resource for the construction of a new reality, for 
change and social transformation” (234). What kind of transformation did Warman 
have in mind when he first wrote Corn and Capitalism in the 1980s, and how does 
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it relate to the present conjuncture in which Mexican maize is being reclaimed by 
Mexican society?19  
After the violent repression of the 1968 student movement in Mexico City, 
the political legitimacy of the Mexican revolutionary state was seriously 
undermined. Despite (or precisely because of) the continuity, throughout the 
1970s, of both direct state repression and economic co-optation, democratic 
demands proliferated steadily in Mexican society as the 20th century drew to a 
close. In 1981, a fall in oil prices curtailed the government's capacity to repay 
foreign debt, depriving it of the economic surplus that it had traditionally employed 
to buy off the acquiescence of disparate social sectors. In response to the crisis, 
the state's development strategy was reoriented along the lines of neoliberalism, 
which was subsequently pursued by the governments of Miguel de la Madrid 
(1982-1988) and Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994). Since the 1970s, 
neoliberalism had circulated as a set of ideas among Mexican political elites.20 
Even though it stems from a narrow domain in economic theory, neoliberalism has 
come to refer to a more comprehensive vision of the social order premised on the 
primacy of the market and on competition among self-reliant individuals. Wendy 
Brown describes this phenomenon in terms of “governmentality – a mode of 
governance encompassing but not limited to the state, and one that produces 
subjects, forms of citizenship and behavior, and a new organization of the social” 
(Edgework 37). In this final section I propose to read the neoliberal transformations 
undergone by maize nationalism through the lens of a very particular 
understanding of technoscience. Even though technoscientific practices such as 
biotechnology are indissociable from neoliberalism, feminist scholar Donna 
Haraway asks us to regard them neither as given facts nor as mere ideologies of 
global elites. For Haraway, technoscience is above all “a form of life, a practice, a 
                                                
19 Warman's anthropological work on Mexican rural issues was widely acclaimed within the country 
and abroad, until he became a functionary of the neoliberal presidency of Carlos Salinas de Gortari 
(1988-1994). Salinas ended land redistribution, exerted repression on Zapatista communities and 
sent the country into one of its most memorable economic crises in decades. From 1988 to 1991 
Warman served as director of the Instituto Nacional Indigenista (INI, National Institute for the 
Indigenous People), then he went to the Procuraduría Agraria (1991–1994) and next he became 
Secretary of the Agrarian Reform (1994–1999). After neoliberal policies proved fatal for the 
Mexican domestic economy, his collaboration with Salinas and with the latter’s successor Ernesto 
Zedillo (1994-2000) sent Warman into ostracism, particularly by (nationalist) Leftist media and 
intellectual circles.  
20 Old revolutionary advocates of neo-Keynesian state expansionism had been facing, for a number 
of years before the debt crisis, Mexican neoliberal ideologues who promoted technical expertise as 
a means to economic progress (O'Toole 270).  
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culture, a generative matrix” (Modest_Witness 50). She attributes “a transgenic 
quality” to technoscientific domains (4), in the sense that they blur the boundaries 
between science, technology, culture, politics and economics. Technoscientific 
confusion of boundaries is simultaneously dangerous and liberatory since, as 
Haraway writes: 
 
(...) technoscience is about worldly, materialized, signifying and significant 
power. That power is more, less, and other than reduction, commodification, 
resourcing, determinism, or any of the other scolding words that much 
critical theory would force on the practitioners of science studies (...) (51). 
 
In the same vein, cultural theorist Jeremy Gilbert forcefully reminds us that 
how far the neoliberal imperative can go, and what it can actually achieve, remains 
undecided because it largely depends on to the balance of forces within specific 
political contexts (Anticapitalism and Culture 172). In his analysis of Mexican 
neoliberal discourse, political scientist Gavin O'Toole has pointed out that a purely 
economic understanding of neoliberalism has tended to downplay the complex 
discursive challenges confronted by Mexican neoliberals as they dismantled a 
political economy legitimized by a potent nationalist tradition. Because 
revolutionary nationalism had been very effective in creating consensus, it was not 
easy for Mexican neoliberals to give it up. What they did was try to reconcile 
nationalism with the neoliberal project by explaining and interpreting in a certain 
way the implications of globalization and “interdependence” (O'Toole 273). The 
shift from protectionist import-substitution to full entry into global competition was 
asserted as essential for national survival, for “the continuity of Mexico in history.” 
Since the threat of “inviability” in a globalizing world derived from the lack of 
competitiveness, sovereignty became a synonym of “competitive strength.” Thus, 
Mexico would at last fulfill its vision of progress, which president Salinas de Gortari 
(1988-1994) described in terms of being “part of the First World and not of the 
Third” (qtd. in O'Toole 283). O'Toole's analysis reveals that there was complex 
political work at the domestic level on the part of Mexican neoliberals. Like 
revolutionary nationalism, Mexican neoliberalism came to promote the 
transformation of the Mexican subject into “an agent of transformation in his own 
right, one who is highly ethical, mobile, progressive, risk taking, and masculinist, 
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regardless of whether [it] is a man or a woman, an adult or a child” (Saldaña-
Portillo 9). 
Mexican neoliberalism was consolidated institutionally through the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which came into effect in 1994 and 
covered most aspects of trade between Canada, Mexico and the United States. 
The Agreement included an end to legal restrictions to land commodification, an 
end to tariffs on all kinds of foreign imports including food, and the withdrawal of 
most state support from domestic production, including small and medium-scale 
agriculture. Before the negotiations had concluded, it was anticipated that cheap 
food imports from the U.S. would easily flood the Mexican market. For this reason 
NAFTA contemplated a transitional exemption of staple products such as maize 
and beans, which would last until 2008. It was expected that in the years 1994-
2008, the Mexican agricultural sector would be strengthened and prepared for 
competition with its Northern counterparts. However, such preparation did not take 
place and the Mexican government never enforced the transitional protection. 
Farmers were abruptly exposed to international competition, which drove them out 
of business and rendered the whole country dependent on cheap maize imports 
from the US, where agriculture is heavily subsidized and can sell its grain in 
Mexico for less than the cost of its production. 16 years after NAFTA, maize 
imports from the US have increased by 1000% (Ashwell 22), and Mexico now 
imports 25% of the maize it uses (Bartra A., "Hacer Milpa" 43). If pro-NAFTA 
politicians defended food imports on the grounds of “food security” (Hewitt 91-92), 
it was because they conceived of “food security” in urban terms as the availability 
of cheap items in supermarket chains. Significantly, against the neoliberal odds, 
the cultivation of maize for subsistence purposes has been maintained and in 
some cases increased, a paradox that tells us much about why Mexican people 
keep producing maize (McAffee).21 Even if we leave the cultural and spiritual 
aside, the paradox reminds us that rural populations keep growing maize because 
of its fundamental contribution to household sustenance (Antal, Baker and 
Verschoor 63).  
                                                
21 In 2007, 30% of the Mexican labor force worked in agriculture, which generated 5% of the GDP. 
Approximately 3.2 million peasants grow maize, on which 12.5 million people depend directly or 
indirectly, an equivalent to 55% of the agricultural population (qtd. in Antal, Baker and Verschoor 
14). 
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Social researchers of biotechnology debates in Mexico generally point out 
that maize has become “the apple of discord” not just because it is a “holy object 
of ancestral cultures,” but more so because amidst the economic devastation 
unleashed by neoliberalism, it has emerged as “the symbol of nationalism and the 
country's political and cultural resistance” (Antal, Baker and Verschoor 2). In 
reaction to the cataclismic effects of neoliberal policies, Mexican academics began 
to oscillate between a furious re-assertion of nationalism and a new pluralistic 
sensibility to the campesino way of life. Following Pilcher, Hernández López 
interprets NAFTA policies, and neoliberalism more generally, as implying a revival 
of the colonialist rejection of maize as an essential component of national identity. 
By giving up maize, neoliberal elites frustrated the democratization of Mexico, a 
process hardly fought for by social movements since 1968. Ana María Ashwell and 
Armando Bartra argue that a combination of ineptitude, corruption and inherited 
racism guided neoliberal politicians in their negotiations of economic policy. 
Whereas the productive capacities of campesinos have been long been 
underestimated by modernizing social policy, today we are witnessing, Ashwell 
says, a full-scale attack on the countryside through the neoliberal decision to 
renounce national “food sovereignty.”22 In a nationalistic tone, Ashwell insists that 
maize coming from “complex and original relationships with the earth” is “the only 
maize which they [the campesinos], you and me want to eat” (22).23 In a similar 
tone, Armando Bartra's starts one of his multiple interventions in defense of maize 
by stating that “more than men of maize, us Mesoamericans are people of milpa” 
("Hacer Milpa" 42), and concludes by asserting that “to save the country is to save 
maize” (45). A crucial question in this regard is whether “saving the country” will 
require a categorical rejection of biotechnology, and particularly genetic 
engineering, as one of the major investments of global agro-industry. 
                                                
22 Before the Second World War, all of the world's most important agricultural regions, except for 
Western Europe, were self-sufficient and exporters of cereals. This panorama changed drastically 
after World War II, when the size of the cereal market grew at an accelerated pace. Between 1960 
and 1962, U.S. production made up half of total exports and in 1971-72 U.S. grain for export 
accounted for three-fourths of the world market. In 1972, besides the United States, only Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand, and Argentina were major exporters of cereals. Poor countries until then 
self-sufficient or which had been net exporters of grain before the war, now purchased almost 40% 
of the grain on the world market after the war.  
23 Ashwell seems more nostalgic than optimistic, and so concludes her piece with a timid reference 
to European consumers of organic food and fair trade products. 
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A paradigmatic industry of the neoliberal era, biotechnology relocates profit-
driven production “at the genetic microbial and cellular level, so that life becomes, 
literally, annexed within capitalist processes of accumulation” (Cooper M., 19).24 
The commercial planting of transgenic crops began in the United States in 1995. 
Ten years later 52% of US corn planted was genetically engineered. About two-
thirds of it was engineered by seed corporations such as Monsanto and Pioneer to 
develop traits of Bacillus thuringiensis, a bacterium that produces toxins lethal to 
many insects of the order Lepidoptera, including larvae that can damage corn, 
cotton, and other crops in the US (McAfee 151). Bt maize, as it is called, has been 
legally imported into Mexico since 1997 exclusively for consumption purposes. By 
contrast with the situation in the U.S., where university research has been 
attracted and capitalized by private seed companies, the majority of Mexican 
maize researchers work only in the public sector25 and have little interest in using 
molecular genetic markers to improve their selection criteria. Currently, of the six 
laboratories where biotechnological research on maize is conducted, only 
CINVESTAV-Irapuato applies advanced genetic engineering to agricultural 
production.26 The relatively few maize biotechnologists specializing in genetic 
engineering based in Mexico have fought hard to persuade their institutions and 
the government that their research is worthy of financial investment.27 Most of their 
efforts have concentrated on gaining space and equipment, yet Mexican 
                                                
24 In her  study of the U.S. biotech industry, Melinda Cooper argues that neoliberalism reworks the 
value of life as established in the welfare state and New Deal model of social reproduction. In her 
view, the neoliberalism of biotechnology lies in its “intent to efface boundaries between the spheres 
of production and reproduction, labor and life, the market and living tissues – the very boundaries 
that were constitutive of welfare biopolitics and human rights discourse” (9). 
25 In the 1970s there was a renewed interest in maize agrodiversity which had its roots in three 
issues: first, a blight attacked maize in the United States leading researchers to seek resistant 
varieties of maize from Mexico’s reservoir of genetic maize diversity; second, maize improvement 
programmes were seeking to improve the production of small-scale producers  in rural Mexico, as 
a way to social and economic transformation in the Mexican countryside. This led to the recognition 
that Mexico’s “genetic resources” were not adequately represented in the global germplasm banks. 
Third, there was a resurgence of interest in maize agrodiversity and ethnobotany due to the work of 
Hernández Xolocotzi at the University of Chapingo (Paczka 125). 
26 Luis Herrera Estrella, working at CINVESTAV-Irapuato, was the first scientist to ever transfer a 
bacterial gene into a plant. Other CINVESTAV scientists work on plague-, drought-, and soil 
salinity-resistant varietals, and are developing plants resistant to fungus, virus, and herbicides, 
through protoplast fusion and recombinant DNA. They are also studying tomato, tobacco, and bean 
genetics to make crops resistant to insects, or are working with Bacillus Thuringiensis (Bt) 
bioinsecticides. CINVESTAV is the only institution engaged in advanced plant biotechnology, while 
others do applied research in tissue culture and micropropagation. 
27 In the early 1990s there were 179 maize researchers, 67 of whom worked on genetic 
improvement. Government invested around 5 million dollars in such research, by contrast with 185 
million dollars invested by Monsanto (Arellano and Ortega, "Caracterización" 55). 
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laboratories are generally under-equipped and only permit basic analyses of 
genetic markers to characterize plants, compare germplasms and dilucidate their 
potential uses. National seed companies, on the other hand, have limited their 
research to the testing of patented seeds, and do not plan to develop their own 
seed varieties on the basis of local germplasm (Arellano and Ortega, 
"Caracterización" 63), since this requires much more money than they are willing 
to invest in the risky business of biotechnology. Therefore, it seems unlikely that 
national seed companies will be the ones to meet the biotechnological demands of 
the national agro-industry. Even transnational companies have met considerable 
difficulty in commercializing their transgenic seeds in Mexico, not just because 
their products have so far not been developed for the specific problems of the 
Mexican countryside, but also because the companies have had to circumvent the 
strong oppositional reaction by environmental, peasant and scientific advocacy 
groups. 
Almost immediately after imports of American grains started flooding the 
Mexican countryside, Greenpeace alerted that they were posing a threat of 
"contamination" to local maize varieties. "Genetic contamination" is a term used by 
activists to assert, in a condemnatory tone, that once transgenic and non-
transgenic maize cross-fertilize, transgenes will prevail and gradually displace 
"native maize" to the point of extintion. In 2001, two Berkeley-based researchers 
(Quist and Chapela) found transgenes in Mexican maize from the Northern 
highlands of Oaxaca, and their findings were published in the journal Nature. In 
2002, Nature disowned their article because of alleged methodological problems. 
Studies conducted in the same year by Mexican institutions28 corroborated Quist 
and Chapela's findings, but the results were again rejected by Nature, apparently 
under pressure of the American biotech lobby. Initially, Mexican farmers were less 
concerned about transgenic maize than about the effects of neoliberal economic 
policy (Massieu, "Cultivos y Alimentos"), yet local and international NGOs such as 
Greenpeace and ETC eventually succeeded, through a forceful media campaign, 
in setting up an anti-GM coalition of small and medium-scale producers, local 
environmentalists, social and natural scientists as well as members of the national 
and international public.  
                                                
28 UNAM, National Autonomous University and CINVESTAV, Advanced Research Centre of the 
National Polytechnic Institute (IPN). 
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Before Greenpeace's campaign and the ensuing constitution of a Network 
in Defense of Maize, public debate on science and technology in Mexico was 
mostly conducted in technical terms by professional societies and government 
agencies (Rubio and Ordóñez 31). Public outrage about "genetic contamination" 
led the Mexican government to create CIBIOGEM,29 an “Inter-Secretarial 
Comission on Biosecurity” that initiated procedures for the elaboration of biosafety 
legislation. Over a period of five years, several political parties30 presented a total 
of eight proposals, but it was the one designed by the Mexican Academy of 
Sciences (ACM)31 that served as a basis for the law that was finally approved and 
passed in December 2004. The ACM proposal established case-by-case risk-
assessment studies as the duty of relevant government agencies and 
recommended to apply the precautionary principle whenever risk-studies were 
found to be insatisfactory. However, this latter point was partially dropped in the 
final text of the law, which was approved fast-track without public discussion 
(Massieu and San Vicente; Antal, Baker and Verschoor). Moreover, the specific 
mechanisms for the protection of native maize were relegated to secondary 
regulations that, according to their Mexican critics, turned out to be arbitrary and 
weak. The Law of Biosecurity of Genetically Modified Organisms (LBOGM)32 was 
therefore met by heavy criticism from a section of the Mexican scientific 
community (Chapela) as well as from anti-GM activists, who dubbed it as one of 
so many “Monsanto laws” around the world.  
In this regard, Edith Antal explains that the discussion of biosecurity in 
Mexico was indeed understood as an application of the international rules of the 
                                                
29 Throughout its existence, CIBIOGEM has been surrounded by suspicion regarding its members, 
such as José Luis Solleiro, who has links with AgroBio, the biotech consortium formed by 
Monsanto, Novartis, Dupont and Savia, and who became explicit supporter of transgenics as the 
solution to "food security." 
30 These were the currently ruling PAN (Partido Acción Nacional), the PRI (Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional), which ruled for 80 years until 2000, and the PRD (Partido de la Revolución 
Democrática), a left-wing party that rules the capital Mexico City: “From the very beginning of the 
debate one could see differing conceptions on the issue among the political parties: whereas the 
PAN focused on the scientific aspect, the PRI insisted on the producers’ needs, and the PRD on 
the fact that the objective of this law was not to promote biotechnology but biosecurity” (Antal, 
Baker and Verschoor 21).  
31 The ACM represents the elite of the scientific community, which meant that in the final draft 
priority was given to the scientific content and the role of experts rather than the political content of 
the GMO issue (Antal, Baker and Verschoor 20). 
32 The LBOGM establishes a system of permits for testing and commercializing GMOs. It 
recognizes the need to protect maize and other 79 plants from the risks of transgenic introgression, 
establishes mandatory labelling for non-processed agricultural foods and bans the cultivation of 
GMOs in protected zones. 
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game to the national context – that is, of the rules established by the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the 
Convention of Biological Diversity (CBD) (Antal, Baker and Verschoor 11).  In the 
end, the LBOGM was passed without taking social dissent into serious 
consideration, which provoked an angry reaction from autonomous peasant 
organizations and made further dialogue almost impossible.33 Their final response 
to top-down scientific governance was to take a radical stance, rejecting 
transgenic maize in the name of their right to survival. 
By framing biotechnology as a threat to national sovereignty, Greenpeace 
has managed to articulate its environmental cause together with some other 
causes, such as economic, political and cultural struggles. This articulation of 
issues previously seen as disconnected has contributed to a novel foregrounding 
of traditional maize varieties as fundamental not just to peasant communities, but 
to the nation and the world as a whole. This is precisely why I want to suggest that 
the controversy over the transgenic products of contemporary biotechnology 
constitutes a platform for a critical interrogation of "cultural difference" within a 
nation which has been historically shaped by capitalist hegemony and, 
increasingly, by globalization. The technoscientific conjuncture has already 
produced novel (yet precarious) alliances between the country and the city that 
were discursively precluded during the postrevolutionary period. Yet, when 
speaking of "technoscientific mutations" in maize nationalism I am not just 
referring to the context in which maize has become a global actor and a 
genetically modified commodity, giving rise to conflicts between national and 
transnational actors. I am more interested in understanding how such conflicts 
may give rise to new democratic subjectivities and new material-discursive 
experiments beyond nationalist resistance. In the light of a cultural history that 
romanticizes an agrarian past and therby conceals the material and symbolic 
violence exerted upon living rural societies, what the anti-GM movement actually 
seems to signal is the possibility of re-signifying the nation in a more ethical way.  
                                                
33 Peasant and indigenous organizations had no direct participation in the legislative organs, and 
their interests were not represented in any systematic way by the political parties. Three farmer 
organizations were active in the parliamentary debates: ANEC (Asociación Nacional de Empresas 
Comercializadoras de Productos del Campo), UNORCA (Unión Nacional de Organizaciones 
Regionales Campesinas Autónomas), and CECCAM (Centro de Estudios para el Cambio del 
Campo Mexicano). All three called attention to the potentially harmful effects of GMOs on the 
Mexican countryside (Antal, Baker and Verschoor 23). 
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In June 2007, the mayor of Mexico City, Marcelo Ebrard, participated in the 
official launch of the National Campaign for the Defense of Food Sovereignty and 
the Reactivation of Small-Scale Agriculture: Sin Maíz no hay País y sin Frijol 
Tampoco ¡Pon a México en tu boca! ("There is no country without maize and there 
is no country without beans; put Mexico in your mouth!"). The campaign's mission 
was to raise awareness about the importance of food sovereignty and of better 
public policies guided by an alternative national project that is inclusive, fair, 
sustainable, and supportive (Campaña Nacional Sin Maíz No Hay País 7). The 
first two stages of the campaign focused on re-negotiating NAFTA and tackling the 
food crisis of 2008. The third stage strengthened the struggle against GMO's by 
proclaiming September 29th as the National Day of Maize and “food 
independence” in Mexico. The rejection of transgenic maize, a concern initially 
promoted by Greenpeace and ETC, has become increasingly important at each 
stage of the campaign, whose strategies of dissemination have included the mass 
signing of petitions, demonstrations, local concerts, performances and food 
festivals to promote the products of the Mexican countryside. On 14th October 
2009, Greenpeace led a theatrical protest against the government's decision 
(allowed by “the Monsanto law”) to authorize the experimental sowing of 
transgenic maize within the national territory. The protest consisted in placing a 
black mourning cloth over the Ángel de la Independencia, an emblematic 
monument in Mexico City, and in pacing black ribbons and placards on statues of 
the national Heroes of Independence. On the placards, one could read: 
 
The heroes who gave their lives for Independence sent  
a forceful message to the nation (...)  
in order to judge what the federal authorities are doing with maize:  
Vicente Guerrero: “First comes our maize, traitors!”  
Miguel Hidalgo: “Down with the government that authorizes transgenics” 
José María Morelos: “Sovereignty emanates from our creole corn” 
 
The main thread in my analysis of the Mexican defense of maize focuses on 
a critical interrogation of the modern political narratives that still dominate the 
encounter between the Mexican nation and biotechnology. Biotechnology debates 
in Mexico have been examined by scholars from a variety of social science 
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perspectives, yet the cultural politics of such debates often appears 
underanalyzed, either taken for granted or mystified. "Culture" only makes itself 
present in assertions about a particular identity, as in “Mexicans are a people of 
corn,” implying that corn, like cultural identity, is a sort of possession that must be 
kept and celebrated as it lies against outside threats such as modern 
biotechnology. To be fair, there are at least two exceptions to this trend. A useful 
precedent of my own critique of the narratives deployed by the activists is the 
discursive analysis undertaken by rural sociologist Gerard Verschoor, who 
classifies the regimes of justification or “grammars of worth” mobilized by social 
actors for and against GMOs. As Verschoor points out, proponents of GMOs 
construct their arguments in terms of industrial efficiency and productivity, 
emphasizing the role of experts in deciding over the universal applicability of a 
rational logic of comparative advantages (36). A market-centred regime defines 
subjects directly as buyers and sellers in competitive relations, foreclosing 
discussion of anything that cannot be reduced to a commercial logic. In principle 
this regime seems to be incompatible with the language of value mobilized by 
opponents of transgenic maize. The latter invoke civic values such as solidarity, 
collective welfare, resistance against biopiracy and injustice, all excluded from 
NAFTA deliberations (39). The same exclusion would seem to apply to the 
language of tradition and locality typically mobilized by academic and peasant 
organizations.34 The critical aspect of Verschoor's analysis resides, however, in 
suggesting that tradition and locality are easily co-opted by the mainstream 
narratives of capitalist progress and development. He observes that the language 
of tradition invokes a “harmonious, quasi-romantic experience of living off the land 
– that is, a close connection between the people and their area, a relationship 
mediated by maize” (42). The environmentalist discourse in turn articulates this 
image with the romantic figure of the noble savage as a “guardian of 
biodiversity,”35 yet historical records show that it is precisely through 
                                                
34 Verschoor cites a 2004 Oaxaca declaration against GMOs, commenting that this kind of 
statement is heard over and over again regarding the issue of genetic contamination: “Here, in this 
part of the world, maize was born. Our grandfathers raised it, and were raised by it when they 
forged one of the greater civilizations in history. The oldest house of maize stands in our soils. 
From here it travelled to other parts of the world. We are maize people. This is our brother, it is the 
foundation of our culture, it is the basis of our here and now. (…)” (41). 
35 Given the political appeal of the “noble savage” in certain (First World) circles, 
indigenous/peasant groups have increasingly appropriated it (with the help of national and 
international NGOs) to formulate and give visibility to their political demands, an issue that is 
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romanticization that civic demands “are reduced, de-politicized and made 
compatible with industrial or commercial goals logic” (46). Verschoor concludes 
from this that asserting the nature and/or culture of particular identities does not in 
itself pose an effective challenge to the instrumentalization of nature and people 
that capitalist technoscience essentially promotes. Moreover, the language of 
property rights and community participation already suggests an implicit 
neoliberalization of resistance and activism.  
Another notable exception to the uncritical acceptance of nationalist 
resistance in the name of peasant worlds is Elizabeth Fitting's recent book, The 
Struggle for Maize (2011). Like other observers of the struggle over maize 
(Kinchy), Fitting praises the way in which the defense of maize has shifted the 
debate on GMOs away from a narrow, technocratic focus on costs and benefits 
and towards some wider concerns about the future of the Mexican countryside and 
culture (12). This is a good thing, she says, because it challenges the inherited 
modernizing assumption that peasant maize agriculture is “backward” or 
“traditional” (36). Yet she also observes that peasant essentialism, or the notion of 
a bounded, millennial people of corn, obscures the way in which rural communities 
are in fact being made and remade in the interaction with larger processes and 
forces (13). Drawing on ethnographic work, Fitting emphasizes that contemporary 
Mexican peasants are better described as a rural proletariat, as commercial 
farmers, or as being in the process of transition from one to the other (24). 
Historical patterns of migration also complicate the picture because many of 
today's self-labeled peasants rely on migrants who go back and forth between the 
worlds of unpaid work and paid employment. These are among the many 
important aspects of contemporary rural life that Mexicans, both pro- and anti-GM, 
seem to forget when they describe Mexicans, rural and urban, as a millennial 
people of corn. My own engagement with the Mexican defense of maize takes into 
account the complexities revealed by empirical work, such as that undertaken by 
Fitting and Verschoor, yet it seeks to bring into the discussion the specific insights 
of deconstructive philosophy, post-Marxist political theory, feminist technoscience 
and media and cultural studies. As I aim to show in what follows, it is necessary to 
interrogate the ethics and politics of nationalism in a more fundamental way in 
                                                                                                                                              
interestingly developed by Cori Hayden in When Nature Goes Public: The Making and Unmaking of 
Bioprospecting in Mexico. 
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order to engage critically and creatively with the challenges posed by capitalist 
technoscience. 
 
Conclusion: Mexican Maize and the Struggle for Technoscience 
 
Many Mexicans today find inspiration in the dialogue with maize. Not only do they 
demand hospitable recognition of the existence of indigenous peoples and of their 
right to continue being what they are, of their cultures to flourish in harmony with all 
the rest within the multicultural reality of Mexico. They also discover that those 
cultures, shared consciously or unconsciously by the majority of Mexicans, may be 
a timely and pertinent inspiration to face up to the current predicaments and to 
conceive projects of transformation (Esteva, Marielle and Galicia 58). 
 
 I have argued in this chapter that the nationalist celebration of maize is 
indissociable from a devaluation of maize agriculture as a culturally specific form 
of biotechnology. In order to qualify as a national symbol, maize had to be 
abstracted from its culturally specific (yet dynamic and diverse) biotechnological 
context. In this process, Mexican nationalism undermined not just the material 
vitality of maize agriculture, but also its public valorization as a culturally specific 
form of biotechnology. For this reason, I want to develop a critical position about 
the use of cultural nationalism as a means of cultural decolonization, and I shall do 
this by acknowledging the ambiguous, open-ended nature of the ongoing 
neoliberal conjuncture. Historically speaking, it was only after the neoliberal turn 
and the rise of technoscientific capitalism in the early 1980s that Mexican farmers 
began to be depicted as something more than a problem to be solved by Western-
style modernization. While there is no point in denying that neoliberalism threatens 
to subject "life itself" to ever deeper exploitation, it seems to me that a more open 
understanding of technoscience (even within neoliberalism) promises to pluralize 
the public discussion about maize and national identity by pushing the conceptual 
boundaries that define what counts as biotechnology and for whose benefit it is 
defined in this way. As Esteva writes in a 2003 publication Sin Maíz No Hay País: 
 
To celebrate diversity in order to adopt a hospitable and pluralistic attitude towards 
the different, to sustain a respectful dialogue with Nature that prevents its 
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exhaustion and destruction, to regenerate forms of conviviality and replace the 
possessive individualism of the homo economicus with solidarious styles of social 
relationship, to imagine nations as common horizons in which diverse cultures can 
coexist and interact in harmony, instead of letting themselves get trapped by 
homogenising and exclusive nationalisms whose contradictions are to be dealt 
with by force… In all those current challenges to the Mexican society we may learn 
a lot from the people of maize and their cultures, which can still form the central 
axes of ours (Esteva, Marielle and Galicia 58). 
 
I am not in fact persuaded that nations can exist unproblematically as 
“common horizons in which diverse cultures can coexist and interact in harmony.” 
Yet I see the ongoing debates around biotechnology and national culture as an 
opportunity to investigate the radical potential of maize as a symbol of nationhood. 
What I want to argue is that in order to be radical, the defense of maize should not 
be reduced to an identitarian, humanistic self-affirmation, at least not if our aim is 
to contest the legacy and the logic of colonialism. Ultimately, the aim of my own 
engagement with the Mexican defense of maize is to take Mexican biotechnology 
debates beyond old humanistic disputes over whose sovereign body owns which 
resources. Situated at the intersection of cultural studies and post-Marxism, 
“cultural politics” refers us to the notion that all social practices are discursive, or 
textually mediated, material phenomena which can be traced back to political 
decisions, whether the latter appear to be explicit or implicit, conscious or 
unconscious. An anti-essentialist elaboration of the cultural politics of 
biotechnology entails that the production of subjectivity and social organization via 
notions of cultural identity is, in every case, contingent and alterable. 
"Technoscientific" mutations in Mexican cultural politics refer to the possibility of 
raising radical questions regarding the ethics and politics of nationalism in the 
context of neoliberal globalization. This might sound trivial if it did not imply that 
both Mexican nationalism and “peasant essentialism” in activist discourse have as 
little ontological ground as neoliberalism itself. What I want to explore in the 
following chapters is to what extent and in what way an acknowledgment of the 
radical contingency of all identities can bring about a more ethical horizon for the 
defense of agriculture as a way of life that has always been technological.  
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Chapter II 
 
A Theoretical Approach to Mexican Nationalism 
 
Introduction: What is a Nation? 
 
A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle.  
Two things, which in truth are but one,  
constitute this soul or spiritual principle.  
One lies in the past, one in the present.  
One is the possession in common of a rich legacy of memories;  
the other is present-day consent, the desire to live together,  
the will to perpetuate the value of the heritage  
that one has received in an undivided form.  
(Renan 19) 
 
In a lecture from 1882, French historian Ernest Renan warns us against the 
dangers of an intellectual mistake: that of confusing nations with “ethnographic” or 
linguistic groups. France, England, and Italy are “individual historical units” not 
because their respective citizens can be classified as a homogeneous “race,” nor 
because they speak the same language. Historically, he says, nations owe their 
existence to multiple factors external to the particular human groups that become 
their members. In Europe, they included the conquest of parts of the Roman 
Empire by Germanic tribes, the introduction by the latter of dynasties and military 
aristocracies, their adoption of the Latin language and Christianity, and the mixing 
of Germanic and Latin populations. There is therefore no pure “race,” and to 
subordinate politics to ethnographic analysis is “to surrender it to a chimera” (14). 
Yet, in asking what the nation is, Renan is not merely trying to correct the 
“ethnographic” confusion between nations and “races” with a more accurate 
historical understanding. Rather, he is concerned with defining the nation as a 
“spiritual principle,” and so he moves from a historical argument to an argument 
about the desirability of a nation grounded in a liberal conception of politics.  
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Renan's critique of the racial and linguistic definitions of nationhood turns 
out to be less about their historical inadequacy than about the importance of 
certain abstract principles. In particular, he invokes the age of Enlightenment, 
when Man returned, “after centuries of abasement, (…), to [a sense of] respect for 
himself” (13). The French Revolution brought into existence a “national principle” 
that was seen as just and legitimate, beyond the divine right of kings. What the 
Enlightenment and the French Revolution therefore produced was not just another 
story of violent conquest, dynasties and the mixing of populations. They also 
inaugurated a humanist principle which requires us to “forget” how nations actually 
come into being. Renan explains: 
 
Forgetting, I would even go so far as to say historical error, is a crucial factor in the 
creation of a nation, which is why progress in historical studies often constitutes a 
danger for [the principle of] nationality. Indeed, historical enquiry brings to light 
deeds of violence which took place at the origin of all political formations, even of 
those whose consequences have been altogether beneficial (11). 
 
In order to survive over time, the nation must forget its own history. This is 
not necessarily wrong, according to Renan, since forgetting may have some 
“beneficial consequences.” The existence of nations at the time of his writing was 
“a good thing, a necessity even,” for they were “the guarantee of liberty, which 
would be lost if the world had only one law and only one master” (20). In 
retrospective, it does not seem accidental that a Frenchman issues warnings 
against “ethnographic” nationalisms. As the sovereign right of Man, liberty came to 
protagonize the historical period dubbed by Eric Hobsbawm “the Age of Empire”. 
Writing in this context, Renan explains why “it is good for everyone to know how to 
forget”: 
Be on your guard, for this ethnographic politics is in no way a stable thing and, if 
today you use it against others, tomorrow you may see it turned against 
yourselves. Can you be sure that the Germans, who have raised the banner of 
ethnography so high, will not see the Slavs in their turn analyse the names of 
villages in Saxony and Lusatia, search for any traces of the Wiltzes or of the 
Obotrites, and demand recompense for the massacres and the wholesale 
eslavements that the Ottoss inflicted upon their ancestors? It is good for everyone 
to know how to forget (16). 
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After Freud, two World Wars and a whole “Age of Extremes,” can we be so 
sure that it is good for everyone to know how to forget? It rather seems that the 
precarious foundations of Renan's liberal faith have been fully exposed since the 
time of his writing. Political philosopher Wendy Brown explains that liberalism 
presumes sovereign individuals and states, both as units of analysis and as sites 
of agency endowed with fixed boundaries, clearly identifiable interests and power 
conceived as generated and directed from within the entity itself (Politics out of 
History 10). Equally essential to liberalism is the ethnocentric belief in historical 
progress, with its investment in individual rights as the main guarantors of freedom 
and equality. Regarding the connection between these liberal assumptions and 
modern democracy, Chantal Mouffe argues that it is merely a contingent 
articulation of two different traditions that are in fact mutually incompatible 
(Democratic Paradox 2).36 There is no logical relation between liberal individualism 
and popular democracy, so liberal-democratic traditions such as the separation 
between church and state, between the public and the private, and the rule of law 
are unstable outcomes of a political struggle between liberals, who demand 
freedom, and democrats, who demand equality. After the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, capitalism itself rendered liberal democracy incapable of delivering on its 
promise of balancing out freedom and equality. Both of these seem impossible in a 
conjuncture, such as neoliberal globalization, in which neither states nor 
individuals control their own affairs, and in which legal codes systematically fail to 
revert social inequalities.37 The historical source of these inequalities seems today 
clearer than ever, as does as the imperial logic of Renan's “spiritual principle.” No 
longer simply “man” but “white capitalist patriarchy,” the liberal faith is now 
constantly reminded of its own “ethnographic” and linguistic particularity. 
                                                
36 Mouffe refers to Claude Lefort's theory of modern democracy as a new symbolic framework in 
which power is an “empty place” rather than a positive transcendental authority. According to 
Lefort, the democratic revolutions of the late eighteenth century derived in “the modern impossibility 
of providing a final guarantee, a definite legitimation” for power (Democratic Paradox 2). 
37 According to Mouffe, neoliberal calls for “modernization” and “flexibility” merely attempt to 
conceal the elite's refusal to consider democratic demands, in particular through their rhetorical 
insistence on “consensus at the centre” (Democratic Paradox 6). She writes: “In this increasingly 
’one-dimensional’ world, in which any possibility of transformation of the relations of power has 
been erased, it is not surprising that right-wing populist parties are making significant inroads in 
several countries. In many cases they are the only ones denouncing the ’consensus at the centre’ 
and trying to occupy the terrain of contestation deserted by the left” (7). 
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In Politics out of History, Wendy Brown argues that liberal narratives of 
sovereignty, progress and rights-based freedom continue to live among “us” in the 
form of “broken narratives” (3-4). To be more precise, liberal democratic citizens of 
the Western world live “as if” those narratives were true, while they painfully 
recognize that they are not (10). The situation is particularly challenging for the 
political Left, with which Brown is concerned in a special way. Drawing on 
philosophical critiques of modernity and psychoanalysis, Brown diagnoses the 
Left's reaction to the crisis of liberalism as moralistic and melancholic. These 
reactions are problematic, she argues, in so far as they disavow the Left's own 
attachment to the foundational narratives of modernity, thus blocking the possible 
exploration of any new possibilities for radical politics. Many of Brown's arguments 
about the Left's current predicament inform my critical approach to Mexican 
nationalism, especially as the latter emerges and re-shapes itself through the 
defense of "native maize" against the new transnational actors of capitalism. Yet 
my aim is not simply to criticize Mexican activists as melancholic or moralistic 
whenever they exhibit these attitudes. Rather, my aim is to understand to what 
extent and in what way their defense of maize may lay a claim to an emancipatory 
force that would be relevant beyond the territorial boundaries of the Mexican state 
and beyond the cultural melodramas of “Mexican identity.” I take up here some of 
the difficult questions facing many contemporary struggles against global 
capitalism. In a similar vein, Brown asks: "When sovereignty is eroded, can the 
rights rooted in the presupposition of sovereign entities – ranging from subjectivity 
to statehood – remain intact? (…) What independent, emancipatory force can they 
continue to claim?" (11). With these questions in mind, I want to propose in this 
chapter what might be described as a post-liberal, deconstructive approach to 
Mexican nationalism.  
Such a post-liberal approach would have to start with the recognition that 
the realm of politics “cannot be ordered by will and intention, but is a complex 
domain of unintended consequences that follow the unpredictable collisions of 
human, historical, and natural forces” (Brown, Politics out of History 27). Rather 
than advocating pragmatic forgetfulness or a disavowal of history, a post-liberal 
framework would require us to engage in active historical enquiry. Yet historical 
enquiry involves more than a mere search for historical data. It also involves an 
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interrogation of how certain cultural ideas, such as the nation, come to appear (or 
fail to appear) as facts or cultural givens. A critical approach to contemporary 
Mexican nationalism, I argue, needs to take into account both the historical 
specificity of Mexican cultural narratives and a theoretical conjuncture that cannot 
be claimed exclusively by any particular geographic location, academic discipline 
or institution. In Homi Bhabha's perspective, for example, the nation lives in the 
ambivalence between narratives speaking of a national “origin” and a social 
temporality that upsets the “totalization” (or fixation) of such histories (19). To say, 
with Bhabha, that the nation is constructed through textual strategies, 
metaphorical displacements, sub-texts and figurative stratagems, is not to say that 
nationalism is only a matter of language and rhetoric. The point of promoting a 
textual understanding of the nation is actually to eschew the traditional dichotomy 
between language and materiality that lies beneath the tendency to read the 
nation in restrictive ways, as either “the ideological apparatus of state power” or 
“the incipient or emergent expression of the 'national-popular' sentiment preserved 
in a radical memory” (3). While both of these readings might reveal important 
aspects of the nation and even “assign new meanings and different directions to 
the process of historical change” (3), they run the risk of fixing, or totalizing, a sign 
that is “always multi-accentual and Janus-faced” (3). Taking heed of Bhabha's 
warning, I want to identify some of the ways in which some larger cultural 
narratives inform the contemporary Mexican response to the threats of 
transnational capitalism.  
The theoretical history of Claudio Lomnitz will allow me to problematize the 
liberal assumptions of Mexican nationalism by theorizing this particular nationalism 
as a heterogeneous framework for the negotiation of specific social hierarchies. 
The work of historian Edmundo O'Gorman, in turn, will let me read such a 
theoretical history of Mexican nationalism in terms of the constitution of political 
subjectivity within what O'Gorman calls “the ontological legacy of the colony.” The 
latter's psychoanalytic critique of Mexican nationalism paves the way for a post-
Marxist interpretation of contemporary Mexican nationalism. Informed by 
Derridean deconstruction and Lacanian psychoanalysis,38 post-Marxism 
                                                
38 As Bowman and Torfing point out, the post-Marxist political theory of Laclau and Mouffe is more 
indebted to literary theory, continental philosophy, deconstruction and semiotics than to political 
theory “proper” (Bowman 10; Torfing 3). Post-Marxism uses deconstructive, literary, psychoanalytic 
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understands the social as a signifying system penetrated by a "constitutive lack." 
On this basis, Ernesto Laclau calls us to go beyond description of historical facts 
into “a new enquiry concerning the social” in which to understand social reality 
“(...) is not to understand what society is, but what prevents it from being” (Laclau, 
New Reflections 44). The nation emerges from this perspective as an attempt to 
overcome what prevents it from being, namely, its own temporality. Nationalism is 
thus always already constrained by the paradox of the social, namely, that it “tends 
toward the constitution of [an] impossible object” (44). What are the implications of 
recognizing this impossibility of the nation for contemporary emancipatory 
struggles that resort to nationalistic language in response to capitalist agents such 
as biotechnology? Taking into account the political debates of Latin American 
cultural critics, I will end this chapter with a reflection on the current importance of 
a deconstructive engagement with maize nationalism as a critical antidote to the 
moralism and melancholia that seem to invariably afflict those who, in the midst of 
political urgency, begin to resist theory.  
 
Nationalism and the Politics of Community Production  
 
Nationality is neither an accomplished fact nor an established essence; it is, rather, 
the moving horizon that actors point to when they need to appeal to the 
connections between people and the polity, when they discuss rights and 
obligations, or try to justify or reject modernization and social change. National 
filiation is therefore used in order to hammer out a consensual, or hegemonic, 
arrangement; it involves cajoling and purchasing, exhibits of strength and coercion. 
Depth and silence are the Siamese twins of national state formation (Lomnitz, 
Deep Mexico xv). 
 
In Deep Mexico, Silent Mexico, historian Claudio Lomnitz undertakes a 
theoretical history of the Mexican national space. Like Renan, Lomnitz begins by 
pointing out that nationality is historically indissociable from the formation of a 
state, that is, from processes of expansion, conquest or decolonization that always 
involve subjecting a diversity of peoples to a single space in a process that is 
                                                                                                                                              
and semiotic concepts and techniques in the analysis of the political, which found its first 
thoroughgoing articulation in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (1985). 
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anything but harmonious or stable (xiv). He delves into the historical specificities of 
the national space in Spanish America, the context in which Mexico first appeared 
as a nation-state. From this vantage point, Lomnitz raises three objections against 
Benedict Anderson’s theory of nationalism, which is “to such degree general and 
abstract that it fails to clarify the politics of community production” (30). In 
Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson argues that the nation was first 
“imagined” by readers of newspapers and novels and was then actualized through 
individual self-sacrifice in wars between nation-states. Crucially, Anderson asserts 
that the nation was imagined as an abstract community defined by horizontal 
relations of comradery. Echoing Renan's assertion of the nation as a “spiritual 
principle,” Anderson's argument seems to “forget” the contingent political workings 
of nation-building in specific historical contexts. Against this forgetfulness, Lomnitz 
raises three objections: first, Anderson's definition of the nation does not 
correspond to the historical uses of the term nación in Spanish America; second, 
his emphasis on horizontal comradery overlooks the fact that nationalism 
articulates discourses of fraternity always within hierarchical relationships; third, 
Anderson makes personal sacrifice appear as a consequence of the literary 
imagination of a national community when it actually results from the subject's 
differentiated position in a web of relations, some of which are characterized by 
coercion, while others have a moral appeal that is not directly nationalistic (11). In 
short, according to Lomnitz, national consciousness in Spanish America did not 
emerge from “print capitalism” but rather from the religious narratives of Spanish 
expansionism.  
In the Spanish American colonies, the term nación was used to pit the 
Spaniards against other social categories, but also to signify blood or caste, as 
well as a panimperial religious identity (Lomnitz, Deep Mexico 8). Both the 
Catholic Reconquista (the expulsion of Arab kingdoms that ruled the Iberian 
Peninsula for eight centuries) and the expansion of the Spanish Crown into Africa 
and America were narrated in the framework of the broader teleology of 
Christendom. Religion and blood related to specific legal categories that gave 
access to limited forms of sovereignty, authorizing Spaniards' moral and religious 
tutelage over Indians, blacks, mulattos, and mestizos, and differentiating them 
from other European foreigners (extranjeros). Tutelage over non-Spaniards 
included “enjoying their tribute” as well as giving them “the good treatment that is 
 73 
mandated in our laws” (16-17), that is, teaching them the Christian religion and the 
Spanish language – not merely a convenient and profane vernacular, but a 
language that was closer to God (18). The category of the "Creole" implied a 
limited access to particular privileges: "Spanish blood" incorporated Creoles into 
the nation, but their American birthplace excluded them from higher political office, 
which was a privilege of metropolitan Spaniards, or peninsulares (9). These 
conditions gave rise, according to Lomnitz, to the opposite of Anderson's theory, 
which posits secularization, and abstract brotherhood, at the root of nationalism 
(18). 
Lomnitz stresses that the political independence of Mexico at the beginning 
of the 19th century was caused less by nationalist feelings of liberal comradery 
and more by the objective decline of the Spanish empire. Like Spain, and unlike 
England or France, the early Mexican nation lacked a national bourgeoisie. 
Instead, it had regional elites for whom the nation as a unified, sovereign territory 
was never a given fact. Their mutual allegiance was, above of all, a religious one. 
The two priests who led the popular insurrection, Miguel Hidalgo and José María 
Morelos, claimed to be fighting for the sake of religion. They accused Spain of 
betraying its Christian mission and of using Christianity as a pretext for the 
enslavement and exploitation of the American poor. After Morelos and Hidalgo 
were executed, it was a loyalist army officer, Agustín de Iturbide, who achieved 
independence with the support of the Creole elites, and the latter made sure that 
Spaniards would be guaranteed full inclusion in the new republic. Given the 
objective decline of Spain in global politics, however, Mexican nationalism evolved 
into a mechanism for modernization under the influence of an emerging British-
American global hegemony.  
In the 19th century, masonry played a decisive role in shaping the discourse 
and institutions of the new Mexican republic. Lomnitz explains that the Scottish 
rite, influenced by Great Britain, and the rite of York, influenced by the United 
States, functioned as “political parties” in the early days of Mexican politics (31). 
Most of Mexico's regional elites belonged to the Scottish rite, which explains the 
fact that Britain was the first imperial power to recognize Mexico as an 
independent nation. Popular radicals came to be associated with the rite of York, 
which instigated anti-Spanish sentiment and supported a movement to expel the 
Spaniards from Mexico (29). Liberal ideologues such as Carlos María Bustamante 
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blamed Spanish colonialism for Mexican “backwardness,” and associated 
“progress” with concepts such as national sovereignty and freedom. Eventually, 
Mexican nationalism was hegemonized by three liberal principles: the defense 
against foreigners, the defense of open political parties instead of secret societies, 
and the economic inclusion of popular sectors through the abolition of religious 
tribute, land redistribution and technological modernization. Yet even as Mexican 
nationalism took a more liberal shape, it did not “ideologically form a single 
fraternal community, because it systematically distinguishe[d] full citizens from part 
citizens or strong citizens from weak ones” (12).  The liberal identification between 
nationality and modernization was steadily fortified towards the end of the 19th 
century – and more so in the aftermath of the 1910-20 Mexican Revolution, when 
the postrevolutionary national state actively intervened to produce a secular 
modern citizenry out of Mexico's mostly rural population. This was to be achieved 
through rural education and economic redistribution, through “land and books” that 
would transform, according to revolutionary president Lázaro Cárdenas, “Indians” 
into “Mexicans” (114). Peasants and indigenous peoples were therefore not 
considered full citizens in Mexico. They had to be modernized, that is, divested 
from their cultural particularity, if they were to become Mexicans.  
An abstract definition of the nation is therefore less useful than a situated 
investigation of specific deployments of nationalism at particular times. Thus, in 
both the colonial and the modern setting, interpretations of nationhood in Mexico 
depended less on the subjective imagination of individual readers and more on the 
mobilization of culturally specific ideas in hierarchical networks of power relations. 
While Lomnitz emphasizes negotiation and consensus through specific 
deployments of nationalism, this does not prevent him from stressing that 
nationalism always involves demonstrations of force and coercion in a context 
determined by factors beyond will and intention. In this vein, Lomnitz writes: 
 
[A]s such, the power of nationalism lies not so much in its hold of the souls of 
individuals (though this is not insignificant) as in the fact that it provides interactive 
frames in which the relationship between state institutions and various and diverse 
social relationships (family relationships, the organization of work, the definition of 
forms of property, and the regulation of public space) can be negotiated (14). 
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Assessing the quality and the degree of negotiations in specific 
conjunctures is a matter, for Lomnitz, of historical description and sociological 
analysis. Since I am more interested in understanding the role of larger cultural 
narratives in contemporary instances of nationalist negotiation, I now want to turn 
to the question of what remained of the Hispanic Catholic legacy when Mexican 
nationalism took a turn toward modernization. Edmundo O'Gorman's interpretation 
of 19th century Mexican nationalism will provide further insights that will allow us 
to think about this question as a textual (and not just “factual”) affair. 
 
The Nation as Subject, or the Ontological Legacy of Colonialism 
 
It always happens that a belief is not abandoned as long as there is found a 
possibility to save it. Thus, the lover or the believer will not admit the unfaithfulness 
of the loved one or the failure of divine intervention, against the most forceful 
empirical evidence, as long as they find a way of objecting or neutralizing such 
evidence. Such was the case of the liberals when they noticed that their hopes 
were not actualized (O'Gorman 50). 
 
In his essay about the “trauma” of Mexican history, Edmundo O'Gorman 
gives an account of Mexican nationalism that does not involve a detailed 
discussion of empirical facts but rather offers a provocative interpretation of 
Mexico's becoming as an identity process (12). O'Gorman frames this process in 
terms of “the great American dichotomy,” which refers to cultural differences 
between Anglo-America and Ibero-America. According to O'Gorman, “[f]or Ibero-
America, the model was an entelechy; for Anglo-America, it was utopia” (20). 
Whereas the English program for civilization in the New World was oriented 
toward the exploitation and instrumentalization of nature for the creation of 
material wealth, the Spanish program aimed to establish ecumenical unity in 
accordance with the eternal truth of Catholicism. The appropriation of the name 
“America” by Anglo-America already indicates a project that privileges originality 
and authorship over the reproduction of an already constituted cultural project. 
This is not to say that the Spanish project was not exploitative or that the English 
project lacked religiosity. Rather, with Spain directing its power to the enforcement 
of Catholicism and with England religiously pursuing modernity, competition 
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between the two imperial forces prefigured the (now stereotypical) dichotomy 
between a future-oriented, technophilic, individualist, rationalist, disciplined 
“America,” and a “Latin” America that is systematically described in exactly the 
opposite terms. In O’Gorman’s view, the Anglo-American and Ibero-American 
models were actually irreconcilable instantiations of the European civilizing 
mission whose antagonism left a deep mark in the self-definition of Spanish 
American nations such as Mexico. 
In his historico-philosophical analysis of the Mexican appropriation of 
British-American liberal ideas, O'Gorman pays attention to the subjective 
dimension of nationalist politics. Thus, while Lomnitz describes the colonial 
predicament of Creoles in terms of their access to limited forms of sovereignty, in 
O'Gorman's narrative the Creole is figured as a split soul, fiercely loyal to his 
Catholic roots but in need of self-affirmation against metropolitan Spaniards. 
Through a deliberately polemical use of psychological language, O’Gorman offers 
a provocative critique of Mexican nationalism as based on a disavowed 
attachment to the authoritarian “ontological legacy of the colony.”39 Creole 
resentment against political exclusion was gradually transformed into a 
glorification of the American fatherland, O'Gorman says, and this glorification took 
the shape of exaggerated tropes uncritically borrowed from Iberian culture – the 
beauty and abnegation of woman, the sexual potency of man, his bold courage in 
the face of danger and effrontery, and the aesthetic exaltation of American nature 
and land (O’Gorman 23).40 While the Creole soul managed to achieve “ontological 
equilibrium” in this way, this would only last until political independence was 
actually gained. O’Gorman agrees with Lomnitz that the latter was achieved not so 
much as a result of Creole unoriginal nationalism, but mainly because metropolitan 
Spain definitively lost ground to competing colonial powers. 
Once “freed” from its colonial status, the Mexican nation had to measure 
itself against “the other America,” against whose influence it had been carefully 
protected during the colonial times. In the Catholic culture of the colonial setting, 
                                                
39 In this regard, O'Gorman's essay resonates strongly with more contemporary critiques, such as 
that of Wendy Brown's, of the Left's reaction to the crisis of Western political thought. 
40 In order to emphasize the Iberian “format” of emergent Creole patriotism, O'Gorman points to the 
close kinship between Catholic saints and creole heroes, between the colonial preacher's sermon 
and speeches at local political campaigns, between the dedication of Creole books to colonial 
officers and the (ongoing) servile gratitude expressed to local politicians for what it was merely their 
duty to do (23). In short, the religious anti-democratic features of Iberian society were fully 
incorporated into Creole nationalism. 
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modernity had meant sin, an evil deviation from the true faith and from authentic 
civilization. Cultural isolation, argues O'Gorman, had prevented the colonial soul 
from ever understanding and assimilating the “utopian” meaning of modernity. 
When political independence came about, it was primarily experienced as a 
traumatic exposure to the reality of the other America. About the latter, O'Gorman 
writes: “[t]here it was in all its threatening reality as a gigantic and inescapable 
factum which, for better or worse, had to be counted on, and in relation to which it 
was necessary to affirm one's own being” (28). Initially an object of fascination, the 
United States became the lasting point of reference for political disputes within 
Mexico, with liberals enthusiastically promoting imitation of North American 
institutions and conservatives defending the social and cultural norms inherited 
from colonial times. O'Gorman regards such disputes as the “axis-event of national 
becoming,” and his philosophical dissection of them reaches the perplexing 
conclusion that both sides ultimately wanted the same thing, namely, to enjoy 
modern wealth and prosperity without ever having to renounce Hispanic Catholic 
culture.  
In O'Gorman's analysis, conservatives were proud of their Hispanic heritage 
quite simply because, as Catholic providentialism essentially taught, it was the 
only true and authentic way of being. By definition, Catholic civilization “transcends 
the contingency of historical change” and its truth is guaranteed “by nothing less 
than divine will” (43); therefore, it was natural that Mexican conservatives wanted 
to preserve it. Liberals fundamentally agreed with conservatives on the desirability 
of preserving their nation's moral superiority, and regarded belief in the latter as 
perfectly compatible with the project of economic modernization. Yet they criticized 
the social hierarchies of the colonial setting: despotism, slavery, ignorance, and 
“the long inventory of injuries contained in the proclamations of the national heroes 
of Independence” (43). They hoped to redress such injuries by asserting the 
modern principle of “natural equality.” Their fatal assumption, however, was that 
equality would result from the adoption of modern codes, without anyone having to 
renounce their Hispanic heritage, which included a hierarchical organization of 
society. What liberal nationalists could not see, O'Gorman argues, was the cultural 
specificity of North American wealth and prosperity. He writes: 
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We have two internally contradictory theses which, in order to save their 
paralogism, blind themselves to the evidence of historical reality: the conservative 
thesis has to negate that the prosperity of North America is consubstantial with its 
historical way of being; the liberal thesis, on its part, has to negate that the 
difference separating North America from the new [Mexican] nation pertains to the 
historical becoming of each nation, that is, to their respective systems of beliefs, 
ideas and values, and not merely to the degree or stage of a same homogeneous 
development (40).     
 
The 19th century should have been “a moment of awakening,” of fully 
assuming that in order to enjoy the economic and political benefits of modernity, it 
was necessary for Ibero-American peoples to adopt “the system of beliefs, ideas 
and values” of modernity (49). Mexican liberalism's disavowed attachment to “the 
ontological legacy of the colony,” however, ultimately led to the failure of the early 
liberal program, that is, the failure of the copied liberal institutions to bring about 
the desired social and economic change. Since the conservatives and the liberals 
hated each other much more than they actually disagreed, the question of national 
identity in Mexico became fixated on a point of incompatibility between the past 
and the future. This paralyzing “clash of two prides” defined the paradox of 
Mexican becoming as “let's be like the Yankees, but let's not be them” (48). The 
result was an ambivalent situation in which “without ceasing to be modern,” 
Mexico has “never fully been so.” This state of events has forced Mexicans to 
arbitrate “between peculiar and distorted modules of the institutions they only half-
adopted, motivated by the mirage of universal natural equality” (48). Having 
diagnosed the problem in these terms, O'Gorman then turns to the examination of 
the response on the part of Mexican liberals to their own failure to bring about 
modernity. 
In a way that is reminiscent of Wendy Brown's political critique of 
melancholia and moralism among contemporary Left intellectuals, O'Gorman 
writes about the subsequent developments of Mexican nationalism in terms of a 
sentimental affair in which the liberal subject refused to accept the reality of its 
unrequitted love. Rather than acknowledging this fact, the liberals quickly placed 
the blame on their Anglo-American neighbor: the benevolent and humanitarian Dr. 
Jekyll of not so long ago now turned into the monstrous Mr. Hyde, who had 
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betrayed his high mission so as to redeem all the oppressed peoples (51). In 
O'Gorman's view, conspiratorial thinking among Mexican nationalists resulted from 
their failure to understand what social progress was really about, namely, a 
profound transformation of ideas and practical values. Besides disavowing the fact 
that American interventionism was often aided by its very detractors – that is, by 
Mexican liberals – conspiratorial thinking refused to acknowledge that there were 
no grounds for expecting that social justice, sovereignty and freedom would ensue 
automatically after the adoption of a political code that was similar to that of the 
United States (56).  
In an analogous critique of the contemporary American Left, Brown has 
argued that the latter's problem "goes beyond superficiality of political analysis or 
compensatory gestures in the face of felt impotence" (Politics Out of History 36). 
Moralistic condemnation of the state for not funding politically radical art, or for not 
treating as a priority the lives of gay men, prostitues and drug addicts "implicitly 
figures the state (and other mainstream institutions) as if it did not have specific 
political and economic investments (...) but was, rather, a momentarily misguided 
parent who forgot its promise to treat all her children in the same way" (36). In 
Brown's view, such a naive figuration of the state's institutions rejects "politics as a 
domain of power and history" and thereby leads to "a troubled and confused 
political stance" (36). Similarly, O'Gorman's point in criticizing Mexican liberals 
here is not to deny North American exploitative interventionism in Latin America. 
His point is rather that whoever finds him or herself surprised at such a fact must 
understand that, from a historical perspective, ethics has not generaly 
characterized the behavior of imperial powers. Significantly, he positions his use of 
psychological language in an antagonistic relation to “many contemporary 
historians who feel disdain for any explanation that does not subject itself to what 
they call "socio-economic factors," especially if such an explanation refers instead 
to ”the sphere of feelings and the personal singularities of men” (64). Against such 
an alienating conceptualisation, O'Gorman argues that overlooking the role of 
emotions makes it impossible to understand what Mexican liberals actually did 
when “progress” failed to arrive.  No socio-economic factor can explain, O'Gorman 
observes, a renewal of self-glorification in the face of social, economic and political 
disaster, which is exactly what the second generation of Mexican liberals did. After 
failing to achieve the wealth and freedom of the Yankees, they devoted 
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themselves to the nationalist assertion (“as a truth nothing less than apodictic”) of 
the spiritual superiority of Native American peoples (superiority, of course, over the 
Yankees). A new set of identitarian theses allowed them to claim that Mexico's 
initial infatuation with North America had been just a necessary “stage” in the 
spiritual unfolding of Ibero-American cultures. It had been necessary so that these 
cultures came to realize that the mistake involved trying to be like anyone else. Yet 
Mexicans had their own original identity, based on a unique mixture of indigenous 
and Spanish blood. This awarded them with a unique historical mission, namely, a 
mission to counteract the “pragmatic spirit” of Anglo-America. For O'Gorman, 
these ideas were nothing but the most pathetic delusion and a resentful 
psychological response to the repeated failure to bring about social change. Most 
importantly, they merely reinforced the ontological legacy of Spanish colonialism. 
He writes: 
 
.. from the wretched condition of a beggar who sought to save himself by taking 
refuge in the generosity of a wealthy neighbor, Ibero-America suddenly discovers 
that its destiny is to occupy the exalted throne reserved to the redeemer of history. 
What else could it do, if the domination of the natural world, so forcefully achieved 
by the Anglo-Saxon peoples, inherently lacked the spirit of a universal justice, a 
spirit that could only be provided by the consubstantial idealism of Ibero-American 
peoples? (70)41 
 
O'Gorman's narrative expands the field of reflection around the differences 
between Mexican nationalism and the historical formations that Benedict Anderson 
takes as a model in theory of nationalisms. Even in its modern/izing vein, Mexican 
nationalism exhibited a deeply problematic attachment to the Spanish civilizational 
model which as Lomnitz is always careful to emphasize, entailed complex social 
and political hierarchies. In O'Gorman's opinion, the three decades of Porfirio 
Díaz's rule of Mexico (1876-1911) were a great opportunity to overcome, once and 
for all, the “ontological legacy of the colony.” Porfirio Díaz, a liberal soldier of 
indigenous origins, demonstrated that he had the political talent to break for the 
first time the vicious circle of disputes between liberals and conservatives. His 
                                                
41 Cultural essentialism grew into a current of continental proportions, and is memorably recorded 
in the rather striking motto of Mexico's National University, which reads: Por mi raza hablará el 
espíritu [“For my race the spirit will speak”]. 
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thirty-year government resulted in the most stable and economically progressive 
period in the history of pre-revolutionary Mexico. The only problem was that Díaz 
was a ruthless dictator, and so O'Gorman admits that the Mexican Revolution had 
to come about. It would have been great, he judges, if the Revolution had been 
faithful to its own “historical necessity”: that of correcting the authoritarianism of 
the modernizing regime by introducing the “utopian” aspect of modernity, namely, 
democracy. Instead, revolutionary elites set out to destroy the existing liberal 
institutions and installed a revolutionary version of the “ontological legacy of the 
colony.”  Four decades into the 80-year rule of the “Party of the Institutionalized 
Revolution,” O'Gorman lamented:  
 
... with the reiteration ad nauseam of the inextinguishability of the revolutionary 
movement as such, the latter is transfigured into a metaphysical entity (...) which 
identifies itself, not only with the interests of the nation, but with the nation itself. 
The [Institutionalized] Revolution [now claims] besides infallibility in its leadership 
of the nation, immortality (...). A history without adventure, frozen and condemned 
to entrapment in the circle of its own becoming, without more destiny than that of 
airing a bit its constitutive conflict, without hope of overcoming it. Such is the 
crossroads of Eris, the crossroads of discord in which Mexican historical becoming 
got itself into and which – since its origins – had absolutely no raison d'être (95). 
 
It might seem that O'Gorman does not interrogate modernity as such, its 
desirability, its identification with universal freedom, progress, sovereignty and so 
on. In my interpretation, however, O'Gorman's argument is complex and 
consistent with his historical mindset. First, rather than embracing “modernity” as a 
whole, O'Gorman highlights the “utopian” project of modernity, which is a 
democratic ethos and not merely, as the liberals thought, a legalistic means to 
wealth and prosperity. Second, rather than embracing modernity as a universal 
model, O'Gorman insists on the cultural specificity of its two fundamental aspects, 
namely, an exploitative economic aspect and a “utopian” aspect which is the one 
that he regards as incompatible with the social hierarchies and the 
authoritarianism inherited from Spanish colonialism. Third, rather than advising all 
Mexicans to stoap moaning and suddenly “become Yankees,” O'Gorman calls for 
Mexican nationalists (among whom he actually found himself) to take up a 
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historico-political responsibility: that of freeing themselves from a cultural 
essentialism which so far has done nothing for Mexico but perpetuate the 
authoritarian culture that Spanish colonialism left behind. Is it possible to 
emancipate from this legacy? If so, what would it take and what would be the 
consequences? O'Gorman's text suggests that “freeing” oneself from this legacy 
entails a labour of self-analysis and an acknowledgment of disavowed 
attachments, which sounds like nothing less than a psychoanalytic investigation of 
nationalism as a subjective experience. Such an approach to nationalism had the 
aim of challenging the economicistic approaches that were dominant in Mexico in 
the 1970s. At this time, Mexican society was beginning to realize the high costs of 
authoritarianism and was thus beginning to question the need for an 
“institutionalized revolution.” What can we learn today from this history, and 
particularly in the context of the defense of maize? In the following section I will 
address this question from a post-Marxist perspective, which suggests that 
recognizing a constitutive failure of identity as such makes it possible today to 
pursue the "utopian" dimension of modernity in a more critical way.  
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Post-Marxism and the Ontological Legacy of Modernity  
 
What is specific and valuable about modern liberal democracy is that, when 
properly understood, it creates a space in which (...) power relations are always 
being put into question and no victory can be final (Mouffe, Democratic Paradox 
15). 
 
What I just tried to foreground from O’Gorman’s text is his injunction to 
respond, to acknowledge a responsibility, for our historicity. Whereas O'Gorman 
associates Mexican historicity with the religious and authoritarian worldview of 
Spanish colonialism, post-Marxism provides a way to analyze the "modern" 
filiations of the Mexican defense of national identity. This is important not just 
because such a defense has borrowed tropes from Western emancipatory 
narratives in a more explicit way than it has invoked Catholicism. It is important, I 
argue, because cultural essentialism is not merely a Hispanic phenomenon but 
actually pertains to the core of Western thought in general, including the modern 
emancipatory narratives that O'Gorman seems to attribute, perhaps too quickly 
and vaguely, to the "utopian" project of Anglo modernity. In Ernesto Laclau's post-
Marxist vocabulary, historical responsibility in both Anglo and Hispanic settings 
would entail an acknowledgment of our fundamental "lack" of a "cultural essence." 
According to Ernesto Laclau, Post-Marxism retains both the Marxist 
recognition of the social transformations entailed by capitalism and the Marxist 
orientation towards the construction of “an alternative project that is based on the 
ground created by those transformations, not on opposition to them” (New 
Reflections 55-56). Yet, instead of analyzing “contradictions” in the capitalist 
"system," post-Marxism situates “the subject's emergence in contemporary 
societies” in “the marks that contingency has inscribed on the apparently objective 
structures of the societies we live in” (61).42 Informed by poststructuralist 
philosophy and Lacanian psychoanalysis, post-Marxism understands the social 
(subject) as a signifying system constituted by dislocation, which means “that the 
                                                
42 As Paul Bowman explains, the “post-“ of post-Marxism merely signals the abandonment of 
Marxism’s essentialist axioms (Bowman 12). Post-Marxism rejects two central assumptions in 
Marxist theory: first, that capitalism is a system governed by an internal logic, and second, that its 
transformation can only result from the development of such an internal logic (Laclau, New 
Reflections 52).    
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real – including physical space – is in the ultimate instance temporal” (42). The 
temporality of being poses a threat in response to which the subject emerges 
through (political) acts of spatialization. Such acts, however, can never be fully 
achieved because dislocation is "spatially unrepresentable" (42). If dislocation 
were a contradiction, it would call for a logical resolution within a rational 
framework, yet according to post-Marxism dislocation actually amounts to letting 
“an element of radical undecidability into the structure of any objectivity” (21). In 
this sense Laclau asserts that we will only be able to undertake a “realistic 
analysis of socio-political processes” when we abandon “the objectivist prejudice 
that social forces are something” and undertake instead “an examination of what 
they do not manage to be” (New Reflections 38). What then can the post-Marxist 
approach contribute to the study of nationalism?  
According to Laclau, “any frustration or unsatisfied demand will be 
compensated for or offset by the myth of an achieved fullness” (New Reflections 
63). The "myth of an achieved fullness" would operate, like all myths in Laclau's 
conception, as "a principle of reading of a given situation, whose terms are 
external to what is representable in the objective spatiality constituted by the given 
structure" (61). In other words, myth arises from and in response to the "structural 
dislocation" of any given situation or structure. In this sense, the work of myth 
coincides with the work of subjectivity, which must be understood, within a 
psychoanalytic perspective, as a precarious response to a lack of "objective" 
identity. Both myth and subjectivity would attempt “to suture that dislocated space 
through the constitution of a new space of representation” (61). Thus, instead of 
being seen as a mere ideological instrument of a ruling class or as a positive or 
"objective" expression of cultural difference (Torfing 192), nationalism can be 
understood as an always already failed subjective attempt to overcome 
constitutive dislocation through "the myth of an achieved fullness." 
Like every "myth of achieved fullness," a national(ist) myth would have both 
a literal content – made up of concrete demands – and a metaphorical aspect 
which would stem "from the fact that the concrete literal content of myth represents 
something different from itself: the very principle of a fully achieved literality,”43 that 
                                                
43 Even the objectivity of objective language is itself a construction relying on rhetorical, textual, 
poetic, and otherwise literary techniques; or, as Laclau say, “all discourse of fixation becomes 
metaphorical: literality is, in actual fact, the first of all metaphors” (New Reflections 111).  
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is, “a fullness that cannot be granted by the reality of the present” (63). In the case 
of Mexican nationalism, particular social demands such as the protection of native 
Mexican maize would “constitute a certain spatial model – an ideal model in this 
sense: the mythical space of a possible social order” (Laclau, New Reflections 64). 
The literal content of the model would be composed by the measures required to 
satisfy the demands, such as banning transgenic imports from the U.S. Yet the 
literal content would limit the possibilities of expansion of the mythical space. By 
contrast, the latter's metaphorical potency would be activated by invoking maize as 
fundamental for national identity. This rhetoric would be able to accomodate other 
concrete demands, from a better education based on local needs and local 
knowledges to the promotion of Mexican artisanal foods and self-government 
rights for indigenous peoples. In Laclau's words, the mythical order invoked by the 
first demand “only needs other dislocations and demands to be added to the 
fullness that the mythical space must represent for the metaphorical moment to 
become autonomous from the literality of the original dislocation, and for the 
mythical space to be transformed into an imaginary horizon” (64). Myth then 
becomes a “social imaginary,” a situation in which metaphor dominates over literal 
content, manages to structure “a field of intelligibility” and becomes the “condition 
of possibility for the emergence of any object” (64). Even in the ideal scenario for 
activists who assert the need of a national project around maize, such a national 
project would still be a precarious and paradoxical attempt to "suture" a lack that 
cannot be eliminated since it is, in the first place, the condition of possibility of the 
national project itself. Where, then, would the latter's emancipatory potential lie?  
Laclau's review of Western emancipatory narratives suggests that a full 
realization of the implications of constitutive dislocation only became evident in the 
aftermath of 20th century totalitarianisms. Classical antiquity, he says, had reached 
its limits in a cyclical reduction of time to space, whereas medieval thought 
domesticated time by turning it into a single, final struggle with the forces of evil. 
Modern rationalism recycled this Christian eschatology by turning it into a rational, 
teleological process, that is, into “history” (New Reflections 72). Liberalism and 
Marxism attempted to take the place of Christianity by claiming to bridge the gap 
between particular representations and universal knowledge (“true” or “free 
society”). This radical attempt, however, turned out to be incompatible with the 
other essential requirements of emancipation, such as the end of violence and 
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exclusion. Within a rationalist framework, any lasting political victory against any 
particular injustice tends to assume “the form of a mere objective presence” by 
concealing its own contingency, which is to say the traces of the exclusion on 
which it is based (Emancipation(s) 34). Yet an unavoidable consequence of 
dislocation (which the post-Marxists call "antagonism") is that destroying the 
hierarchies on which particular exclusions are based will “always require the 
construction of other exclusions for collective identities to be able to emerge” (33). 
Post-Marxism therefore departs from the modern thinking of emancipation in so far 
as the latter assumes that “a free society is one from which power has been totally 
eliminated” (33). As Laclau and Mouffe summarize: 
 
Our thesis is that the constiution of a social identity is an act of power and that 
identity as such is power. (...) the constitutive nature of antagonism entails 
asserting the contingent nature of all objectivity and this, in turn, means that any 
objectivity is a threatened objectivity. If, in spite of this, an objectivity manages to 
partially affirm itself, it is only by repressing that which threatens it (New 
Reflections 32). 
 
Laclau claims to remain within the legacy modern emancipatory narratives 
in so far as the latter have opened up the possibility of thinking "dislocation's 
nature as pure event or temporality” (75). By partly secularizing the medieval 
model, liberalism and Marxism made the thinking of democracy possible (75). That 
is, they made possible the recognition of an ontological paradox that all societies 
have in common, according to which “(...) what constitutes the condition of 
possibility of a signifying system – its limits – is also what constitutes its condition 
of impossibility"  (Emancipation(s) 37).44 For Laclau, there is no solution to this 
paradox generated by the temporality of being. We can negotiate the paradox but 
never supersede it; “we can play with both sides of the ambiguity and produce 
results by preventing any of them from prevailing in an exclusive way, but the 
                                                
44 Jacob Torfing explains that antagonism involves a loss of meaning that cannot be symbolized 
(44) and that is not captured by the Marxist rational framework. In this regard, Laclau explains that 
“there is nothing in the category of ’seller of labour power’ to suggest [that] resistance [to 
exploitation] is a logical conclusion” (Laclau, New Reflections 9). In order for antagonism to arise, it 
is necessary for capitalist exploitation to threaten something outside the relations of production, 
that is, social life as a whole, in which the worker's identity goes beyond his or her relationship with 
the capitalist. For example, if wages fall or if there are fluctuations in the labour market, the 
worker's identity as a consumer, as a parent, or as a critical theorist will be threatened. 
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ambiguity as such cannot be properly resolved” (30). In the same vein, fellow post-
Marxist Chantal Mouffe argues against treating the paradox of the social as a 
mere contradiction to be either solved or rejected. In The Democratic Paradox, she 
explains how to embrace the paradox of liberal democracy just as Laclau affirms 
modern emancipation as a system of logical incompatibilities that can be played 
against each other in a strategic way (Laclau, Emancipation(s) 2).  
Mouffe engages with Carl Schmitt's argument that democracy necessarily 
presupposes a dynamics of inclusion and exclusion. Since democratic rights can 
only be exercised within particular human groups, democracy as a form of rule is 
logically incompatible with the liberal emphasis on universal rights and freedoms 
(Democratic Paradox 4). By contrast with Schmitt, Mouffe believes that democracy 
and liberty can coexist, even if in necessarily imperfect ways.45 Imperfection 
actually constitutes a virtue by impeding “both total closure and total 
dissemination” (10). As the incompatible principles of democracy and liberalism 
are played against each other according to specific circumstances, in every case 
there will always be an alternative to the existing configuration of power. If we 
cannot think of the alternative, that is merely because “[t]he status quo has 
become naturalized” (5). For instance, at present democratic politics is mistakenly 
understood as the search for an inaccessible consensus whereas it should rather 
be understood as an “agonistic confrontation” between conflicting interpretations of 
the constitutive values of liberal democracy (that is, of equality and liberty). 
“Agonistic pluralism,” according to Mouffe, is the best way of acknowledging the 
tension between equality and liberty that the democratic paradox encapsulates. 
Post-Marxism suggests to us that not even a whole-hearted investment in 
the “utopian” project of modernity (in “a truly democratic nation”) could have 
spared, or could ever spare, Mexican nationalists from endless conflicts and 
logical contradictions. It also suggests that conflicts and contradictions are not an 
obstacle for democracy but rather part and parcel of it, in so far as they keep open 
the possibility of challenging hegemonic voices or narratives. Thus, it seems to me 
that the main point of post-Marxism is not to affirm conflicts and contradictions per 
                                                
45 Liberty and equality are incompatible with each other but this is not to say that their relation is an 
interaction between two ontologically separate principles. Rather than in terms of ontological 
dualism, Mouffe proposes to understand the democratic paradox in terms of mutual 
“contamination.” She writes, in this regard: “As always in social life, there is a “gestaltic” dimension 
which is decisive in understanding the perception and behavior of collective subjects” (Mouffe, 
Democratic Paradox 10). 
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se but rather to strengthen the social's capacity for “agonistic pluralism.” The latter 
is premised on the acknowledgment of radical contingency as the fundamental 
source and inescapable limit of society. In the following chapters, I attempt to 
identify some of the ways in which radical contingency arises in the cultural politics 
of biotechnology in Mexico, preventing the “true nation” from establishing itself as 
a kind of universal consensus. That is, I attempt to highlight the moments in which 
radical disagreements around the meaning of social life in Mexico take center 
stage and make evident the paradoxical constitution of Mexicanness. By invoking 
post-Marxism as a reference for this way of proceeding, however, I do not want to 
reduce the Mexican debates on biotechnology to a mere example for political 
theory. The work of Laclau and Mouffe allows me to theorize Mexican nationalism 
in a non-essentialist way but it does not provide ready-made answers to the 
question of what might constitute an effective intervention in the singular situation 
faced by the Mexican defenders of maize. Such a question seems to require a 
more radical orientation than political theory seems to offer.  
In Post-Marxism versus Cultural Studies, Paul Bowman differentiates 
cultural studies from the post-Marxist "realistic analysis" of sociopolitical processes 
in terms of how each of them responds to what that they both have in common 
with the outside world, namely, desire as “constitutive lack.” He writes: 
 
Cultural studies and post-Marxism's constitutive but ultimately ‘impossible' desire is 
to intervene, fully. If they could fully intervene (cessation of desire/eradication of 
lack) they would no longer ”need” to be. Their condition of possibility is, in more 
than one way, also their condition of impossibility (101). 
 
Acknowledging the “metaphysical” character of the founding desire of 
cultural studies (that is, the desire to intervene “fully”), it is indeed possible, 
Bowman suggests, to pursue the desire in a critical way. He argues that while 
cultural studies has interrogated its own institutional place through a rigorous 
attention to the irreducible singularity of cultural and political phenomena, post-
Marxist political analysis has used deconstructive formulae merely to confirm the 
institutional authority of political theory.46 In particular, he calls into question the 
                                                
46 According to Bowman's stark diagnosis, “post-Marxism uses and abuses deconstruction in order 
to institute itself” (156).  
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post-Marxist tendency to construe the complexity of singular situations in terms of 
metadiscursive categories. If anything can be diagnosed as temporal and thereby 
undecidable, “[s]o what? Or rather, and what? Then what?” (79). Bowman 
suggests that cultural studies is better equipped to answer such questions 
because, unlike post-Marxism, it has deployed deconstruction as an anti-
disciplinary orientation rather than as a mere instrument for the analysis of 
phenomena “out there.” Drawing on John Mowitt's genealogy of text as an “anti-
disciplinary object,” Bowman argues that cultural studies can intervene more 
effectively than post-Marxism to the extent that cultural studies refuses to be 
“purely logical, formalising, and analytical” (59). For cultural studies, the task is not 
only to understand the ontological mechanisms of the political. The task is also to 
investigate and make explicit “how this (each and every “this” of academic 
intellectual work) might already be ensnared within a complexly reticulated political 
context, and how it might thereby seek to make a difference to it, within it, and 
’beyond’ it” (82). As opposed to subsuming objects or phenomena in the 
macropolitical framework of post-Marxist “discourse analysis,” cultural studies can 
deploy deconstruction in order to problematize the construction of knowledge 
about objects and phenomena “by drawing attention to its institutional and 
theoretical frames, and exploring the question of their ethico-political implications” 
(175).  
Even though Bowman's critique of post-Marxism is rather strong, what he 
actually advocates is a more fruitful relation between the two paradigms, or modes 
of thinking. He does not outline (since this would be inconsistent with his 
argument) any general recipes for achieving that goal, but he does provide a 
useful starting point when he asks: “...once the topic has been chosen, how does 
the academic work itself intervene?” (200). The only way I can begin to try and 
answer this question is by situating my own approach to Mexican nationalism in 
the context of recent debates around the status of the nation as a political category 
and around the ethical and political responsibilities of academic or intellectual 
workers dealing specifically with Latin American problematics. 
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Regional Intellectuals and a Retreat from Theory 
 
...if cultural studies wants to say something significant to Latin American countries 
(and not only to their scholars), it must once more explore the eroded space of the 
nation in order to understand a two-century history that cannot be fashionably 
dismissed and swept away by the thrust of a concept such as globalization (Sarlo 
339). 
 
In 2002, Argentinian cultural critic Beatriz Sarlo argued that it was necessary 
to revise the “globalizing perspective” that had dominated, in her view, Latin 
American cultural studies since the 1980s (332). While the “cultural populism” of 
the 1980s found in globalization “an array of opportunities for the exercise of a 
liberating mass culture” (338), in Sarlo's view the metamorphosis of Latin 
American criticism into cultural studies was for the most part merely ideological 
and detrimental. Before the 1980s, Latin American criticism had sought to address 
social disappointment at the state's failure to realize the promises made by 19th 
century liberal nationalists. The tradition evolved from literary essays on “the 
national being” towards sociological studies of popular culture in the 1960s and 
early 1970s. During this period Latin American critics analyzed popular cultures 
from the standpoint of resistance to authoritarian state apparatuses. Canonical 
authors of the transatlantic radical tradition, starting with Gramsci, Fanon and 
Benjamin (but extending to Raymond Williams, Richard Hoggart, Stuart Hall and 
Pierre Bourdieu) all received attention, translation and publication in Latin America 
even prior to their reception in the United States (Sarlo 335). Despite the lack of 
disciplinary self-consciousness such as there is in Anglo-Saxon settings, Latin 
American cultural criticism was then unified by a sort of critical arrogance, “as 
though political issues were closely tied to our analysis and our concepts” (335). In 
the 1980s, however, this “utopian desire” to “cross the boundary separating 
academe from the social world, and to bridge the gap between the intellectual and 
the political fields” (336) was displaced by the problematic of “democratic 
transitions” under conditions of globalization.  
According to Sarlo, “globalization has not merely displaced the nation but has 
conquered it” (339). Far from being “one of the good news of the millennium”, the 
erosion of nation-states in Latin America has turned out to be “a Hobbesian 
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nightmare” (338). It would be difficult to disagree with Sarlo's call to recognize that 
globalization brings about “a disintegrated society, whose components are all at 
war with each other even when they think that they are carrying on the same 
battle” (338). In Mexico as elsewhere in Latin America, neoliberal policies have not 
just created more inequality but have also turned society into a breeding ground 
for extreme forms of social violence that are now reductively associated with the 
“war on drugs.” Yet the problem for Sarlo does not just lie with globalization or 
neoliberalism. The main problem for her is that under the influence of “avant-
garde” theory, Latin American cultural studies has come to perceive itself as “the 
ultimate epistemological break” with totalizing Western concepts, such as the 
humanities and the nation-state, leading to a closure of debate around nations and 
national identities. This closure, she claims, has irresponsibly overlooked the 
unequal consequences that the erosion of the nation-state has had for the Global 
North and the South (333).47 
At stake in Sarlo's criticism of cultural studies and poststructuralism seems to 
be the question as to whether a post-Marxist and, more broadly, a "textual" 
approach to nationalism is capable of fulfilling any aspiration of intervening 
ethically and politically in the Mexican debates around maize biotechnology, which 
are obviously connected with the problematic of globalization. For Sarlo, the 
erosion of modern identities entails some very specific challenges for Latin 
American scholars. Her critique suggests a tension analogous to that described by 
Paul Bowman between cultural studies and post-Marxism, except for the fact that, 
in this case, both cultural studies and post-Marxism appear as morally 
questionable from the vantage point of a particular location. Sarlo claims that “the 
avant-garde representatives of deconstruction and post-structuralism” have lent 
themselves to “betraying” the foundational political commitments of Latin American 
cultural critique by becoming complicit with the cultural logic of late capitalism. She 
describes transnational cultural studies as “a field that quotes liberally from 
deconstructive philosophical sources, but that curiously enough does not feel 
uncomfortable with words such as empowerment and self-empowerment” (340). 
                                                
47 Sarlo is right to observe that “while globalization may have weakened the national state, nations 
have not for that reason disappeared; either you have national fundamentalisms or you have new 
ways of preserving  sovereignty through regional alliances” (336). Even Mexican Zapatismo  claims 
rights to national belonging. In Chapter V, I will devote some attention to this phenomenon yet 
precisely in order to  demonstrate the relevance of what Sarlo calls, somewhat pejoratively, “avant-
garde theory.”  
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“Beyond the tragic social inequality,” she blames cultural studies for the Latin 
American scholars’ "growing sense of belonging to an unimportant, secondary and 
backward region of the world” (339). As a way to redress this injurious situation, 
Sarlo recommends Latin American cultural critics should “consider what is really 
happening in our countries after globalization” by contributing to “the description, in 
precise historical terms, of the ways in which national society is dismantled” (338). 
As part of this process, she demands scholars make “a major effort to relate the 
philosophical map of concepts with the empirical map of research, and with the 
ideological map of the ambitions of cultural studies as a public discipline” (340-
341).  
In my critical examination of the Mexican biotechnology debates, I take heed 
of Sarlo's call to strengthen the public orientation of cultural studies in Latin 
America. I also try to relate philosophical concepts to issues that tend to be 
treated, at least in Mexico, in more empirical ways. It is my impression, however, 
that it is also important to problematize the sense of injury that Sarlo invokes when 
she blames “avant-garde theory” for the marginalization of Latin American nations. 
One of my basic premises is that a post-foundational approach to cultural politics 
is indispensable for a critical examination of how “national society” (and anything 
that gets to count as its representative) gets construed as an empirical fact. The 
fact that a social movement such as the Mexican Network in Defense of Maize is 
rising against the violent aspects of globalization (in this case, the corporate 
enclosure of agriculture) does not imply, in my view, that I must automatically 
endorse its nationalistic rhetoric or that I should assume any essential stability of 
“national society.” My argument is that assuming precisely the opposite (that is, an 
essential instability of “national society”) allows us to raise ethical and political 
questions that are relevant both to the Mexican debates around maize 
biotechnology and to cultural studies as a publicly oriented (anti)discipline. Such 
an argument is of course not new, but it continues to stand as a minoritarian 
position in Latin American intellectual debates. Thus, Latin Americanist 
philosopher Alberto Moreiras describes the history of such debates as a “quasi-
systematic exploration of the specificity of the Latin American alternative modernity 
from what today are outdated concepts of identity and difference” (The Exhaustion 
of Difference 4). In his view, it was precisely the lack of a thorough engagement 
with the anti-essentialist theoretical explorations of cultural studies that made Latin 
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Americanism uninteresting and even irresponsible under conditions of 
globalization. Moreiras agrees that “it is certainly our responsibility as Latin 
Americanists to take stock of what it is that we do, so that our own ‘immaterial 
labour’ (...) does not end up serving at the cultural level the very apparatus that 
constrains Latin American social and political options” ("Deconstruction..." 308). 
However, "difference” as an essentialist category has been “exhausted” as a 
viable driver of Latin Americanism. Consequently, the question that needs to be 
asked at a theoretical level now is the following one: “Can critical reason dissolve 
in identitarian or differential description?” (5) For Moreiras, it must not do so, which 
is why, for him, deconstruction is indispensable for a critical re-imagination of Latin 
Americanism as a publicly oriented theory and practice. Fortunately, and even 
though its advocacy remains quite minoritarian in Latin American universities, the 
legacy of deconstructive theory has not disappeared entirely from Latin American 
thinking. 
In a response to Sarlo's article, Uruguayan critic Mabel Moraña interprets 
Sarlo's position as a legitimate concern over the need to conceive forms of 
organization that effectively respond to the consequences of neoliberal 
globalization in Latin America. Agreeing with Sarlo on the need to problematize 
“redemptionist and self-legitimizing” assumptions in cultural studies, Moraña 
nevertheless attempts to take the blame for Latin American disaster away from 
cultural studies. As an antidote to nihilism and melancholy, she asks us to 
differentiate between the need to criticize the critic and the nature of the 
phenomena analyzed (111). The Latin American predicament, Moraña says, calls 
“now more than ever, for a dismantling of the modern ideas that historically 
constitute a fundamental part of the extreme situations we now face” (112). We 
should not forget that most forms of nationalism in Latin America have legitimated 
authoritarian rather than democratic social projects, and have done so under the 
umbrella of corrupt and incompetent states. We should also keep in mind that 
solutions to current problems such as drug trafficking and financial bankruptcy are 
“unthinkable if we are not able to surpass the imposed parameters of the national, 
even if the daily battles as well as the suffering are taking place within them” (113). 
Therefore, before reviving nationalism in the name of Latin American suffering we 
need an “extensive discussion with regard to the distinction to be made between 
nation and state in order to define the role that we would assign to each of these 
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categories, and the measure of their political and historical responsibility” (112). In 
her own account of the trajectory of Latin American cultural studies, Moraña draws 
our attention to how Latin America has oscillated between the imported 
vocabularies of liberalism and Marxism, none of which have been able to 
productively engage with local and regional specificities. It is for this reason that 
Latin American thought insists on a mythic dimension of the nation as a place of 
collective “communion,” of “solidarity on a grand scale.”48 Moraña suggests that: 
 
(...) perhaps it is to this dimension that we are really referring when we discuss the 
nation from within the horizons of neoliberalism and globalization: the need to 
recuperate, as if it were a matter of faith, a fraternal citizenship which would fulfill 
an agglutinating and mobilizing role in our time. If this were the case, it would be a 
genuine challenge to both praxis and theory to examine the ways in which the 
myth of the national could be articulated to the realities of globalization (114).  
 
It seems to me that this position resonates strongly with the idea of “New 
Cultural Studies” proposed by Gary Hall and Clare Birchall in their eponymously 
titled 2006 collection. What distinguishes “new” cultural studies from its prior 
disciplinary incarnations is an ethico-political commitment to “theory,” and more 
specifically to deconstruction. The latter is understood as an anti-disciplinary 
theoretical practice that seeks to “intervene” by exposing the incompleteness of 
disciplinary approaches and particularly those premised on a devaluation of 
"theory." More specifically, Gary Hall diagnoses a recent “retreat from theory,” with 
all its empiricist underpinnings as a moralizing and melancholic response to a 
crisis in the Left-leaning political project that was foundational to the discipline and 
project of cultural studies in its early days.49 He explicitly relates such a disciplinary 
response of cultural studies to the disavowed attachments theorized by Wendy 
                                                
48 According to Moraña, only several thinkers, such as Peruvian socialist José Carlos Mariátegui 
(1894-1930), have occasionally been able to “deconstruct” nationalist mythologies. Taking 
Mariátegui as an inspiration, she speculates about “a form of reflection that, taking local 
specificities as its point of departure, is able (...) to challenge the bourgeois nation from within, with 
critical and political thinking which might constitute an alternative to the models of liberal modernity” 
(112). 
49 The project of mainstream “cultural studies” (as represented by Stuart Hall and Raymond 
Williams) “… has always been to develop critical positions primarily for those whose social function 
was to study and teach in universities the humanities which could correlate meaningfully with the 
core philosophical assumptions of certain radical political movements” (Gilbert, "Cultural Studies..." 
183). 
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Brown in Politics out of History. In a situation in which it is difficult to tell "good" 
from "evil" – since capitalism now penetrates everything, including the university 
and therefore cultural studies itself – new cultural studies seeks to invent, through 
risky but rigorous strategies, knowledge-based interventions within capitalism, 
beyond the mourning, moralism and melancholia that so trouble the academic 
Left. This is not to say that new cultural studies has renounced its public or political 
orientation, but rather that it has stopped looking for it, on the basis of equivalence, 
somewhere "outside" capitalism. As Joanna Zylinska explains:  
 
(...) the vision of a unified left fighting its crusade against the ills of capitalism is a 
symptom of the same moralising desire for totality and closure. Taking into account 
the dispersed character of the left and its politics, as well as the reformulation of its 
economics-focused agenda via an engagement with more ”culturalist issues” such 
as new social movements, cultural industries and identity politics, I postulate that 
cultural studies – for which culture is not a mere ”decorative addendum to the 
"hard world" of production and things” (…) but rather a structuring, material 
element in the politico-economic landscape – can help us respond to the current 
moral conjuncture (77). 
 
A good counterexample to Sarlo's complaint about "avant-garde theory" can 
be found in Jeremy Gilbert's book Anticapitalism and Culture, in which the author 
argues that contemporary cultural studies remains informed “by a resolutely 
political critique of capitalism, individualism, patriarchy, colonialism and hierarchy 
in general” (66). In fact, his argument about the kind of work that cultural studies 
can do for social movements has been extremely valuable for my own approach to 
the cultural politics of biotechnology in Mexico. Gilbert argues that the anti-
essentialist turn in philosophy and political theory has contributed to the 
transformation of the militant ideology critique into some more nuanced forms of 
cultural analysis, forms which can prove useful for social movements struggling 
against the negative effects of capitalist globalization. Cultural studies as a mode 
of critical thinking coming from within academia can first of all remind those 
professing the discourse of anticapitalism that “historically, people do not act 
against a given social order unless they believe that there is a good chance that it 
can be changed and that the likely benefit to them of changing it will outweigh the 
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risks involved in the attempt” (208). In particular, Gilbert takes the time to develop 
an unusual articulation of Laclau and Mouffe's work with that of Gilles Deleuze.50 
What these approaches have in common is that they reject “old-fashioned ways of 
thinking about politics which see society as a single coherent thing with a centre, 
or a top, a singular locus of power, which a radical movement must seek to occupy 
and control” (95). Rather, for all of them, power resides in “the capacity to set the 
terms of reference in any given situation, defining what is to be accepted, implicitly 
or explicitly, as truth and normality” (137). If power is dispersed throughout the 
culture, argues Gilbert, then it is a matter of connecting self-conscious activism 
with the “spontaneous” anticapitalism that expresses itself in popular culture, 
including mass media culture. 
The question for Gilbert is what kinds of political work contemporary 
anticapitalist movements need to carry out in order to pursue their goals 
effectively. He identifies two problematic features in contemporary anticapitalism, 
which he sees as remaining under the spell of an “activist imaginary.” One of them 
is blindness to political strategy, derived from the assumption that heterogeneous 
political actors already share a fundamental identity (210). The standard form of 
activist literature, an endless catalogue of disparate organizations and 
movements, would be symptomatic of this tendency (203). Another, related feature 
of the activist imaginary is “a state of perpetual outrage and surprise at the 
exploitative and undemocratic character of capitalist society” (209). Leading 
figures of global anti-capitalism, such as Noam Chomsky and Naomi Klein, often 
reduce their interventions to a ceaseless recounting of the outrageous exploits of 
corporate power. Rather than persuading people that another world is possible, 
the perpetual outrage of the activist discourse has the counterproductive effect of 
“reinforcing the general assumption that such a state of affairs is normal and 
inevitable” (209). Hence, in my own analysis of the Mexican defense of maize, I 
                                                
50 The differences between those thinkers lie in their contrasting conceptions of desire. Laclau and 
Mouffe are rigorously committed to Lacanian psychoanalysis which understands the human subject 
as constituted by an inherent lack. For Deleuze and Guattari, however, desire is a form of 
productive fullness. In Gilbert's view, the disadvantage of Laclau and Mouffe's psychoanalytic 
perspective is “a decidedly negative conception of the social,” which is replicated in their 
understanding of antagonism as constitutive of a political community. This is a problem because 
anticapitalism needs to conceive of groups as bound together not just by a logic of antagonism but 
also by relations of solidarity (158-159). Yet, like some critics of Deleuze, Laclau and Mouffe would 
emphasize that political creativity never occurs in a vacuum. Their relative advantage over Deleuze 
would be their capacity to construct a strategy “beyond the limitations of a naïve perspective which 
is constantly surprised by the fact that solidarity is so precarious” (New Reflections 159). 
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examine not just the “biological facts” or the “rational arguments” of the different 
participants in the debate. I focus on how the arguments get constructed, not 
always rationally, in media and cultural platforms that are often left unconsidered 
by social scientific approaches. My attention to the broader narrative frameworks 
of the contemporary dispute around Mexican maize seeks to foreground its nature 
as a battle around the meaning of social life under capitalism. I see this work as a 
critique of the Mexican “activist imaginary” that intervenes by exposing disavowed 
investments even in the most radical discourses, including potentially my own. 
Moreover, it intervenes by foregrounding the possibility of articulating the dominant 
language of activism in alternative ways. As Gilbert points out, once anticapitalism 
acknowledges that the question of rhetorical strategy is key, it can start to work on 
“different and unpredictable acts of naming and of carefully calculated intervention, 
which only detailed analysis of specific conjunctures can make possible” (133). In 
the United Kindgom, for instance, successful campaigning against GMO's 
strategically mobilized a cultural attachment to rural aesthetics. While such an 
attachment had a conservative face, campaigners were able to mobilize it for 
progressive ends. The question, Gilbert says, is how to open more of such 
possibilities for the future by “actualizing” the radical potential of cultural 
attachments while “counter-actualizing” their potential to transform into hostile 
defensiveness (191).51 As I work towards the final chapter of this thesis, I attempt 
to develop a number of preparatory examples of how a theoretical understanding 
(as well as a subjective acknowledgment) of the "genetic contamination of 
Mexican nationalism" (which I present as my own "unpredictable act of naming") 
can simultaneously contribute strategic insights to political activism and open up a 
future beyond hostile defensiveness against biotechnology. By way of conclusion 
to this chapter, I want to reflect on the thorny issue of drawing on psychoanalytic 
vocabularies in order to undertake a critique of identitarian positions, including the 
unreflective nationalism of many Mexican defenders of "native maize."   
 
                                                
51 Importantly, aesthetics plays a key role in this process that the Old Left typically underestimated. 
Cosmopolitan values such as cultural diversity and solidarity (beyond the immediately known social 
group) might be more effectively promoted through the aesthetic realm that includes eating, 
dancing and lovemaking (195). Social networking sites such as Facebook, in which people learn to 
present themselves according to hegemonic values, also betray a widespread desire for 
collaboration, cooperation and free exchange of ideas. All of this makes such sites strategic tools 
for anticapitalism (198). 
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Conclusion: The Nation in Psychoanalysis 
 
The malaise in the culture, whether Mexican or of any other people, arises from 
the gulf between the self and that “spoken portrait” which the Other is able to 
produce. Further, the self equates to the difference between the real and the 
image that takes shape through countless myths, legends, and essays with 
historical pretentions (Braunstein, "Freud and the Malaise" nonpag.). 
 
In a recent article titled "Freud and the Malaise in Mexican Culture – Mexico 
is Burning," psychoanalyst Néstor Braunstein has pointed out that Freud's great 
contribution to the analysis of culture lies in his call for the deconstruction of 
identity. Contrary to what popular and legal discourses routinely imply, from a 
psychoanalytic perspective people do not “have” an identity. The existence of the 
unconscious means that we are not identical even to ourselves, which means in 
turn that identity is never anything more than a mirage. Psychonalysis helps us to 
understand how the subject emerges in response to intepretations, always partial 
and contingent, of the narratives available in culture. As a Lacanian, Braunstein 
believes that language operates as a distorting mirror which is indispensable for 
the emergence of the subject. As a “fictive structure” which results from identifying 
ourselves with the distorted images in the mirror, subjectivity is “the mortar of 
human existence” ("Mexico in Pshychoanalysis"). Yet psychoanalysis is concerned 
with subjective differences between individuals. Indeed, nothing allows us to 
conclude that those differences repeat themselves in order to constitute a 
collectivity. In other words, there cannot be anything like a psychoanalysis of 
“Mexicanness.” However, in the case of Mexico, “something persuades us to go 
on,” and that something is the very existence of a widespread discourse on 
“Mexicanness.”  
Braunstein strongly argues that “the Mexican does not exist” outside of the 
theories and characterizations of covertly or openly racist writers. There are no 
specifically Mexican traits, he says, no “solitude,” no “melancholy,” no “inferiority 
complex” due to “racial interbreeding,” no “conquest trauma” and not even 
nationalism, that “reactive idealization” which is “the other face of racist 
disparagement” ("Freud and the Malaise"). Yet the accumulation of images such 
as these imposes itself as “a ghostly presence in the overall image people have of 
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themselves,” and it is precisely the ethico-political consequences of such an 
imposition of sedimented discourse that are important for psychoanalysis. If 
“Mexicanness” is in a sense "real" for psychoanalysis, it is because it contributes 
to the shaping of that which is made to count as reality. Braunstein calls on us to 
ask, in each instance: “who is the optician polishing up the distorting mirrors; why 
does he do it, who does he work for?” ("Freud and the Malaise"). For Braunstein it 
is very important to emphasize instead that if “Mexico is burning,” this is not due to 
any fundamental characteristic of its inhabitants, but rather  to the place assigned 
to the country by global organized crime, by authoritarian elites allied to foreign 
capital, by the deadly unwritten law enforcing corruption at all levels of public 
office, and by the multiple forms of social discrimination. 
Braunstein's accusation of racism directed against any psychologizing 
approach to “Mexicanness” perhaps calls for a justification for my own use of 
O'Gorman's narrative about “the Mexican soul.”52 According to O'Gorman, 
disavowed conservatism – which appears as a kind of neurotic attachment to the 
mother – sabotaged the emancipatory aspirations of nineteenth-century Mexican 
nationalists by reinforcing the social hierarchies inherited from the colonial era. 
Ultimately, it also sabotaged the revolutionary aspirations of twentieth-century 
Mexican nationalists, to whom O'Gorman's essay was addressed. As a 
provocative alternative to the routine denunciations of economic imperialism, 
O'Gorman exhorted “the nation” – that is, the nationalist subject-position – to free 
itself from cultural essentialism, whereby the latter had only served to legitimate 
political authoritarianism as the enduring legacy of colonial times. If O'Gorman's 
allegorical psychoanalysis of “the Mexican soul” remains pertinent today, it is 
precisely and only to the extent that it resonates with other critiques of 
essentialism in contemporary philosophy, psychoanalysis and political theory. The 
latter do not merely assert that cultural identity "does not exist," but rather 
interrogate the material and ethical and  consequences of its political 
"construction" in specific contexts.  
Stuart Hall has asked why, after the comprehensive philosophical critique of 
“the self-sustaining subject at the centre of post-Cartesian western metaphysic,” 
we should continue to have discussions about “identity” ("Introduction" 1). While 
                                                
52 Braunstein seems to refer indirectly to O'Gorman when he cites the notion of “historical trauma” 
among those attempts to characterize Mexicans in an essentialist and therefore racist way.  
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such a concept cannot be thought in the old, essentialist way, Hall argues that we 
cannot do without it if we are to think through and understand key issues such as 
politics and agency. After all, the very idea of a “self-sustaining subject” continues 
to play a dominant role in the context of global capitalism, through its neoliberal 
associations with material prosperity, symbolic status, and “freedom.” As Hall 
says, for agency to be thinkable at all it is necessary to assume that identification 
requires a psychic investment that is not entirely predetermined by power. The 
point is to recognize that ideology works both at the level of the drives – the 
subject as an investment in its own identifications – and at the level of the 
discursive practices which constitute the social field: “(...) it is in the articulation of 
these mutually constitutive but not identical fields that the real conceptual 
problems lie” (Hall S., "Introduction" 7).  In this regard, Braunstein reminds us that 
Mexican history has been written and rewritten several times, and none of its 
versions is the true one because the only “truth” that psychoanalysis is able to 
identify is “that of the battles fought around the history that will be written” ("Mexico 
in Pshychoanalysis"). The fictional nature of this process, as Hall would say, “in no 
way undermines its discursive, material or political effectivity” (Hall S., 
"Introduction" 4). 
In view of the current situation in Mexico, characterized by increasing levels 
of violence in all spheres of social life, I would advocate, with Braunstein, the need 
to align psychoanalysis with a critique of capitalism understood as a source of 
human suffering. Braunstein specifies that in a society that is subjected to the 
worst possible effects of the three decades of neoliberal policies, psychoanalysis 
must actively oppose the violence exercised by those who produce an essentialist 
discourse on “Mexicanness,” because such a discourse merely conceals and 
reinforces the place assigned to Mexico by the forces of global capitalism. While it 
is difficult to disagree with Braunstein when he denounces the overwhelming 
imbalances in global power which seem to condemn places such as Mexico to 
“burn” regardless of the best efforts of their inhabitants, I think it is also important 
to recognize and support those efforts in a more active way. In other words, 
perhaps psychoanalysis can offer more than a denunciation of “Mexicanness” as a 
mirage in the service of power, that is to say, perhaps it can be more than just a 
critique of “ideology” in the traditional sense. To adopt cultural politics as a 
practical perspective involves affirming that the political problem of “agency” is 
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never exclusively an economic one, that it is never a matter of “hard facts” such as 
“competitive advantage” or unequal terms of exchange: it is rather a more complex 
issue involving narratives, interpretations and identifications. Thus, while I take 
heed of Braunstein's professional warning that there is no psychoanalytic 
treatment for a collective subject, I also insist that psychoanalysis is relevant to the 
extent that it goes beyond the denunciation of global economic actors and towards 
a project of understanding and facilitating “agency” at the level of the constitution 
of identity, that is, at the level of cultural politics. From the standpoint of a 
psychoanalytically-informed cultural studies, the question of agency and politics is 
not about choosing a pregiven identity – such as "the winner" as opposed to "the 
loser" in the global game of technoscience. Rather,  it is about working through 
identifications and rehearsing ways to make them work against the naturalization 
of the social order, including the capitalist rules of the technoscientific game. To 
borrow from Hall's explanation, agency would involve a creative task, that of “using 
the resources of history, language and culture in the process of becoming rather 
than being” (4). It seems to me that psychoanalysis has a key role to play in this 
task. 
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Chapter III 
 
Revolutionary Science Meets Biotechnology 
 
Introduction: Science, Technology and Technoscience  
 
The narratives become clear mirrors, fully magical mirrors, without once appealing 
to the transcendental or the magical (Haraway, Modest_Witness 23). 
 
In Is Science Multicultural? Sandra Harding describes the dominant 
historiography of modern science and technology as eurocentric, internalist and 
diffusionist. Mainstream narratives claim that modern science originated in a 
“European miracle” that was made possible by the unmediated retrieval of Greek 
knowledge after the so-called “Dark Ages.” Dominant historiographies are 
“internalist” in the sense that they explain the universal success of modern science 
in terms of characteristics such as a “critical attitude toward conventional beliefs, a 
distinctive method, uniquely high standards of objectivity, a distinctive rationality, a 
distinctive metaphysics that distinguished primary from secondary qualities, the 
shift from an organicist to a mechanistic model of nature, and the reliance on 
mathematics” (Harding 56). They are “diffusionist” in the sense of claiming that 
modern science was irradiated from Europe to other geographical locations where 
no scientific “miracles” ever happened. The hegemony of eurocentric, internalist 
and diffusionist historiographies began to crumble in the 1960s, when Thomas 
Kuhn argued, in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, that scientific practices 
are always just one part of a complex social process in which knowledge-seeking 
is indissociable from other practices and institutions such as education and legal 
systems, economy and religion, state projects and gender relations (4). Post-
Kuhnian historical research has led to the re-conceptualization of modern sciences 
as local knowledge systems in competitive relations with other local knowledge 
systems, and so the contemporary field of science and technology studies (STS) 
has set out to chart how science(s) and culture(s) constitute each other and co-
evolve even if “constrained in diverse respects by nature's order” (3). Whereas in 
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the “internalist” view technology tends to be reduced to an “applied science” by 
regarding science as dependent on the technologies of its production (including 
social technologies), STS has also cleared the way for a re-consideration of the 
knowledge-seeking practices of non-European societies (11). According to 
postcolonial STS, the development of modern sciences resulted not from a special 
"European" ability to rise over cultural particularity but rather from a socially 
developed “ability to neutralize some cultural elements while fully exploiting others, 
in the context of tensions between the maximally global and the firmly local” (7). 
Thus, wheras much of the so-called “Scientific Revolution” had been driven by the 
technical requirements of European expansion, many ideas for navigation, 
cartography, agricultural development, manufacturing and pharmacology had 
actually been borrowed from non-European cultures and incorporated into the 
colonial project. Finally, postcolonial STS has traced the connections between this 
colonial project and contemporary “development” theories and policies. The latter  
systematically figure modern science and technology in eurocentric and 
diffusionist ways – with “development” understood as knowledge transfer from the 
North to the South (37). 
In spite of the historiographic revolution inaugurated by Kuhn and 
radicalized by feminist and postcolonial STS, the eurocentric, internalist and 
diffusionist assumptions of traditional historiographies continue to permeate global 
culture as “a relic of western ‘folk belief’” which is disseminated in popular science 
texts and the mass media. It is still invoked by scientists themselves when 
speaking to funding bodies or when explaining what they do. Harding suggests 
that the resilience of eurocentrism is not simply the result of ignorance: it reveals a 
deeply rooted emotional investment in the standards and values of “civilization.” 
Harding herself is more interested in what she calls the “civilizational” dimension of 
eurocentrism, which accounts for its existence as “an ethic, an ontology, and an 
epistemology” (14). Since the latter conform a discourse “in the rich, materialist 
sense that includes, but is not restricted merely to, ways of thinking and speaking,” 
“good intentions and tolerant behaviors” are not enough to avoid reproducing 
eurocentrism (13-14). It is therefore necessary to actively “decolonize” 
representation by investigating the links between knowledge and power that 
legitimate eurocentric social arrangements, the way the more politicized branches 
of STS have been doing for several decades now.  
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As suggested in the previous chapter, a critical approach to understanding 
the relation between Mexican nationalism and  contemporary biotechnology 
requires both a historical perspective and an attention to the singularity of local 
narratives about science, technology and technoscience. In this chapter I 
interrogate the function of these concepts in narratives of national identity, 
focusing on the more recent history of Mexican revolutionary nationalism. Drawing 
on the insights of STS, I want to argue that revolutionary nationalism failed to 
produce its own critical engagement with Western science and technology 
because it privileged political stability over political change. A purely instrumental 
consideration of science and technology, implicit in modern developmentalist 
narratives, eventually led to a subordinated engagement with technoscience, 
which was predominantly seen as a neutral, universally valid means to overcome 
"backwardness" and "underdevelopment." The purpose of reconstructing the 
Mexican nation’s troubled relations with science and technology here is to support 
and contextualize my broader critique of nationalism in the discourse of 
contemporary activism against biotechnology. After examining the differences 
between post-revolutionary “science patronage” and contemporary “science 
policy,” I attempt to characterize and interpret the current predicament of the 
nationalist subject position in the midst of technoscientific capitalism. In this 
conjuncture, which is defined by global economic competition on the basis of a 
convergence of science and industry (Lyotard), the Mexican nation's position 
seems to be as precarious and fragile as that of the modern political narratives on 
which nationalism itself is based.  
In The Postmodern Condition, J.F. Lyotard discussed the status of 
knowledge at a time when science seems “more completely subordinated to the 
prevailing powers than ever before” (8-9). He asserted that there is no escape 
from the fact that “knowledge is and will be produced in order to be sold, it is and 
will be consumed in order to be valorized in a new production: in both cases, the 
goal is exchange” (4-5). Even though in this chapter maize itself recedes to an 
almost imperceptible background, the analysis of how science, technology and 
technoscience have been framed and developed in Mexico promises to reveal 
some of the underpinnings of the national debates surrounding maize 
biotechnology. Tracing the ways in which Mexican research institutions have been 
reorganized and contested through debates around “science policy” will allow me 
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to diagnose the difficult relationship between Mexican nationalism and 
technoscience. While the Mexican scientific community is active and productive, it 
is at the same time very small, and mostly concentrated in public universities and 
research institutes. The majority of Mexican companies invest very little in 
research and development to sustain their competitiveness. Productive 
cooperation among industry, academy, and government is almost nonexistent. 
While the debate continues  about the exact causes of this seeming 
"backwardness" of Mexican technoscience, in this chapter I want to approach the 
situation as first and foremost an issue of cultural politics. From this perspective, I 
want to ask the following questions: How have "science" and "technology" been 
conceived and mobilized in Mexican cultural politics? What has been the 
connection between the use of such concepts and the exercise of power in the 
Mexican nation? Has Mexican nationalism ever produced a socially satisfactory 
engagement with (Western) science, technology and technoscience? What kind of 
engagement with science, technology and technoscience is required in Mexico 
today and why? These are vast and complex questions that I can only expect to 
approach in a very partial way by considering science and technology as culturally 
specific practices that remain largely unthought by Mexican nationalism. The latter, 
I suggest, has reduced science and technology to neutral and universally valid 
instruments of progress and modernization, with disastrous consequences for 
Mexican knowledge production and for Mexican democracy.  
Writing in 1979, Lyotard argued that scientists must resist the subordination 
of knowledge to industry “if they feel that the civil society of which they are 
members is badly represented by the State” (36). At any rate, I argue in this 
chapter that nationalism locks resistance to technoscientific “terror” (the term 
Lyotard uses to describe the imposition of the criterion of efficiency) in role of a 
purely oppositional reaction, one that, as Lyotard himself observes, is unlikely to 
succeed. What he proposes instead is a sort of radical science, a generalized and 
in a sense impure scientific practice. The latter would not be about objective 
expertise, but rather it about creative game playing. As Lyotard himself explains:  
 
...working on a proof means searching for and "inventing" counterexamples, in 
other words, the unintelligible; supporting an argument means looking for a 
"paradox" and legitimating it with new rules in the games of reasoning (54). 
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Donna Haraway's approach to technoscience exemplifies precisely the kind 
of playful experimentation Lyotard recommends as a more effective political 
response to the capitalist imperative of efficiency. Haraway understands 
technoscience as a domain in which science and technology are so thoroughly 
interrelated that one category “cannot be used to explain the other, and neither 
can be reduced to the status of context for the other” (Modest_Witness 62). At 
work in this concept of technoscience is a relational ontology in which language 
and materiality are inseparable from each other (37). Technoscience is about 
“materialized re-figuration” because technoscientific practices and products are 
“simultaneously literal and figurative”; their ambiguous nature means that 
technoscience “must involve at least some kind of displacement that can trouble 
identifications and certainties” (11). Since the power to distinguish between the 
technical and the political “is very much at the heart of technoscience”, for 
Haraway technoscience is “more, less, and other than reduction, commodification, 
resourcing, determinism, or any of the other scolding words that much critical 
theory would force on the practitioners of science studies” (51). If technoscience 
cannot be simply reduced to capitalist competition, what then can technoscience 
become in a context defined by political and economic subordination? Inspired by 
Haraway's project, I seek to problematize Mexican nationalism's tendency to 
exhaust its engagement with biotechnology, and with technoscience more 
generally, by re-asserting the nation in a defensive way. With Haraway, I want to 
insist that subjugation does not yield “immediate vision” ("Situated Knowledges" 
587). While promising some better accounts of the world than mainstream science 
can offer, such kinds of “subjugated standpoints” face problems of their own. 
Therefore, as we learn to “see from below,” we have to decode and deconstruct 
both what we see and how we see it (584). In this process, we need what 
Haraway calls “passionate detachment,” which depends on “the impossibility of 
entertaining innocent ’identity’ politics and epistemologies” (585).  My critical 
engagement with nationalist narratives that neither celebrate nor reject 
technoscience has the purpose of opening a consideration of some more 
promising approaches to the technoscientific conjuncture, approaches that will be 
based on a critical relationship with the history of Mexican nationalism. 
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Revolutionary Science: an Anti-Technological Fantasy 
 
Commitment to the difference in kind of the beliefs and practices advanced by 
European sciences is central to the self-conception of many people around the 
world as modern, enlightened, progressive, and guided in our beliefs and 
behaviors by the highest standards of objectivity and rationality (Harding 9). 
 
Mexican revolutionary nationalism is most often associated with rural 
education, popular arts, entertainment media and tourist propaganda (Joseph, 
Rubinstein and Zolov). What was the place of science and technology in the 
nationalist agenda of the post-revolutionary regime? Early in the 1930s, President 
Lázaro Cárdenas (1930-1936) defended the post-revolutionary state's commitment 
to science and technology on the grounds of the latter’s importance for the 
progress of the country. He was merely continuing with an older liberal rhetoric 
that had posited science and technology as the solution to the national problems, 
that is, to problems related to the economic basis of national sovereignty. The 
revolutionary endorsement of modern science and technology, which I want to call 
here "revolutionary science," certainly involved material investments on the part of 
the state, including the building of public universities where national scientists 
were supposed to train and conduct research for the nation's benefit. I want to 
argue, however, that revolutionary science was first and foremost a cultural 
fantasy underpinning science patronage in the post-revolutionary era. It was not so 
much about coordinating or regulating economically productive research as it was 
about celebrating progress and modernization in order to create consensus 
around the post-revolutionary state. 
The Mexican “Golden Age” of industrial progress and political stability 
(1940-1968) resulted not from domestic research but rather from the nation's 
alignment with the capitalist “free world” during the Cold War era. Within the 
“import-substitution” regime of the Golden Age, national industries focused on 
producing basic commodities for protected local markets. It was easier for most of 
them to import or imitate technologies developed abroad than to develop their own 
technological capacities. Meanwhile, the Mexican state sponsored the activities of 
an incipient scientific community, which cultivated the belief that science should be 
pursued for its own sake, not for the sake of pragmatic or economic ends. In 
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principle at odds with the instrumental attitude required by modernization, the 
inclination to “pure science” was not a big problem for the Mexican state during the 
prosperous Golden years. In fact, the seeming incoherence between the state's 
utilitarian rhetoric and its actual sponsoring of overtly “useless” science was 
entirely symptomatic of the role that science and technology played in 
revolutionary nationalism. Their role was not to sustain the Mexican economy, 
much less to achieve social transformation, but rather to consolidate the prestige 
of revolutionary nationalism. In this vein, Martha Finnemore argues that before the 
global spread of "science policy" in the 1970s, state sponsorship of science was 
analogous to state sponsorship of the arts, so that “greatness and accomplishment 
in arts and sciences reflected state power rather than being a means to achieve 
power” (Finnemore 567). Yet I want to suggest here that revolutionary science was 
not simply a reflection of Mexican state power. The funding of universities in the 
name of scientific progress had a productive role: that of sustaining the allegiance 
of the new urban middle classes, who were the main beneficiaries of the political 
regime. I am interested here in the workings of revolutionary science as a 
hegemonic tool on the one hand, and as a half-hearted, uncritical engagement 
with modern science and technology on the other.  
In the absence of a programmatic agenda for national scientific research, 
the state seemed to assume the existence of a magical connection between 
science, technology and modernization. In this context, it seems understandable 
that Diego Rivera's murals embraced a passionate technological utopianism. The 
murals, which were mostly sponsored by the state with the purpose of enlightening 
the masses about the meaning of the Mexican Revolution, seem just as useful 
now to illustrate the fantasy of revolutionary science. In Rivera's murals, modern 
technology is depicted as a powerful force advancing the goals of socialism by 
producing a society in which all men and women, regardless of race or creed, 
work together in peace and harmony (Gallo 5-7). This techno-utopian theme 
appears most clearly in a mural titled The Arsenal (1928), which depicts Zapatista 
and Bolshevik revolutionaries working together in a landscape dominated by 
industrial machinery. In the mural titled Man at the Crossroads Looking with Hope 
and High Vision to the Choosing of a New and Better Future (1935), a man 
appears in a central position as the technical controller of a universe populated by 
electrical transformers, microscopes and telescopes, an X-ray apparatus, plus 
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numerous tanks, gears, and other artifacts. Art critic Rubén Gallo has described 
Rivera's man looking at a crossroads as “an android who has gained complete 
control over the world” (6). What Gallo finds rather startling is that the artist 
actually privileged, in his practice, “the art forms of the past.” In his depiction of 
modern technology, Rivera took inspiration from Italian Rennaissance churches 
and pre-Columbian wall painting. He never experimented with photography and 
never learned to drive a car, not even while living in 1930s Detroit as a friend of 
Edsel Ford, working on Detroit Industry, a mural about the Ford factories. 
Moreover, Rivera painted murals that, while being partly modelled on photographs, 
systematically omitted the harsh realities of industrial Detroit. Unemployment, 
gangsterism, racism and anticommunism were left to photographic documentation 
while Rivera depicted a harmonious workplace that went on as if the Great 
Depression had never happened. From this, Gallo concludes that: 
 
[f]or all of Rivera's enthusiasm about modern technology and its potential to 
revolutionize human experience, he seems to have been blind to the profound 
antitechnological impulse that permeated Detroit Industry. In an age dominated by 
worldwide calls for artists to embrace a photographic "new vision," Rivera insisted 
on working in the entirely unmodern medium of fresco painting. But the muralist 
was not only resisting photography: by transforming photographs into embellished 
murals, Rivera was in fact subverting the properties – indexicality and mechanical 
reproducibility – that made photography both radically modern and politically 
revolutionary (16). 
 
Gallo's argument that Rivera's art is inhabited by “a profound 
antitechnological impulse” is relevant for my approach to revolutionary science. 
For Gallo, the anti-technological impulse amounts to the fact that technology is 
celebrated in a purely thematic or representational way, while questions “about 
media themselves, their uses and their effects on art and perception were a blind 
spot in [Rivera's] vision of technology” (18).53 While I am not persuaded by Gallo’s 
                                                
53 Gallo then engages with some more experimental Mexican artists of the same period in order to 
argue that “Mexican modernity” was not exhausted by the statism and populism of revolutionary 
nationalism, of which Rivera is taken as a straightforward representative. In this chapter I do not 
dwell on the virtues of avant-gardism as a "truly modern" alternative to revolutionary statism. 
However, I regard it as important to consider (as Gallo invites us to do) how more experimental 
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categorical distinction between the “entirely unmodern” and the “radically modern,” 
his argument suggests to me that something like an antitechnological impulse 
might inhabit not just Detroit Industry and Man Looking at the Crossroads, but 
more generally the cultural politics of revolutionary nationalism. There is of course 
a connection between the art of Rivera and the revolutionary enthusiasm about 
modern science and technology as means of economic, political and cultural 
"progress." The connection appears as more interesting if we interpret the “anti-
technological impulse” detected by Gallo as a refusal to engage with modern 
science and technology in a way that would transform society in a more 
democratic direction. Following O'Gorman, I want to suggest that what I am 
positing here as the antitechnological impulse of Mexican nationalism is related to 
an authoritarian political culture inherited from colonial times and disguised by 
revolutionary rhetoric (including the celebration of modern science and technology 
as instruments for progress). 
In his essay about the “trauma” of Mexican history, historian Edmundo 
O'Gorman, whose work I discussed in Chapter II, argues that 20th century Latin 
American nationalisms were premised on an imagined dichotomy between the 
“idealist spirit” of Iberoamerica and the “pragmatic spirit” of the Yankees. 
Provocatively, O'Gorman presents the former as wishful thinking inside the head of 
a dreamy maiden who is simultaneously seduced and repelled by the “pragmatic 
spirit” of the Yankees. The figuration of Latin American nationalists as maidens 
dreaming of masculine Yankees might seem crude and indicative of patriarchal 
thinking. I want to suggest, however, that O'Gorman uses this figure of speech as 
an ironic device in his critique of cultural essentialism, a critique which directly 
inspires my own interpretation and critique of “revolutionary science.” In 
O'Gorman's view, 20th century Mexican nationalism was reactionary and 
counterproductive in that it entailed a compulsive re-enactment of “the ontological 
legacy of the colony,” that is, of the Hispanic providentialist worldview that qualified 
Anglo modernity as a sin or an evil deviation from the true faith and the authentic 
civilization. From this perspective, it is possible to interpret the antitechnological 
impulse in revolutionary nationalism as something more profound than an 
aesthetic fixation, namely, as a conservative rejection of social and cultural 
                                                                                                                                              
engagements with new technologies were able to compete and negotiate with the hegemonic 
discourse that is found in muralism and state policies. 
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democratization. In practice, revolutionary science was rhetorically and materially 
sustained by an authoritarian regime that, despite its emancipatory rhetoric, was 
investing its resources in a particular kind of capitalist development that was not 
based on local knowledges or research but rather on imported technological 
recipes for the production and subsidization of basic commodities, such as maize. 
In the meantime, “pure science” could exist in public universities without any major 
political consequence for the regime. 
Like the liberal nationalism of the 19th century, revolutionary nationalism 
assumed that modern science and technology would bring about "progress" just 
by being promoted and celebrated in an instrumental way. The conception of 
technology as a means to a human end is what philosopher Martin Heidegger 
designated as “the instrumental and anthropological definition of technology” ("The 
Question Concerning Technology" 312). For Heidegger, this conception – and 
everything derived from it – was the symptom of a deeper problem, namely, the 
metaphysics of Western thought. The metaphysical tradition operates in 
analogous fashion whenever we think of art as a thing, or an object with certain 
aesthetic properties that are subject to human directions and judgements. It 
essentially consists in “forgetting” that technology and art are not just things, and 
that they have in common a creative or world-making power that precedes and 
exceeds individual will and intentions. Both revolutionary science and revolutionary 
art allowed nationalist dreamers to appropriate the benefits of the North American 
“pragmatic spirit” without becoming “polluted” by it. The problem, as O'Gorman 
pointed out, is that whatever works in dreams rarely works in reality. Mexican 
nationalists need to realize that “there always exists a condition that the maiden 
has to observe in order for the hut to be transformed into a palace and the humble 
woodcutter into a shiny prince” (73). Modern science and technology are not 
magical tools, the historian tells us, but “the actualization of a whole system” which 
can only be possessed “by adhering to the vital program of modernity” (75). 
Whatever is involved in such an adherence, it certainly requires us to go beyond a 
mechanical or “magical” association between science, technology and economic 
development, and towards an understanding of the potential of new technologies 
to change social relations. 
By exploring science and technology as something more or perhaps 
something other than mere instruments for the achievement of "development," 
 112 
knowledge producers in Mexico may enable themselves to pursue a more critical 
and creative relation with the metaphysical legacy. In agreement with O'Gorman, I 
hold that such a change in orientation would require both an acknowledgment of 
history and the taking of responsibility for the potential of (techno)science to 
transform social relations. An interesting exception to the anti-technological 
impulse of “revolutionary science” was the development of maize-based flour, 
which was achieved through a collaboration between two public companies under 
the aegis of nationalist welfare programs that subsidized maize (Pilcher, "Taco 
Bell" 72). Whereas the industrialization of maize ultimately had a negative impact 
on small-scale agriculture, one must acknowledge that maize flour (as a 
technoscientific product for the urban consumer world) was in fact welcomed by 
many Mexican women, for whom maize flour signalled the possibility of 
challenging traditional gender hierarchies. This kind of social transformation 
cannot be underestimated even if the overall idea behind the state's investment in 
maize industrialization was not that of a more democratic society, but rather that of 
a society premised on a devaluation (in the sense of "feminization") of local 
agricultural knowledges and a growing dependence of the increasingly 
homogenized urban populations on industrial food controlled by an authoritarian 
(and openly masculinist) state. The one instance of revolutionary technoscience – 
since maize flour developed as a result of collaborative R&D by a public and a 
private enterprise – illustrates the power of technscience itself to subvert 
instrumentalist appropriations by a particular politics. Yet, as the exception that 
confirms the rule, maize flour also illustrates the limitations that an authoritarian 
political culture is able to impose on a society's engagement with modern science 
and technology. After all, maize flour stands today more as a symbol of corporate 
domination than as an indicator of freedom. Mexican feminists realized long ago 
that their freedom needed to involve a much more radical questioning of gender 
hierarchies than revolutionary nationalism would ever allow for. 
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Revolutionary Nationalism Meets Science Policy 
 
[T]here it was in all its threatening reality as a gigantic and inescapable factum 
which, for better or worse, had to be counted on, and in relation to which it was 
necessary to affirm one's own being (O'Gorman 28). 
 
International relations scholar Martha Finnemore has argued that the 
emergence of the “science policy” discourse within international organizations 
resulted from political tensions that emerged during the Cold War. Early science 
programs at the United Nations were designed for science and scientists rather 
than states. They aimed to advance scientific knowledge regardless of national 
boundaries. Conventional wisdom held that the point of bringing science under the 
auspices of the UN was to free it from the “unscientific” kinds of intervention 
associated with national states. By the mid-1950s this “pure science” orientation 
had lost ground among the UN members, which is why individual scientists were 
replaced with state representatives as policy-makers at the UN. As Americans 
failed to make the United Nations an exclusive tool of their foreign policy, the 
Soviet Union and its Eastern bloc allies finally agreed to join the organization in 
1954. Shortly after came the influx of postcolonial nations with an agenda of their 
own (Finnemore 577-581). Among the latter, the notion that states should and 
could promote and direct science, with all its economic and military applications, 
became very popular. Yet Finnemore argues that most countries started creating 
science policy bureaucracies at this time not so much because they needed to but 
rather because UNESCO had taught them a new "norm" about the role of states 
regarding science, namely, that “coordination and direction of science are 
necessary tasks of the modern state and that a science policy bureaucracy having 
certain well-specified characteristics was the appropriate means to fulfill those 
tasks” (566). In this way “science policy” began to displace the earlier vision of 
science as a nongovernmental enterprise, that is, the vision that allowed science 
to be based on the model of patronage.  
Finnemore reports that 1962 was the peak year when it came to the 
adoption of science policies around the world. It is significant that the Mexican 
state was not among the early adopters of science policy. This was a time when, 
unlike many of the “less developed countries” to which Finnemore refers, Mexico 
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was still enjoying its “Golden Age” of industrial prosperity and friendly relations 
with the United States. American historians of the period pointed out that “the 
Mexican experience afforded a preferred solution for the hemispheric problem of 
change and development” and that it “had much to offer the world” (Schmidtt 25). 
What the Mexican experience had to offer was a paradigmatic example of a 
dependent economy, in which national industries were not based on local scientific 
or technological research but rather on imitating or purchasing obsolete 
technologies from abroad. This phenomenon, generalized throughout Latin 
America, was attributed by dependency theory to a programmed obsolescence 
exploited by imperial powers. As Saldaña-Portillo explains in The Revolutionary 
Imagination in the Americas, dependency theorists argued that in a dependent 
economy, capital does not complete the cycle of its own reproduction without 
returning to the metropole. Instead, capital returns to the metropole in order to 
purchase the technology on which increased profit margins and further 
industrialization depend. Either as license fees, as joint venture costs, or as direct 
purchase costs, capital from “the periphery” returns to “the center” for something it 
cannot produce on its own: science and technology. Science and technology thus 
emerge, in the revolutionary imagination in the Americas, as an instrument of 
domination on the part of “the center”, while the imperative to adopt Western 
technology for progress emerges as “a policing technique, as an administered 
technological obsolescence that determines the terms of dependence” (Saldaña-
Portillo 55).  
In this section I want to argue that UNESCO's teachings and economic 
imperialism offer only partial answers to the question of why revolutionary 
nationalism failed to produce its own critical engagement with dominant narratives 
of science and technology. I want to approach this question from the perspective 
of Mexican cultural politics, which I have formulated so far in terms of the 
instrumentalist fantasy of "revolutionary science." After all, Mexican revolutionary 
nationalists shared the belief of American liberals that, with the proper application 
of Western science and technology, the “less developed countries” would rapidly 
be able to exploit their newly discovered “productive capacity” (Saldaña-Portillo 
21-23). If there ever was a bold attempt on the part of the Mexican state to make 
this dream come true, it was in the aftermath of 1968, when student protesters 
were violently repressed by the Mexican army in downtown Mexico City. Two 
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years later, President Luis Echeverría embarked on a neo-nationalist agenda that 
would restore the political legitimacy of the revolutionary regime, and this was the 
time when revolutionary science finally met “science policy.” The National Council 
for Science and Technology (CONACYT) was founded in 1970 with the aim of 
determining, implementing and evaluating the national science policy. Policy 
documents from Luis Echeverría's presidential term (1970-1976) acknowledge an 
increasingly competitive international market and assert that the national industry 
must move from a stage of import-substitution to one of “technological adaptation” 
and “conquest” of foreign markets. The shift to adaptation and conquest was 
premised on Echeverría's claim that Mexico had by that time satisfied its most 
important internal demands and could dedicate itself to pursuing “the freedom 
afforded by knowledge” by means of the techniques “most beneficial to Mexico” 
(qtd. in Cano 144). The "Plan Nacional Indicativo de Ciencia y Tecnología" 
(PNICyT), whose main goals were the achievement of a non-imitative scientific 
developement, cultural autonomy and technological self-determination, and which 
involved hundreds of scientists and business people, was issued just three months 
before the end of Echeverría's term.  
Among the steps that Echeverría's administration took in the attempt to 
rescue the institutionalized revolution from a crisis of legitimacy (sparked by the 
massacre of Mexican student protesters in 1968) were a short-lived nationalization 
of the pharmaceutical industry and the creation of the Institute for the Study of 
Medicinal Plants (Imeplam). Anthropologist Cori Hayden has analyzed how 
Imeplam's ethnobotanical collections trace back the origin of the “national flora” 
either to the colonial encounters or to the observations made in the 19th century by 
the German traveller-scientist Alexander von Humboldt, whose writings inspired 
the Mexican nationalist imaginary. At Imeplam, collections of ethnobotanical 
knowledge were produced on the basis of the already existing inventories. The 
purpose of the collections was to identify a distinctly national herbolaria that could 
serve as a resource for the pharmaceutical industry. Thus, Hayden points out that 
the translation of Mexican nationalism into ethnobotanical knowledge was not only 
metaphorical in its significance, but also historical and institutional. She reminds us 
that the cultural politics of the Mexican post-revolutionary state was based on the 
argument that while the cultural heritage of indigenous peoples had provided the 
nation with a distinctive personality, the present and future nation would belong to 
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a bioculturally assimilated, national mestizo citizen (Knight; Hayden, 
"Vinculaciones" 309). Through the ethnobotanical inscription of cultural and 
political notions of mixture and hybridity, Imeplam's collections helped to 
materialize the hegemonic story of Mexico as a modern, racially improved nation 
(309). As it turned out, the revolutionary science of ethnobotanical nationalism did 
not achieve the goal of technological self-determination. No lasting pharmaceutical 
industry emerged from Imeplam's collections, which once again suggests that their 
function was from the beginning political. Imeplam temporarily satisfied popular 
aspirations of "development" by reasserting the developmentalist narrative of 
civilizational transcendence.  
Mexico's next president, José López Portillo (1976-1982), continued with 
Echeverría's neo-nationalist line of argument. His "Global Development Plan 1980-
1982" included a special chapter on science and technology, in which it was 
established that “technology policy” derived from the “national political philosophy 
and the national aims” (Cano 148).  Its role was to achieve a “massive diffusion of 
those technological innovations directly impinging upon the productivity and 
training of the workforce, thus connecting science with the social and productive 
needs of Mexico” (Cano 148). For this purpose, the Plan prescribed the 
strengthening of “scientific and technical services” through the state support of 
basic research carried out in public universities. Basic research, however, was 
seen as not compatible with the “inmediatist visions” of the productive sector. 
Implicitly, López Portillo seemed to be re-asserting the ambitions of revolutionary 
science: that of magically deriving “technological self-determination” from “pure 
science.” This fantasy would not be exposed in its vulnerability until the neoliberal 
age, when the state would no longer guarantee such concessions to national 
knowledge producers.  
The failure to engage with science and technology except in terms of 
cultural luxury and imported goods is one for which Mexico is being severely 
punished in the neoliberal age of technoscientific capitalism. Previously, countries 
like Mexico survived on a combination of subsistence agriculture, light industry, 
and the export of primary commodities, including labour. Contemporary capitalism 
has threatened the viability of such a survival strategy. It has introduced new and 
widening inequalities between the "new" knowledge-based economies of the North 
and the "old" production-based economies of the South. Technoscientific 
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industries such as biotechnology are reducing the overall demand for primary 
products from Southern countries, while intellectual property regimes now limit the 
flow of knowledge except in the form of expensive commodities. Moreover, under 
the neoliberal austerity measures, Southern countries are finding it increasingly 
difficult to develop their own science and technology. Unable to create propietary 
knowledge, including biotechnology, the South seems doomed in terms of global 
competition (Peritore and Galve-Peritore). 
Even though the Mexican “neoliberal turn” is most often dated back to 1982 
– the year in which a debt crisis pushed the government to accept the structural 
adjustment programs prescribed by the World Bank and the IMF – science policy 
documents produced by Miguel de la Madrid's presidency (1982-1988) still contain 
some key concerns of nationalism, such as the need to “master” imported 
technology and to use public research in the solution of “national problems.” De la 
Madrid's "Programa Nacional de Desarrollo Tecnológico y Científico" 
(PRONDETyC 1984-1988) makes it plain for the first time that science policy does 
not depend on the national aims alone but rather on how the country as a whole 
adapts to the wider international context. In other words, the emphasis shifts from 
technological self-determination and cultural autonomy to the reduction of 
"dependency" in the context of global "interdependence." Among the main 
obstacles in this regard, PRONDETyC detects technoscientific gaps such as low 
incentives for innovation, the lack of a link between research and production, the 
lack of highly trained human resources in the productive sector, the focus on short-
term technical problems and the unwillingness to take "risks" among national 
business communities (Cano 151-152). Acknowledging the social complexity of 
these obstacles, PRONDETyC concludes that science planning is not just a 
technical issue, and invokes instead the citizen's perception of “the desirability of 
alternative future situations” (664). In clear anticipation of the academic resistance 
to the neoliberalization of public institutions, de la Madrid's science policy called for 
wider “participation” from “the scientific and technological community, the public, 
social and private productive sectors, and more generally, all of the social groups 
concerned” (664). Significantly, the policy included the creation of the National 
System of Researchers (SNI), which supplemented between 50% and 100% of the 
salaries of academic researchers who had been hit by the first wave of neoliberal 
cuts to higher education. Yet subsequent cuts to public spending sparked 
 118 
antagonistic responses on the part of many social groups, including academics. 
Globalization was there, “in all its threatening reality as a gigantic and inescapable 
factum” (O'Gorman 28), and one that science policy was supposed to address for 
the sake of “viability.” Whereas the failure of revolutionary nationalism to produce 
a satisfactory engagement with modern science and technology has been 
irreversibly exposed by the neoliberal conjuncture, the debate goes on about what 
would count as a satisfactory or even desirable engagement with technoscientific 
capitalism. 
Against Neoliberalism: Revolutionary Science Strikes Back 
 
In matters of social justice and of scientific truth alike, the legitimation of (...) power 
is based on its optimizing the system's performance – efficiency. The application of 
this criterion to all of our games necessarily entails a certain level of terror, whether 
soft or hard: be operational (that is, commensurable) or disappear (Lyotard xxiv). 
 
In mainstream analyses neoliberalism tends to be reduced to a set of 
economic policies, making it difficult to appreciate its cultural and political 
dimensions. With these in mind, I borrow Wendy Brown's understanding of 
neoliberalism as a political rationality or mode of governance that organizes 
society as a function of the market. Under neoliberalism, the market is “the 
organizing and regulative principle of the state and society” (Brown, Edgework 41). 
No longer the representative of popular sovereignty, the state is positioned as 
being responsible above all for the economy, which individual citizens enact as 
entrepreneurial actors in every sphere of life (42). At the moral level, individuals as 
much as nations are interpellated by neoliberalism as “rational, calculating 
creatures whose moral autonomy is measured by their capacity for ‘self-care’ – the 
ability to provide for their own needs and service their own ambitions” (42). 
Whereas capitalism provides a sort of basic ideological structure to neoliberalism, 
cultural theorist Jeremy Gilbert has forcefully insisted that it remains unclear how 
far neoliberalism can go and what it can actually achieve because it largely 
depends on to the balance of forces within specific political contexts 
(Anticapitalism and Culture 172). In Mexico, neoliberals had to translate their 
technical recipes into a meaningful political discourse that was capable of 
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generating enough legitimacy to ensure the continuity of neoliberal reforms 
(O'Toole 274-275). The text of Mexican science policy briefly sketched above 
already suggests the general orientation of neoliberal efforts at hegemonizing the 
national imaginary. 
Even though the implementation of neoliberalism in Mexico was not a 
democratic process, Mexican neoliberals worked hard to elaborate a new public 
philosophy, or “new ways of thinking and speaking about the republic” (qtd. in 
O'Toole 274). In particular, technocratic President Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-
1994) expounded the theory that an increasingly individualized Mexican society 
demanded a comprehensive reform of the state that recognized both the 
competitive and plural nature of party politics, and the individual as a political actor 
defined by human and civil rights. Because a central tenet of neoliberalism was 
the superiority of market mechanisms and the extension of economic freedoms 
through the limiting of state intervention, the political reform demanded by Mexican 
individuals had to start with the withdrawal of the state from large areas of 
economic activity. The reformed Mexican state, said the neoliberals, would 
regulate and orient the economy, but no longer possess, substitute or extend 
protectionisms and privileges. In attacking state paternalism, the neoliberals 
sought to produce Mexican citizens as "mature" subjects on the basis of their 
supposed individual initiative. For instance, Salinas's "National Solidarity 
Programme" (PRONASOL) explicitly promoted a new civic ethic of "co-
responsibility" and self-reliance. "Solidarity", a key slogan of the Salinas 
administration, played the role of synthesizing the ideals of individual 
entrepreneurship and social justice, serving simultaneously “as a legitimizing 
formula for market reforms that reduced the role of the state, and as a social ethic 
underpinning the continuing task of nation-building” (O'Toole 277).54 
                                                
54 Another example of Mexican neoliberalism is the reform of Article 27, which allowed campesinos 
to sell their collectively owned land (ejidos). Government spokesman Arturo Warman (author of 
Corn and Capitalism) argued that the main result of “state paternalism” had been the treatment of 
the campesino as child-like, lacking the full maturity of other citizens, and that the primary aim of 
reforming Article 27 was to correct such a denigrating situation. Warman argued that the Salinista 
approach sought a “third way” between individualism and collectivism that responded to the 
historical complexity of Mexican rural society:  
 
It is not easy, but it is possible and necessary. It does not remain between paternalism and 
passivity; it proposes another route that can be assimilated within the concept of solidarity, 
that implies respect, participation, consensus and co-responsibility; a new relationship 
between society and state (qtd. in O'Toole 781). 
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Combined with an imperative of competitiveness and self-reliance, attacks 
on "paternalism" set the tone for the policy documents of the Salinas period. In the 
"National Development Plan (1989-1994)," science and technology are located 
within a chapter on economic modernization, which asserts that modern policies 
are necessary for the nation to compete effectively in the global economic game. 
The "National Science and Technological Modernization Program 1990-1994 
(PNCyMT)" explains that the previous economic model had been based on 
protectionism, isolationism, excessive regulation, a distorted character of industrial 
growth and scientific and technological backwardness, all of which had to be 
rectified. While the National System of Researchers (SNI) had been set up by de 
la Madrid as a mechanism of direct compensation to academics struck by 
neoliberal reforms, Salinas sought to decrease the reliance of the national 
research system on public funds and to increase private participation instead. He 
also introduced novel requirements to measure the correspondence between 
state-sponsored research activities and economic growth, in terms of the degree 
of connection between such activities and the private industrial sector. Public 
funding of scientific and technological development had to be reflected in the 
modernization of the productive basis and in the development of competitive 
products and processes. The assumption was that technological knowledge was 
susceptible to “private appropriation,” that it was destined to generate financial 
yields, and that the participation of the productive sector in funding R&D was not 
only necessary and desirable, but that it also had to respond to criteria of 
economic competitiveness. Budgeting measures, which required a considerable 
increase in bureaucratic activities such as evaluation, control and planning, 
included the requirement to annually review the criteria for budget allocation to 
research centres, taking into account other sources of funding and conditioning 
funding on percentages of self-funding (CONACYT, Programa Nacional 67).  
Neoliberal science policy provoked a prompt reaction on the part of Mexican 
academics. Schoijet and Worthington, for example, decried “the collapse of a 
nationalist science policy” and its replacement by “a transnational model of 
science and industry as interconnected processes” (210). One of the most 
“prominent casualties” of such a new model, they say, was CONACYT. Created by 
Echeverría “to break the chains of technological dependency,” it was then made to 
“sell off” the research institutions previously thought to be necessary for national 
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independence, in order to finance research in which budgets, projects, and results 
counted as proprietary information kept by enterprises such as Ericsson, IBM, and 
Nestlé (214-215). Rather than the promised modernization, Schoijet and 
Worthington argued, the restructuring of the research system would bring about 
“new patterns of discrimination and repression” against the dissenting scientists, 
since it was driven not merely by global economic trends, but also by a political 
system in a state of decomposition. The critics concluded that “Mexico's earlier 
nationalism in development strategy and science policy, which aimed to build up 
the nation's industrial infrastructure and research system, has been superseded by 
a retrograde nationalism that distributes declining resources to a self-serving elite 
of progovernment elements” (218). This was the worst of neoliberalism combined 
with the worst of nationalism, they thought, representing as it did “both subjugation 
to the interests of global capital (...) and [a] retrograde nationalism that limits the 
vitality of the research system” (227).  
Schoijet and Worthington did make a valid point about the specific dangers 
of the appropriation of neoliberalism by an authoritarian state. The continuity of 
authoritarianism, however, does not eliminate the fact that Salinista neoliberalism 
attempted to formulate, discursively and materially, a problematic that 
revolutionary science had systematically refused to confront. More significant than 
the continuity of authoritarianism seems to be the fact that neoliberalism utterly 
failed to correct the lack of technoscientific innovation in Mexico. As late as 1998, 
and only two years before the democratic transition, Mexican policy analyst Cano 
declared that the Mexican government did not have a clue about how to relate 
scientific research activities to national priorities, much less a bureaucratic strategy 
for doing so. More than a decade later, in 2010, Bazdresch and Meza complained 
that Mexican economists still routinely understimated innovation issues, due to 
their over-reliance on the import-substitution regime that had prevailed until the 
early 1980s (7-8). In sum, Mexican neoliberalism introduced managerial 
discourses into universities and research centers, yet it did not succeed in 
eradicating the strong anti-technological stance of revolutionary science. At the 
risk of playing the devil's advocate, I want to suggest that it was the scientists 
themselves who kept the fantasy of a "pure science" that would lead to "national 
development" alive through their opposition to neoliaberalism. 
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The last PRI president of the 20th century, Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000), is 
less remembered for any original contributions to national science policy than for 
steering the crisis of revolutionary nationalism towards its end: the so-called 
“transition to democracy.” After years of civil struggles and negotiations with the 
authoritarian regime, Zedillo facilitated the setting up of institutions that could 
guarantee the transparency of the elections. In 2000, Vicente Fox Quezada from 
the Party of National Action (PAN)55 became the first democratically elected 
president of Mexico. Through his Programa Especial de Ciencia y Tecnología 
2001-2006 (PECyT), Fox reinforced the neoliberal emphasis on supporting 
initiatives orientated towards innovation through the generation of links between 
public research and private companies. Like his immediate predecessors, Fox 
believed that technoscientific links would lead to an increase in competitiveness 
for national (private) enterprises. In line with his background as manager of Coca-
Cola Mexico, he proposed to organize the research system into “strategic areas” 
and to manage it “efficiently.” Fox also proposed a drastic reduction of state 
investment in science education, in particular by eliminating the SNI and by limiting 
the number of grants for postgraduate study.56 The initiative failed to prosper 
because the scientific community reacted strongly against it during a heated 
consultation hosted by the national congress in 2002. Because of the strong 
opposition on the part of the scientists to the further neoliberalization of science 
policy, the 2002 consultation led to a legislation which kept science distinct from 
technology, reasserted the public importance of basic research, recognized the 
humanities and the social sciences as disciplines of national interest, strengthened 
the legal status of the SNI and CONACYT, and avoided the dismantling of public 
                                                
55 Partido Acción Nacional historically formed to gather the traditional right-wing Catholic opposition 
to the post-revolutionary regime. Until the 1990s the PAN had been dominated by its most 
conservative factions. However, in order to win the national elections and stay in power it had to 
shift to the centre-right. Many critics of the PAN still view it as an agent of the most retrograde 
beliefs, a perception that has been reinforced, paradoxically, by the fact that the PAN has merely 
continued with the neoliberal reforms implemented in the first place by the PRI. The situation 
seems analogous to popular figurations of the Tories in England, which seem to ignore the 
technocratic consensus across parties. 
56 Neoliberal priístas, as we have seen, were not naïve, so they carefully explained their 
dismantling of the welfare state through a nationalist rhetoric. De la Madrid created the SNI to avoid 
further confrontation with academics while Salinas mobilized a precious psychological resource, 
namely, the urbanite desire of “being part of the First World and not the Third.” By contrast, the tall 
ex-CEO of Coca Cola Mexico (who also dressed like an American cowboy) seemed to lack both 
the shrewdness and the revolutionary aura of a traditional Mexican politician, and was constantly 
ridiculed for it. Yet, it was precisely Fox who became the first democratically elected president in 
Mexican history.   
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research centers (Zubieta and Loyola 951). This spectacular victory of the 
scientific lobby signals a political environment very different from that prevailing in 
1993, when Schoijet and Worthington denounced old-style repression against 
Leftist, foreign-born or dissenting scientists. Precisely with this social 
transformation in mind, I now want to introduce my own critique of the scientific 
lobby's oppositional discourse to technoscience, the latter being understood, in the 
very precise terms used by Worthington and Schoijet, as “a transnational model of 
science and industry as interconnected processes” (210).  
Two passionate critics of Mexican science policy of the neoliberal period, 
Zubieta and Loyola argue that framing science in terms of an economic strategy 
and expecting it to show results in terms of technological development and 
innovation is incompatible with science “in its purest sense.” They complain that 
the legal agreements that were reached in 2002 were subsequently “administered 
by a team of engineers who had a limited and highly biased vision of science as 
well as of technology” (951). In other words, the "team of engineers" focused on 
technological development and innovation, wrongly assuming that technological 
research can be done separately from the development of knowledge, “as if the 
solution of social problems or competitiveness could be achieved without (...) 
science, in its purest sense” (973). The vocabulary of “pure science” as something 
opposed to technology and innovation suggests a somewhat moralistic hostility to 
technoscience as a form of life. In what sounds like a resentful death-wish, Zubieta 
and Loyola conclude that, as long as governments continue to privilege technology 
and innovation over science “in its purest sense”, there will be no science, and not 
even technology in Mexico (992). Such a categorical prophecy is particularly 
striking in the context of a democratic transition which, with all its imperfections, 
has seen Mexican scientists and academics rise collectively as outspoken and 
organized policy-makers – and no longer as just privileged clients of an 
authoritarian state or as mere victims of the state's authoritarian repression.  
From this perspective it seems to me that Zubieta and Loyola's categorical 
rejection of technoscience resonates with an impulse that is far removed from 
“pure science” and situated closer to the way in which science and technology 
have been historically framed in Mexico. I am thinking of revolutionary science, or 
the cultural dream that social and economic progress will magically come about 
without any loss of "purity." On the one hand, as the historian O'Gorman 
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understood well, the very concern for purity was historically contaminated by a 
legacy of authoritarianism. On the other hand, as postcolonial STS has made 
clear, the establishing of “productive links” between science and "progress" has 
always required at least some degree of contamination (both commercial and 
military). Whereas Zubieta and Loyola think that national problems cannot be 
solved without “pure science,” their argument does not seem to be based on any 
connection, instrumental or of another kind, between “pure science” and social life. 
It might rather be based on the immediate threat to the cultural prestige that 
sustains their disciplines and academic positions. Considering that contemporary 
Mexican scientists tend to see themselves as liberal and modern rather than as 
Catholic conservatives, it is ironic that Zubieta and Loyola end up framing 
technoscience (that is, the interconnectedness of science and technology in the 
context of global capitalism) as nothing less than a sin.  
Critical accounts of biotechnology in Mexico do indeed stress the un-
cooperative “attitude” of Mexican scientists and the “unwillingness” of local 
companies to invest in R&D. American development theorist Cynthia Wagner, for 
instance, includes the “pure science mentality” of Mexican scientists among major 
obstacles in the development of biotechnology in Mexico (Wagner 64). By 
suggesting resonances between the disciplinary self-assertion of “pure scientists” 
and the cultural conservatism that O'Gorman associates with "the ontological 
legacy of the colony," I do not mean to uncritically duplicate the developmental 
discourse of the neoliberal managers. As María José Saldaña-Portillo has argued, 
the deepest problem with developmental discourse is the idea that social progress 
depends on the subjective transformation of allegedly “underdeveloped” peoples 
into “free, mature, fully-conscious, and self-determining individual subjects” (6). 
Modernization theories attribute "underdevelopment" to the failure of people to 
make proper cultural choices, that is, the failure to choose the future-oriented 
values of modernity as opposed to the backward-looking values of "tradition."57 
Such an explanation, Saldaña-Portillo argues, obscures the histories and politics 
of colonialism, dictatorial regimes, oligarchies, death squads, unjust land tenure 
systems, and internal migration patterns, all of which clearly constrain the 
                                                
57 As Saldaña-Portillo has pointed out, American modernization theorists such as W.W. Rostow  
typically identified the condition for economic development in the adoption of an “effective attitude” 
towards basic and and applied science (Saldaña-Portillo 30). 
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possibilies of “choosing” development and change (29). Whereas my overall 
argument depends on not granting absolute deterministic powers to the economy 
or any other sociohistorical instance, I take heed of Saldaña-Portillo's warning 
about the ideological risks of invoking “choice” in an abstract way.58 Without 
claiming that I have a solution for the complex challenges that a country such as 
Mexico faces in the world of technoscientific capitalism, I want to insist that 
scientific purism poses serious limitations to the imagination of technoscientific 
futures in Mexico. A more critical relationship with (Western) science and 
technology might become possible on the basis of a recognition that science has 
never been "pure," and of this fact as a key factor in the explanation of why 
Mexican basic research has never attained much in terms of "social progress," 
beyond the narrow circles of individuals that make up the Mexican scientific 
community. Rather than downplaying the real threats of neoliberalism to 
knowledge production in Mexico and the world, my intention here has been to 
interrogate the very desire for "original projects for national development, in the 
broad and shared sense which today is missing" (Cano 166). That Mexican 
science and technology has failed the expectations of Mexican society is not just 
the perception of policy-makers but of Mexican scientists themselves too. Casas 
and Detmer, for example, lament that what is missing in Mexican science policy is 
nothing less than “the framework of a project of national development orientated to 
the satisfaction of social needs” (137). In a tone which is both moralistic and 
melancholic, Zubieta and Loyola assert that the technoscientific model has already 
produced a “regression” that will be very difficult to undo (945). From their 
discourse in particular it appears as if the aspiration of revolutionary science to 
bring about national development by means of "pure science" had become stuck 
and self-defeating. How else can revolutionary science respond to the 
technoscience of biotechnology?  
 
                                                
58 This is a potential problem in O'Gorman's discourse, which ends up challenging Mexican 
nationalists to “adhere to the vital program of modernity,” as if the fate of the Mexican nation 
depended on the will and intention of individual subjects. Still, my appropriation of O'Gorman's text 
stresses the anti-essentialist orientation of his critique of nationalism as a flight from history. 
O'Gorman's injunction to take historical responsibility is consistent, in my view, with a rigorous 
critique of developmental fantasies such as revolutionary science. 
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The Idealistic Spirit of "Third World Biotechnology" 
 
The selective blindness and active opposition to everything that is new and 
relevant is one of the structural features of underdevelopment (Goldstein 51). 
 
For a long time it has seemed unlikely that Mexican science and science 
policy will ever be able to have any significant "impact" on "national development." 
In a paper titled "Third World Biotechnology, Latin American Development, and the 
Foreign Debt Problem," Daniel J. Goldstein describes “Third World Biotechnology” 
as “an altruistic, noncompetitive, salvationist, and regionalist enterprise” (42). 
Goldstein's critique of such an enterprise resonates strongly with O'Gorman's 
analysis of Ibero-American cultural essentialisms and with my own 
characterization, in this chapter, of "revolutionary science." Instead of focusing, as 
the Northern-based biotech industry does, on the generation of profit through the 
invention of competitive, high-value products, “Third World biotechnology” hopes 
to eradicate malnutrition and endemic parasitic diseases, and to improve the life of 
poor farmers (37). In other words, very much like revolutionary science, "Third 
World biotechnology" positions itself as “the ideal instrument for wiping out the 
consequences of misery without touching its causes” (40). What "Third World 
biotechnology" does not seem to understand is that hunger and disease are 
political problems that will not be solved by technological means (41). What is 
really needed, Goldstein says, is “a radical transformation of the way in which poor 
people live and work in urban and rural areas," including decent housing, 
education, better-paid jobs and adequate working conditions (43).  
If biotechnology is defined as “an industrial activity that appropriates the 
expanding frontier of molecular physiology to produce molecules and devices that 
generate wealth” (39), it appears obvious that biotechnology is not there to save 
Latin America, or any other region of the world, from marginality and exclusion. 
Despite the salvationist rhetoric deployed by transnational biotech corporations 
themselves, the contrary appears to be the case. Only the "Third World" can save 
itself, Goldstein argues, by making a political decision to enter fully into the game 
of technoscience. A whole new corporate, managerial, financial, and political 
culture of high technology would have to be created in order to generate the 
technoscientific links that would allow biotechnological enterprises to become 
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commercially viable (39). Yet the problem is precisely that the practitioners of 
"Third World Biotechnology" reject and often denounce technoscientific links as 
"antinational and antiregional” (41), while paradoxically limiting themselves to 
"relearning the technologies invented by others” (42). A change of attitude appears 
all the more unlikely considering that biotechnology is not only “inseparable from 
an economic-business model” (Thacker 43) but also “inseparable from the rise of 
neoliberalism as the dominant political philosophy of our time” (Cooper, M. 19). 
Thacker writes: 
 
(...) nearly every account of the biotech industry notes the simultaneity of scientific 
and economic innovation: recombinant DNA and the formation of Genentech, 
polymerase chain reaction (PCR) and the Cetus Corporation, transgenics and 
DuPont, and a wide range of examples related to the pharmaceutical industry. 
However, we should be cautious of any attempt to limit such views to the 
commercial sector, for there also exists a “governmentality” surrounding biotech 
that is in many ways inseparable from business models: alliances between the 
corporate and public sectors patenting disputes between developed and 
underdeveloped countries, and policies that allow universities and nonprofit 
organizations to apply for patents based on federally funded research (43). 
 
 Clearly, the “pure science mentality” of Zubieta and Loyola does not fit into 
the ultracapitalist governmentality described by Thacker. While in the U.S. 
entrepreneurial startups by scientists have gradually become the foundation of 
biotechnology, the basic research orientation of Mexican scientists, coupled with 
their “negative attitudes” toward patenting and their overall pejorative 
consideration of mixing science with business, has impeded the proliferation of 
scientist-entrepreneurs (Wagner 65-66). In order to illustrate the daunting task of 
actually doing biotechnology in a country such as Mexico, Cynthia Wagner 
narrates the story of Genin, a biotechnology startup founded in the early 1980s by 
two prominent Mexican scientists. Francisco Bolívar Zapata and Roberto Quintero, 
fellow students at the MIT, combined their complementary skills upon returning to 
Mexico.59 Their patented biotechnology-based invention for producing a 
                                                
59 A recent pamphlet on Mexican biotech by San Diego Dialogue, Borderless Biotech, summarizes 
Zapata's scientific profile as follows: “In California in the late-1970s, Genentech was not as well 
known as it is today.  One of its co-founders, Dr. Herbert Boyer, was a professor of biochemistry 
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biocatalyst used in the production of penicillin appeared to have a market in the 
country. Unfortunately, their initial startup capital was slashed due to the Mexican 
currency devaluation in 1981. A further shock came when it became clear that the 
potential customers, Mexican pharmaceutical companies, were not interested in 
licensing the technology, but preferred to buy the biocatalyst itself, just as they 
would buy it from a foreign company. Genin then faced the typical obstacle to 
biotechnology startups, namely, no funds to scale up production. As a result, it 
was forced to settle for boutique status, performing contract research projects for 
various sponsors, for about ten years before ultimately closing its operations. As 
an outcome of this initial failed venture, Bolívar and Quintero went on to create the 
Instituto de Biotecnología (IBT) at the National Autonomous University of Mexico 
(UNAM), which they still lead.60 
 The case of Genin makes it clear that there are other factors beside a "pure 
science mentality" that lead scientists to take refuge in the dream of revolutionary 
science. For reasons that are not merely psychological, Mexican biotechnology is 
a relatively small endeavor. It is centered in university and federal technical 
institutes, mostly isolated from national industry, and pursuing projects of a 
general or “non-applied” nature (Peritore and Galve-Peritore 71).61 By contrast 
                                                                                                                                              
and biophysics at UCSF, where several members of his research team, including Mexican-born 
Francisco Bolivar and Californian Ray Rodriguez, were diligently working to create a safe and 
effective biological mechanism to facilitate cloning of special bacteria.  Their answer:  a “plasmid 
vector” – a small, self-replicating genetic element with built-in coding of enzymes that allow its host 
– a bacteria, for instance – to thrive in environments in which many other bacteria cannot (for 
instance, in the presence of antibiotics). The resulting genetic package was the plasmid pBR322 
(the “B” for “Bolivar,” the “R” for Rodriguez) – designed to be resistant to two antibiotics (ampicillin 
and tetracycline)." By subsequently modifying this plasmid, Bolívar and Rodríguez were able to 
stimulate the production of certain hormones by the bacterial host – such as insulin.” This work, 
according to Borderless Biotech, helped to launch Genentech as a multi-billion dollar company. 
60 As Bolívar Zapata narrates, IBT could have been founded as an autonomous research centre 
with funds from the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), had the Mexican 
government not withdrawn the support required by UNIDO on the grounds of economic crisis 
(again, 1981 currency devaluation, following the oil crisis). In the end, it was a relatively small 
concession from the national government that enabled the creation of IBT as part of the UNAM's 
research system (Fundamentos y casos exitosos...). 
61 Of the more than $40 million invested in biotechnology R&D in Mexico since 1990, about half is 
concentrated in the Instituto de Biotechnología (IBt) at the UNAM. IBt’s director is Francisco Bolívar 
who, in the 1970s, worked in the University of San Francisco laboratory of Genentech’s co-founder, 
Herb Boyer. Other smaller but relatively successful biotechnology R&D efforts can be found at 
CINVESTAV-Irapuato, CINVESTAV-Mexico City, at various departments within the UNAM, and at 
the Metropolitan University (UAM). The Nitrogen-Fixation Center of UNAM-Cuernavaca is charged 
with fixing nitrogen in nonleguminous crops, thereby avoiding dependency on chemical fertilizers 
and avoiding further soil deterioration, a serious ecological problem in Mexico. Production of 
nitrogen-fixing bacteria is monopolized by two foreign industries, Nitrogén and Química Lucava. 
The Centro Internacional de Mejoramiento de Maiz y Trigo (CIMMYT), a prominent internationally 
supported agricultural research center, also has a notable program in biotechnology; and, while its 
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with the situation in the U.S., most Mexican maize researchers have little interest 
in using molecular genetic markers to improve their selection criteria. The 
relatively few Mexican maize biotechnologists have had to fight hard to persuade 
their institutions and the government that their research is worthy of financial 
investment.62 Currently, of the six laboratories where biotechnological research on 
maize is conducted, only CINVESTAV-Irapuato applies advanced genetic 
engineering to agricultural production.63 Although most biotech projects in Mexico 
are nominally associated with industries such as food processing, plant and animal 
agriculture, environmental management, and pharmaceuticals, biotechnology 
researchers tend to avoid focusing their research on the specific needs of local 
companies. The latter, in turn, see little advantage in hiring scientists, particularly 
when technology can be obtained more cheaply from abroad. Not surprisingly, 
most biotechnological products circulating in Mexico are imported, a situation 
which not only keeps local biotechnological research isolated from economic 
activity, but also exacerbates the perception of biotechnology as foreign intrusion.  
 Still, the fantasies of revolutionary science reappears everywhere, even 
among the least expected actors. Francisco Bolívar, the failed scientist-
entrepreneur, is an ardent promoter of biotechnology as an opportunity and an 
instrument for “solving the problems of our country” ("Creación y Consolidación..." 
13). At the same time, he stresses that the solution to those problems is not the 
fundamental goal of the IBT. The goal of the IBT is rather to perform "first-level 
research" in order to "advance knowledge" under the evaluation and approval of 
international experts, for its publication in prestigious journals (16). In a gesture 
that is all too familiar by now, Bolívar equates his job with a desire “to understand 
our national problems, to search for solutions and, simultaneously, increase our 
identity and sovereignty” (22). There is therefore no fundamental shift in the way 
                                                                                                                                              
efforts are not focused exclusively on Mexico, it collaborates periodically with other research 
institutes that operate in the country. 
62 In the early 1990s there were 179 maize researchers, 67 of whom worked on genetic 
improvement. Government invested around 5 million dollars on such research, by contrast with 185 
million dollars invested by Monsanto (Arellano and Ortega, "Caracterización" 55). 
63 Luis Herrera Estrella, working at CINVESTAV-Irapuato, was the first scientist to transfer a 
bacterial gene into a plant. Other CINVESTAV scientists work on plague-, drought-, and soil 
salinity-resistant varietals, and are developing plants resistant to fungus, virus, and herbicides, 
through protoplast fusion and recombinant DNA. They also are studying tomato, tobacco, and bean 
genetics to make crops resistant to insects, or are working with Bacillus Thuringiensis (Bt) 
bioinsecticides. CINVESTAV is the only institution doing advanced plant biotechnology, while 
others do applied research in tissue culture and micropropagation. 
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that science and technology are imagined in Mexico, namely, as mere tools for the 
attainment of national sovereignty. I want to conclude this chapter by suggesting 
that there exist some other ways, more critical and more creative ones, to engage 
with biotechnology in a context such as Mexico. They involve breaking free from 
the traps of oppositional thinking and inventing different ways of understanding 
and practicing biotechnology, and technoscience more generally. 
  
Conclusion: Local Knowledges and Postmodern Technoscience 
 
It does not matter if in the middle of the way one finds oneself in a blind alley... in 
any case there is no other choice than starting to look and ask questions about the 
many hidden assumptions in narratives, in our own narratives (Gorbach and López 
Beltrán 21). 
 
In line with international trends, in recent decades Mexican science policy 
started to foreground business as the main engine of scientific and technological 
innovation, a neoliberal conception that merely re-articulated older expectations of 
development qua modernization. Yet the documents and analyses of Mexican 
science policy that I have briefly examined in this chapter suggest a crisis in the 
narratives of national development through state-sponsored science and 
technology. The crisis seems to pertain above all to the role of science and 
technology in Mexican society, which touches directly on the self-definition and 
cultural prestige of scientists but also on their historical and current relationship 
with the Mexican government. While "the Mexican problem with technoscience" 
cannot of course be reduced to the problem of "attitude" or "mentality," I have tried 
to show that a focus on cultural and political narratives does illuminate relevant 
aspects of the problem, not least questions of agency and historical responsibility. 
Scientists (and not just Mexican scientists) are of course being reasonable when 
they warn us against the extrapolation of productivist parameters to the field of 
academic knowledge. Yet more than defensiveness or purist contempt for 
engineers is needed if they are to satisfy their own desire for “effective 
interlocution and direct participation, with original projects for national 
development, in the broad and shared sense which today is missing” (Cano 166). 
An acknowledgment of the historical "impurity" of science and technology need not 
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lead us to downplay the challenges of technoscientific capitalism. On the contrary, 
it might help Mexican scientists (and more generally "us" as academic producers) 
to give up on melancholy, moralism and wishful thinking in order to start valorizing 
the increasing politicization and interrogation of our role in the wider society, for it 
is society as a whole that is exposed to the transformations entailed by 
technoscientific capitalism. Far from resolving this complex issue, to expect social 
change to come from a truly nationalist and transparent science policy “would 
mean cancelling spaces and opportunities to intervene, critically and autocritically, 
in the search of viable alternatives for the nation from the perspective of the 
interest of national majorities, an intervention which (...) is indispensable in the 
present time” (Cano 166). My general aim in this thesis is precisely to reflect on 
what counts as a responsible intellectual intervention in the definition of Mexican 
nationalism's historical responsibility towards Mexican society as a whole. 
Under the hegemony of modernizing narratives (including neoliberalism), it 
comes as no surprise that middle-class, Western-educated, urban subjects such 
as Mexican scientists feel compelled to view biotechnology as involving an 
either/or identity choice, a choice between, on the one hand, success, world-class 
science and development and, on the other hand, scientific backwardness and 
never-ending subordination. Yet the imperative of making a choice in such binary 
terms only reiterates the formulation of the problem as it is conceived from a 
modern hegemonic standpoint. Lyotard observes that a purely oppositional 
reaction to the contemporary subordination of knowledge to industry is unlikely to 
bring about any success. What he proposes instead is a sort of radical science, a 
generalized and in a sense impure scientific practice. The latter would not be 
about objective expertise, but rather it about creative game playing. In this vein 
Lyotard explains that "working on a proof means searching for and ’inventing’ 
counterexamples, in other words, the unintelligible; supporting an argument means 
looking for a ’paradox’ and legitimating it with new rules in the games of reasoning" 
(54). 
Starting in 2000, a History of Science seminar at the National University's 
Institute of Philosophical Investigations gathered researchers with different 
backgrounds around two points, namely: frustration with the indifference on the 
part of Northern historians to science in “peripheral” places such as Latin America, 
and a feeling of entrapment in the kind of rationality that reinforces the 
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peripherality or marginality of such places in relation to the dominant (Northern) 
narratives of the history of science. From the seminar's work there emerged a 
book, titled Saberes Locales, in which the editors explain:  
 
It happened that, in many ways, that central history, even when one attempted to 
fight it, was repeated locally, again and again, and in the end we didn't do more 
than importing Northern methods and theories, while we exported data and useful 
case studies so as to expand the explanatory power of those historiographies 
(Gorbach and López Beltrán 16). 
 
For some of these researchers, the dilemma was to either “domesticate with 
flattering the controlling and exoticizing gaze of dominant historiographies, or to 
take sides with the relativist, postmodern and postcolonial critics, but both 
extremes left us without a historical place for our sciences” (Gorbach and López 
Beltrán 16). For others, the choice was between nationalism and diffusionism, that 
is, between an essentialist attempt to capture the local contributions to science, 
and a “realistic” vision of such contributions in terms of bad copies of a science 
achieved elsewhere. Every path, however, ended up reinforcing the centrality of 
Europe as the subject of history, “...and thus there was no alternative to writing 
history of science to show Europe how modern we are, or to tell her how we adapt, 
configure and commemorate the nationalist singularity. In one or another way, we 
continued searching for essentialisms” (17). What the researchers discovered was 
a fundamental inhibition in the thinking of Southern sciences and histories from 
any place other than "Europe." Specific case studies constituted a kind of raw 
material for eurocentric thinking, leaving "perhipheral" historians with a sense of 
emptiness, one that could only be filled by the nation and nationalism (17). 
Nationalism, however, amounted to a reproduction of the centrality of the centre as 
the only possible way of defining oneself in terms of success or failure, 
development or stagnation, alignment or non-alignment (17).  
The two editors of Saberes Locales, Frida Gorbach and Carlos López 
Beltrán, refer to the "science wars" that followed Kuhn's publication of The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions as having made it necessary to understand 
sciences as knowledges, that is, “as cultural practices within complex power 
relationships” (Gorbach and López Beltrán 19). Rather than feeling triumphant 
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about the visibility of a new horizon beyond eurocentric diffusionism and 
nationalism, they insist that the science wars did not make it clear how Mexican 
knowledge producers must proceed in order to distantiate themselves from the 
European frameworks, which continue to be imposed. Yet it is precisely through 
the work of these historians and philosophers of science that more critical and 
more creative engagements with technoscience are beginning to be produced in 
Mexico. In 2011, the members of the same History and Philosophy of Science 
research seminar published another book, titled Genes (&) Mestizos, Genómica y 
raza en la biomedicina mexicana. In it, contributors not only identify the racist 
assumptions at work in current projects to develop a national biomedicine based 
on the genetic markers of Mexico's population. They also directly investigate the 
links between the interests of economic and political elites and the rhetoric that 
they use in order to colonize public discourse about health and illness in Mexican 
society. Beyond the melancholic mourning of development's failure, their 
historiographic deconstruction of Eurocentric narratives in revolutionary science 
has thus turned into an active intervention in the contemporary cultural struggle for 
a more democratic technoscience.  
Is it possible to multiply this kind of effort at "postmodern science" in the 
field of agricultural biotechnology? In the following chapter, I argue that a 
contestation of the dominant framing of biotechnology as “the genetic 
informationalisation of life itself” (Kember 236) can indeed destabilize the 
concentration of technoscientific debate within expert circles of policy-makers and 
scientists. In this vein, I ask what media and cultural studies can contribute to the 
analysis of biotechnology debates in Mexico. If it seems strange to assert that 
media and cultural studies is a kind of biotechnology, it might seem less so to see 
food practices as biotechnologies - and directly relevant to media and cultural 
studies at that. Having expanded the field of biotechnology studies through an 
understanding of technoscience as a sociocultural process, I want to turn my 
attention from science policy to cultural policy. In the next chapter, I analyze the 
story of cultural activism that has led to the recent inscription of Traditional 
Mexican Cuisine in UNESCO's List of Intangible Cultural Heritage (2010).  
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Chapter IV 
 
The People of Maize and the Technoscience of 
Culture 
 
Introduction: A Postmodern Apocalypse or Postmodern Knowledge? 
 
Postmodern knowledge is not simply a tool of the authorities; it refines our 
sensitivity to differences and reinforces our ability to tolerate the incommensurable. 
Its principle is not the expert's homology, but the inventor's paralogy (Lyotard xxv). 
 
In The Postmodern Condition, J.F. Lyotard defined postmodernity as an age 
in which knowledge, having lost its metaphysical foundations, is produced as a 
weapon in a global economic war. His prognosis was that the new economic role 
of knowledge would lead to a widening of the gap between rich and poor 
countries. As I explain in Chapter III, the same prognosis underpinned the 
widespread adoption of science policy by the Mexican government, which 
gradually sought to promote new attitudes and behaviors towards knowledge 
production based on the neoliberal premise that a country's economic survival 
depended on its technoscientific competitiveness in the global economy. Mexican 
scientists resisted the implementation of neoliberal science policy by invoking 
older narratives of pure science and national sovereignty. In my argument, their 
discourse failed to question conventional historiographies of science and 
technology and thereby reduced the national engagement with the technoscientific 
conjuncture to a re-assertion of revolutionary science – a term by which I 
designated an fantasy of social progress by means of science and technology. By 
contrast, a new generation of Mexican historians and philosophers of science 
started to explicitly challenge the legacies of both revolutionary nationalism and 
dominant, eurocentric narratives of science and technology. Rather than just 
lamenting the end of state support for so-called "pure science," they focused their 
attention on the symbolic and material construction of national science in relation 
to colonial history and global capitalism. As I conclude in Chapter III, I see their 
work as a critical engagement with technoscience that also provides a self-
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reflective alternative to purely modernizing critiques of “Third World Biotechnology” 
(Goldstein, Wagner). In this chapter, I want to expand their engagement with 
technoscience from science as culture towards cultural activism as a form of 
technoscientific activism. 
Much like science policy, cultural policy in the neoliberal era is elaborated 
by international think tanks promoting attitudes and behaviors appropriate for the 
transformation of all social practices into economic resources. With the argument 
of making cultures viable in the context of globalization, contemporary cultural 
policy promotes their technoscientific integration into the market economy. Early in 
the Mexican campaign against transgenic maize, a heterogeneous group of 
activists came up with the idea of appealing to international cultural policy as a 
strategic domain from which to advance their defense of Mexican maize varieties. 
The inscription of Mexican cuisine in UNESCO's List of Masterpieces of Intangible 
Cultural Heritage was sought since 2002 by a diverse group of citizens, including 
professional anthropologists, urban chefs, popular cooks, food writers, journalists 
and government officials. Through the “nomination files” that they sent to 
UNESCO, advocates of Mexican cuisine called for a defense of indigenous and 
national identity, defined in terms of traditional cuisine, against global threats such 
as junk food and genetically modified organisms. They argued that UNESCO's 
recognition would help to ensure the “viability” of Mexican food culture in a 
globalized world. It took them eight years to finally achieve inscription in the 
Representative List of Intangible Cultural Heritage (2010). The process involved 
one failed attempt undertaken by Mexican public institutions and academic 
activists, and a second, successful intervention on the part of urban gastronomic 
entrepreneurs sponsored by the transnational food corporation Maseca-Gruma. 
The role of industrial actors in achieving the UNESCO seal of approval makes it 
clear that “intangible heritage” is an ambiguous, slippery terrain rather than a 
straightforward oppositional force, yet I want to suggest that it is precisely for that 
reason that cultural activism must now be understood as technoscientific activism, 
which makes it important to analyze both the possibilities and the potential 
obstacles of a culture-centred defense of traditional maize agriculture on the part 
of social movements.  
Heritage has come to be officially understood as a construct and a form of 
cultural politics that inevitably recreates “a sense of inclusion and exclusion” 
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(Smith and Akagawa, "Introduction" 7). From this perspective, every heritage is 
“intangible” in the sense that it is never an objective given. Heritage becomes 
tangible only when certain immaterial values appropriate institutional spaces 
through acts of power. For instance, by upholding the universality of a particular 
set of European values, UNESCO's World Heritage List sanctioned an 
international hierarchy of cultural relevance or status (7). This hierarchy was 
challenged during the culture wars of the 1980s, and the critical compromises 
reached through these wars (such as an official recognition of “cultural diversity") 
were in turn institutionalized in UNESCO's concept of intangible cultural heritage. 
At present, the heritage contest between nations is less about cultural prestige 
than about relative capacity of local cultures to "survive" the threats of 
globalization. In the absence of clear alternatives to global capitalism, cultural 
policy has become an effort to preserve cultural diversity through its productive 
integration into a global market of symbolic goods and services. In this context, 
cultural policy came to promote new technoscientific attitudes as the proper 
response to the demise of industrial development. The new technoscientific 
attitudes rely on a figuration of culture as an economic resource that can allow a 
country to face up to the challenges of a global economic war – which is how J.F. 
Lyotard described the status of knowledge in The Postmodern Condition. 
In Chapter I of this thesis, Jeffrey Pilcher's cultural history of Mexican 
cuisine provided a key source for my exposition of how the nationalist celebration 
of maize obscured the devaluation of rural life and local agricultural knowledges in 
post-revolutionary Mexico (Que Vivan 124). Pilcher's own conclusion, however, 
justified revolutionary nationalism as a key for the continuity of Mexican food 
culture, a continuity that Pilcher took as an evidence of popular agency (133). In 
recent years Pilcher seems to have changed his view about the agency of 
Mexican majorities. He has argued that in the age of globalization, 
“postmodernism” is threatening what he now calls “peasant cuisines” with nothing 
less than an “apocalypse.” According to Pilcher, postmodernism amounts to a 
middle-class logic of fascination with the native indigenous, that is, a logic of 
consumption of an exoticized and folklorized other ("Taco Bell" 70). He denounces 
the power that “postmodern” organizations such as Slow Food exercise in Mexico, 
where they divert social movements towards “middle-class agendas with little 
relevance to the needs of common people” (75). In the case of Mexico, the 
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common people would be “the mestizo (mixed-race) majority, who do not speak an 
indigenous language but still suffer economic and political marginalization” (75). 
Since organizations such as Slow Food are, in Pilcher's view, insensitive to class 
issues, their articulation with social movements in Mexico promises nothing but a 
degeneration of peasant cuisines into exoticized commodities for privileged 
consumers. 
Pilcher's apocalyptic interpretation of "postmodernism" strikes me as odd 
considering his earlier vindication of post-revolutionary Mexicans who celebrated 
maize as a national food at the same time that they benefitted from the 
modernizers' destruction of rural life and local knowledges. In other words, why 
does he blame "postmodernism" instead of modern development theories and 
policies for the current situation of Mexican peasants and their cuisines? While I 
agree with Pilcher on the importance of pointing out the elitist tendencies of 
globalizing gastronomic discourse, in this chapter I propose to explore the 
convergence of gastronomy and cultural heritage through a more nuanced 
understanding of "postmodernism" which allows us to eschew moralistic 
accusations and leads us towards a critical consideration of the political 
opportunities opened up by the new technoscience of culture. Hence, I examine 
the debates to which UNESCO's recognition led among the activists and 
promoters of Mexican cuisine. Such debates concerned precisely the 
technoscientific character of UNESCO's prescriptions for "safeguarding" Mexican 
cuisine as intangible heritage – particularly an articulation of cultural know-how 
with the capitalist economy, with all the regulatory and "expert" intervention that 
such an articulation involves. Is intangible cultural heritage a postmodern 
apocalypse for Mexican traditional cuisine, or is it rather a platform for postmodern 
knowledge? Or is it, perhaps, both at one and the same time? 
In the first section of this chapter I explore how cultural studies is able to 
strengthen the post-Marxist approach to nationalism through its attention to 
contextual singularities and everyday cultural practices, in this case Mexican 
heritage practices. From Stuart Hall's perspective, the nation is “performed” into 
existence by heritage institutions that interpellate the citizens through the latter's 
own investments in narrative substantiality and coherence. On this basis I draw 
attention to some of the ways in which the theoretical orientation of cultural studies 
has already been used in Mexico to de-mistify state patrimonialism. As a critical 
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counterpoint to the more disciplinary orientation of Latin American research on 
culture, however, I re-introduce the insights of anti-essentialist philosophy and I 
frame intangible heritage as an unstable platform for the construction and 
deconstruction of political subjectivity. In the following section I examine the role 
played by anti-essentialist critique in the creation of intangible heritage discourse 
at international policy think tanks. I argue that intangible heritage is an offspring of 
the mutual "contamination" of postmodern anti-essentialism and neoliberal 
rationality. Beyond moralistic judgment of this mutual contamination, I try to 
understand the ambiguous dynamics of the ongoing heritagization and 
gastronomification of indigenous cuisines. After examining the discourse of the 
nomination files sent by Mexican activists to UNESCO between the years 2005 
and 2010, I suggest that, as a matter of strategy, the nationalist defense of 
Mexican maize also had to allow itself to be "contaminated" by UNESCO-style 
heritage discourse.  
Even if intangible heritage is permeated by an exoticizing logic of cultural 
capitalism, the contemporary celebration of Mexican food as intangible heritage 
promises to unsettle previous picturings of Mexicanness as a cage of melancholy 
or a static limbo between "modernity" and "tradition." In this vein, I reflect in the 
concluding section on how an anti-essentialist perspective allows us to re-
formulate the political and ethical problems raised by the technoscientific 
conjuncture in which the Mexican defenders of maize are trying to "safeguard" the 
national cuisine. 
 
Nation and Heritage: Unstable Materializations of Power/Knowledge 
 
The archive we are talking about, or rather, the heritage, implies that a stock is 
never constituted, never in one piece. It is less and less localizable, paradoxically 
because it is always already classed, that is to say, interpreted, filtered, put in 
order (Derrida, Echographies 68). 
 
Cultural theorist Stuart Hall once defined heritage as “the whole complex of 
organisations, institutions and practices devoted to the presentation of culture and 
the arts” ("Whose Heritage" 23). To Antonio Gramsci's original insight that the 
cultural domain is politically strategic for the national state, Hall added the more 
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contemporary Foucauldian argument that the cultural domain exercises a specific 
kind of power, namely, the power “to order knowledge, to rank, classify and 
arrange, and thus to give meaning to objects and things through the imposition of 
interpretative schemas, scholarship and authority of connoisseurship” (24). In 
short, heritage creates hegemony by means of power/knowledge, which subtly 
produces a compliant subjectivity or “governmentality.” In order to emphasize the 
subtlety of power/knowledge operations, Stuart Hall draws our attention to “the 
very quaintness” of the term “heritage,” to how “innocently” it slips into everyday 
speech ("Whose Heritage" 23). His specific concern is the everyday speech of 
multicultural Britain, where the dominant understanding of heritage privileges the 
conservation of historical sites “as opposed to the production and circulation of 
new work in different media” (23). Hall suggests that the designation the English 
past as the nation's heritage illustrates the role of heritage in creating an imaginary 
consensus around “a particular settlement of structured inequalities” (27). Such a 
heritage is not intended for a multicultural society in which all differences, past and 
present, count the same, but for “a society which is imagined as, in broad terms, 
culturally homogeneous and unified” (26). Moreover, it conceals the fact that those 
features which appear in the imaginary as primordial "English" virtues, such as 
free speech and the welfare state, are in fact the focus point of ongoing conflicts in 
a society which is in fact characterized heterogeneous and riven by 
disagreements. In this context, cultural studies has undertaken a close scrutiny of 
heritage, paying particular attention to the persistence of imperial and colonial 
imaginaries, of “the legacies of race,” in its ongoing construction (Littler and 
Naidoo). The aim has been to understand and expose many of the ways in which 
the national heritage works to produce and hierarchically organize differences. In 
this chapter I try to understand how heritage has been enacted in Mexico in order 
to conceal and even sanction power inequalities. 
Hall argues that despite the usefulness of Foucault’s theory of the 
productive operations of power/knowledge, it makes it too difficult to explain “how 
or why bodies should not always-for-ever turn up, in place, at the right time” 
("Introduction" 12).64 Drawing on Judith Butler's theory of gender performativity, 
                                                
64 In his later works Foucault went beyond the abstract formalism of his early theories of power – 
through ethical notions such as the “aesthetics of existence” and “technologies of the self.” 
However, for Hall it remains a limitation in Foucault's work that he always rejected psychoanalysis 
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Hall argues that heritage involves more than an abstract power exercised 
unilaterally through the filtering of representations. In Gender Trouble, Butler 
argues that words, acts, gestures and desire repeatedly enact fantasies of 
incorporation that end up producing, on the surface of the body, “the effect of an 
internal core or substance” (185). Butler writes: 
 
(...) it is clear that coherence is desired, wished for, idealized, and that this 
idealization is an effect of a corporeal signification. In other words, acts, gestures, 
and desire produce the effect of an internal core or substance, but produce this on 
the surface of the body, through the play of signifying absences that suggest, but 
never reveal, the organizing principle of identity as a cause (185). 
 
The popularity of claims that Mexicans are “a people of maize” and that 
“maize is our flesh” speaks of a strong fantasy of incorporation, that is a strong 
psychic investment in an effect of coherence that is desired, idealized and 
ultimately materialized. The eating of maize dumplings over the generations and 
throughout each eater's life seems to justify a positioning of maize as the "cause" 
of a collective identity, and such a positioning is reinforced (as well as exploited) 
by institutions that figure maize as national heritage. In Bodies that Matter Butler 
explains that she does not really conceive “matter” as a pregiven site or a surface, 
but rather as “a process of materialization that stabilizes over time to produce the 
effect of boundary, fixity, and surface” (xviii).65 In this way she strengthens her 
original conception of performativity as “not a singular or deliberate "act," but, 
rather, (...) the reiterative and citational practice by which discourse produces the 
effects that it names” (xvii).66 In analogy with Butler's conception of gender, we can 
understand heritage as an ongoing series of “repeated acts within a highly rigid 
regulatory frame that congeal over time to produce the appearance of substance, 
                                                                                                                                              
and thus failed to elaborate a satisfactory account of the psychic as well bodily sources of 
resistance to dominant discourse. 
65 This clarification was developed in response to criticisms of Butler's statements that the body has 
“no ontological status apart from the various acts which constitute its reality” (Gender Trouble 185). 
There is no space here to review the criticisms in detail, although I will give them some 
consideration in the next chapter. I interpret Butler's position not as overlooking material/historical 
constraints on individuals' choices, but rather as a prophylactic against metaphysical naturalistic 
discourses.  
66 While matter is defined as “power's most productive effect” (Bodies that Matter xvii), Butler urges 
us not to be misled by grammar, for power is “neither a subject nor its act, but a process of 
reiteration by which both “subjects” and “acts” come to appear at all” (xviii). 
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of a natural sort of being” (Gender Trouble 33). For instance, after the European 
Enlightenment developed an enthusiasm for “Classical Antiquity”, institutions were 
created which contributed to narrate, naturalize and universalize such an 
enthusiasm, until it became “a self-evident element of social life” (Bendix 256). 
Much of UNESCO's heritage policy would be indeed modeled on the history of 
European architectural and archaeological conservation – what Laurajane Smith 
calls an “Authorized Heritage Discourse” (AHD) – that defines heritage as 
aesthetic, tangible and monumental ("Uses of Heritage"). Yet the advantage of 
Butler's theory over Foucault's theory of governmentality would be that people 
actively identify with heritage, as if “the drives” invested themselves through bodily 
enactments of heritage. Hall writes that “[i]t is through identifying with these 
representations that we come to be its subjects by subjecting ourselves to its 
dominant meanings” (Hall S., "Whose Heritage" 25). In this light, Mexicanness 
appears as more than a set of imposed abstract representations; it appears as a 
material and discursive terrain in which subjects emerge through fantasies of 
substantiality, coherence and indeed collectivity. Crucially, these fantasies involve 
a concealment of the filtering operations of power/knowledge. At the same time, 
the analogy with gender performativity also helps to understand that it is only a 
matter of time or as Hall puts it, of a shift in circumstances that dominant 
narrations of “Mexicanness” will be revealed as “context-bound, historically 
specific, and thus open to contestation, re-negotiation, and revision” ("Whose 
Heritage" 26).67 
In the concluding sections of his essay on heritage, Stuart Hall suggests 
that the “highly evolved Amerindian cultures” of Latin America are “less familiar 
than the surface of Mars” ("Whose Heritage" 35). This is at least partly due to the 
fact that after the Conquest, the Spanish Crown sought to put an end to research 
on indigenous subjects by Catholic missionaries, first of all through the censorship 
of their publications (Castañeda, "The Aura of Ruins" 462). Thousands of 
indigenous cities and practices were "lost" from the map of knowledge, at least 
                                                
67 As Hall points out, Butler's theory insists on the essential incompleteness of performative 
processes, arguing that if reiteration is necessary for discourse to produce that which it names, this 
“is a sign that materialization is never quite complete, that bodies never quite comply with the 
norms by which their materialization is impelled” (Bodies that Matter xvii). It is because “bodies 
never quite comply” that “the body” had served, in Gender Trouble, “as a permanently available site 
of contested meanings” (15). In the more rigorous terms of Bodies that Matter, bodies never quite 
comply because “instability is the deconstituting possibility in the very process of repetition” (xix). 
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until the nineteenth century when Mexico became independent from Spain. Creole 
elites then made great efforts to localize the ruins of Mesoamerica, which they 
imagined as the primordial origins of the Mexican nation (463). Crucial for the 
conversion of those ruins into the “national patrimony” were the writings of foreign 
traveller-scientists such as Alexander von Humboldt (462). Humboldt's depiction of 
ancient societies as “civilizations” within the Eurocentric vision of World Civilization 
laid down the narrative structure not just of early Mexican nationalism but much 
later of World Heritage discourse at UNESCO. Whereas in the United Kingdom 
something like “white England” has presided over the national heritage, until 
recently there was in a hegemonic identity defined by mestizaje, a celebration of 
“Mexicanness” as a mixture of Amerindian cultures and the European legacy of 
the Spanish colonizers.  
According to historian Alan Knight, the nationalist celebration of mestizaje 
was in fact a call for cultural homogeneity through racial as well as cultural 
“improvement” ("Racism, Revolution").68 In the years following the Mexican 
Revolution (1910-1921), when educational policy took priority over conservation, 
ancient Mesoamerican ruins were recreated in temporary and traveling exhibits, 
cultural missions and pictorial works. Muralists Diego Rivera, David Alfaro 
Siqueiros and José Clemente Orozco drew simultaneously on Maya and Aztec 
works, Catholic church altarpieces, regional handicrafts and European avant-
garde experimentalism for their iconographic constructions of Mexican identity. By 
the 1950s, industrialization and tourism had given rise to a complex network of 
specialized museums and archeological sites, which expanded in parallel with the 
schooling system and the mass media. In all these institutional networks, the 
presentation of the “national patrimony” was dominated by monumental pre-
Columbian sculpture, rural imagery and indigenous handicrafts. However, it 
generally followed the guidelines of classic European museums, namely, 
aestheticism and decontextualization. 
Although there is no institutionalized discipline of cultural studies in Mexico, 
the exercise of power through the symbolic construction of heritage has been 
                                                
68 Celebration of mestizaje bequeathed a deceptive consensus that Mexicans have no race issues 
and merely silenced discussion about the colonial legacy. All that people had to do in order to avoid 
racial marking was to become mestizo. This implied an active erasing of any indigenous trait, 
physical or cultural, by “developing” and foregrounding other traits such as whiteness, height, the 
Spanish language, an urban lifestyle, wealth, fashion, and so forth.  
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studied by several scholars based in Mexico, such as Néstor García Canclini. In 
his classic work Hybrid Cultures: Strategies for Entering and Leaving Modernity, 
García Canclini describes contemporary Mexico as the sedimentation, 
juxtaposition, and interweaving of indigenous cultures, Hispanic Catholicism, and 
modern acculturation policies. Despite a concentration of the indigenous and the 
Catholic elements in the “popular” or majoritarian sectors, there are “hybrid” 
formations, García Canclini argues, in all social strata.69 He develops an argument 
about the Mexican "national patrimony" that resonates closely with Edmundo 
O'Gorman's diagnosis of Mexican nationalism explored in earlier chapters.70 Like 
O'Gorman, García Canclini is interested in showing how Mexican liberals – 
including their revolutionary heirs – failed to recognize their own complicity with the 
persistence of economic inequalities and social injustice in Mexico. In his own 
diagnosis of Mexican patrimonialism we find a very similar analysis of the positions 
of the two historic types of Mexican nationalists: the “abstract liberals” on the one 
hand and the “dogmatic fundamentalists” on the other hand. While dogmatics 
explicitly cling to “the synthesis of Catholicism and the social order,” liberals 
pursue “abstract modernity.” Both positions amount in the end, says García 
Canclini to the same “mystical adherence to a set of obsolescent religious and 
patriotic goods without any productive relations to contemporary conflicts” (143). 
The national patrimony emerges in García Canclini's study precisely as that which 
different types of nationalists hold in common because it compensates for 
something else which they are unwilling to address.  
By contrast with O'Gorman, however, García Canclini does not attribute the 
cultural essentialism of Mexican nationalists to a disavowed attachment to 
Hispanic Catholicism. Instead, he argues that cultural essentialism is a modern 
operation that sustains modern forms of oppression. Drawing on a Gramscian 
paradigm, he explains that Latin American states, qua modern projects, 
appropriated popular goods and practices in order to persuade their addresees 
that they were prolonging shared traditions at the same time that they were 
                                                
69 Thus, even if modern acculturation was “more effective” among the urban middle classes, certain 
elites still preserve their roots in Hispanic-Catholic traditions, and even in indigenous traditions in 
agrarian zones (García Canclini 46). 
70 According to O'Gorman, a disavowal Hispano-Catholic attachments rendered Mexican liberals 
incapable of explaining why a modern legislation and a capitalist economy failed to bring about 
modernity. In his argument, Mexican liberals refused to acknowledge the cultural and political 
dimensions of modernity, and their failure to achieve modernity sparked only a reactive, self-
glorifying cultural essentialism. 
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renewing society. Echoing Roger Bartra's analysis of revolutionary nationalism 
(outlined in Chapter 1) García Canclini points out that the "national patrimony” 
became the axis of the state's cultural policy at a very specific time, namely, the 
time when rural populations were being displaced and subjected to development 
policies. It was thus for the sake of modernity that rural imagery and artifacts came 
to sustain “a metaphysical, ahistorical view of the national being” (108). Like Stuart 
Hall, García Canclini criticizes the conception of the national patrimony as a set of 
objects to be glorified and preserved, with its associated privileging of historical 
sites over the production and circulation of new work. State patrimonialism, he 
says, may have served to preserve and democratize access to cultural goods that 
would otherwise have disappeared as a consequence of capitalist modernization. 
However, precisely this same process prevented a “just and solidary” re-
appropriation of territorial space and historical time (134). As the post-
revolutionary state co-opted cultural production and channelled it towards a 
reiteration of its nationalist doctrines, continuing social inequality led to a situation 
in which “modernity” came to be seen as a “mask” or a “simulacrum” to which 
cultural producers could relate only with a sense of guilt (53).71 
Writing at a time when Mexico was about to undergo the neoliberal 
acculturation that would eventually mark its “transition to democracy,” García 
Canclini proposes to undertake a radical “desubstantialization of the concept of 
national patrimony” through an interrogation of traditionalism not simply because it 
is a hegemonic operation but more importantly because he sees it a false solution 
to the country's predicament in the face of globalization. García Canclini 
emphasizes that democracy was not achieved in Mexico through the celebration of 
the national patrimony. In fact, the achievement of democracy was facilitated by 
the transnational culture industries that came to permeate everyday life in Latin 
America by the final decades of the twentieth century. In this context, state 
patrimonialism offers nothing but a compensatory practice, governed by the 
principle that “if we cannot compete [with the culture industries] (...) let us 
celebrate our handicrafts and old techniques (...)” (113). One serious consequence 
of investing ourselves in such a principle, however, is that it creates even more 
                                                
71 The final decades of the twentieth century saw an explosion of critical discourses particularly in 
the field of visual arts, with artists aiming to dissociate themselves from the revolutionary discourse 
of the authoritarian political regime and insert themselves into the transnational circuits of the art 
market. 
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“difficulties in performance.”72 As an alternative, García Canclini invites us to draw 
the consequences from “the postmodern deconstruction of Western Modernity.” 
He explains that he conceives postmodernity “not as a stage or tendency that 
replaces the modern world, but rather as a way of problematizing the equivocal 
links that the latter has formed with the traditions it tried to exclude or overcome in 
constituting itself” (7). It is on the basis of a “postmodern” interrogation of the 
status of modernity that García Canclini envisions an exit from the modern 
dichotomy between modernity and tradition. From this, he concludes that the 
critical task is to understand how a plurality of cultural actors “relocate their 
practices in the face of [the] contradictions of modernity, or how they imagine they 
could do so” (65). He writes: 
 
There can be no future for our past while we waver between the reactive 
fundamentalisms against the modernity achieved, and the abstract modernisms 
that resist problematizing our "deficient" capacity to be modern. To leave behind 
this "western", this maniacal pendulum, it is not enough to be interested in how 
traditions are reproduced and transformed. The postmodern contribution is useful 
for escaping from the impasse insofar as it reveals the constructed and staged 
character of all tradition, including that of modernity: it refutes the originary quality 
of traditions and the originality of innovations (144). 
 
García Canclini's critique of Mexican patrimonialism explicitly indicates that 
the “postmodern” critique of essentialisms was crucial to de-mistify heritage 
practices and to examine them as an arena of cultural and political struggle. In the 
aftermath of postmodernism, cultural processes are no longer interesting “for their 
capacity to remain "pure" and equal to themselves” (42), but rather for their 
willingness to adapt to the needs of the present. While inequalities certainly persist 
in the appropriation of symbolic goods, they “no longer take the simple and 
polarized form we thought we would encounter when we were dividing every 
country into dominant or dominated, or the world into empires and dependent 
nations” (65). From this perspective, the challenge for Mexican culture is not an 
                                                
72 In the same vein, Hall exhorts British citizens to re-imagine their “Britishness” in a more inclusive 
manner “to prepare their own people for success in a global de-centred world” (Hall S., "Whose 
Heritage" 31-32). Failing to do so by insisting on a defensive narrative of “Britain” as a tight little 
island would be “to fatally disable them” (31-32). 
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either/or identity choice, but an adaptation to the new conditions of “heterogeneity, 
mobility and deterritorialization” (García Canclini 113). While he does not provide 
examples of "postmodernism," García Canclini does credits the latter for a 
"deconstruction of Western Modernity." Most of his arguments in Hybrid Cultures 
(regarding concrete empirical subjects such as Octavio Paz, Mexican television 
spectators, museum audiences, vanguard artists and popular artisans) in fact 
invoke the need to develop novel theoretical approaches that take into account 
“the postmodern deconstruction." In a typical instance, he argues that “[i]n almost 
all the literature on patrimony it is still necessary to effect that operation of rupture 
with the naive realism that epistemology long ago carried out” (142). Yet García 
Canclini himself refuses to take such a rupture to its last consequences, which 
pertain to the disciplinary constitution of cultural studies in Latin America. 
In order to assess such the adaptation of cultural producers to the global or 
“deterritorialized” conditions, García Canclini recommends an alliance between 
knowledge disciplines, such as sociology and anthropology, on the assumption 
that these disciplines are able to provide “real referents” for the study of culture in 
Latin America. Moreover, he demarcates Latin American cultural studies from both 
the traditional literatures on “the national being” and “the postmodern 
bibliography.” The reasons for this disciplinary demarcation run as follows: 
 
It is a question of seeing how, within the crisis of Western modernity – of which 
Latin America is a part – the relations among tradition, cultural modernism, and 
socioeconomic modernization are transformed. For that it is necessary to go 
beyond the philosophical speculation and aesthetic intuitionism that dominate the 
postmodern bibliography. The scarcity of empirical studies on the place of culture 
in so-called postmodern processes has resulted in a relapse into distortions of 
premodern thought: constructing ideal positions without any real reference (6). 
 
Of course, I am not against empirical studies of how various cultural actors 
resituate their concrete practices in the face of globalization processes and even 
less of “how they imagine they could do so” (65). Yet, an empirical description of 
such "real referents" seems of little critical interest to me without a theoretical 
investigation of the power/knowledge operations that simultaneously constrain and 
enable cultural actors to respond in unexpected ways. Moreover, by opposing “real 
referents” to “philosophical speculation,” García Canclini uncritically re-instates the 
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modern epistemic framework that "postmodernism" is supposed to have called into 
question. It is as a critical alternative to such a relapse into empiricism that I 
propose to undertake a reading of "textual referents" such as cultural policy 
documents, academic and policy-makers' testimonials, “nomination files” 
submitted to UNESCO and press articles by activists concerned about the fate of 
Mexican food culture. Through my investigation of these texts, I show that in the 
global technoscientific conjuncture, "postmodernism" is no longer the preserve of 
philosophical speculators or social scientists applying their methodological 
frameworks to cultural actors outside the university. It now permeates the expert 
field of cultural policy discourse as a set of ideas that mobilize material resources 
and competition among states around recognition and management of "cultural 
diversity." Taking heed of Hall's warnings against an exclusive emphasis on 
abstract domination by discourse, I try to diagnose the inherent constraints as well 
as the possibilities opened for activism by the "postmodern" trend in cultural policy. 
I start by explaining on how the postmodern critique of essentialisms infiltrated 
international policy think tanks with highly ambiguous consequences for the 
Mexican defense of maize.  
 
Intangible Heritage: Nostalgia, Postmodernism and Technoscience 
 
People all around the world do not want to be left without a soul. This helps explain 
the extraordinary upsurge of cultural politics surrounding the loss and 
transformation of cultural practices, which evolved over millennia in all regions of 
the world, and which have been disappearing at an alarming rate in only 50 years 
(Arizpe, "Cultural Politics" 387). 
 
Anthropologist Quetzil Castañeda recently characterized the proliferation of 
heritage discourse in contemporary archaeology, public debate, policy-making and 
intergovernmental discussions as a nostalgic response to the postmodern crisis of 
modern metanarratives. In the aftermath of “the great culture wars” of the 1990s, 
he explains, “diversity” came to be recognized as “really real reality that could not 
be uprooted by modernization schemes and political solutions to the problem of 
the Other” ("Commentary" 109). The wars, however, left “no immanent logic of 
reintegration for the fragments and shards of cultural wholes” and thus a desire 
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installed itself “to make the present "whole" by reunifying it with a resucitated past” 
(111). Borrowing Walter Benjamin's metaphor, Castañeda concludes that heritage 
institutions “seek to be the angel of History, trying to stay, awaken the dead and 
make whole what has been smashed” (111). Whether or not heritage practices are 
ultimately able to make whole what has been smashed, we must account for their 
powerful operations. In this section I argue that heritage has emerged as a 
technoscientific field through the articulation of theories of performativity with 
economic discourse. Rather than framing this articulation as a “postmodern 
apocalypse,” I want to explore its ambiguous potential in order to identify 
possibilities for a subversive engagement on the part of Mexican defenders of 
maize with the postmodern technoscience of culture. 
Until the 1980s, national debates around “folk cultures” had resonated with 
larger tensions in international policy discourse between economic modernizers at 
the IMF and the World Bank on the one hand, and UNESCO social scientists on 
the other hand. The discursive hegemony of the modernizers meant that folk 
cultures needed to be superseded if "underdeveloped" nation-states were to 
achieve "development." The developmental imperative in turn shaped the 
ambivalent relation between the Mexican post-revolutionary state and the nation's 
folk cultures.73 Towards the end of the post-revolutionary era and with the decline 
of the Keynesian paradigm worldwide, more nuanced positions emerged at both 
ends of the international ideological spectrum. At the modernizing end, a 
neoliberal understanding of culture as “social capital” was developed. At the 
anthropological end, a defense of 'diversity' began to take shape on the grounds of 
a non-essentialist, performative understanding of culture (Arizpe, "Cultural Politics" 
372). Intangible cultural heritage eventually emerged from these ideological 
reformulations as a strategic domain where experts and state officials converged 
around the need to promote “a different mix of culture and the economy” (372). 
1982, the year of the debt crisis that officially inaugurated Mexico's turn towards 
neoliberalism, was also the year of the World Conference on Cultural Policies, 
which took place in Mexico City. In that Conference, UNESCO adopted for the first 
time a definition of culture that went beyond the arts and humanities in order to 
                                                
73 As previously explains, rural populations in Mexico were encouraged to leave behind the 
concrete social practices that sustained their “folk cultures”, in return for having these “folk cultures” 
celebrated as “national patrimony.” 
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include folk cultures, local worldviews and traditional ways of life. Parallel to the 
Conference, the National Museum of Popular Cultures opened with a major 
exhibition called Maize: the foundation of Mexican popular culture. The exhibition 
attempted to illustrate contemporary developments in cultural policy based on the 
new conception of culture as "living." Besides the usual gathering of objects, 
artifacts, images and explanatory notes within the space of the museum, the 
exhibition showcased the results of a larger project involving writing contests and 
other mechanisms for the participation of citizens across the Mexican republic. 
Significantly, the narrative of the exhibition explicitly opposed, among many other 
things, “the diversity and flexibility of traditional agricultural technologies” to the 
project of “transnational companies that conceive maize as a mere commodity 
unrelated to the cultural and historical context that gives maize its true importance 
for the Mexican people” (Bonfil Batalla 154). In the words of Mexican 
anthropologist Guillermo Bonfil Batalla, founder and first director of the National 
Museum of Popular Cultures, the whole point of the Museum was “to identify, 
display and valorize the autonomous cultural production of the popular sectors, a 
production that makes them creators rather than mere consumers of an imposed 
culture” (155). In retrospective, Batalla's words sound like a genuine battle cry 
within the “great culture wars” that would culminate in the recognition of “cultural 
diversity.” This recognition, Castañeda observes, soon turned into a desire to 
protect culture from a deconstruction that had already been inflicted on it.  
A revalorization of "living" popular cultures was being actively mobilized by 
the end of the 1980s by Southern state officials protesting against the selection 
criteria of the World Heritage List. Debates were held at UNESCO over whether to 
incorporate “living” cultures into the World Heritage List, or rather design a 
separate “instrument” for them. The preparation of this instrument took off with the 
1989 Recommendation on the Safeguarding of Traditional Culture and Folklore. 
During that process, which coincided with the “great culture wars,” the relation 
between culture and development was reconceptualized across the tension 
between a “postmodern” defense of cultural diversity and a neoliberal drive to 
integrate cultural diversity into global capitalism. Throughout UNESCO's World 
Decade for Cultural Development (1987-1997), experts set out to craft new notions 
of "development" based on a revalorization of the creativity and know-how of 
“living” traditional cultures. In 1995, the World Commission on Cultural 
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Development published a report titled Our Creative Diversity. While it established 
that culture is not just a means to material progress, the report did point in new 
directions. For instance, it claimed that both culture and development were 
endangered by wars, environmental disaster and “inattentive development.” 
Moreover, it argued that something needed to be done in order to preserve 
expressive cultures from expropriation, reification, and elimination. Our Creative 
Diversity thus situated the new problematic of culture the crisis of modern 
metanarratives of development, industrialization, and the march of universal 
progress. Significantly, the report claimed to have been conceived “in the questing 
spirit of our age,” which sought to enrich a debate rather than impose the 
acceptance of new truths, by subjecting the notion of culture itself to “multiple 
readings and possibilities.” Yet, the project seemed doomed if it was not somehow 
articulated with the global economy. Hence, the “questing spirit” of the report was 
eventually transformed into a programme for the rational management of cultural 
“skills, enabling factors, products, impacts and economic value” (Arizpe, "Cultural 
Politics" 381). Thus defined, intangible heritage came to be permeated by 
neoliberalism as a political rationality of “viability” through cultural performance.  
Permeated by neoliberal languages, what I would call a new "technoscience 
of culture" (that is, an economically oriented task of cultural conservation and 
production) came to operate through a cosmopolitanist celebration of intangible 
cultural heritage. Ironically, it was another Mexican anthropologist who watered 
down in this way Guillermo Bonfil Batalla's defense of an autonomous cultural 
production. In her testimonial account of the expert and intergovernmental 
meetings that took place between 1999 and 2003, Mexican anthropologist and 
UNESCO advisor Lourdes Arizpe explained that the crafting of intangible heritage 
involved a “reconstruction of meaning” of the term “intangible” which was meant to 
mobilize “a people- and process-centred understanding of cultural heritage” 
("Cultural Politics" 383). In 2001, Arizpe won a debate over the definition of 
intangible heritage against Brazilian anthropologist Manuela Da Cunha, who had 
proposed a broader definition including the management of biodiversity by 
indigenous peoples. Arizpe argued instead for a concept of intangible heritage as 
“a process of creation comprising skills, enabling factors, products, impacts and 
economic value” (381). By restricting itself to oral traditions, practices of social 
cohesion and “beliefs about nature and the cosmos,” Arizpe's definition would 
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prevent conflicts around indigenous property rights with other international bodies 
such as the World Intellectual Property Organization.74 Given that trade-related 
issues such as intellectual property fall beyond the scope of UNESCO, Arizpe's 
definition succeeded over da Cunha's. The very definition of intangible cultural 
heritage was therefore designed to remain neutral in relation to economic disputes 
between “cultures,” states and transnational actors. This economic neutrality does 
not free intangible cultural heritage from political implications, so it is worth looking 
into the kind of politics that emerge from the discourse of Arizpe, author of the 
official UNESCO concept of intangible cultural heritage.  
In her essay "Intangible Cultural Heritage, Diversity and Coherence," Arizpe 
argues that intangible cultural heritage aims at reconciling “cultural coherence” 
with “cultural freedom” in a world “overloaded” with migration, tourism, television 
and the Internet. According to Arizpe, these features of globalization induce an 
experience of “cognitive dissonance“ with “deleterious effects for psychological 
well-being” (133). Fundamentalism, for example, is presented as a psychologically 
disturbed response to globalization, which “inevitably produces a cultural overload, 
similar to information overload, but with greater risks of fostering personal anxiety, 
since cultures provide the nucleus of individuals’ personalities and norms of 
behaviour” (132). In order to avert fundamentalism, it is necessary “to keep a basic 
cultural coherence, albeit one that does not translate as cultural hostility” (132). 
Arizpe argues that recognizing “great cultural achievements” as intangible heritage 
would help to “preserv[e] a certain harmony, a kind of “golden cultural proportion” 
whereby can people safeguard intimate cultural roots, whether originally ascribed 
or adopted, while feeling free to embrace whatever they have reasons to value 
from other cultures” (133). In other words, as a celebration of the “deliberate, 
conscious choices of groups to assume an identity by defining themselves in 
certain ways” (131), intangible heritage would help to eradicate fundamentalisms 
from societies exposed to the psychological challenges of globalization.  
Among the problems in Arizpe's discourse are her positivist depiction of 
globalization as a threat to mental health, her abstract characterization of great 
                                                
74 In 1997, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and UNESCO jointly organized a 
World Forum with the aim of launching an international treaty to protect intellectual property rights 
of “folklore.” Because intellectual property goes beyond UNESCO's mandate, WIPO pursued, as of 
1999, the negotiation without UNESCO. The latter in turn set out to pursue its own actions for 
safeguarding “intangible heritage” (Aikawa-Faure 15).  
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achievements as free choices made by already constituted groups, and her 
rationalistic understanding of identity formation processes. In the latter regard, 
Arizpe recognizes the tendency of all cultural groups to “create a sense of identity 
by defining themselves towards other groups” (131), yet she seems to overlook 
the fact that processes of self-definition emerge historically within relations of 
hierarchy and through antagonism rather than friendly reasoning or smooth 
cooperation. By downplaying the constitutive role of antagonism in processes of 
identity formation, Arizpe also underestimates the psychic and epistemic 
constraints at work in the constitution of culture. One of these requirements would 
be to acknowledge dimensions of power and violence in all cultural claims, 
including UNESCO's cultural discourse. Yet, in counterposing (rational) “free 
choices” and (friendly) “great achievements” to fundamentalisms (or mental 
illnesses), what Arizpe's discourse actually achieves is a concealment of the 
symbolic violence at work in UNESCO's own activity. Given that current cultural 
“choices” still occur within relations of hierarchy and antagonisms, it is just not 
possible to separate, as Arizpe does, the production of “cultural distinctiveness” 
from processes which lend “privileges or disadvantages in given political settings” 
("Intangible Cultural..." 132). In the context of global capitalism the profitable 
potential of heritage fosters competition and disputes around the economic 
appropriation of culture, hence the dimension of power seems inescapable.  
Guillermo Bonfil Batalla's inauguration of the National Museum of Popular 
Cultures in Mexico involved a discourse against cultural imposition. After the “great 
culture wars,” such a process crystallized in Lourdes Arizpe's cosmopolitan 
antidote to fundamentalism. Intangible cultural heritage was initially conceived in 
the hope that it would provide opportunities to interrogate the process through 
which something comes to be valued as “heritage,” and that such an interrogation 
would finally include “local people especially in the developing countries” (Smith 
and Akagawa 46). Lately, however, several researchers have expressed 
skepticism about the technical and philosophical capacity of intangible cultural 
heritage to address the complexity of contemporary power relations. Icelandic 
delegate Hafstein, for example, reports that one of the most controversial issues at 
the 2003 Intergovernmental Meeting of Experts on the Preliminary Draft 
Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage was the 
purpose of registers of intangible cultural heritage. Initially, there would be a list of 
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“treasures” or “masterpieces” similar to the 1997 Proclamation of Masterpieces of 
Oral and Intangible Heritage of Humanity. Against this project, some countries 
argued that selection criteria such as “exceptional value” would divert the 
democratizing aims of the new Convention by producing a list as “subjective and 
elitist” as the World Heritage List. A universal register, by contrast, would prevent 
the repetition of old forms of exclusion (Hafstein 98).75  
According to Hafstein's account, many delegates agreed with the political 
arguments in favor of a universal register, yet most of them did not actually 
support it (102). For instance, a Brazilian delegate argued pragmatically that “we 
cannot safeguard everything, and this means we cannot value everything equally” 
(103). After intense confrontations, delegates finally settled on a compromise 
solution, the "Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity." 
Accepting selection as a structural mechanism, the Representative List rejected 
excellence as a criterion in order to prevent hierarchies and competition among 
states.76 In his analysis of these debates, Hafstein observes that “representativity” 
is even more indeterminate as a criterion of selection, begging the question of 
what the listed heritage actually represents. Such an insatisfactory solution 
illustrates, he concludes, that heritage practices can only work by “creating 
casualties,” that is, by giving a seal of approval to some practices and condemning 
others to “the dustbin of history.” Moreover, because intangible cultural heritage is 
itself nothing but a list, the dustbin of history is perhaps the instrument it can least 
do without (105). 
Hafstein's testimony exposes the limitations of Arizpe's discourse by 
demonstrating that intangible cultural heritage can only materialize in partial ways 
within given political contexts. Southern challenges to Authorized Heritage 
Discourse included from the start a calculation to stake a claim in the benefits of 
tourism, which in the neoliberal era quickly came to be regarded by states as a 
means to guarantee the economic survival of places and practices that had lost 
their former economic function (106). In such a politico-economic conjuncture, 
intangible heritage is unlikely to operate as a transparent, benign promoter of 
                                                
75 Purely technical requirements such as adequate documentation, exposition of relevant domestic 
legislation, proper identification of the communities concerned, and a safeguarding plan would be 
the only conditions to be fulfilled by states in order to inscribe their intangible heritage in the 
universal register (Hafstein 98). 
76 In addition, the final text of the 2003 Convention would establish a List of Intangible Heritage in 
Need of Urgent Safeguarding. 
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“friendly” cosmopolitan relations. I want to argue that it operates instead as the 
disseminator of a new subjectivity or “governmentality” (Hall S., "Whose Heritage" 
24). Following anthropologist Regina Bendix, I want to situate the governmentality 
of intangible heritage in relation to the capitalist drive to exploit all potential 
resources. Bendix describes heritage as a process through which actors weave 
authenticity/inauthenticity arguments in order to present heritage as emanating 
from one particular cultural context in order to claim ownership or custodial care 
over it (259). While the status of heritage seems to depend on who can make the 
biggest moral claim – for example, friendly “great achievements” as opposed to 
disturbed “fundamentalisms” – there is no way of achieving or maintaining such a 
status without articulating it with two mechanisms of the contemporary global 
economy: competition, which fosters innovation and marketing, and quality control, 
one of the central elements of a highly regulatory “audit” culture. As the text of the 
2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage suggests, 
intangible heritage is no longer about protecting autonomous cultural production, 
but rather it is about  a new educational project based on the concept of 
“safeguarding.” “Safeguarding” belongs to a context in which culture is figured as a 
resource that, if actively produced and expertly managed, can allow a country to 
“survive” globalization. 
According to the text of the 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of 
Intangible Cultural Heritage, national state governments must adopt general 
policies and designate competent bodies if they are to “ensure the viability” of local 
cultures in the face of globalization.77 The first step in this direction is to build 
“greater awareness, especially among the younger generations” of the importance 
of the intangible cultural heritage” (3). Governments must first of all teach young 
people to identify their local cultures as “intangible cultural heritage” and persuade 
them about such an identification's potential to produce something with added 
value, namely: “cultural diversity,” “human creativity,” and “sustainable 
development” (3). Through “specific educational and training programmes” (6), 
such as “capacity-building activities” involving “management and scientific 
research” as well as “non-formal means of transmitting knowledge” (7), 
governments must harness the “participation” of “communities, groups and 
                                                
77 A disclaimer included in the Convention says that nothing in the Convention affects current IPR 
legislation (3).  
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relevant non-governmental organizations” (5) in the task of identifying and 
inventorying the “elements” of intangible cultural heritage present in their territory. 
Thus, although the preservation of heritage continues to be, nominally speaking, 
the responsibility of states, the civil society, including private companies, is 
encouraged to increase its participation in the active production of intangible 
cultural heritage.78 At this point “cultural mediators,” among them independent 
“experts” and political activists, as well as entrepeneurs seeking business 
opportunities in the cultural terrain, are seen as potentially playing an important 
role (64). Thus, the task of “safeguarding” involves the creation of technoscientific 
links in the field of culture: links between government, industry and communities 
who “participate” in the generation of knowledge about themselves, which is now 
also measured in terms of its economic value. I now turn my attention to the 
process undertaken by defenders of maize culture in order to have Traditional 
Mexican Cuisine recognized by UNESCO as intangible cultural heritage. 
 
The People of Maize and the New Technoscience of Culture 
 
(...) the candidature of the ancestral cuisine of Mexico, with its basis on maize, (...) 
posits traditional cuisine as an engine to go ahead and update our own patterns of 
progress, development and quality of life, with the certainty of [our cuisine's] 
universal value as heritage. [The candidature] (...) establishes that the intangible 
heritage of the communities, inherited from past generations, can reasonably 
constitute itself as a springboard for the future. (Pueblo de Maíz 20) 
 
Mexico was the first member of the United Nations to request inclusion of its 
national cuisine in UNESCO's registers of intangible cultural heritage. The idea 
first came up during the Third Latin American Congress of Gastronomic Patrimony 
and Cultural Tourism, two years before the adoption of the 2003 Convention for 
the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage. At the insistence of 
anthropologist Yuriria Iturriaga, a group of academics, government officials, 
popular cooks, professional chefs and food writers gathered again one year later 
                                                
78 As heritage lawyer Janet Blake explains, calls for “community participation” are far from unique in 
the context of international policy-making, and indeed have older currency in the fields of human 
rights and environmental law. What is new is the call for “community participation” in cultural policy 
discourse (50). She also points out that it is rather difficult to measure participation, because it 
could range simply from spreading information to project planning and facilitation (63). 
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in order to start drafting a dossier based of the valorization of Mexican food as a 
cultural asset with the potential of “projecting and dynamizing the life of the 
country” (Pueblo de Maíz 14). The final document was titled Pueblo de Maíz: The 
Ancestral Cuisine of Mexico, Rites, Ceremonies and Cultural Practices of Ancient 
Mexicans. Headed by Gloria López Morales, the Mexican government's 
Coodination of Cultural Patrimony, Development and Tourism followed up 
preliminary studies and coordinated the interdisciplinary contributions by other 
government agencies, independent experts, academic institutions, and worker 
organizations devoted to ecology, agriculture and gastronomy. In 2005, Pueblo de 
Maíz was submitted to UNESCO in order to compete for inscription in the Third 
Proclamation of Masterpieces of Oral and Intangible Heritage.79 After it was turned 
down by a jury presided by Jordanian Princess Basma Bint Talal, a second 
request was prepared throughout the following five years, this time by the 
Conservatory of Mexican Gastronomic Culture (CCGM), an NGO presided by 
Gloria López Morales, the former CONACULTA official who had coordinated the 
preparation and submission of Pueblo de Maíz. In collaboration with the National 
Institute of Anthropology and History (INAH), the CCGM composed a new 
document titled Traditional Mexican Cuisine - ancestral, ongoing community 
culture: the Michoacán paradigm. This was the “nomination file” that finally 
achieved inscription in UNESCO's Representative List of Intangible Heritage of 
Humanity (2010). In what follows I examine how each dossier, Pueblo de Maíz 
and Traditional Mexican Cuisine, present maize-based cuisine as a factor of 
national identity. In order to compare their arguments and their depiction of what it 
would mean and what it would take to safeguard maize-based cuisine from the 
threats of globalization (in particular biotechnology and GMOs), I ask: How does a 
nationalist discourse take shape in each dossier through the defense of Mexican 
cuisine against external threats? How does each dossier figure these threats, and 
how does it respond to them? Is there anything new in the defense of Mexican 
cuisine as intangible cultural heritage in relation to Mexico's history of cultural 
nationalism? What opportunities and dangers are posed by the new technoscience 
of culture to the Mexican defense of traditional maize agriculture? 
                                                
79 Even though the 2003 Convention was already in force, the Representative List of Intangible 
Heritage of Humanity only superseded the Proclamations of Masterpieces in 2008. Thus, the 
practical implementation of Convention initially consisted in the biannual selection of aesthetically 
defined “treasures” by a group of country delegates rather than expert committees. 
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Pueblo de Maíz presents itself as an exercise of “memory, invention and 
mechanisms” to preserve an “originary flow of richness” on the basis of an 
argument “that can today sustain the sense of its cyclical transformations” (18). It 
describes Mexican cuisine as both “ancestral” and “transcendental” (that is, 
originary) yet also “diverse” and “open” (that is, in flow) (18). Its “ancestral 
indigenous roots” are presented as undergoing a “continuous process of 
mestizaje,” intensified by the Conquest and gradually “enriched” by Jewish, Arab 
and many other cultures from all continents (19). The argument that can sustain, 
today, the sense of Mexican cuisine's transformation starts with an anthropological 
perspective on cuisine as a cultural system, that is, as a complex set of 
sociotechnical practices enacting a “sacred” way of life. Thus, while Pueblo de 
Maíz affirms the “dynamic, crossborder character” of Mexican cuisine – 
exemplified in the dossier by the culinary practices of Mexican migrants – it also 
argues that what is at stake is a specific culture, namely milpa culture, that is 
rooted in Mesoamerican lands. Milpa culture is defined as “an anthropological and 
philosophical entanglement with cosmogonic foundations still valid in many 
indigenous and mestizo communities in Mexico” (24). Instead of recounting the 
numerous interesting facts about Mexican cuisine that are listed by the dossier, I 
want to highlight the latter's political narrative and specifically the way in which it 
transfers “identity” from local communities to the whole nation.  
Social cohesion is the major political theme throughout Pueblo de Maíz. 
According to the dossier, “the historical sustenance of Mexicans corresponds to 
that piece of land in which maize, beans and chilli interact with one another, along 
with a variety of other elements” (24). Pueblo de Maíz includes a plan of action to 
identify, preserve and promote “traditional culinary patrimony.” Because such a 
patrimony is based “above all on maize and the products of the milpa,” the plan 
focuses on areas “with more traditional richness,” such as the states of Oaxaca, 
Puebla and Michoacán.80 Those states are presented as particularly “authentic” 
because, for the indigenous and mestizo communities who still dwell in their rural 
areas, “the act of eating is tightly related to cosmogonic conceptions,” and theirs is 
a “sacred world” which is particularly urgent to safeguard (122). However, the 
                                                
80 The Plan of Action in Pueblo de Maíz includes collecting recipes, documenting culinary aspects 
of community celebrations and commerce in traditional markets, formal and informal educational 
programmes, such as research projects and an interactive, and crucially: supporting small-scale 
agriculture oriented to supplying artisanal food businesses with traditional ingredients. 
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convergence of Mexican cuisine with territory and language “can no longer be 
understood as a resource within ethnically isolated circuits” (18). This is because 
“today's global displacements pose the challenge to (...) millennial cultures of 
taking the step into the space of inter-culturality” (18) and in this context maize is 
re-created, based on its role in the context of milpa agriculture and peasant 
cuisine, as “the plant of conviviality, reciprocity and shared solidarity” (19). From 
this perspective, Oaxaca, Puebla and Michoacán appear as merely “emblematic 
examples” which can contribute to an “exchange of knowledges and experiences” 
and to “the cohesion of the national social tissue” (20). 
More than any other ingredient, maize is presented as giving the Ancestral 
Cuisine of Mexico the power to act, today, as a “vigorous and efficacious factor of 
national identity” (22). It is the omnipresence and culinary versatility of maize – 
which indeed is particularly evident in areas of “traditional richness” – that gives 
Mexican cuisine its “uniqueness and integrality” in the face of other cuisines, and 
which even allows it to transcend the territorial boundaries of the Mexican nation. 
Mexican migrants, for instance, are depicted as remarkably faithful to their 
“ancestral roots,” because through their selection of ingredients, they maintain a 
“reference to the origin,” a “space of continuity,” a labor option and a field of 
knowledge. If they and, presumably, other non-rural Mexicans can still see 
themselves as “a people of maize,” that is because beyond any particular “ethnic 
perspective,” Mexicanness is now, metaphorically rather than literally, associated 
with the entanglement and dynamic interrelation of multiple elements in the milpa.  
The “millennial continuity” of milpa culture is now at risk, Pueblo de Maíz 
explains, because traditional knowledges are being displaced by “globalized and 
inappropriate techniques” (15).  Junk food in particular has “deformed the unicity of 
the food system,” “distorted and supplanted customs,”81 disrupted nutritional 
equilibrium and undermined the precarious economy of the popular classes (27). 
This reference to the popular classes makes it clear that the argument of Pueblo 
de Maíz is far more complex than a plea for recognition of the aesthetic merit of a 
national gastronomy. Having been written during the years of the worldwide social 
                                                
81 Even “the proverbial Mexican family,” the dossier argues, would lose its “sociological structure” 
without ancestral cuisine (25). It is unclear to me whether it refers to the modern paradigm of a 
nuclear family or the extended networks of rural and migrant community life –  the absence of a 
specification here may reflect that the dossier needs to ignore that “the proverbial Mexican family” 
is a product of capitalist social engineering rather than “ancestral traditions.” 
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mobilization against free trade agreements and GMOs, the dossier argues that it is 
“cold economic growth” that has favored the expansion of “private practices and 
public policies detrimental to milpa agriculture in Mexico” (24). Industrial cattle 
breeding and export-oriented agriculture, environmental degradation, unequal 
terms of exchange in the global marketplace, chronic emigration and 
governmental abandonment of the countryside, and more recently GMOs, are 
among the various threats to the ancestral foundations of Mexican cuisine.82 They 
have already contributed, the dossier alerts, not just to food dependency, but also 
to an impoverishment of the national culture (27). For instance, Mario Riestra 
refers to maize as “the father of the Mexican race” and characterizes Mexicans as 
people who “know themselves of a divine origin” (144). Chauvinistic exaltation 
aside, Riestra takes a strategic position when he says that more than language, 
dress or music, it is cuisine that provides “the common root of the Mexican.” As 
opposed to gratuitously asserting the divinity of “the Mexican race,” in a striking 
turn towards Schmittian rationality he argues that “[t]he identification of man or the 
group against extraneous cultural patterns will determine the permanence of 
customs and will annihilate the threats which weaken or render vulnerable our 
cultural patrimony” (145). As any post-Marxist philosopher would recognize today, 
it is precisely such a threat, rather than any common root, that constitutes the 
source of an identitarian affirmation such as we find it in Pueblo de Maíz.  
As explained above, the same perceived threat gave rise to the concept of 
intangible cultural heritage during the last two decades of the twentieth century, 
yet several researchers have called into question both the technical and 
philosophical capabilities of intangible heritage as a means to rescue cultural 
diversity in the age of globalization. Pueblo de Maíz firmly asserts that “the future 
of the country depends on the preservation of its cultural values” (26). In view of 
the destructive consequences of current alternatives to milpa agriculture – 
migration and organized crime – the regeneration of food traditions is presented as 
a viable response to neoliberal dislocation.83 What the dossier calls preservation, 
                                                
82 With regard to GMO's, the dossier asserts that they are “unable to give continuity to 
autochtonous cultivars and diversity,” and points out that they merely make farmers dependent on 
seed imports which they cannot afford  (27). 
83 Expressing disagreement with those “pragmatic economists” who think that milpa agriculture is 
bad business and therefore irrational, one of the essayists, Jesús Puente Leyva, points out that the 
vast majority of Mexican people have so few opportunities of decent employment that milpa 
agriculture is not a matter of business but a matter of survival. 
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however, requires first of all a valorization of local foods as “the foundation of 
material and spiritual sustenance of a nation” (26). This call to valorize stands in 
contrast with the constant description of Mexican identity as an accomplished fact 
rooted in ancestral traditions. The current state of milpa agriculture in Mexico 
instead suggests that the cultural values that are to be preserved must be 
produced in the first place, in response to the threat of disappearance. In this 
regard, Gloria López Morales, who was in charge of CONACULTA's Coordination 
of Cultural Patrimony and Tourism during the preparation of Pueblo de Maíz, 
invokes the “prodigious force” of UNESCO to “awaken minds regarding the value 
of culture in its vast dimensions” and “to trigger preserving and creative actions in 
all senses” (158-159). Above all López Morales emphasizes the labor of 
imagination at work in the Mexican request of UNESCO's recognition. The 
question was, she says, how to construct a solid argument as opposed to a 
collection of recipes, exotic products or “archaic practices.” However extraordinary 
our ancestral practices may seem to us, “many other families could propose their 
aunts and grandmothers as the best cooks in the world” (161). Pueblo de Maíz 
had therefore to invest a labor of imagination in constructing a “scientifically 
founded argumentation” that could persuade UNESCO about the need to 
safeguard of Mexican cuisine.  
Whereas Pueblo de Maíz identifies sacredness, community and milpa 
culture as that which needs to be preserved from global capitalism – that is, from 
free trade agreements and genetically modified organisms – the argument about 
the viability of Mexican cuisine draws on a new understanding of cultural policy as 
an engine of development. During the launch of Pueblo de Maíz, the Director of 
CONACULTA, Sari Bermúdez declared that “beyond its symbolic and traditional 
values, culture is a real factor of development, a means to create wealth” (126). 
Therefore, she says, the government must commit to “a national strategy with a 
cultural perspective” (126).84 The strategy must involve, among other things, 
policies to recuperate traditional agriculture and to preserve indigenous and 
popular cuisines through education and research, capacity-building in artisanal 
production, and even protection of industrial property rights as well as controlled 
                                                
84 The strategy must involve policies to recuperate traditional agriculture, the preservation of 
indigenous and popular cuisines, capacity-building in artisanal production, nutritional education 
based on local foods, promotion of culinary patrimony, protection of industrial property rights and 
controlled origin status for Mexican products (127). 
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origin status for Mexican products (127). Thus, beyond the sacredness of 
ancestral roots, it is in order to link culinary patrimony with “other factors of social 
and economic development” (20) that Pueblo de Maíz proposes “a crusade” to 
educate the public about the cultural, nutritional and economic value of traditional 
cuisine. In this task, emphasis is given to consensus among different actors – 
private business, grassroots organizations, the government – around the idea that 
“protecting Mexican gastronomy means conserving an important identity trait, an 
invaluable legacy in which the coming generations will find a powerful impulse to 
advance without denying what they are and what they have been” (16).  
As the day approached when Mexico would know whether Pueblo de Maíz 
had succeeded in obtaining UNESCO's recognition for Mexican cuisine as a 
masterpiece of intangible heritage, the author of the “technical justification” of the 
dossier, food writer Cristina Barros, declared that the point of obtaining such a 
recognition was to force the Mexican government to undertake concrete actions 
such as “a programme to defend maize as a fundamental food of the Mexican 
people, a consideration of traditional cuisine as culturally, socially and 
economically strategic, the participation of environmental authorities in the 
protection of threatened ecological spaces, the commitment of health and 
education authorities to support traditional foods against industrial, junk foods, and 
a long etcetera” (Barros 8). Drawing on the most radical currents of thought that 
contributed to the crafting of the 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of 
Intangible Cultural Heritage, Barros warned against conflating traditional cuisine 
with gastronomy, which belongs to the realm of pleasure, she says, “not the realm 
of cultural expressions that UNESCO has sought to recognize.” In accordance with 
the technical, anthropological dimension of intangible cultural heritage, Barros 
insists, “no dish should be presented in isolation of the social and cultural context 
that gives it meaning and support. As a society we must remain vigilant that the 
benefits of this proclamation go directly to indigenous communities, and to prevent 
usurpation or corruption of their culture. Only in this way we shall fulfill the 
mandate of UNESCO.” By remarking that the argument in Pueblo de Maíz went far 
beyond a celebration of colorful dishes and exotic flavors, Barros invoked the 
political aspirations of the Mexican defenders of maize.85 For them, UNESCO’s 
                                                
85 Issues of environmental damage by foreign and domestic industries, and opposition to the junk 
food industry, particularly regarding its power to control the media industry and its profitable 
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recognition was instrumental in counteracting the neoliberal destruction of milpa 
culture and its historically specific food habits. While there is little reflection 
throughout the dossier on the ways in which indigenous communities have been 
historically sacrificed in order to construct the very nationalist discourse that exalts 
them, there is an effort to valorize the practices of those communities, their 
knowledges and their techniques, which are said to deserve a serious investment 
of the state if only because of their potential to help the nation survive in the 
context of neoliberal globalization.  
As it turned out, Pueblo de Maíz did not succeed in obtaining a place for 
Mexican cuisine in the Third Proclamation of Masterpieces of the Oral and 
Intangible Heritage of Humanity. Although UNESCO did not release an official 
statement explaining the reasons of this outcome, it seems likely that one of the 
reasons was the complexity of the Mexican candidature combined with the lack of 
anthropological "experts" who would have been able to deal with it.86 One can only 
speculate that there were too many issues beyond the actual scope of UNESCO 
(such as free trade agrements, property rights in biotechnology and the very 
concept of an industrial food system) that, according to the dossier's argument, 
needed to be addressed in order to safeguard Mexican cuisine. Even though the 
2003 Convention was already in force, the Representative List of Intangible 
Heritage of Humanity only superseded the Proclamations of Masterpieces in 2008. 
Thus, the practical implementation of Convention initially consisted in the selection 
of aesthetically defined "treasures" by a group of country delegates rather than 
expert committees. Basma Bint Talal, president of the jury that rejected the 
dossier, declared in this vein that there was a lack of “focalization” in Pueblo de 
Maíz (Pacheco). Indeed, maize was presented in the latter as a multiplicity of 
elements – with a corresponding heterogeneity of practitioners – rather than as a 
single, clearly bounded cultural asset, this in spite of the constant assertions of 
uniqueness, integrality, millennial continuity and so forth.  
In the same year that Pueblo de Maíz was rejected by UNESCO, Gloria 
López Morales was dismissed from CONACULTA and went on to become the 
                                                                                                                                              
distribution in schools, are very thorny issues in Mexico which have often involved violence, 
corruption and acute de-legitimation of the corresponding authorities. 
86 When Pueblo de Maíz was rejected on 2005, López Morales attributed the failure to the jury's 
lack of a specialist perspective (Bucio). 
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president of the Conservatory of Mexican Gastronomic Culture (CCGM).87 The 
CCGM defines itself as a grassroots organization and a consultant of UNESCO 
that is dedicated to the preservation of Mexican cuisine through research, 
education and production. Through the CCGM López Morales continued to pursue 
recognition of Mexican cuisine as intangible heritage, devoting the following three 
years to the drafting of a second nomination file titled (in English) Traditional 
Mexican Cuisine: Ancestral, Ongoing Community Culture; the Michoacán 
Paradigm.88 Like Pueblo de Maíz, Traditional Mexican Cuisine transfers the 
sacredness of indigenous food habits to the whole nation and emphasizes the 
need to safeguard the nation by articulating "authentic" agricultural and culinary 
practices with national development through the novel framework of international 
cultural policy. Once again we hear that “[h]umankind was made with maize” (5), 
and that food has a “fundamental role in the life of the group, comprising the most 
revered local and national heritage” (4). Once again it is stressed that the 
argument for Mexican cuisine evolved during several years in encounters, 
congresses, courses and other projects organized in conjunction with numerous 
public and private institutions.89 Yet, whereas Pueblo de Maíz called for a cultural 
exception to free trade agreements and biotech penetration, Traditional Mexican 
Cuisine combines the official argument for cultural diversity with the neoliberal idea 
of viability through technoscientific articulation of cultural traditions with productive 
chains. 
                                                
87 López Morales worked as a diplomat for 34 years before joining CONACULTA by invitation of 
Sari Bermúdez, CONACULTA's director during the presidential administration of Vicente Fox 
(2000-2006), the first democratically elected government after 70 years of “institutionalized 
revolution.” After her dismissal from CONACULTA, López Morales wrote a book against Bermúdez 
in which she denounced the arbitrariness of her dismissal and related it to the neoliberal 
dismantling of public institutions. In interview with Proceso, López Morales invoked the post-
revolutionary era, in which public intellectuals contributed to cultural policy and in which the state 
had a clear, inalienable responsibility. By contrast, she denounces, the Fox years were lost in 
terms of cultural policy because functionaries like Sari Bermúdez administered cultural institutions 
as “their ranch,” that is, for the benefit of the power groups in office. Ironically, López Morales 
succeeded in obtaining UNESCO recognition through what seems a discursive neoliberalization of 
Pueblo de Maíz. 
88 In the same period, several countries – including France, Peru, South Korea and Croatia – also 
prepared nominations of their own traditional cuisines. This time, an expert committee would select 
the candidates for inscription in the Representative List of Intangible Heritage, which superseded 
the earlier Proclamation of Masterpieces on 2008, when the 2003 Convention finally took effect. 
89 The Mexican government signed the Convention in December 2005. The Working Group for the 
Promotion and Safeguarding of Mexico’s Intangible Cultural Heritage was created (2002) to put 
together an initial estimated inventory of intangible cultural heritage elements in 2008, “Traditional 
Cuisine in Mexican Culture” was inscribed on that inventory as a heritage asset subject to 
protection by the Mexican government (15). 
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Traditional Mexican Cuisine fulfills the technoscientific vision, merely 
anticipated in Pueblo de Maíz and explicitly endorsed by the 2003 Convention, of 
linking industry, government and grassroots organizations dedicated to the 
production of knowledge in the field of cultural patrimony. The first thing to 
emphasize in this regard is that Traditional Mexican Cuisine was prepared by the 
CCGM in collaboration with the National Institute of Anthropology and History 
(INAH), with financial sponsorship of Maseca-Gruma, the powerful corporation that 
commercializes corn flour all over the world and that embodies what was perhaps 
the single instance of successful technoscientific development in Mexico.90 
Tellingly, Traditional Mexican Cuisine is presented in a standard format provided 
by UNESCO in which it is explained point by point how the candidate fulfills the 
selection criteria established by the 2003 Convention. For instance, Mexican food 
is again described as ancestral, but this time the meaning of the term is specified 
in UNESCO's vocabulary of something preserved “through oral transmission of 
skills and knowledge between generations” (3). Authenticity is defined as “a desire 
not to falsify the roots” which explains the fact that, despite “the invasion of other 
customs and the battering of the market” (5), “communities still prepare food using 
the time-tested methods” (4). The dossier argues that in order to “ensure ongoing 
historic continuity” of Mexican cuisine it is necessary to revive products, 
procedures and techniques through transfer of knowledge and insertion in circuits 
of sustainable development” (3). Among the time-tested methods specified in the 
file are milpa agriculture, chinampa agriculture91 and the nixtamalization of maize 
kernels. The latter is presented as a “revolutionary” technique that “reflects the 
very birth of Mexican culinary culture” which has contributed to “a healthy 
balanced diet for its peoples for thousands of years” (5). Although mechanical mills 
have largely displaced manual grinding of maize, stone metates are also cited in 
                                                
90 The importance of Maseca's sponsorship was stressed by this company's global marketing 
director, Sylvia Hernández, in an interview with newspaper La Jornada. She said, “as leaders in the 
production of maize and tortilla we were very interested in taking part in this, as a way of promoting 
the consumption of our products. From the beginning we joined the project. Our culinary expert 
participated in all gatherings for the elaboration of the nomination file throughout the year 2010; we 
had a chance to support the Conservatory (CCGM) with all the communication and promotional 
tools that they required, and which were forceful and important to achieve the inscription” 
(Caballero 9). 
91 At the time Cortés arrived to Mesoamerica, chinampas built in the swamp-lake of Tenochtitlán, 
now Mexico City, supported an urban population of a million and a half people, larger than Henry 
VIII's London. The Aztecs had devised a system of dams, aqueducts, dikes, and canals to provide 
irrigation, cultivation, and transport all at once. The system is still in use today in Xochimilco, south 
of Mexico City (Fussell, "Translating Maize into Corn" 48-49). 
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the nomination file among the “singular utensils” that contribute to the authenticity 
of Mexican cuisine. Hence, the methodologies designed and tested by CCGM are 
in turn aimed at the viable reactivation of “productive chains” on the assumption 
that “[i]ncreased production brings more jobs, improved training and education 
requirements, growth in cultural tourism and, on the whole, better quality of life to 
the communities” (7). Since it is a requirement of the 2003 Convention that 
“communities” be clearly identified as conscious guardians of their intangible 
cultural heritage, attached to the nomination file is a map of the Mexican territory in 
which communities are classified and ranked as “hubs of culinary knowledge.” On 
that basis, certain communities proposed as targets for the application of a model 
that “has already proven to be efficient” (2). The model in question is a project 
carried out with indigenous communities in the state of Michoacán.  
Starting in 2004, the project involved “sustainable marketing of products 
and training courses given to the tourism sector along culinary heritage routes” (8). 
Cooks were asked to work in teams made up of mothers, grandmothers, 
daughters and granddaughters. In order to present their dishes to the public, they 
were also asked to build a stone and hearth, decorate their stalls, and dress in 
their traditional outfits (9). Traditional Mexican Cuisine insists that the point of all 
this intervention is to enable communities to “respond to tourism without altering 
the cultural context characterized by adherence to customs and working as a 
community” (9). Furthermore, and in accordance with the Convention's 
requirement of informed consent, it assures the reader that the Michoacán project 
met with “convincing community support for courses on sanitary food handling, 
oral transmission of dietary culture or know-how, discussing problems they face “in 
defending the purity of their traditions” and in finding ways to overcome their 
“isolation and paralysis of activities, which are in need of greater spaces to expand 
and develop” (12).92 In particular, the Don Vasco Route93 is presented as “a 
                                                
92 In the format's field of “Consent to the Nomination,” it is answered that some families accepted to 
have their names included in the nomination file, to which there is also attached a Declaration of 
Traditional Cooks for the Recognition of Traditional Cuisine. 
93 The Don Vasco Route project comprises cultural tourism itineraries to the towns in which Vasco 
de Quiroga, a 16th century Spanish humanist, organized indigenous communities around guilds 
and trades, inspired by Thomas More's Utopia. The communities are still organized around 
handicrafts, and it is argued in Traditional Mexican Cuisine that it is handicraft tourism that provides 
people with a “viable” living. The dossier also explains that, before opening the route to tourism, 
“information” was provided to cooks, tourist operators and students before opening the route to 
tourism: “It was also necessary to raise tourist consciousness so as not to belittle the authentic 
native traits of the communities. Since traditional cuisine is a major aspect of the cultural tour, 
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showcase” for the nomination file, an example of safeguarding through memory 
conservation, transmission of knowledge and creation of infrastructure for 
community development (5). CCGM thus argues: 
 
This is not a utopian pipedream: the already fruitful Michoacán model must be 
applied to other regions. Inscribing Mexico's traditional culture on the 
Representative List will push that purpose forward tremendously via an action plan 
founded on the premises expounded throughout this document. The goal is to 
make the most of that element of intangible heritage inclined like few others to 
strengthen dialog [sic] across the culturally diverse map. (Conservatorio de la 
Cultura Gastronómica Mexicana 7) 
 
Cultural anthropologists Heath and Meneley have highlighted the mutual 
imbrication of artisanal causes and technoscientific methods through a number of 
case studies exemplifying the paradoxical ways in which branding strategies 
combine the celebration of local identities with the technoscientific promises of 
“quality control” and “safety.” For instance, artisanal producers of foi gras in 
America defend their techniques from the accusations of animal rights activists by 
insisting that force-feeding is “safe” for geese because such animals have a 
physiological capacity to fatten their own livers in preparation for migration. While 
industrial producers could well endorse the same argument, artisanal producers 
have succeeded in differentiating themselves by invoking culture, locality and 
sustainability, creating wide consumer support that also surpasses the popularity 
of animal rights activists (Heath and Meneley 594). In the case of Traditional 
Mexican Cuisine, business administration, marketing lessons and hygiene training 
courses are presented as being instrumental to the preservation of cultural 
authenticity. Moreover, the argument is technoscientific in presenting cuisine as a 
matter of knowledges and techniques that must be linked to socioeconomic 
development via knowledge transfer and the production of self-reliant, managerial 
subjectivities – popular cooks joining urban chefs and tourist operators in a big 
society dedicated to the preservation of cultural patrimony. In sum, what 
Traditional Mexican Cuisine proposes that is different from the proposal at the 
                                                                                                                                              
those in charge of the project have promoted a program of lodging and eateries that allows cooks 
to work within their field and improve the conditions in which they can offer their dishes without 
affecting their authenticity” (14). 
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heart of Pueblo de Maíz is “to continue setting up small enterprises and providing 
training in business administration, hygiene and marketing” (9). On this basis (and 
alongside the gastronomic cuisine of France and the Mediterranean diet) 
Traditional Mexican Cuisine was inscribed in the Representative List of Intangible 
Heritage on 16th November 2010. In the months leading up to the event, and 
during the days that followed it, a series of disagreements among the original 
promoters of the Mexican candidature became evident in the press – as if maize, 
instead of giving cohesion to its defenders, only managed to underscore their 
differences. 
Clearly, from the "postmodern" anthropological perspectives that originally 
informed intangible heritage discourse, safeguarding Mexican cuisine would 
require preserving the conditions of existence of the living beings that produced 
Mexican cuisine. Yet as I explained in a previous section, such perspectives were 
contaminated by neoliberal discourses that attempted to articulate heritage 
preservation with the capitalist economy. When Traditional Mexican Cuisine 
achieved inscription in UNESCO's List of Intangible Heritage, early promoters of 
maize-based cuisine resented its explicit technoscientific rationality. For instance, 
maize defender Cristina Barros publicly called into question the fact that it was the 
CCGM, a private rather than a public organization that would administer the 
safeguarding of Mexican cuisine. There was little to expect from this, Barros 
lamented alongside other disappointed activists, beyond a gentrification of 
traditional cuisine by elite gastronomy and tourism. In her view it was fundamental 
to distinguish the nation's culinary heritage from mere gastronomy. Unlike elite 
gastronomy, Mexican culinary heritage is a complex interdisciplinary field, 
involving anthropology, philosophy, biology and history, “even more so in our 
country where food, particularly maize, is sacred.” Barros was not the only one to 
react against the technoscientific orientation of Traditional Mexican Cuisine. There 
was also anthropologist Yuriria Iturriaga, who is credited in People of Maize as 
having been the first to propose the seeking of UNESCO's recognition for Mexican 
food. The day after Traditional Mexican Cuisine was inscribed in UNESCO's 
Representative List, a piece by Iturriaga was published by newspaper La Jornada 
in which she decried the outcome of the process that she herself had started eight 
years before. Her first complaint was that CCGM had presented safeguarding 
measures not as legal obligations for the Mexican government, but rather as 
 168 
proposals to be administered by a private organization. She then criticized the 
strategy of “taking cooks out of their communities to teach them hygiene, 
techniques, business administration and marketing,” so that their “mini-enterprises 
can be planted along touristic routes (that is, planted among restaurants of 
Mexican nouvelle cuisine that those who wrote up the nomination file will set up 
with the benefits deriving from it).” Third, Iturriaga condemned the fact that the 
safeguarding plan was accepted as a local project, whereas she had insisted that 
Mexican cuisine coincides with the territorial boundaries of the Mexican nation as 
a whole. In Iturriaga's disappointed view, UNESCO should have “ordered” the 
Mexican nation to “integrate all traditional cuisines of the country” as an absolute 
responsibility of the state. She concluded that Mexico would have a reason to 
celebrate only if UNESCO had bound the Mexican authorities to safeguard the 
milpa, “a food system that is nearly extinct today due to predatory agrarian 
policies.” UNESCO would have thereby contributed to establishing a “cultural 
exception” that exempted local maize agriculture from NAFTA “so the people 
would again eat in a healthy way.” Instead, UNESCO lent its seal to “particulars 
who would never share their table with an indigenous woman, perhaps because 
they prefer to present mole poblano [a dark, thick sauce typical of Puebla] in little 
drops over huge plates in order to "raise its category."  
In my view, Iturriaga is right to point out that Mexican rural women are 
implicitly positioned in Traditional Mexican Cuisine as ignorant and needy, that is, 
as people who need to be taught how to overcome isolation and (a presumed) 
ignorance about safety and risks. Yet Iturriaga's criticism seemed to be motivated 
by something other than a critical position about developmental discourse. Earlier 
in 2010, she had accused López Morales of “forgetting” that that it was Iturriaga 
herself who had first proposed, in 2002, to seek UNESCO recognition “with the 
noble end of engaging the Mexican government in a crusade to rescue a people 
under threat: countryside workers, cooks and artisans” (Iturriaga, "Cocinas 
Tradicionales"). In a bitter tone, she had anticipated a new failure of the Mexican 
request, which would be explained by the fact that López Morales had “turned her 
back” on the “true pioneers.” Thus, while both Iturriaga and Cristina Barros have 
good arguments against the managerial shift in the second Mexican candidature, 
their conclusions focus on the more superficial aspects of the problem, namely, 
Gloria López Morales and the CCGM, as if these empirical agents were the cause 
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of the Mexican failure to protect maize from globalization. Moreover, their 
conclusions end in a moralistic accusation that as Wendy Brown would put it, 
“conveys at best naive political expectations and at worst, patently confused ones” 
(Politics out of History 36). In other words, their outrage implicitly figures a 
mainstream institution such as UNESCO as if it were not “the codification of 
various dominant social powers, but was, rather, a momentarily misguided parent 
who forgot her promise to treat all her children all the same way” (36). By implicitly 
positioning UNESCO as a misguided parent, the Mexican defense of local maize 
agriculture is in turn positioned as if it did not represent “a significant political 
challenge to the norms of the regime” (36). In Brown's argument, such implicit 
figurations signal a rejection of politics as a domain of power and lead nowhere but 
to a backward-looking melancholia that is premised on disavowed attachments to 
oppressive regimes. 
In the case of Iturriaga, it has been easy to trace such disavowed 
attachments. In 2002, she wrote a lengthy piece on Mexican cuisine as a “factor of 
identity and unity.”94 There, she had argued that “Mexican gastronomy does exist,” 
that it is a “harmonious sensual structure” and that it does not have to exclude an 
economic strategy of “higher yields.” Her only condition was that the strategy 
reversed “the perverse side of the globalization process” by drawing on “the 
cultures of the people” in order to oppose “imperial hegemony.” Iturriaga explained 
the aims of promoting Mexican cuisine as World Heritage. She wrote that by 
means of heritagization, it would be come possible: 
 
...to stop the deformation and degradation of regional cuisines that is caused by 
the junk food industry by preserving the existence and obtaining a better price for 
vernacular products in the local, national and international markets; 2) to create 
employment in the agricultural sector and related industries, with its ideological 
and economic revalorization; 3) to stop the unjustified self-devaluation of the 
Mexican people in relation to their cuisine and 4) to benefit the palate of humanity 
(Iturriaga, "Cocinas Tradicionales"). 
                                                
94 She says there, among other things, that even if Northern Mexico's culinary habits share a taste 
for wheat and beef with the neighboring United States, it can be argued that “the frontiers of the 
Mexican Republic coincide with its culinary frontiers since, from Tijuana to Chetumal, Mexicans 
share the same set of knowledges and eating practices that are extraneous to their American 
neighbors” – a passage that makes it plain how important it is for maize nationalists to constantly 
assert "our traditional differences" against O'Gorman's Anglo-America (Iturriaga, "Gastronomía 
Mexicana"). 
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It thus turns out that Iturriaga herself had promoted the technoscience of 
culture that later on she would end up condemning moralistically, which suggests 
to me that her outrage came not so much from the technoscientific discourse of 
Traditional Mexican Cuisine as from the fact that it was a gastronomic 
entrepreneur rather than a public anthropologist like herself who finally achieved 
UNESCO's recognition for Mexican food.95 This is not so strange, I would argue, 
since intangible cultural heritage itself emerged from the world of technoscience 
with the ambiguous purpose of preserving cultural diversity and harnessing 
cultural difference as an economic resource. Through transnational cultural policy, 
intangible cultural heritage itself promotes managerial attitudes towards cultural 
legacies and seeks, implicitly or explicitly, to achieve their productive articulation 
with the global economy. In view of this, the ideological pitfall of intangible heritage 
discourse appears to be precisely the intimation that it will put an end to 
antagonism, hostility and indeed politics itself, as defined by post-Marxist theorist 
Chantal Mouffe. The rationalist, universalist and individualistic rhetoric at work in 
UNESCO's intangible heritage discourse is as much of a problem as the 
unrealistic expectation, on the part of some Mexican defenders of maize, that 
UNESCO itself would be forceful enough to settle the conflict between biotech 
corporations and peasant agriculture in Mexico, and between Mexicans 
themselves as those "originarily" responsible for the future of Mesoamerican 
maize agriculture.  
As an alternative to the apocalyptic thinking that the actual outcome and 
logic of intangible heritage seems to ellicit among disappointed maize defenders, I 
suggest that culinary activists (including, initially, Barros and Iturriaga) performed a 
technoscientific form of cultural politics when they resorted to international cultural 
policy as a way of gaining advocates of a reconsideration of the historic 
devaluation of indigeneity and popular cultures in Mexico. In other words, the 
success of Traditional Mexican Cuisine depended on a strategic "contamination" 
of activist discourse by the technoscience of culture. I disagree with activists who 
                                                
95 This is how Iturriaga interpreted the version that Pueblo de Maíz was unsuccessful because it 
was too oriented towards the “anthropological.” She even cast doubt on the expert committee who 
finally accepted to designate Traditional Mexican Cuisine as intangible heritage: “perhaps they do 
not know what intangible heritage is, perhaps because they are not anthropologists but rather 
politicians sent by state governments?” 
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see this process as a dead end for Mexican cuisine, and I think it is necessary to 
undertake a more open-minded interrogation of the political productivity of 
"contamination" as an inescapable condition in technoscience. In the story of 
Traditional Mexican Cuisine, precisely at the moment when everybody seemed to 
converge around the urgency to preserve maize as the essence of Mexican 
identity, multiple disagreements cropped up regarding what exactly the 
preservation was to involve. The disagreement precluded the desired totalization 
of the national text. My argument here would be that coming to terms with the 
impossibility of totalization is what "contaminated" life is all about. It is not an 
apocalypse, I argue, and it continues to be vital for activists to deploy 
contamination subversively within the ongoing "gastronomification" and 
"heritagization" of Mexican indigenous cuisines. At the risk of playing the devil's 
advocate, I suggest that we welcome inauthenticity of the technoscience of 
culture, which gathers Mexicans in the urgent (yet necessarily "impure") task of 
making a creative use of the resources of history as a potential challenge to the 
capitalist imperative of efficiency. 
 
Conclusion: Seed of Unity, Seed of Discord or Seed of Change? 
 
...the task will always be to try to identify points of potential convergence between 
the radical desire to break down all concentrations of power (...) and the more 
immediate desires, hopes and fears of those who do not spontaneously identify 
themselves with any radical political project (Gilbert, Anticapitalism and Culture 
187). 
 
Having initially united the heterogeneous defenders of maize, intangible 
heritage ended up stirring their disagreements around the best way to preserve 
the nation's cultural patrimony. A fundamental disagreement related to the 
managerial and neoliberal orientation that UNESCO's policies on intangible 
heritage shares with technoscientific capitalism more generally. While Pueblo de 
Maíz had drawn on the critical and progressive legacy of anthropological 
"postmodernism," the second nomination file, Traditional Mexican Cuisine, 
straightforwardly exploited the convergence of "cultural diversity" with the cultural 
logic of late capitalism. The success of Traditional Mexican Cuisine depended on a 
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"contamination" of activist discourse by the technoscience of culture. Should we 
reject such a "contamination" in an oppositional way, or should we rather welcome 
the opportunities it offers to re-articulate Mexican nationalism in a strategic way in 
order to promote a social re-valorization vital domains such as food and agriculture 
in the midst of a capitalist colonization of life itself? Rather than an oppositional 
reassertion of nationalism (which, as I have shown, is prone to getting stuck in 
melancholy and moralism) the field of intangible heritage requires a subversive 
deployment of technoscientific discourse. Of course, to recommend 
"contamination" as a strategic operation within the technoscience of culture is not 
to exclude further questioning of whether Traditional Mexican Cuisine actually 
achieves anything besides the reproduction of cultural capitalism. My aim is rather 
to introduce a more nuanced appreciation of the possibilities and limitations of a 
cultural defense of maize under the hegemony of neoliberal capitalism. 
In a contribution to the same book in which cultural historian Jeffrey Pilcher 
deplores what he calls a "postmodern apocalypse of peasant cuisines," American 
anthropologist Richard Wilk warns us against describing food culture through 
linear narratives leading up to a single point in the present ("From Wild Weeds" 
18). In a post-Marxist spirit, he advises us not to think of a single unitary capitalism 
but rather of multiple sites at which capitalism is negotiated in singular ways. Wilk 
insists that people do usually find “ways to decommodify food, to make it personal, 
meaningful, cultural, and social” (20). To recognize those singular acts of de-
commodification need not render us blind to the paradoxical ways in which the 
very acts that decommodify - for instance, “identifying a food as part of an 
inalienable heritage” - re-commodify it for “high-end gourmets and cultural 
theorists” (20). I share Wilk's attention to the paradoxical and "impure" logics of de-
commodification, and therefore I suggest that even within the neoliberal hegemony 
that compels cultural managers to capitalize on the designation of "authentic" 
cuisines, the contemporary technoscience of culture is in principle capable of 
unsettling previous picturings of Mexicanness as “a cage of melancholy” (Bartra), 
that is, as a static limbo between "modernity" and "tradition."  
In the next and final chapter of this thesis, I explore the ethical and political 
promises of affirming "contamination" as an originary (as well as generative) 
condition in technoscience. Opponents of transgenic organisms speak of 
"contamination" as the cause of an apocalyptic scenario. While I give serious 
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attention to the many reasons why they do so, I also re-figure the term in a 
philosophical sense in order to try to imagine different possibilities for the thinking 
and doing of biotechnology in Mexico. 
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Chapter V 
 
The Genetic Contamination of Mexican Nationalism 
  
 
Introduction: A Textual Contamination of Biotechnology Debates 
 
We exist in a sea of powerful stories. (...)  
Changing the stories,  
in both material and semiotic senses,  
is a modest intervention worth making.  
(Haraway, Modest_Witness 45) 
 
In their introduction to New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, Politics, Diana 
Coole and Samantha Frost explain what they see as a widespread dissatisfaction 
with "the more textual approaches associated with the so-called cultural turn" (2-
3). Textual approaches, they say, are increasingly deemed inadequate for 
addressing political issues such as environmental disaster and climate change. In 
view of the obvious materiality of these phenomena, Coole and Frost ask 
rhetorically: "how can we be other than materialist?" (1). Their answer is that 
"radical constructivism" has dominated the theoretical scene since the 1970s and 
has resulted in a generalized inability to give material factors "their due in shaping 
society and circumscribing human prospects" (3). From this, Coole and Frost go 
on to assert that textual approaches are "allergic to matter," allegedly dissuading 
young researchers "from the more empirical kinds of investigation that material 
processes require" (6). Given that I want to position my own textual approach to 
the Mexican defense of maize as materialist in its premises and its critical 
orientation, I take issue in this chapter with Coole and Frost's construction of a 
straw opposition between textuality and materiality set up in their justification of the 
so-called "new materialisms." The latter take on the form, as recently suggested 
by Dennis Bruining, of a revival of foundationalism which is motivated by a 
moralistic response to the political challenges of the day. While I share Bruining's 
line of intepretation, my focus here is on demonstrating the continuing relevance of 
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textuality for contemporary materialist thinking. In the context of a neo-empiricist 
backlash against textual approaches, I want to pose the following question: Why 
would it be important to think and speak of "genetic contamination" in non-
empiricist and non-moralistic ways, and what form would such a discourse take? 
A key argument of this chapter is that textual entities such as tropes, myths 
and figurations are part and parcel of a critical materialist engagement with the 
technoscientific world. On this basis, I attempt to re-figure "genetic contamination" 
along the ethico-political lines of a deconstructive kind of materialism. This line of 
thinking can be traced back to the re-conceptualization of technics performed by 
deconstructive philosopher Bernard Stiegler in the first volume of his Technics and 
Time. Drawing on the empirical work of André Leroi-Gourhan, Stiegler elaborates 
a philosophical understanding of technics as an evolving, non-deterministic 
relationship between the living and the non-living. He explains that the 
archaeological finding of the Zinjanthropian, a tool manipulator with a very small 
brain, suggested to Leroi-Gourhan that brain development had not been the 
leading cause of hominization. Hominization was instead set in motion as a co-
functioning of body and tool, which Stiegler interprets philosophically as a mirror-
effect process "whereby one, looking at itself in the other, is both deformed and 
formed" (158). By including thinking itself in this process, Stiegler radically 
challenges the dualistic terms imposed on the thinking of technics by the 
metaphysical tradition. No longer a mere instrument of a priori humanity, technics 
stands in Stiegler's work for life in general understood as a technical process from 
which humanity emerges contingently, that is, dependent on specific material 
conditions. Stiegler's intense engagement with physical anthropology already 
seems remarkable from a materialist perspective; however, what actually inspired 
my project of re-figuring "genetic contamination" was Stiegler's mythological 
elaboration of Leroi Gouhran's work. It this textual gesture that I find more valuable 
for my own attempt to re-figure "genetic contamination" along the lines of what we 
might call a "deconstructive" or non-essentialist and non-empiricist kind of 
materialism. 
In his philosophical reading of the Greek myth of Prometheus, Stiegler 
suggests that humans emerged as technical beings in more than an empirical 
sense. There he foregrounds a fault committed in the first place by Epimetheus, 
who forgot to assign qualities to human beings as had been instructed by the gods 
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to his brother Prometheus. After the fault Prometheus performed his famous deed, 
namely, that of stealing "the gift of skill in the arts" (technicity) and fire in order to 
help human beings survive. As we know, Zeus allowed humans to keep the 
Promethean gift, if only because his revenge was already included in the gift as 
the condition of mortality. As Stiegler says, humans were to be forever haunted 
with "trepidation at the condition of technicity (its power, implying equally the 
powerlessness of mortals)" (Technics 189). This explains the notion of "originary 
technicity," or Stiegler's own "myth of the absence of foundation" (Marchart 151), 
according to which human beings emerged "without qualities, without 
predestination: they must invent, realize, produce qualities, [but] nothing indicates 
that, once produced, these qualities will bring about humanity (…) they may rather 
become those of technics" (194). What is the relevance of Stiegler's philosophical 
elaboration of the Promethean myth in the context of a confrontation between 
agricultural activism and corporate biotechnology? 
Rosi Braidotti has drawn attention to the dangers of traditional philosophy 
as a machine with a tendency to "cannibalize" or assimilate "all new and even 
alien bodies" (Nomadic Subjects 33). As an alternative to the disciplinary workings 
of institutionalized philosophy, Braidotti proposes a nomadic style of thinking which 
consists in "crossing disciplinary boundaries, extensive borrowing of notions and 
concepts that are deliberately used out of context and derouted from their initial 
purpose" (37). It is in such a nomadic spirit that I want to borrow originary 
technicity from Stiegler's deconstructive framework, as a preliminary step in the 
project of re-thinking "genetic contamination" in ethico-political terms. Such a re-
thinking or repurposing seems indispensable in this case because, as Oliver 
Marchart recently pointed out, Stiegler's technical focus has led him to overlook 
the ontological specificity of the political – which is, by contrast, rigorously 
theorized by post-Marxist philosophers Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau in 
terms of antagonism. For Stiegler, politics is needed to regulate disagreements 
around the threats posed by technics – for instance, he is particularly concerned 
about an apparent decline in cognitive and affective dispositions under capitalist 
media industries. Echoing the feminist criticism of institutional philosophy, 
Marchart concludes quite forcefully that the generalizing tone with which Stiegler 
pathologizes the social has the function of absolving the philosopher from 
analyzing the concrete circumstances that contribute to the emergence of politics 
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in particular contexts (151-163). By failing to grant any constitutive role to 
antagonism as such, Stiegler ends up precluding radical politics in favour of bland 
reformist appeals to regulate the media and teach the youth to "take care" of 
themselves and others (Marchart 160). Moreover, through his constant use of 
medical language, Stiegler transforms sociopolitical analysis into a pathologizing 
discourse that re-inscribes metaphysics by presupposing a non-pathological state 
of origin (such as a "natural" libidinal economy that can be "destroyed" by 
consumer capitalism). In a similar vein, Richard Beardsworth accuses Stiegler of 
overlooking the contextual specificities of the economic domain. Whereas for 
Stiegler the question of technics is a Greek question, contemporary economic 
alienation needs to be thought, Beardsworth argues, beyond Greek philosophy 
and in terms of what kind of regulation of capitalism is possible today for the world 
as a whole. As Beardsworth says, that is a vast and difficult question that cannot 
be adequately handled with generalizing, deterministic arguments ("Technology 
and Politics" 189). My own conclusion is not that philosophical reflection should be 
regarded as useless in the face of complex material realities, or that we should 
abandon, as Coole and Frost demand, textual approaches in favour of "more 
empirical" ones. Rather, I argue in this chapter that the philosophical framework of 
originary technicity can be deployed in more critical ways, with due attention to the 
contextual specificities of an "event in technics" such as the Mexican defense of 
maize agriculture.  
Combined with the psychoanalytic insights of post-Marxism, the politically 
informed practice of figuration by feminist technoscience scholars provides the 
theoretical basis for my attempt at refiguring "genetic contamination." The purpose 
of this refiguration would be to provide critical alternatives to the current usage of 
this term in activist circles, wherein genetic contamination is conceived as an 
intentional attack on a sovereign entity – whether this sovereign entity is framed in 
modern developmental terms as "the Mexican nation" or in the radical autonomist 
terms of indigenous "milpa culture." While the political reasons for the activist 
opposition to transgenic "contamination" seem clear enough in the context of 
global capitalism, I want to problematize the human-centred narratives privileged 
by activists, which tend to lock their own discourse in fruitless moralistic 
denunciation. It is fruitless, I want to argue, because it merely rehearses the 
paranoid habits of thinking around modern technology in general, as opposed to 
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taking ethical and political responsibility for the emergence of a post-human(ist) 
subjectivity in particular contexts. In order to illustrate this point and argue for 
alternative associations and becomings within a refigured genetic contamination, I 
undertake a close reading of selected texts in the Mexican biotechnology debates 
in order to identify to what extent and with what consequences each of them 
establishes a link between the origin of maize and the origin of national identity.  
I begin with the text of the Master Project of Mexican Maize (PMMM), which 
is a technoscientific project partly funded by Monsanto and implemented since 
2007 by Mexican research institutions in a controversial collaboration with peasant 
communities from the state of Puebla. My purpose in engaging with PMMM is to 
demonstrate that culture matters in the Mexican biotechnology debates, with 
specific consequences for activism. After diagnosing the activist predicament in 
the face of the hegemonic narratives mobilized by PMMM, I open up the question 
of whether the "contamination" denounced by environmental activists can be 
productively re-figured in terms of a creative ontology inspired by the ethics of 
deconstruction and feminist affirmative politicization of technoscience. By way of 
experimenting with this idea, I engage with key chapters from the book Origin and 
Diversification of Maize, a scientific report in which Mexican scientists recreate the 
origin of maize in the larger context of a cultural and political defense of Mexican 
biodiversity. By weaving together the science of the origin of maize with the 
cultural aspects of its diversification, the authors of the report elaborate a renewed 
national mythology orientated to confront the Mexican Biosafety Law (2005). After 
locating the "genetic contamination of Mexican nationalism" in the scientific failure 
to close the national text precisely at the point where the origin of the nation is 
made to coincide with the origin of maize, I try to discern the political and ethical 
dimensions of the Mexican biotechnology debates in order to assess the 
possibilities as well as the limitations of thinking genetic contamination in the way I 
propose. With this in mind I examine the anticapitalist narratives in Maize is Not a 
Thing; It is a Center of Origin, a book composed by the activist Network in Defense 
of Maize. I suggest that textual engagements with the cultural terrain in which 
maize anticapitalism takes place are not only useful when it comes to 
foregrounding the political nature of all empirical claims in the Mexican 
biotechnology debates, but they are perhaps also necessary from a (bio)ethical 
perspective.  
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Faces of Maize: Why Culture Matters in Technoscience Activism 
 
What seems to be at stake is this culture's stories of the human place in nature, 
that is, genesis and its endless repetitions. And Western intellectuals, perhaps 
especially natural scientists and philosophers, have historically been particularly 
likely to take their cultural stories for universal realities (Haraway, 
Modest_Witness 60). 
 
Are textual approaches "allergic" to the materiality of ecological issues such 
as the flow of transgenes in Mexican cornfields? In a recent issue of New 
Formations, Jeremy Gilbert seems to agree with Coole and Frost that cultural 
theory and cultural studies have tended to retreat from ecological issues out of 
"scepticism regarding anything that might smell of naturalism" (Editorial 7). Unlike 
Coole and Frost, however, Gilbert argues that such a retreat is unnecessary, since 
ecological issues take place on a cultural terrain. Importantly, a cultural terrain is 
for Gilbert not just one sphere amongst many, but is rather a complex (we may 
perhaps say, ecological) field in which the political, the economic and the natural 
form an inseparable dynamic. In other words, "culture" is a complex material affair, 
and the highly politicized articles in this special issue of New Formations on 
"Imperial Ecologies" amply testify to that. They also illustrate that critical textual 
approaches do not claim to exhaust or displace matter but rather call into question 
all kinds of authoritative accounts of material reality. From this perspective, even 
"new materialism" is seen as a cultural approach, something that becomes evident 
when Coole and Frost explain that materialism is not so much about an immediate 
access to matter itself but about a critical engagement with "underlying beliefs 
about existence that shape our everyday relationships to ourselves, to others, and 
to the world" (5). Critical textual approaches can indeed share with "new 
materialisms" the assumption that what humans think and believe is, after all, 
decisive for shaping current experiments done "with and to matter, nature, life, 
production, and reproduction" (4). How then do human(ist) beliefs, assumptions 
and values inherited from cultural histories matter for Mexican activism around 
maize agriculture and biotechnology? 
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An early observer of the Mexican biotechnology debates, sociologist Gerard 
Verschoor pointed out that some environmental activists shared with their pro-
industry opponents a modern regime of justification that was unlikely to aid their 
cause. In particular, by invoking the myth of the noble savage as a means of 
preserving biodiversity, such activists were unwittingly drawing on the same logic 
as their pro-industry opponents. Echoing Martin Heidegger's famous critique of 
modern technology as metaphysics, Verschoor described the industrial logic as 
anthropocentric and instrumentalist. He wrote:  
 
The main end of all logics that are utilized to distinguish between right and wrong 
is always an end that is good for humans, according to humans. This common 
anthropocentric truism makes it possible for all grammars of worth to state with 
certainty that everything in creation, whether people or things, can be used 
merely as a means and that only man is an end in himself (49). 
 
Verschoor warned that activists would see their position undermined once 
industrial actors managed to mobilize the anthropocentric rationality in a more 
persuasive way, for instance by  arguing that biological threats could be managed 
"by simply extending the production process and monitoring the "health" of the 
environment" (47). Shortly after Verschoor issued this warning, some sections of 
the Mexican state apparatus, including research institutions, began collaborating 
with the biotech giant Monsanto on a project called the Master Project of Mexican 
Maize (PMMM). PMMM offered to integrate farming communities into the global 
market economy by designating them as "custodians" of native maize varieties 
that would simultaneously become the object of technoscientific research. PMMM 
presented itself on its website as a unique project in the history of Mexico, whose 
uniqueness derived from bringing together two distinct goals: 1) to preserve maize 
varieties threatened with extinction and 2) to improve the quality of life of the 
"custodians" of those varieties. By articulating environmental concerns with 
hegemonic narratives of development, PMMM came to fulfill Verschoor's 
prediction about the industry's superior ability to profit from an instrumentalist 
common sense. In this section I want to argue that the failure to provide 
alternatives to this rationality has resulted in some activists becoming stuck in a 
fruitless repetition of moralistic denunciations and naive empirical demands. If this 
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hypothesis is correct, then culture, discourse and subjectivity still matter decisively 
in political struggles around material issues such as agriculture, biological diversity 
and economics. This is not to say that culture, discourse and subjectivity are all 
that matters, or that they matter more than matter, or that they matter in a radically 
different way than matter itself. Rather, I argue that they have a decisive role to 
play in thinking and living materiality otherwise, for instance in non-anthropocentric 
and non-instrumentalist ways. Following Jeremy Gilbert's argument in 
Anticapitalism and Culture, I aim to show that a textual approach to the activist 
position vis à vis the capitalist discourse of PMMM can usefully generate a deeper 
understanding of the political challenges confronting the Mexican defense of 
maize. In this way, I begin to frame my textual approach as materialist not just in 
the sense that it addresses explicit concerns of so-called "new materialisms" but, 
more importantly, in the sense that it opens up the question of how theoretical 
practice can intervene responsibly in ecological issues.  
According to activist researcher Silvia Ribeiro, PMMM was first mentioned 
in a series of requests made by Monsanto, Dow and Dupont-Pioneer to carry out 
experiments with transgenic maize in the highly industrialized states of Sinaloa 
and Tamaulipas, both in northern Mexico (Proyecto Maestro). As it actually turned 
out, PMMM was implemented between 2007 and 2011 in the central state of 
Puebla, where small-scale and subsistence agriculture were (and still are) widely 
practiced and where maize diversity was relatively high. While the nature and 
orientation of any activities carried out in such a context by biotech corporations 
must certainly be scrutinized and called into question by society as a whole, here I 
want to pay attention to how PMMM communicated its activities to Mexican 
society. In other words, rather than questioning immediately whether a company 
like Monsanto lies or tells the truth about the nature and orientation of its activities, 
I want to understand how PMMM could succeed in persuading a particular public 
about the rationality and desirability of its role in society. Understanding how an 
industry of dubious reputation can produce consent among Mexicans might be 
instructive for activists in many ways, in this particular case in the task of 
producing genuine alternatives to the inherited narratives of nationhood. My 
analysis of PMMM is thus not meant to merely inform activists about the 
ideological traps of their own narratives, but rather to open up the question of how 
such narratives may be re-figured or re-configured in a critical and creative way.     
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The website of PMMM was rich in images that associated traditional 
agricultural methods with the poverty of rural populations. It included a series of 
video interviews in which individual farmers were shown to support such an 
association by voicing, through personal testimonies, the argument of PMMM.96 At 
first sight it seemed plain that PMMM reproduced, point by point, the old 
developmental narrative of turning "backward" peasants into "modern" farmers. 
However, PMMM also exhibited a neoliberal rhetoric, that is, it updated the 
modernizing imperative by showcasing ideals of individual self-reliance within a 
society no longer led by the national state and led instead by technical and 
industrial actors. While PMMM explicitly described itself as an Integral Project of 
Rural Development, it also asserted that unlike previous state-led projects, it 
aimed to "implement strategies for the preservation and multiplication of [the 
Mexican] genetic treasure, and for the viability and development of those who 
guard it." According to PMMM, those who guarded Mexico's "genetic treasure" 
were those who had not benefitted from state programs. They even were 
portrayed as victims of both inattention and corruption on the part of the state. For 
the same reason, perhaps, they were the very subjects chosen to perform the role 
of the noble savage, that of an instrument for "agrodiversity conservation" and 
economic "development." Through PMMM, private entrepreneurs occupied the 
place previously assigned to the national state and they did so, I argue, not simply 
by imposing themselves through sheer force but also through a labour of 
persuasion that re-articulated the inherited narratives and foundational myths of 
Mexican nationhood.  
The text of PMMM's website started with a series of mythological 
statements about the supposed link between maize and the Mexican nation. Nobel 
Prize winner Octavio Paz was quoted as saying that "the invention of maize by the 
Mexicans can only be compared with the invention of fire by Man". Maize was 
described as "the heart of the world" and as the origin of a relation "between 
Mexican culture and civilization." Nearby was the image of a hairy man inside a 
cave, wearing only a loincloth, and raising his arms solemnly in some kind of 
religious gesture. Below the image one could read: "these producers make it 
                                                
96 The website was accessed by me on September and October 2012, and it was apparently taken 
down on 2013. Some of the interviews and video commercials of PMMM are still accessible online 
(http://www.youtube.com/user/PMMMproyecto accessed 11 Ago. 2013) and have been 
downloaded and saved for future consultation.  
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possible that Mexico is the richest and most complex center of active genetic 
diversity of maize [which is also] in continuous improvement." Cave men appeared 
in the framework of a teleological narrative of "continuous improvement" as 
producers of "the largest wealth of germplasm in the planet" and (in anticipation of 
contemporary maize "custodians") as "fundamental agents of germplasm 
conservation." Their worldview and culture were correspondingly framed in terms 
of labour, the product of which was to be admired now in "living sculptures, 
amazingly beautiful and surprising, which express themselves with a prodigious 
diversity of shapes and colors, as well as potential uses and transformation." That 
is, maize cobs, cave men and Mexican identity were made to converge 
foundationally in the mission of germplasm exploitation, and it was not difficult to 
detect the shifts through which PMMM re-articulated previous civilizatory missions 
conducted by colonial and state powers.  
An old woman was facing us with a sad expression on her face while corn 
was being hand-harvested in the background. Not far from this image, one could 
read a quote attributed to a Jesuit missionary: "the poor are those who have not, 
cannot and know not." It is absurd, the text claimed, that the producers of the 
largest wealth are also the poorest people in the Mexican countryside. If such 
producers were given "access to better technological processes, 
commercialization and added value," they would at last become able to generate 
"equitable and upward" life conditions. A researcher wearing a PMMM cap was not 
looking at us because his attention was focused on a small plant, which he was 
manipulating. Nearby we could read that Mexican public research institutions had 
previously been guided by "an erroneous belief" that biodiversity conservation 
could be achieved by storing seeds away from their original creators. The problem 
was that such an approach to conservation lacked "an integral vision." Guided by 
a "national vision," PMMM would pursue conservation through development, first 
of all the development of those whose role in germplasm conservation had been 
unjustly neglected.  
Despite its claim of novelty with respect to the previous approaches to 
biodiversity conservation, the "integral" and "national" vision embraced by PMMM 
was quite obviously not new. In the years after the Revolution (1910-1921), the 
Mexican state had set out to educate and modernize rural populations. The early 
labour of post-revolutionary rural teachers eventually became an international 
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scientific enterprise in which North American scientists funded by the Rockefeller 
Foundation developed high-yield seeds to be used in conjunction with fertilizers 
and pesticides. Like post-revolutionary rural teachers, PMMM went "out to the 
centers of origin (...) just there where it is needed." Beyond teaching literacy skills, 
however, it aimed to remind rural populations about "the value of their germplasm" 
as their own contribution "to Mexico and humanity" since, according to PMMM, 
maize was much more than "the vital center of Mexican identity, culture and food." 
It was above all the most important grain on the planet, an ingredient of thousands 
of everyday products and a key "input" for technological development and added 
value. Like the Green Revolution, PMMM offered to provide financial and technical 
assessment, expert-led research on potential uses of maize varieties, including 
biochemical and industrial uses, the creation of products, enterprises and 
commercial strategies and, in a (hardly novel) neoliberal twist, the development of 
managerial abilities for "custodians" to improve both the environment and their 
relations with the market.  
At the same time it might seem that PMMM's designation of rural subjects 
as "custodians" shifted an earlier tendency to isolate indigenous and peasant 
culture "away from its original creators," While classifying and naming maize 
varieties to be stored away in ex-situ banks, the experts of the Green Revolution 
had chosen names such as "Ancient Indigenous," "Pre-Columbian Exotic," "Pre-
historic Mestizo" and "Modern Incipient" (Fussell). Their acts of naming clearly 
echoed eurocentric narratives of progress as well as the modern tendency to 
confine otherness to spaces such as the museum or, in this case, the germplasm 
bank. Nonetheless, in its defense of in-situ (alongside ex-situ) conservation, 
PMMM assigned to living rural populations an active role of keeping valuable 
germplasm in close collaboration with the research industry. At any rate, such a 
shift re-articulated the racializing logic of modern power/knowledge. The 
designation of particular individuals as "custodians" of particular maize varieties 
involved a racializing identification between native subjects and native maize, an 
identification which operated through the visual and verbal association of individual 
human faces with maize "races." Like that of its predecessors, the vision of PMMM 
emerged from a biopolitical, orientalist regime of representation that positioned the 
rural subject as "usually dark and lacking in historical agency, as if waiting for the 
(white) Western hand to help subjects along and not infrequently hungry, illiterate, 
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needy, and oppressed by its own stubborness, lack of initiative, and traditions" 
(Escobar, Encountering Development 8). It is this long-duration discursive scheme 
that, I want to argue, deserves careful attention in the task of generating 
alternatives to the logic of industrial actors. 
"Faces of Maize" was one of the promotional spots that could be viewed on 
the website of PMMM. In the video, men were shown using animal traction to plow 
soils that appeared to be very dry; a woman removed the leaves from a cob while 
a child seeded the plot. Labouring hands were subtly foregrounded as they 
manipulated instruments and animals, as they shelled maize cobs and as they 
dropped maize kernels one by one along the furrow. The extreme seriousness of 
hand labourers was framed by an epic soundrack that suggested that some 
dramatic event was under way. Towards the end of this musicalized introduction, a 
child came forward, looking down, for us to inspect him while the older people 
continued working in the background. Perhaps, one thought, this poor child should 
be attending school instead of working the land. Once the introduction ended, we 
were presented with non-musicalized, seemingly spontaneous testimonies of a 
series of male farmers.  
The first farmer was a thin old man with strong indigenous features. He 
appeared next to a large cluster of dry corn leaves among which could be seen the 
dark purple cobs of a native variety of maize. The ancient Popocatépetl volcano 
exhaled picturesque clouds in a dusky background. Somewhat out of the blue, the 
man lamented in broken Spanish that "nothing comes out from working like this; it 
is not possible for us to sell maize, yet we have to make a living; we have to work." 
After him, several farmers appeared speaking individually about the problems 
faced by Mexican campesinos. One after the other the testimonies presented the 
familiar picture of a needy rural subject, yet their authority seemed to increase as 
they featured younger, plumper mestizo subjects who explained the farmer's 
predicament in economic terms. One of them showed a handful of maize kernels 
and stated, against the sunny background of an incipiently mechanized plot: "this 
is the white, Creole maize that we cultivate here." Another one then explained that 
he usually ate his maize because low yield made it difficult to commercialize it. In 
such a situation, he concluded, "I'd rather keep some goats." He thereby 
introduced the suggestion that farmers engage in agricultural activities because 
they need cash. In sum, progressing from a dark to a luminous setting, from dark 
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purple cobs to "Creole maize", from aging indigenous subjects to young and 
robust mestizos, the argument was made that the main problem faced by the 
Mexican countryside was a lack of monetary capital, curtailing farmers' access to 
the machinery and fertilizers that would save them (and their maize) from 
extinction. 
In a crucial scene, one of the farmers clarified the role of the government in 
the rural predicament. He said: "I'm not saying that the president does not give us 
cash. I'm just saying that they play the milpa game, which is [mil pa ti, mil pa mi] a 
thousand for you, a thousand for me", so that when it is finally my turn, there is 
nothing left." As we know, the term milpa belongs to the vocabulary of traditional 
Mesoamerican agriculture and stands in activist discourse for a radical alternative 
to capitalist agri-business. Yet, through a play of words in Spanish, milpa was 
equated in the farmer's testimony with a trick played on farmers by the 
government. State agencies, the farmer implied, divided public money among 
themselves and so they constrained the ability of farmers to increase their 
monetary capital. Since capital had been already positioned as the only way to 
survive extinction, the state's failure to fully include farmers in a cash economy 
was framed as "that which leads us to the loss of what we campesinos are." Thus, 
by weaving together a series of naturalized perceptions, PMMM foreclosed a 
consideration of the (political) history of rural poverty and of the role of 
agribusiness in the displacement of rural inhabitants. Voiced by the farmer himself, 
a commonsensical equation of poverty with the lack of cash and a widely shared 
opinion that the money was there but was being mismanaged (or even stolen) by 
state officials were skillfully combined in order to legitimize the neoliberal 
developmentalism of PMMM. One must ask, of course, whether the Mexican 
public would buy all of this propaganda and why.  
In 2011, PMMM reached the semi-finals of a national TV contest called 
Iniciativa México (iMx). At the time of an unprecedented security crisis sparked by 
the government's war against drugs, iMx described itself as "a great movement to 
transform the country" by disseminating "a spirit of change."97 As the show's 
propaganda unapologetically explained, "the most influential politicians and the 
Mexican business elite" had joined forces with the media in order to communicate 
                                                
97 My description of Iniciativa México is based on promotional videos that were broadcasted on 
2011 and are still available for online viewing at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wio1LZ8AXDg. 
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how "an ordinary Mexican with initiative" could be part of "a national project, an 
attitude." Their argument was that "a better nation is made of better individuals"; 
therefore iMx instructed Mexican audiences to transform themselves into 
"individuals with initiative, courage, will and strength to attain change." More 
precisely, Mexicans had to "break inertia and evolve" by giving up the belief that 
"success can only be attained through cheating, corruption and immorality." As if 
the cause of social problems in Mexico was the corrupt behavior of individual 
citizens, iMx enjoined Mexicans to transform themselves morally.  While we might 
explain PMMM's appearance in this show simply by pointing out Monsanto's 
privileged access to influential politicians and the business elite, I want to suggest 
that we should also pay close attention to the narratives mobilized by both 
Iniciativa México and PMMM among other "initiatives" that took part in the contest. 
By framing peasants alongside agronomic technicians and scientists as heroic 
individuals who can and do "break inertia and evolve," PMMM benefitted from the 
media's experience and skill at tapping into popular desire. Rather than dismissing 
the neoliberal narratives of PMMM and IM as mere ideology (in the old sense of 
distorted representations of reality), I want to consider the seriousness of their 
challenge by looking into the fortunes of the activist response to PMMM. 
PMMM was quickly detected and denounced by activists long before its 
implementation in Puebla (2008-2011). In 2006, Greenpeace issued the first alert 
against "Monsanto's Master Project," denouncing that the two Mexican scientists 
who would become research leaders of PMMM were conducting "agronomic 
efficacy" tests on Monsanto products. A few months later, activist Silvia Ribeiro 
described PMMM as a national humiliation. She accused government officials and 
PMMM researchers of behaving in the same way as Antonio López de Santa Ana, 
a villain of Mexican history who had supposedly "sold" the fatherland to foreign 
invaders in the 19th century. Through the "Master project of contamination," as 
Ribeiro dubbed PMMM, Mexican authorities would sell "the genetic patrimony of 
the country" against “the interests of Mexico, against the popular will and against 
the law." Like Greenpeace, Ribeiro had insisted throughout the years on the 
inevitability of "contamination" in the sense of a biological phenomenon verified by 
empirical science. This time, however, she equated "contamination" with a "racist 
attack" on the peasant and indigenous populations of Mexico. In a press article 
titled "Racist Maicide," she wrote:  
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Being the centre of origin and diversity of maize, the unavoidable transgenic 
contamination that will occur [in Mexico] will seriously affect the world's genetic 
reservoire. Worse, maize is the main element of the economies and cultures of 
peasants and indigenous peoples, its ancestral creators, which means that [the 
government’s decision to authorize experimental sowing of transgenic maize] is 
an attack on their rights and a violent act of neocolonialist racism. (nonpag.; 
italics mine) 
 
I would certainly agree with Ribeiro that PMMM is structured by a racist and 
neocolonial logic, which is why I am concerned about her utter failure to challenge 
such a logic apart from denouncing the poor moral quality and the economic 
interests of PMMM's promoters. Ribeiro seems to assume that the nation's 
"genetic patrimony" is as literally given as the territorial boundaries of the nation 
itself, and she reduces the problem of "genetic contamination" to the existence of 
a bunch of corrupt individuals who plan to injure the nation by selling the national 
patrimony to a bunch of predatory foreigners.98 By insisting, through nationalistic 
clichés, on a moral/juridical battle that has already been lost (since, as she herself 
claims, Mexican legislation has already been co-opted by the biotech lobby) 
Ribeiro's discourse turns reproachful and bitter to a point that it is not just useless 
but actually counterproductive. Her outrage at "contamination," in the sense of a 
national humiliation, reduces activism to a tiresome lamentation around something 
that has already happened and that (one is forced to conclude) is therefore 
inevitable, namely: racist attacks, neocolonial violence, corrupt and immoral elites, 
and so forth. Such a fixation on moral corruption and moral injury seems to stop 
Ribeiro from interrogating why it is actually not just a few corrupt individuals but 
also farmers unions, farming associations and even a good share of the Mexican 
public who seem willing to endure the "contamination" of Mexican maize and 
Mexican culture.99 In her framework, the explanation can only reside in the 
widespread moral corruption or sheer ignorance of the masses, which suggests a 
                                                
98 PMMM included the creation of a germplasm bank that would concentrate potentially useful 
genetic information about several “races” of maize. Activists point out that the true goal of PMMM is 
to facilitate Monsanto's filing of patents on such information (Puga). 
99 When it was implemented in the state of Puebla, PMMM deployed the National Confederation of 
Maize Producers (CNPAMM), a branch of the National Campesina Confederation (CNC), as a 
political representative of Mexican campesinos (Puga).  
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rather disturbing resonance with the discourse of the media and business elite 
behind Iniciativa México. Like the latter, Ribeiro's discourse ends up framing the 
issue of biotechnology in terms of moral corruption, yet unlike the elites' positive 
injunction to develop "an attitude toward change," Ribeiro's endless recriminations 
against corrupt elites leave her readers with the feeling that there is little to be 
done in the face of such age-old problems.  
Ribeiro is of course not alone in positioning "genetic contamination" as a 
deliberate attack on the Mexicans. According to the Network in Defense of Maize, 
contamination constitutes a deliberate attack on "the territoriality and the common 
realms that were previously a bastion of our national sovereignty" (Maize is Not a 
Thing 8). In denouncing such an attack, the Network positions itself as reflecting 
"the ancestral dignity of people, the enormous lucidity of their analysis, their 
political clarity and their untainted morality" (8). In particular, it positions itself as 
voicing a cultural ethics of care and healing of the whole world (80). In the last 
section of this chapter I focus on the Network's positive agricultural alternative to 
capitalist extraction and financial speculation. At this point, however, I only want to 
remark that Network members such as GRAIN activist Camila Montecinos also 
indulge in the moralistic, reproachful tone that makes their denunciations sound 
nothing but fatalistic. In Montecino's contribution to the activist chronicle Maize is 
Not a Thing, contamination appears as a meaningful process emerging from a 
dispute among capitalist and noncapitalist humans, and more specifically as the 
result of "a conscious strategy" on the part of capitalist attackers. Her text begins 
dramatically with the declaration that "maize is genetically contaminated in its 
centre of origin" (29). Immediately after this initial statement Montecinos accuses: 
“despite manipulations, denials, evasives, pseudo-scientific falsities, half-lies, 
euphemisms, pitiful justifications and attempts at silencing, maize is genetically 
contaminated in its center of origin” (29). Anyone who attempts to rationalize this 
fact, Montecinos dictaminates, must feel deeply ashamed. If scientists, biotech 
CEOs, international organizations and research centers have any decency left, 
she says, "what they must do now is feel shame for what they do or do not do in 
order to avoid disaster. And their shame should be deep and impossible to 
conceal" (30). Should one feel ashamed of trying to understand "genetic 
contamination" as something else than a deliberate attack of certain humans 
against other humans? Rather than answering this question in a straightforward 
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way, I want to suggest that Montecinos and other activists who employ the 
dramatic effects of humanistic moralism are closer than they think to their own 
opponents. 
In order to avoid the logic of the business elite, they would need to go 
beyond a moralistic reassertion of identitarian clichés. They would need to 
understand much better than they do now how the business elite mobilizes such 
clichés in order to interpellate "Mexicans" as such. Despite the fact that successful 
entrepreneurship requires a good deal more than moral "initiative," iMx's emphasis 
on the agency of ordinary citizens inspired many Mexicans to a surprising point: 
while PMMM did not even win the contest, many other "initiatives" involving 
organic agriculture and environmental care at the community level achieved a 
degree of visibility that was previously unthinkable in Mexican media culture. This 
is not to say that we should celebrate the happy discourse of iMx and dismiss the 
angry discourse of activists. Yet it appears that Verschoor was right in warning the 
activists that their position would be undermined when the biotech lobby 
appropriated their own claims of preservation and protection of the environment 
without really changing economic priorities. Since I do not think that this is merely 
a contest in rhetorical strategy, I agree with Verschoor about the need to 
interrogate the philosophical structure that opposing arguments share in the 
debates around the contamination of native maize. 
According to Verschoor, the anti-GM movement can be profoundly political 
if it dares to go beyond the activist "over-lucid indictment of all that is morally 
objectionable" (49). It can do this, he suggests, by cultivating a posthumanist 
sensibility in the face of complex political questions such as how to deal with the 
loss of biodiversity or the emergence of superweeds (51) By contrast with 
anthropocentric regimes of justification, a posthumanist politics would stress our 
"inability to differentiate between subjective and objective," since it would first of all 
pay attention to "the interrelatedness between all humans and non-human 
participants in the discourse" (49). Maize, butterflies, and transgenic crops would 
be themselves acknowledged as agents that are decisive for campesino 
livelihoods, for the political legacy of the Mexican Revolution, for the material 
status and symbolic import of agricultural knowledges, for the freedom to produce 
one's own food, and for democracy (50). This argument reinforces my conviction 
that textual approaches have a central role to play in the exploration of the 
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distinctive themes of contemporary materialist theory, namely, a posthumanist 
conception of matter as itself lively or agential, a bioethical concern with the status 
of life and of the human, and a critical and nondogmatic re-engagement with 
political economy. Yet when Coole and Frost explain that ecological perspectives 
consider interactions between different sets of conditions, the cultural (and 
therefore textual) dimensions of such interactions is not mentioned on their list, as 
humans figure in their discourse merely as "individuals and governments" who 
have a responsibility for "the health of the planet" (16). By ignoring cultural texts, 
they seem to assume that we can simply forget about culture in general when 
embarking on empirical investigations of "risk and accountability" (16). I have tried 
to argue in this section that we cannot simply ignore culture because we are 
already in it whenever we put ourselves in a position that diagnoses "materiality," 
and we therefore need textual approaches (or, more broadly, philosophy, cultural 
analysis and discourse) in order to become accountable for the materiality of 
ecological phenomena.  
The problem raised by PMMM is that some actors have more material 
authority than other actors in determining risk and accountability within a specific 
symbolic framework. On the one hand, this is a political problem (a problem 
involving power struggles) that cannot be solved in any straightforward or 
transparent way, for instance, by producing more and more empirical information 
about the environmental risks and planetary health. On the other hand, since 
capitalist "development" is still commonsensically accepted as the founding 
narrative of the nation,100 nationalism will not necessarily mobilize Mexican citizens 
against the agro-industrial occupation of the Mexican countryside. What can be 
done when moralistic denunciations and empirical information turn out to be 
ineffective? In the following section, I argue that it is possible and desirable to 
relate in a more critical way to the humanistic legacy by acknowledging and 
affirming the "genetic contamination" of the national text – that is, its constitutive 
dislocation or vulnerability to the threat of time.  
 
                                                
100 I do not know of any statistics that "prove" this, but I can testify from personal experience that 
"development" is still a term routinely employed in Mexico in everyday conversations, in the media 
and in political rhetoric in order to signify all that is desirable for the Mexican nation. It is rare to find 
anyone who would disagree that Mexico needs to "develop." In short, the poststructuralist critique 
of development discourse has barely touched Mexican common sense. 
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Becoming Subjects, Becoming Myths: Always Already Material 
 
...there is no ground for ontologically opposing the organic, the technical, and the 
textual. But neither is there any ground for opposing the mythical to the organic, 
textual, and technical. Their convergences are more important than their residual 
oppositions (Haraway, "The Biopolitics..." 212). 
 
It is in order to rectify the atrocities of Cartesian dualism that "new 
materialisms" pursue, according to Coole and Frost, "a creative affirmation of a 
new ontology, a project that is in turn consistent with the productive, inventive 
capacities they ascribe to materiality itself" (8). By suggesting that textual 
approaches are unsuitable to the task, Coole and Frost seem to overlook the 
decisive role that the critique of metaphysics, and deconstruction in particular, has 
played in the very formulation of the new materialist project. Beyond their 
introduction, New Materialisms is actually a plural volume in which more than one 
contributor takes care to foreground the continuing relevance of textuality for 
thinking materialism today. Rey Chow, for example, argues that poststructuralist 
theories of the text were never about "a simple swapping of places between 
materialism and idealism" (227). Rather, their aim was to give up a dogmatic 
conception of matter as "a preexisting concrete ground" in order to think it 
politically as "a destabilizable chain of signification, the certitude of which is at best 
provisional and subject to slippage" (226). By exposing the metaphysical structure 
of economicist materialism, for example, poststructuralism cleared the ground for 
"a revamped materialism defined primarily as signification and subjectivity-in-
process" (226). In another contribution, Pheng Cheah argues that if we ever 
mistook deconstruction for a kind of linguistic constructionism, this was because 
we failed to frame it through the philosophical problem of time (74). For Derrida, 
the presence of matter is made possible by "a true gift of time ... a pure event" 
(75). Paradoxically, time also destabilizes presence by subjecting it to "a strict law 
of radical contamination" (74). According to this law, any form of presence is 
inherently "riven by a radical alterity that makes it impossible even as it makes it 
possible" (74). Cheah explains that in Derrida's framework time itself is "more 
material than matter" since it makes matter possible in the first place. If, as Chow 
and Pheah contend, poststructuralism and deconstruction already pushed a re-
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thinking of materiality beyond the terms of Cartesian dualism, why is it that Coole 
and Frost seem so keen to exclude textual approaches from the ontological project 
of so-called "new materialisms"?  
In "Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences," 
Derrida describes metaphysical thinking as an attempt to neutralize time through 
the postulation of concepts above and beyond "the slowness, the process of 
maturing, the continuous toil of factual transformations, history" (368). Derrida 
argues that it is impossible to destroy the totalizing tendency of metaphysics, since 
it operates structurally as a condition for thinking. However, it is possible to 
interrupt and criticize metaphysics in more or less consequential ways. Derrida 
presents Lévi-Strauss's structural analysis of myths as an example of critique by 
means of conceptual recycling or bricolage. According to Derrida, Lévi-Strauss 
realized that "[t]he focus or the source of the myth are always shadows and 
virtualities which are elusive, unactualizable, and nonexistent in the first place" 
(362). Having understood the supplementary function of certain mythological 
notions, Lévi-Strauss went on to emulate myths, his own work taking the shape of 
that of which it spoke and becoming itself "mythomorphic" and "mythopoetic." 
Derrida suggests that this is in fact the best way to interrupt the totalizing logic of 
metaphysical thinking, because it "makes the philosophical or epistemological 
requirement of a center appear as mythological, that is to say, as a historical 
illusion" (363). Yet mythopoetic discourse can always relapse into totalization. By 
failing to reflect on the philosophical implications of mythopoiesis, Lévi-Strauss 
ended up presenting his work as "(...) hypotheses resulting from a finite quantity of 
information and which are subjected to the proof of experience" (364). This is 
empiricism, or "the matrix of all faults menacing a discourse which continues (...) to 
consider itself scientific" (364). Derrida understands empiricism as the 
metaphysical trap of believing that our failure to achieve intellectual totalization is a 
matter of incomplete information – for example, believing, with Coole and Frost, 
that "more empirical approaches" will allow us to grasp the essence of materiality 
much better than "merely textual ones".  
Derrida attributes empiricism to an ethic of nostalgia for the origin. In the 
case of Lévi-Strauss, nostalgia manifested itself as a remorse about certain 
"archaic" societies (369). Yet such societies are "always already lost", in the sense 
that they were always subject to the law of time. The same would have to be 
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acknowledged about matter and materiality, and about life in general: it is always 
already "lost". An ethic of affirmation would nevertheless regard time itself 
otherwise than lost. It would undertake a joyous affirmation of language as "a 
world of signs without fault, without truth, and without origin which is offered to an 
active interpretation" (369). Derrida sees nostalgia and affirmation as two ethical 
interpretations of textuality that are "absolutely irreconcilable even if we live them 
simultaneously" (370). Rather than choosing one of them against the other, he 
advocates a thinking of their mutual composition "in the formless, mute, infant, and 
terrifying form of monstrosity" (370). Eschewing the nostalgic relapse into 
empiricism that Coole and Frost seem to have in common with Lévi-Strauss, 
feminist scholars of technoscience such as Donna Haraway, Rosi Braidotti and 
Karen Barad have affirmed the paradoxical materiality of language. Moreover, they 
have deployed mythopoietic writing as a form of political intervention in the 
technoscientific world. Despite their critical positionings with respect to Derrida, I 
would suggest that they all pursue a deconstructive kind of materialism in the 
sense that for them, materiality is not a fixed essence but rather it is the condition 
of possibility (a generative source) and of impossibility (a dynamic process) of 
thinking and acting as part of life in general. Like that of Lévi-Strauss, their work 
illustrates both the possibility of critique through linguistic play and the impossibility 
of destroying metaphysical thinking as a whole, once and for all.  
In Coole and Frost's introduction to New Materialisms, Haraway is 
mentioned as one of the "more textual" inquirers whose work is no longer 
adequate either for the understanding or the transformation of the world. 
Haraway's contribution is reduced to a single image, that of the cyborg as a "fusion 
of human and technology," which Coole and Frost regard as less sophisticated 
than Katherine Hayles's more recent theorization of the posthuman as 
"informational pattern" (17). There is, however, much more in Haraway's work than 
the image of a human-machine hybrid. In Haraway's own words, figurations such 
as the cyborg are "performative images that can be inhabited" as "condensed 
maps of contestable worlds" (Modest_Witness 11). There is indeed a complex 
map of the technoscientific world in the "Cyborg Manifesto" that continues to 
stimulate a posthumanist disposition to intervene responsibly – that is, otherwise 
than through moralistic condemnation or empiricist demands.  
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In a 2006 interview with Nicholas Gane, Haraway explains her position 
about the persistent ideological belief that "intercourse, communication, 
conversation, semiotic engagement is trope-free or immaterial" (qtd. in Gane 153-
54). On the contrary, Haraway understands semiotic engagement as thoroughly 
material, and the materiality of semiosis as being subject to stutterings, trippings or 
breakdowns (152). Figures and tropes such as the cyborg emerge from 
breakdowns in signification which are not determined as a loss of "empirical 
reality" but are rather affirmed as a condition for change. Indeed, change is what 
figuration is all about for Haraway, who deploys figures as mythopoietic antidotes 
to the apocalyptic thinking and melancholia that threaten to swallow radical politics 
in the technoscientific world. She celebrated the cyborg insofar as it involved, like 
all figures, "at least some kind of displacement that can trouble identifications and 
certainties" (Modest_Witness 11). She explains that her legendary cyborg trope 
emerged as a strategy for "inhabiting the despised place" (156). At the time of her 
"Cyborg Manifesto," the despised place was technology itself conceived in 
anthropocentric and instrumentalist ways. While Haraway does acknowledge the 
temporal limits of her cyborg trope, I find it crucial to remember today the the 
original point of it was to re-figure technology "beyond function and purpose to 
something open, something not yet" (qted. in Gane 154). Although there is clearly 
an ethical dimension to this project, I want to briefly look at its more strategic side 
that becomes apparent if we compare Haraway's argument about tropes with post-
Marxist argument about politics in a so-called postmodern age. 
Haraway's style of intervention resonates strongly with Laclauian post-
Marxism. Ernesto Laclau argues in Emancipation(s) that "…if the term 
'emancipation' is to remain meaningful, it is impossible to renounce any of its 
incompatible sides. Rather, we have to play one against the other in ways which 
have to be specified" (7). Prefiguring this argument, Haraway explains in her 
"Cyborg Manifesto" that the cyborg operates through "the tension of holding 
incompatible things together" (149). Echoing Laclau's psychoanalytic theory of 
radical democracy, it is presented as a strategy for "fractured identities" which are 
not afraid of "contradictory standpoints" (154). The cyborg is "postmodern" in the 
sense that it is not seduced by "organic wholeness through a final appropriation of 
all the powers of the parts into a higher unity" (150). At the same time, the cyborg 
speaks from within the modern tradition of socialist feminism, and from there it 
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continues to pursue radical emancipation, that is, a free society where all 
hierarchies have been eliminated. The cyborg can only be an "ironic myth" 
because there is a sense in which its "postmodern" side makes its "modern" side 
impossible, and yet necessary. In a postmodern world "the boundary between 
science fiction and social reality is an optical illusion" (149), and therefore there is 
no ultimate, transparent ground for the cyborg. Nevertheless the cyborg is 
necessary because science fiction is "a matter of immense human pain" that 
becomes increasingly "hard to see," both politically and materially (153).  
Like the post-Communist world analyzed by post-Marxist and cultural 
studies, Haraway's technoscientific world of disrupted unities requires "subtle 
understanding of emerging pleasures, experiences, and powers with serious 
potential for changing the rules of the game" (173). With deconstructive insight, 
she describes transformation as a long-term process that we can pursue through 
"a slightly perverse shift of perspective," one that enables us "to contest for 
meanings, as well as for other forms of power and pleasure in technologically 
mediated societies" (154). In Haraway's diagnosis, these societies are defined by 
a "confusion of boundaries and moral pollution" (165), a situation that can be 
formulated, she says, either from a managerial point of view or from a critical 
perspective (163). Admittedly, Haraway does not associate the critical point of 
view with "more empirical approaches." Her project has to do with textual 
engagements that interrupt and ideally transform "the systems of myth and 
meaning structuring our imaginations" (163).101 I have attempted to undertake 
such engagements with PMMM and many other texts throughout this thesis 
precisely because I share Haraway's investment in critique as a potential road to 
transformation. By contrast, Coole and Frost seem to leave room only to 
managerial perspectives when they mention genetic engineering as a mere 
technology that "seems destined to change forms of agricultural production and 
energy use irrevocably" (16). Their language tends to downplay the ongoing 
cultural struggles around the seemingly irrevocable "destiny" of agricultural 
                                                
101 I would contend that it is precisely through a critical engagement with "information" that the 
"Cyborg Manifesto" becomes a materialist intervention. According to Haraway, organisms have 
ceased to exist as objects of knowledge, giving way to biotic components, i.e., special kinds of 
information-processing devices (164). Haraway postulates that lived experience is permeated by 
information in the same way as language and "modern machines [that] are everywhere and they 
are invisible" (153). Visualizing silicon chips, electromagnetic waves and signals as "floating 
signifiers moving in pickup trucks across Europe" (153) is not to reduce them to abstractions but 
rather to call into question our own lived experience and our material obligations to the world. 
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production and energy use. The Mexican defense of maize is of course one such 
struggle, and it is my task in this chapter to demonstrate how myth-making matters 
for those who are engaged in it. 
Even though Haraway distances herself from Derrida's thinking about 
animals because of its masculine "lack of curiosity" (qted. in Gane 143), I would 
stress that there is a fundamental affinity between her own feminist thinking about 
tropes and the deconstructive materialism that Cheah finds in Derrida's conception 
of textuality. I also want to extend this argument to the work of feminist theorist 
Rosi Braidotti, who has expressed severe reservations about Derrida's 
poststructuralist framework. Braidotti develops a vision of subjectivity as "a 
multilayered and dynamic entity" that can create alternatives to the Eurocentric 
and patriarchal logic of the metaphysical legacy, first of all by reinventing 
philosophy as a "pursuit of the singular, in all its complexity and diversity" 
(Transpositions 20). In such a task, figures and tropes are deployed in order "to 
think through and move across established categories and levels of experience" 
(Nomadic Subjects 4). Braidotti's trope of "nomadic subjectivity," for example, is 
designed to enact a "critical consciousness that resists settling into socially coded 
modes of thought and behavior" (5). As Haraway's cyborg trope, nomadic 
subjectivity is not meant to simply describe reality, but rather to enact a "politically 
informed account of an alternative subjectivity" (1). Concerned about the historical 
accountability of nomadic subjectivity, for instance, Braidotti points out a link 
between nomadism and violence. The sacking and looting of cities, she says, and 
even the killing of sedentary populations, have marked "the nomad's answer to 
agriculture" (25). In Braidotti's work, the point of nomadism is not to celebrate 
violence but rather to "open up in-between spaces where new forms of political 
subjectivity can be explored" (7). What kind of alternative subjectivity may emerge 
through a re-figuration of "genetic contamination" as a cyborg and nomadic trope? 
In the present age, transnational capitalism enacts a violent kind of 
nomadism that, in Braidotti's view, is framed ideologically as a threat of ecological 
disaster, genetic mutation and immunity breakdown (Transpositions 33). As an 
alternative to the "manic-depressive" response that, in her own diagnosis, "is 
favoured by our culture" (34), Braidotti calls for figurations that "enable us to 
account in empowering and positive terms for the changes and transformations 
currently on the way" (31). In this spirit, she draws on Barbara McClintock's theory 
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of the non-linear behavior of certain genetic elements and borrows its central 
notion, that of a "transposition," in order to perform "a creative leap that produces 
a prolific in-between space" (6). Like McClintock's "jumping genes," Braidotti's 
textual transpositions enact "mobility and cross-referencing between disciplines 
and discursive levels" (7). They are, she says, "a way of revisiting, reclaiming and 
relocating a crucial shift in the process of becoming subjects" (9). The shift in 
question involves, for Braidotti, an invasion of the body by technology. Rather than 
getting stuck in the pain and despair that a technological invasion of the body may 
inflict, Braidotti proposes to explore the idea that the body (and hence subjectivity) 
is by definition embedded in a complex environment of "mutual flows and data 
transfer", so that it is best understood through "the notion of viral contamination or 
intensive interconnectedness" (41). In the context of intensive interconnectedness, 
figurations themselves may operate as transpositions, and so the placenta, the 
parasite, the cloned animal, the gene and hybrid complexity all become, through 
figuration, ways of enacting critical and creative leaps in the world. Such "creative 
leaps" might seem to conflict, however, with the defense of Mexican agriculture.  
After all, the defense of maize is a defense of territory, of sedentary forms of 
existence, of identity as a right to inhabit the world according to socially coded 
modes of thought and behavior. It therefore may appear as unrealistic (and 
downright offensive to some) to suggest that a nomadic trope of "genetic 
contamination" could perform better than "nation" or "ethnicity" in the project of 
defending agriculture against transnational capitalism.  
It might seem unimaginable (and I do not expect it to happen) that peasant 
or environmental activists will ever consider adopting "genetic contamination" as a 
political slogan, yet something like a dialogue around the critical need to articulate 
nomadic tropes with grassroots politics has already started to take place. 
Exemplary in this regard is Braidotti's engagement, in Transpositions, with the 
militant discourse of Vandana Shiva, a guru of anti-GMO movements worldwide, 
including the Mexican one. Braidotti deals with Shiva's discourse in the context of 
her own call for "grounded, historicized accounts for the multiply positioned 
subjects of postmodernity" (79). In Braidotti's self-consciously European vision, 
activism must eschew a re-assertion of humanist dichotomies and focus on 
disrupting their social status (55). Braidotti observes that Shiva's dialectical style of 
neo-humanist argumentation takes it for granted that the life of seeds is "an 
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externally constituted 'other' which gets invested or taken over by the powers-that-
be" (55). Likewise, in European culture, the seed "conveys the notion of purity of 
the lineage and of direct genetic inheritance"; therefore, it is regarded as "the 
opposite of the discourse and the practice of hybridity and mixity in genetic 
engineering and more especially in transgenic species experiments" (54). By 
contrast, Braidotti argues that objects of biopolitical interest such as seeds are 
"constructed" in a semiotic-material sense. If one approaches this constructed 
opposition "in an open-ended and contested manner, in keeping with the cognitive 
and figural 'style' of philosophical nomadism" (55), it emerges that life is not simply 
being vampirized by bio-technology but rather that, "as a result of bio-technological 
material and discursive practices, 'life as bios/zoe' produces ever-growing new 
areas of activity and intervention" (55). As both Braidotti and Shiva know very well, 
the problem is that such new areas are increasingly coextensive with neocolonial 
capitalism, which poses a common threat in European and non-European 
locations. For this reason, rather than condemning Shiva's militant neo-humanism 
(and that of post-colonial intellectuals more generally) as a theoretical mistake, 
Braidotti regards it as "a sort of travelling companion" (56).  
Braidotti's solution to the theoretical disagreement with Shiva illustrates a 
crucial feature of feminist figuration that I have already mentioned, namely, its 
ability to hold "incompatible things together" (Haraway, “Cyborg Manifesto” 149). 
In the context of my own topic, the issue seems to be whether and how an attempt 
to re-figure "genetic contamination" as an alternative (nomadic and deconstructive) 
subjectivity can remain in solidarity with the territorial defense of maize in Mexico. 
Since Braidotti's disagreement with Shiva relates to the task of the social critic, 
which Braidotti explicitly understands as a contestation of "constructed" 
categories, it seems odd to find Braidotti suddenly opposed to "the linguistic turn in 
the sense of the postmodernist over-emphasis on textuality, representation, 
interpretation and the power of the signifier" (Transpositions 50). In her more 
recent work, she has continued to oppose "the power of the signifier" by proposing 
the post-human as a new kind of subjectivity that moves "altogether beyond the 
postmodern critique of modernity and is especially opposed to the hegemony 
gained by linguistic mediation within postmodernist theory" (“Putting the Active” 
44). Thus, in her search for "a neo-materialist, embodied and embedded 
approach" (40), Braidotti ends up rejecting the poststructuralist legacy she initially 
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claimed to embrace and which she now describes as an extension of 
representational thinking. It seems clear, however, that her practice of figuration 
cannot do without textuality, representation, interpretation and the power of the 
signifier, and it is at least doubtful that "nomadic subjects" and "transpositions" can 
take us to another world that is free of such things. Yet Braidotti implies that we 
can at least imagine such a world when she claims that it is possible to over-
emphasize language to the detriment of material and bodily forces. Like Coole and 
Frost, she seems to underestimate the generative and open-ended characteristics 
of textual materiality. 
It might be that Braidotti's impatience with "linguistic mediation" and "the 
power of the signifier" signals a metaphysical yearning for some kind of unpolluted 
signified that could have been "lost" or sacrificed. However, I would rather 
suggest, alongside Derrida's view of the mutual composition of negativity and 
affirmation, that Braidotti's fundamental motivation is an ethical one. Braidotti 
detects too much negativity in dominant varieties of poststructuralism such as 
Lacanian psychoanalysis, Derridean deconstruction and neo-Heideggerian 
meditations on "bare life" (“Putting the Active” 44). She therefore tries to 
differentiate her project from such approaches by embracing "a dynamic view of all 
affects, even those that freeze us in pain, horror or mourning" (50). Following 
Deleuze, she advocates "generative desire" and "an openended web-like subject" 
(50) as promising alternatives to "structural lack" and "constitutive outsides." The 
point for her is that an active engagement with the world requires something more 
important than a rigorous intellectual framework. It requires, she says, an affective 
capacity to "live with the open wound" (52). Thus, even if she cannot prove at the 
epistemological level that a figurative affirmation of "the power of life itself" will 
bring about a world free of lack, constitutive outsides, and linguistic mediation, 
Braidotti will insist that an affirmation of "generative desire" promises a more 
ethical being-in-the-world than a constant reminder of "constitutive lack." Thus, 
rather than side with Braidotti against "linguistic mediation," I interpret her 
"affective" engagement with Shiva as indicative of an ethical motivation.  
In Transpositions, Braidotti declares that what matters to her project is "the 
synchronization of the different elements, their affective dimension, the affinity, not 
the political or theoretical correctness" (56). In this vein, since Braidotti does not 
seem to think it possible to agree with Shiva at the theoretical level she invokes 
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another level of agreement which is defined by "openness to others, in the positive 
sense of affecting and being affected by others, through couples and mutually 
dependent co-realities" (49). What I find attractive in this solution to an apparently 
fundamental theoretical conflict is that it seems to allow me to theorize "genetic 
contamination" not in opposition to activists but rather in alliance with them and 
against capitalism as a human-centred cultural narrative that is at the root of 
contemporary technoscientific practices, including crop biotechnology. A relevant 
precedent in this regard is postcolonial critic María José Saldaña-Portillo's 
theorization of Zapatista politics. Saldaña's approach not only illustrates the critical 
power of textual approaches in general. It also provides an opportunity for me to 
show how a combination of feminist critical openness to technoscience and post-
Marxist political theory can strengthen such approaches along the lines of a 
deconstructive materialism. 
In a comparative analysis of Latin American revolutionary texts from the 
1950s and 1960s, Saldaña-Portillo argues that their authors had been "captured" 
by the discourse of development, a "regime of subjection" that re-articulated and 
re-deployed the logic of European colonialism (21). In her view, it is not possible to 
simply escape the logic of developmental discourse, but it is possible to subvert it 
through "performative acts" (10). Among other Latin American examples of 
performative subversion, Saldaña analyzes the political discourse of Mexican 
Zapatistas. Drawing on Laclau's political theory, she argues that the Zapatistas 
were able to disrupt the semiotic chain of national meanings through a re-
signification of "Indian difference." By locating the reason for their rebellion in the 
lack of democracy and in the government's betrayal of the Mexican Revolution, the 
Zapatistas generalized their situation in order to include millions of Mexicans who 
would otherwise not regard themselves "Indian" (231, 255). In other words, they 
"stretched" indigeneity beyond its role as folkloric origin and abject residuality and 
transformed it into a new ground for multiple democratic identifications at the 
national (and in fact international) level. This analysis certainly focuses on the 
narrative strategies deployed by Zapatismo in its revolutionary struggle against 
neoliberalism, and yet it would be unfair to qualify Saldaña's textual approach as 
merely subjectivist or forgetful of material factors.  
Saldaña takes care to explain that Zapatismo did not emerge 
spontaneously from anything like "Indian culture" but was instead a contingent 
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outcome of the boom and boost of an oil-based economy (213). During the boom, 
indigenous peasants from the highlands of Chiapas migrated to construction sites 
in the jungle, where jobs and wages depended on international oil prices. Those 
who continued farming became increasingly dependent on rural development 
programs, which allowed them to sell maize at the local markets. When 
international oil prices fell and development programs stopped, many farmers 
were caught in a cycle of debt and poverty (218). From this semi-industrialized 
context, Zapatismo emerged as an "active reconstruction" and "collective 
investigation by mediating, self-reflective subjects" (236). While Saldaña is careful 
to materially circumscribe the cultural agency of the latter, her post-Marxist point is 
that "[e]conomic changes alone cannot explain what occurred in Chiapas" (214). 
Rather, Zapatista "self-reflecting subjects" emerged in response to a complex set 
of dislocations that cannot be reduced to political economy.  In keeping with her 
post-Marxist orientation, Saldaña points towards the political specificity of what 
happened in the jungle during the oil boom. Activities such as clearing the jungle, 
establishing towns and petitioning the state for land grants and services during the 
oil boom demanded an unprecedented amount of organization and cooperation 
among previously isolated communities (239). Such activities in turn re-articulated 
traditional hierarchies by favoring more horizontal structures of community 
governance (240). Now, what I find interesting about this analysis goes beyond the 
fact that it foregrounds the material context of Zapatista politics, and thereby the 
latter's contingency with respect to material factors. In foregrounding contingency 
and re-articulation of nationalist narratives Saldaña-Portillo does not merely 
"apply" (in cannibalistic fashion) the formulae of Laclauian post-Marxism. Rather, 
she attempts to subvert the post-Marxist theorization of the political precisely by 
taking the form of that of which she speaks, namely, Zapatista myth-making.  
According to Laclau, we will only be able to undertake "a realistic analysis of 
socio-political processes" once we have abandoned "the objectivist prejudice that 
social forces are something" and undertake instead "an examination of what they 
do not manage to be" (New Reflections 138). What socio-political processes do 
not manage to be in Laclau's psychoanalytic approach is exclusion-free and 
violence-free, since "the constitution of a social identity is an act of power and that 
identity as such is power" (32). As an act of power, any identity will tend to assume 
"the form of a mere objective presence" and become "sedimented." It will tend, in 
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other words, to conceal its own contingency, or the traces of the exclusion, power 
and antagonism on which it is necessarily based (34). Such is the basis of Laclau's 
neo-Gramscian theory of hegemony, in which the exercise of political power is 
understood not as coercion or repression but rather as persuasion and leadership 
through myth-making. Saldaña argues that Zapatista discourse both enacts the 
Laclauian formula of hegemony and transcends its roots in antagonism through "a 
counterpunctual discourse emerging from silence" (223). In order to make her 
point, Saldaña narrates an activist meeting in which Zapatistas requested that 
foreign attendants remained absolutely silent for at least ten minutes, in the course 
of which they would be slowly and silently surrounded by their hosts. That night in 
Oventic, Saldaña says, the Zapatistas "brought all of us into a relationship of 
abstract and temporary parity (...) with each other, through our identification with 
their silence" (196). At the same time, silence re-created the ontological conditions 
for a positive achievement of radical democracy. She writes: 
 
Silence is the clearing that makes speech possible, not because it stands in a 
dichotomous relation to speech, as contentless space, but precisely because it is 
in the fullness of silence where differences take shape: "In silence, we are 
speaking." Silence is the noise of democracy (235). 
 
As opposed to the structural "lack" that a Laclauian "realistic analysis" 
would detect in Zapatista discourse, Saldaña's mythologically-oriented account 
detects a "fullness" in the non-verbal aspects of Zapatista political performance. 
Saldaña's mythological figuration of silence as an infinite, generative process that 
exceeds the boundaries of the human world promises to subvert the humanism 
implicit in post-Marxist political theory. Concerned as he is with human identities, 
Laclau associates democracy with the recognition of "the purely human and 
discursive nature of truth" (4). Unfortunately, Saldaña-Portillo ends up re-inscribing 
such a humanism in a particularistic form. That is, she re-humanizes silence by 
associating it with the communitarian politics of indigenous Zapatista communities. 
She explains that the Zapatistas are proposing a new form of government that is in 
direct contradiction with the party system. Whereas the party system is based on 
the idea of irreconcilable differences or antagonism, the indigenous proposal is 
based on the belief that "you can reach consensus as a community" (251). Even if 
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disagreements persist among the Zapatistas over the kind of autonomy they want 
to have (247), Saldaña insists that they have finally achieved "fullness," 
transcending thereby the antagonistic logic of signification as theorized by post-
Marxist political philosophers. She writes: 
 
I am suggesting that the empty signifier is no longer empty. The Zapatistas twice 
challenge Laclau's antagonistic formulation of hegemonic politics when they fill 
the "empty" signifier of Indian difference with their own particularity even as they 
universalize this particularity to represent the fullness of the Mexican community. 
They fill Indian difference with a specificity – with the aesthetics of silence and 
the politics of the comón – capable of encompassing the abstract national 
community in struggle and in difference (256).  
 
By postulating that Zapatistas are above and beyond the dynamics of power 
and antagonism that define political life from a post-Marxist perspective, Saldaña 
re-inscribes the modern utopian vision that "a free society is one from which power 
has been totally eliminated" (Laclau, New Reflections 33). Perhaps there is indeed 
something radically new and important about Zapatista politics, yet to say that 
Zapatistas have overcome antagonism (which is, for the post-Marxists, the threat 
of temporality itself) and finally achieved a power-free society is not merely to re-
inscribe metaphysical thinking but also to depoliticize the social dynamics of 
Zapatista communities. It amounts to forgetting that democracy is a political 
commitment that is premised on "an all-embracing subversion of the space of 
representability in general, which is the same as the subversion of spatiality itself" 
(Laclau, New Reflections 79). Thus, democracy necessitates a rigorous 
acknowledgment of the radical contingency, or the constitutive temporality, of all 
political identities. To say, with the post-Marxists, that antagonism is ineradicable 
is not to recommend exclusion and violence but rather to acknowledge the 
relational dynamics of identity in order to understand why, historically, 
emancipatory projects have often disappointed and continue to disappoint 
humankind. As Wendy Brown cautions in a "Freedom's Silences":  
 
Silence calls for speech, yet speech, because it is always particular speech, 
vanquishes other possible speech, thus canceling the promise of full 
representation heralded by silence. Silence, both constituted and broken by 
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particular speech, is neither more nor less "truthful" than speech is, and neither 
more nor less regulatory (Edgework 83). 
 
As an alternative to Saldaña's figuration of silence as power-free 
communitarian fullness, I want to re-figure genetic contamination along the more 
critical lines of technoscience feminism. When Haraway asks "what might be 
learned from personal and political pollution?" (Modest_Witness 174), she fully 
acknowledges the fact that, as unequally positioned inhabitants of technoscience, 
we are traversed by power relations and contradictory attachments which we must 
negotiate in a critical and responsible way. In this vein, Haraway reminds us: 
 
Believing that somehow there is this seamless, friction-free becoming is an 
ideological mistake that we ought to be astonished that we can still make. If we’re 
going to get at why we still make it, we need psychoanalytic mechanisms. We 
need to understand how our investment in these fantasies works (Haraway in 
Gane 148). 
 
While Saldaña's silence echoes Braidotti's affirmation of generative desire 
as opposed to psychoanalytic lack, the "fullness" which she attributes to silence 
might benefit from some contamination with Braidotti's early philosophical 
nomadism, that is, with the search for a "critical consciousness that resists settling 
into socially coded modes of thought and behavior" (Nomadic 5). Nomadic 
subjectivity entails a psychoanalytic acknowledgment of the ineradicability of 
antagonism while nevertheless seeking to create an ethical "openness to others, in 
the positive sense of affecting and being affected by others, through couples and 
mutually dependent co-realities" (Transpositions 49). With a careful dosage of 
contamination, Saldaña's trope of silence might become, alongside Haraway's 
cyborg, an "ironic myth" for "fractured identities" (Haraway, "Cyborg Manifesto" 
154). In order to avoid an uncritical re-inscription of metaphysics that would merely 
celebrate the Mexican defense of maize as a moral crusade, my own trope of 
"genetic contamination" would fundamentally attend to the mutual composition of 
negativity and affirmation, lack and generative desire, critique and creativity, 
political violence and an ethical openness to the other, and in the last instance, 
death and life. By holding such incompatible things together "in the formless, mute, 
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infant, and terrifying form of monstrosity" (Derrida, "Structure, Sign..." 370), 
"genetic contamination" would allow for a non-empiricist reading of the Mexican 
defense of maize. Contamination would no longer be just the despised place in a 
particular political programme, but would figure positively as "a name for 
experience itself, which is always experience of the other" (Derrida, Echographies 
11). How does experience itself positively resist empirical determination? I want to 
explore this question through a reading of Mexican scientists' efforts to intervene in 
biosafety legislation that would protect native maize from genetic contamination in 
an empirical sense. 
 
Scientists Before the (Biosafety) Law: In Search of the Origin of Maize 
 
In absolute chance, affirmation also surrenders itself to genetic indetermination, 
to the seminal adventure of the trace (Derrida, "Structure, Sign..." 369). 
 
In his essay "Before the Law," Derrida undertakes a reading of Kafka's short 
story in which he demonstrates how an "act of literature" is able to suspend the 
conventions of the literary institution by foregrounding the operations of the Law of 
time itself. In Kafka's story, which was part of his novel The Trial, a man from the 
country waits for a gatekeeper's permission to enter the premises of the Law. 
Permission is never denied to him, but rather it is repeatedly deferred by the 
gatekeeper, who warns the man that once inside the gate he will encounter other 
gatekeepers like himself (202). The man chooses to wait, grows old and dies 
without ever entering the premises of the Law. As he dies, the gatekeeper 
approaches to inform him that the gate will now close, since it was made only for 
this particular man. Perhaps, Derrida says, the man from the country did not know 
that "the law is not to be seen or touched but deciphered" (197). What must be 
deciphered is the operation of the Law that “fuels desire for the origin and 
genealogical drive” (197). 
According to Derrida, what makes Kafka's text an "act of literature" is that 
not just the man in the story but ultimately also the reader of the story is brought 
“before the law” (211). Whereas initially the Law insinuates itself “as a kind of 
personal identity entitled to absolute respect” (211), by the end of the story we 
come up against the Law of the text itself. In this vein, Derrida writes that the text 
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"guards itself, maintains itself–like the law, speaking only of itself, that is to say, of 
its non-identity with itself. It neither arrives nor lets anyone arrive. It is the law, 
makes the law and leaves the reader before the law" (211). What Kafka's act 
reveals is the operation of Law that makes particular laws appear as "beyond 
history, genesis, or any possible derivation" (191). Such an operation has nothing 
to do with the inclusion of a work within literature as “a field, a domain, a region 
whose frontiers would be pure and whose titles indivisible” (215). Rather, it has to 
do with letting oneself be “tempted by the impossible” (192). Sigmund Freud, for 
example, let himself be tempted when he conceived a theory about the origin of 
the moral law (192). Like Kafka, he wanted to write a history of the Law. Since, 
according to Derrida, "the law is not to be seen or touched but deciphered" (197), 
the literal improbability of Freud's tale of parricide in Totem and Taboo in no way 
diminishes, in Derrida's view, “the imperious necessity of what it tells, its law” 
(199). Like Kafka's story, it is a text that operates in “the simulacrum of narration” 
rather than merely in “the narration of an imaginary history” (199). What counts 
here is the fact that parricide can be neither proved nor disproved by 
psychoanalysis, and yet it remains constitutive of it.  
In this section I want to engage with the textual activities of Mexican 
scientists who seem to have let themselves be "tempted by the impossible" in their 
defense of Mexican maize biodiversity. The Origin and Diversification of Maize: An 
Analytical Review is a scientific report commissioned by the Mexican 
government102 in the context of disputes around biosafety legislation. The authors 
of the report position their assessment of scientific theories about the origin and 
diversification of maize as "a serious contribution of scientific information for the 
authorities responsible for discerning the country's opening to strictly regulated 
experimentation with transgenic maize" (6). In my reading of this contribution, I pay 
attention to how scientists re-articulate a national myth by interweaving scientific 
stories with national stories and, more precisely, by making the origin of maize 
coincide with the origin of the nation. I suggest that such a textual mobilization on 
the part of scientists injects into the cultural politics of biotechnology in Mexico a 
                                                
102 These were the National Commission for the Knowledge and Use of Biodiversity (CONABIO), 
the Ministry for Agriculture, Cattle Breeding, Rural Development, Fishing and Food (SAGARPA), 
the Ministry for the Environment and Natural Resources (SEMARNAT), the Intersecretarial 
Commission for the Biosafety of Genetically Modified Organisms (CIBIOGEM), the National 
Institute of Agricultural, Cattle Breeding and Forestry Research (INIFAP) and the National Institute 
of Ecology (INE). 
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paradox that has to do with the impossibility of fixing the origin. In spite of the 
scientists' claims to empirical reality, the impossibility of fixing the origin is not just 
empirical but, as Derrida would claim, it is quasi-transcendental. From this 
perspective, which is certainly not the one embraced by most scientists, no 
evidence about the true origin of maize could ever guarantee the closure of the 
national text, and yet the search for the origin would remain constitutive of maize 
nationalism. Hence the ontological condition that I propose to frame as the 
"genetic contamination of Mexican nationalism." 
The Origin and Diversity of Maize is introduced by José Sarukhán, 
president of the National Commission for Biodiversity (CONABIO), who begins by 
alluding to the familiar contrast between the Mexican meanings of maize and its 
"more utilitarian" uses in the rest of the world. Even though the latter account for 
the current designation of maize as "the grain of humanity," the origin of maize 
resides in Mexico, and it is the link between the origin of maize and the Mexican 
nation that will be illuminated in the report by the best of representatives of science 
(6). Sarukhán warns us, however, that the origin of maize cannot be known with 
absolute precision, but he also anticipates the report's emphasis on the theory that 
the origin of maize "occurred simultaneously in several regions and extended to all 
the national territory, which was inhabited by hundreds of indigenous groups who 
have constituted the historical roots of that which our country is today" (6). Thus, 
he concludes by exhorting Mexican authorities to make decisions on the basis of 
two simultaneous considerations: scientific evidence on the one hand and the 
status of biodiversity as “national and international heritage” (6) on the other hand. 
In a subsequent preface to the actual report, UNAM ethnobiologist Dr. Robert 
Arthur Bye Boettler regrets that Mexican maize has been the victim of 
development policies rooted in "complacency, ignorance and lack of attention to 
critical issues" (14). Such issues, Bye argues, must fall within the dynamics of 
scientific knowledge, in which error and disagreement play a central role. Bye 
reflects on the heterogeneity and incommensurability of the available evidence on 
the origin of maize. While archaeological information seems too heterogeneous to 
give us a precise image of such an event, the techniques and methods of 
molecular genetics seem incommensurable with archaeological data. In his view, it 
is necessary to overcome heterogeneity and incommensurability through 
systematic monitoring and standard methodologies in order to fill the gaps in our 
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knowledge about the origin and diversification of maize. Could this scientific call 
for overcoming heterogeneity and incommensurability be seen in reality a call for 
national unification? In his conclusion, Bye calls for the authorities (including 
researchers) to adopt a commitment based on the economic and strategic 
importance of maize as a national resource, a vision in which farmers appear (one 
again) as instrumental for the conservation of genetic information that is 
represented as a cultural and historical gift from Mesoamerica to the whole of 
humanity.  
In the chapter "Theories about the Origin of Maize," maize cytogeneticist 
Takeo Angel Kato, reviews the scientific search for the origin of maize in the 
context of 20th century biological paradigms. Despite its impersonal style and 
highly technical vocabulary, Kato's review unfolds like an adventure story. Once 
upon a time in the nineteenth century a certain Ascherson suggested that the wild 
grass teocintle might be the direct ancestor of maize. Ever since, scientists have 
restlessly searched for a complete explanation of the origin of maize by 
deciphering the "mysterious" relation between maize and teocintle. In order to 
explain the morphological differences between these two plants, Paul Mangelsdorf 
and his colleague Robert Reeves postulated in 1938 that maize had a complicated 
hybrid origin. According to their tripartite hypothesis, teocintle is not the direct 
ancestor of maize, but rather the descendant of an ancient variety of wild maize 
that spontaneously crossed with Tripsacum. Via teocintle, genes from Tripsacum 
were incorporated into wild maize, detonating the genetic variability that was a 
precondition of human domestication of teocintle. The role of Tripsacum as 
represented in this theory eventually met with many objections,103 in response to 
which Mangelsdorf and Reeves dropped the Tripsacum hypothesis out of the 
theory. Yet they stuck to the hypothesis of a hybridization event protagonized by 
ancestral maize. In Kato's interpretation, at any rate, the tripartite hypothesis was 
never a theory about the origin of maize; rather, it was about the origin of teocintle 
(48). For all of Kato's rational style of presentation and argument, his search for a 
                                                
103 First, the ancestral maize invoked by the tripartite theory could only be 'monstruous' and 
therefore unfit to survive in the wild. Second, the spontaneous crossing of maize and Tripsacum is 
highly improbable under natural conditions, given that experimental crosses have yielded 
unconvincing results. Third, there was early evidence that chromosomes in maize differ from those 
in Tripsacum both in number and in constitution. Fourth, it seems impossible to tell from the 
archaeological record whether gene transfer from Tripsacum to maize first took place at the origin 
of maize or long after maize had been domesticated. 
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mysterious origin of maize has a literary resonance and even echoes debates 
about the origin of writing. In Proust and the Squid, a neuroscientific review of the 
scientific debates around the development of writing, Maryanne Wolf observes 
with amusement the anthropocentric tone of the discussion that figures the Greek 
alphabet as either the "sister" or the "daughter" of a previous writing system. Either 
the origin of the Greek alphabet must be fixed in a single most likely "parent," or 
the search must continue until another "missing ancestor" is found that accounts 
for the origin of all the "relatives" acknowledged so far. As far as neuroscience is 
concerned, these disputes about where to fix the origin may continue forever and 
have little or no impact on current pedagogical issues, such as how to develop a 
reading brain in the fast-paced world of digital media. Like the origin of the Greek 
alphabet, the origin of maize has involved human-centred genealogical disputes. 
In the late 1960s molecular biologist George Beadle argued that the 
morphological differences between maize and teocintle were not so large as to 
require an extinct ancestor. He proposed that maize was simply a form of teocintle 
arrived at through the human selection of several major genes, each of which 
would control a single difference between the two plants. Humans may have 
noticed promising mutations, such as a softer glume in some teocintle plants, and 
may have started selecting them for cultivation (Buckler and Stevens 81). The 
ascent of molecular biology in the 1960s led to the increasing popularity of 
Beadle's theory. Over the decades, however, Beadle's theory had to be re-
elaborated on the basis of a non-reductionistic understanding of the complex, 
uncertain interaction between genetic elements, the cytological environment and 
morphological expression.104 Even though, according to Kato, it seems clear 
enough today from taxonomical, morphological, cytological and genetic 
perspectives that teocintle alone is the closest relative of maize (49),105 the 
differences between teocintle and maize are now seen as affected by multiple 
genetic interactions rather than being simply determined by individual genes (51). 
Since most genes in fact have modest effects, even Beadle came to recognize 
                                                
104 In 1983 the American biologist Barbara McClintock received the Nobel Prize in Physiology for 
her discovery of the mobile genetic elements in the chromosomes of maize. These genetic 
elements are also known as “jumping genes,” due to their ability to “jump” from one part to another 
in the chromosomes. Evelyn Fox Keller narrates the life and work of McClintock in  the context of 
20th century biological paradigms in her book A Feeling for the Organism (1983). 
105 Contemporary proponents of Beadle's theory argue that maize was developed through human 
selection of specific traits of one particular teocintle, Zea mays  ssp.  Parviglumis (Buckler & 
Stevens 73). 
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that perhaps hundreds or thousands of additional "modifier" genes would be 
necessary to achieve transformation, as well as environmental factors (75). 
Ironically, given that the interplay between genetic and environmental factors 
remains mysterious and unpredictable, science has kept the door open to the 
investigation of events other than human selection that supposedly triggered the 
origin of maize.106 Yet, under the dominant teocintle hypothesis of human 
domestication as the origin of maize, the debate among scientists shifted towards 
the question of the origin's location. Significantly, both theories depend on the 
excavation of further fossil evidence from archaeological sites (87).  
In the penultimate chapter of the report, titled "The Biosecurity Law and the 
Centers of Origin and Diversification," José Antonio Serratos picks up on Kato's 
conclusion that there is a lack of definitive evidence for current theories about the 
geographical origin of maize. The "unicentric" and "multicentric" theories each give 
a particular answer to the question about where and how domestication took 
place. The unicentric theory holds that maize was domesticated in a single event 
in the Balsas river basin in Mexico, after which it spread out to the whole American 
continent. The multicentric theory claims that maize was domesticated in different 
areas at the same time, drawing support from cytogenetic research describing 
correlations between chromosomal nodes and geographic distribution of 
"landraces." As Serratos explains, assuming the correctness of the unicentric 
theory has huge implications for the definition of the center of origin. If maize 
originated through a single event of domestication, its center of origin must be 
located at one specific point along the basin of the Balsas River. Yet if maize had 
a multicentric origin, many other regions, "practically in the whole country," (91) 
would have to be included in the determination of maize's center of origin and 
genetic diversity. Serratos concludes that as long as we lack "definitive evidence" 
for the unicentric theory, "the most conservative position must prevail" (91).  
                                                
106 In a modern version of the tripartite theory, Eubanks argues that Tripsacum introgression into 
teocintle could have provided the “mutagenic action” leading to an “explosive” origin and 
diversification of maize (Kato 96). Kato also mentions Hugh Iltis' 1983 theory of “The Catastrophic 
Sexual Transmutation.” According to this theory, environmental factors induced drastic changes in 
the morphology of teocintle which derived in a “feminization” of male organs and their substitution 
for the small teocintle fruits. The maize cob would have originated not through genetic mutation but 
rather through “genetic assimilation” of an acquired trait (Serratos 8). While the theory was mostly 
criticized as “pure and simple Lamarckism,” Kato argues that the morphological changes it 
describes would be insufficient anyway to bring about the the effects that Iltis attributes to them. 
According to Kato's own cytogenetic research, the maize cob has an explanation directly at the 
genetic level. 
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In Article 3 of the Ley de Bioseguridad de Organismos Genéticamente 
Modificados (LBOGM) the "center of origin" is defined as a geographic area where 
the domestication of a given species took place. The "center of genetic diversity" is 
defined separately as a geographic area where 1) there is genetic or 
morphological diversity of a given species; 2) there is a population of wild 
ancestors and 3) there is a “genetic reservoir” (88). The problem with these 
definitions, Serratos argues, is that they separate the human and biological factors 
that were joined in Vavilov's classical understanding of origin and diversity. In his 
view, it is also important to consider biological, human and social aspects of the 
domestication process that impinge on the definition of the center of origin and 
diversity of maize. Human labour, Serratos points out, cannot be dissociated from 
the origin of maize if the origin is understood as a process of diversification. Since 
crop diversification occurs when human beings orientate natural selection towards 
their own purposes, Vavilov had included the persistence of widespread cultivation 
in the definition of the crop's center of origin. Yet LBOGM "breaks the unity" of 
origin, domestication and diversity by reducing origin to a geographical area and 
by separating domestication from genetic diversity (89-90). Moreover, LBOGM 
contains “unnecessary and incorrect restrictions” (90) within the definition of the 
center of diversity. According to the law, in order to be regarded as the center of 
diversity, a geographical area must not only host a population of wild relatives but 
it must also be classified as a genetic reservoir. Both of these conditions exclude 
large areas of Mexico in which maize agriculture is widespread. On the one hand, 
the presence of wild relatives is in fact much more localized than the presence of 
maize diversity. On the other hand, the status of genetic reservoir implies 
confinement, which is both inconsistent with diversification and impossible without 
adequate information and operational measures (90). By reducing and 
impoverishing the concepts of origin, domestication and diversity, LBOGM 
exposes the nation's “genetic resources” to all the threats posed by genetically 
modified organisms (90).  
In order to correct such a failure in the Mexican biosecurity law, Serratos 
proposes to re-unify the concepts of center of origin and center of diversity, and to 
incorporate archaeological, ecological and cultural considerations into their 
definition. On this basis, Serratos proposes new definitions for the Law, formulated 
as follows:  
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Centers of origin are those geographical areas within the national territory where 
the ancestors and wild relatives of a crop are found today or were once found, as 
well as those in which a crop's domestication took place in association with 
specific cultural trajectories. Likewise, centers of origin include those areas in 
which there is either or both morphological and genetic diversity that might 
constitute a genetic reservoir (96). 
 
Serratos's proposed definition promises to satisfy the activist demand that 
all of the Mexican territory be considered as a centre of origin of maize (El Maíz 
No es una Cosa 169), since there is no geographical area within the national 
territory where native maize was never found, cultivated or consumed. Very subtly, 
the definition makes the theoretical boundaries of a Vavilov center of origin 
coincide with the territorial boundaries of the Mexican nation-state. At the same 
time, Serratos points out the need for a new characterization of the existing maize 
diversity that takes into account the changes in land use and economic activity that 
have taken place since the last samples were taken several decades ago. An 
accurate characterization would have to rely, moreover, on new physical 
explorations across the Mexican territory and then on “risk maps” for the “vigilance 
of native maize” (91). What sounds like a project to maintain the boundaries of the 
nation through the scientific protection of maize diversity is accompanied, in other 
words, by an acknowledgment that such a diversity cannot be determined or even 
approached in isolation from the complex processes of social and technical 
transformation that have already taken place. Thus, while Serratos re-asserts the 
national boundaries through his defense of maize biodiversity, he also gives up 
any guarantee that the latter can described as "pure" or un-contaminated. In this 
regard, Wainwright and Mercer observed that the activist demand for "de-
contamination" gives rise to a political dilemma that consists in the fact that such a 
task exceeds the capacity of scientists as the hegemonic group in the dispute. 
While ecological scientists such as Bye, Kato and Serratos can mobilize 
uncertainty about the actual origin of maize and thereby about the actual risk of 
"contamination," they cannot actually produce “decontaminated maize” 
(Wainwright and Mercer 351).  
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For Wainwright and Mercer, the impossibility of producing an effective de-
contamination indicates that Gramsci was right in defining science as culture, that 
is, as a relationship between humanity and reality that is necessarily mediated by 
technology (351). In my own interpretation, what The Origin and Diversification of 
Maize helps to foreground in the Mexican biotechnology debates is a paradox that 
has to do with the actual impossibility of closing the national text by fixing the 
origin of maize. Even though the search for the origin of maize appears to be 
necessary for a debate around the nation's response to biotechnology, no 
empirical evidence about the origin or diversity of maize could guarantee the purity 
and integrity of any national response to the threat of contamination. In fact, I 
would suggest that the scientists' search for the origin of maize is "genetically 
contaminated" the sense that it tends to subvert the founding narratives of the 
nation that the scientists themselves seem to embrace, namely, that maize is a 
given entity which the nation can fully identify, control and protect through scientific 
expertise. I am thus suggesting that what The Origin and Diversification of Maize 
produces is very different from what it attempts to represent.  
If, as Kato's scientific review implies, an undisputed "origin of maize" is 
irretrievable and if, as Serratos wants, the "center of origin of maize" is seen to 
coincide with the boundaries of the Mexican nation, the latter appear as more 
unstable and questionable than they are usually assumed to be. It is as if the 
history of the Mexican nation-state became "contaminated" by the biological 
history of maize, which is paradoxical considering that the biological history of 
maize is in fact a cultural/technical history, that is, it is a history of theoretical and 
empirical disputes that can reach no closure unless it is closed in an authoritarian 
way. This is what happened on March 2009, when a 10-year moratorium on the 
experimental sowing of transgenic crops in Mexico was ended by presidential 
decree. In response, the activist Network in Defense of Maize – which counts 
scientists among its prominent members – launched a series of public protests 
denouncing the government's decision as a "historical crime" and a "wound to the 
identity of Mesoamerican peoples" (El Maíz No es una Cosa 82). I now turn to the 
Network's argument that "maize is not a commodity but the origin of a civilization 
and the basis of peasant lives and economies" (182). From the Network's 
perspective, an origin is "a complex entanglement of relations, a civilizational 
process" (14). This argument is developed in Maize is not a Thing, It is a Center of 
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Origin, a two-volume book that chronicles and reflects on the 10-year struggle of 
the Network in Defense of Maize. In the following section, I interrogate the political 
program of the Network from the standpoint of the "genetic contamination" of the 
search for the origin of maize. How does the Network's figuration of the origin 
simultaneously open up and close down the future of maize?  
 
Not a Thing But A Myth: Autonomy and its Discontents 
 
Only with proper, native maize (not its disfigured transgenic version), sown so 
that the community eats with minimal dependence, can the realm of the "us" [sic] 
be lived: collective work, our own justice, self-government, assembly, in a life 
against the tide of planetary systems (Red en Defensa del Maíz, El Maíz No es 
una Cosa 43). 
 
Maize is Not a Thing; It is a Centre of Origin was co-edited in 2011 by 
several members of the Network in Defense of Maize, namely, the Collective for 
Autonomy (Coa), the Centre for Social Analysis, Information and Popular 
Education (Casifop), GRAIN and Itaca Editorial. Its purpose was to reflect on the 
lessons learned throughout ten years of the Network's struggle against 
"contamination." In the first of several prologues to the book, Mexican 
anthropologist Guillermo Bonfil Batalla is made to remind readers that maize is 
more than a human creation;107 it is an active agent, he says, that organizes 
human life according to its own rhythms, demanding from human beings both 
cultural and technological creativity. In Mexico, Batalla declares, maize has 
sustained a "popular project" based on community and directly opposed to the 
abstraction and commodification of crops under capitalism (12). His founding 
statements are followed by a list of eighteen "inescapable points" about transgenic 
contamination.108 From the list emerges the Network's current position that 
                                                
107 Bonfil Batalla died in 1991; a fragment of his writings appears as a "prologue" to the book. 
108 The points are: 1) transgenic seeds belong to a legal system that criminalizes the victims of 
contamination; 2) transgenic seeds benefit companies rather than farmers; 3) contamination of 
non-transgenic crops is inevitable; 4) transgenics are dangerous to humans; 5) transgenics are an 
attack on small-scale, independent food production; 6) in Mexico, this attack is a historical crime 
because Mexico is the center of origin of maize; 7) maize is not a crop but a complex entanglement 
of relations, a civilizational process; 8) health risks are higher in Mexico because Mexicans eat a lot 
of maize; 9) contamination is destruction of a genetic reservoir that is indispensable to confront 
climate change; 10) contamination is an attack on Mexican campesinos; 11) contamination could 
cause deformity and sterility of Mexican maize; 12) biosafety laws pave the way to large-scale 
cultivation of transgenic maize; 13) contamination has been detected in Mexican fields since 2001; 
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contamination does not amount to, as activists themselves had initially thought, 
accidental gene spilling. Rather, contamination is a deliberate attack on agriculture 
understood as a "popular project." In opposition to profit-driven agro-industry, 
agriculture is described as a process of taking care of the world through taking 
care of the natural and social environment. When such a process is accomplished, 
"it grounds autonomy, history, a present and a future of [one's] own" (14). 
Autonomy is indeed presented as the whole point of agriculture and as the road 
that many members of the Network have decided to take in response to "the 
abandonment and contempt of all kinds of institutions; [which] made them 
understand that the whole world can be seen from the milpa" (120). Such an 
anticapitalist turn of the Mexican defense of maize seems to me more critical and, 
in a sense, more realistic than the nationalist rhetoric of urban middle-classes. Yet, 
it also seems to me that the Network's assertion of autonomy carries its own 
serious disadvantages, which are unlikely to be overcome without the help of 
some "contamination" in a refigured sense.  
After ten years of struggle, the Network seems to have gained a more 
realistic picture as well as a historical perspective of what is going on with Mexican 
laws and institutions now that transgenic experiments have reached the Mexican 
countryside. In the first essay of Maize is Not a Thing, GRAIN activist Ramón Vera 
explains that from its beginnings in the European Renaissance, capitalism set out 
to "kill agriculture" through land theft, enclosure and forced migration to the cities. 
The Green Revolution continued the killing by expelling farmers' knowledge from 
the countryside. More recently transgenic seeds were invented in order "to 
disfigure crops, exhaust farmers' varieties and promote dependency on industry" 
(19). At present, neoliberal capitalism seeks to consummate its historical project 
by imposing everywhere a standardized “series of laws destined to privatize our 
resources and rights” (168). In addition to LBOGM, a seed law was passed in 
Mexico which is virtually identical to seed laws passed in other countries, since it 
was written by seed corporations grouped under the International Seed Federation 
                                                                                                                                              
14) independent civil organizations have protested against contamination; 15) thousands of 
scientists have publicly stated their disagreement with the end the 1998 moratorium on transgenic 
maize; 16) the government has systematically dismissed the legal resources mobilized by civil 
organizations and has even changed the law in order to proceed with the release of transgenics; 
17) the government's attitude has been 'violating laws' in order to promote the release of transgenic 
maize; 18) relevant instances of the United Nations, the FAO and the CBD, have also ignored civil 
organizations when these requested their support (El Maíz No es una Cosa 13-15). 
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(ISF). In Mexico, ISF is represented by the Mexican Seeds Association (AMSAC), 
which demands that only “certified” seeds are legally sown. Seeds must be stable 
in order to be certified, and only certified, patented seeds can be used in rural 
development programs involving technical assistance and credit. In view of their 
repeated failure to influence the law, activists have increasingly realized that the 
nation-state acts today, and has in fact always acted, as a facilitator for capitalism 
by either directly repressing non-cooperative agricultural communities or by 
fragmenting them through co-optation into developmentalism. No longer a simple 
defense of national identity, the defense of maize has grown into a more focused 
critique of the complicity of state institutions with transnational capitalism. 
The historic de-indigenization of peasant identity under developmentalist 
hegemony, for example, did play a decisive role in the fracturing of the defense of 
maize and in the subsequent radicalization of the Network's discourse. In 2002, a 
coalition of independent indigenous and unionized mestizo peasants launched a 
campaign called El Campo No Aguanta Más (The Countryside Bears it No More). 
They demanded a renegotiation of NAFTA and a general reorientation of 
economic policy towards the protection of national agriculture. After four months of 
nationwide demonstrations, a National Agreement for the Countryside was 
proposed by the government and was accepted by peasant unions that had 
historically emerged through political pacts with the post-revolutionary government 
(84). Since the Agreement positively excluded a renegotiation of international free 
trade agreements, many independent organizations felt betrayed and 
progressively radicalized their discourse by aligning it more closely with 
anticapitalist movements such as Zapatismo and Vía Campesina. The testimony 
of Aldo González, included in Maize is Not a Thing, contributes an interesting 
reflection in this regard, that is, regarding the question of why indigenous activists 
have been more active in the defense of maize. "They touched us on our 
essence," he says, "our essence as indigenous peoples" (65). For indigenous 
peasants such as González, defending maize is about defending collective rights, 
community government, history and the environment (43). Collective rights, history 
and the environment, however, are particular cultural values that capitalism has 
undermined by means more subtle than land-theft, enclosure and forced 
migration. As I have tried to show in my analysis of PMMM, it is through 
hegemonic operations that capitalism has undermined resistance from within, and 
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the hegemonic power of capitalism (which historically includes nationalism) 
continues to be the main challenge of a radicalized defense of maize agriculture. 
Realistically, González takes for granted that "they will not pay attention to us" 
(66), so it makes no sense for "us" to go out on the street and demonstrate against 
globalization. Neither does it make sense to wait for international NGOs to come 
and tell "us" about laws. It is dangerous to make laws when the people are not well 
informed, and so mobilization must take place "inside our communities" (66). 
Communities must learn by themselves that transgenics "disfigure maize in its 
esence" (38), an essence that he describes in therms of variety and 
meaningfulness, knowledge and adaptability. They must learn by themselves that 
transgenics are good "only to poison the lands and to destroy the economy of 
communities" (38).  
From the Network's current perspective, contamination is not a matter of 
technical discussion among juridical and ecological experts. Rather, it is a political 
problem involving threat and antagonism from the industry. Capitalism, after all, 
has always attacked the peasant's way, that is, autonomy, because this is "the 
way that generates freedom, critical vision and the possibility to fight" (19). 
Activists have come to the conclusion that contamination as a weapon deliberately 
employed by the industry. In their view, the industry knows very well that many 
Mexican peasants will not comply with pro-capitalist legislation imposed by the 
nation-state. According to Vera, for example, it is in view of an unusual resistance 
to the individualization of land titles on the part of Mexican peasants that the World 
Bank started promoting research-based agricultural contracts (such as PMMM) 
involving experiments with transgenic crops (21).109 While the government "tries to 
convince subsistence and commercial farmers without an ancestral past of their 
own that transgenics mean progress" (25), activists spread information and debate 
about the actual meaning of relations between urban and rural areas, and 
particularly about "the effects of rural devastation on cities and how urban growth 
is creating sustainability problems for both the rural and the urban environment" 
                                                
109 After PMMM, a new partnership was announced between Bill Gates and Carlos Slim to promote 
“Green Revolution 2.0” in the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Research Center. As 
Dolia Estevez reports in Forbes Magazine (13/2/2013), Gates was invited by Mexico’s International 
Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT) to open new facilities that were funded by the 
Slim Foundation. As Gates pointed out, new digital infrastructure (provided by his own foundation) 
will allow CIMMYT to apply its latest agriculture findings on a gene bank that holds the genetic 
diversity of 130,000 wheat and 28,000 maize varieties worldwide.  
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(23). Assuming that the biotech industry wants to "kill" agriculture, and assuming 
that transgenic flows constitute a weapon in such a project, what kind of exercise 
of power would it take to win this battle against the biothreats of contemporary 
capitalism? The Network's own diagnosis clearly points towards the need for a 
hegemonic strategy, that is, a strategy of persuasion that is able to articulate 
multiple struggles.  
In the last chapters of Maize is Not a Thing, we read that even though 
people are rising everywhere in defense of water, petroleum, and the forests, the 
defense of maize does not appear as a "strategic axis" for a truly viable 
alternative. In Mexico, the imminent privatization of oil and other energy sources 
seems to have "drained the energy of the struggles" (158). The problem is that oil 
defenders "are not having the capacity to address or face the situation from an 
integral perspective, in which all of the struggles can be articulated into a single 
one, but which also allows to recognize many of the other necessary spaces of 
defense, such as maize and water" (158). The absence of an integral perspective, 
as the activists call it, is strange considering that maize is the primary target of the 
new biofuels ideology, which promotes the idea that everything can be used as 
fuel or as energy source. Agroecological systems such as the milpa, where 
several species coexist and thrive as long as the soils are taken care of, are now 
seen as mere raw material for the production of biofuel. An integral strategy, 
besides “a categorical no to transgenics,” would promote the “ruralization of the 
city against the savage urbanization that the countryside is suffering” (160). Yet 
activists recognize that resistance can only be "a slow, dispersed and fragmentary 
process" (157). It is easily dismantled by uncontrolled urbanization, land theft and 
speculation, which increase the pressure on rural inhabitants to migrate. 
Depopulation of the countryside leads those who stay to replace labour with more 
agrochemicals. Money, including migrant remittances and government allowances, 
breaks their will to preserve agriculture as a way of life. Government programs 
such as OPORTUNIDADES "make people lazy and dependent (even alcoholic) by 
giving them money in exchange for nothing" (165). When money dominates 
everything, the healthy diversity of the milpa is replaced by low-quality industrial 
food, and health problems come to plague the most vulnerable people (165). New 
sources of instant gratification make it difficult for new generations to understand 
the economic importance of agricultural work – not to even mention its cultural and 
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political meaning for older generations. Rather than working in the field, young 
people from the countryside are driven, voluntarily or by force, to the ranks of 
organized crime, which offers quick money and a false solution to the enduring 
problem of discrimination against poor and indigenous persons. Of course, the 
Network provides an accurate empirical description of the effect money has had in 
Mexican rural life so far. What it fails to provide is a convincing account of the 
future that can be shared by the wider public, whose support they evidently need 
in order to position their cause. It seems, however, that they "do not have the 
necessary words in order to enter into dialogue with the defenders of energy 
resources in Mexico" (158). Finding the words is necessary because the Mexican 
public has not said a forceful "no" to transgenic food, not to mention the 
industrialization and commodification of food. While the Network seems to have 
arrived at a precise diagnosis of the challenges it faces at the hegemonic level, its 
proposed solution seems to alienate it even further from the society that it seeks to 
change. 
For activists, maize is not "mere culture." Rather, it is about a politics of "not 
asking for permission to be" (116). In "A Life in Sowing," Ramón Vera (GRAIN) 
and Verónica Villa (ETC) argue that the defense of maize demands "a sense of 
being different from those who accept impositions from the government and the 
companies" (35). They propose to call maize "a sovereign crop" and associate it 
with a "creative act that has nothing to do with making money. A creative act is 
free, whereas making money through wages makes one dependent" (41). In this 
libertarian spirit, activists insist that "something is always possible," that "history is 
not set in stone" and that "options are not mere illusions" (162). In a chapter titled 
"The Lessons of Maize," Camila Montecinos holds that "we must support 
processes that include technologies designed to generate autonomy and to 
strengthen local capabilities" (31). It would be not just a matter of promoting 
different kinds of research but also of changing the researchers, meaning that 
indigenous peoples should now be regarded as "the true experts" of agriculture 
(34). Only they, by becoming "custodians" of the land, are capable of maintaining 
autonomy from capital today (33). Here we finally come across the myth of the 
noble savage, which I have argued is more convincingly deployed by PMMM.  
As we know, PMMM assigns peasants the role of "custodians" of maize 
varieties. However, instead of promoting "a life against the tide of planetary 
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systems" (El Maíz No es una Cosa 43), PMMM promises survival and individual 
autonomy through money – that is, through social recognition and connection with 
the world. Because money is not, in itself, equivalent to exploitation, PMMM is able 
to argue that the problem is not money itself, but rather the lack of it – since it is 
the lack of money that puts people at a disadvantage in a world structured by 
competition. Thus, PMMM has the advantage of common sense on top of all the 
other advantages that it possesses, namely, money, political power, and 
technoscientific power. By contrast, the activist rejection of both money and state 
institutions isolates the cause of maize agriculture from the public, whose heart 
and mind activists would need to win in order to effectively survive what they call 
"the tide of planetary systems," namely, capitalism itself. If we accept, as a 
necessary evil, the reproduction of humanist narratives involving "custodians" of 
the land and the environment, the challenge would then be to make "autonomy 
against capital" appear as more promising than the compromises offered by a 
project such as PMMM. 
While history is certainly not set in stone, activists might need to think of an 
imaginative strategy within (the history of) capitalism rather than in frontal 
opposition to it. In my view, they are already working in this direction, such as 
when they argue that all maize varieties "are part of the same tissue" which is the 
"sacred" tissue of collective humanity. Autonomy is humanized and humanity is 
sacralized in their discourse, yet what emerges from this discourse does not 
merely reproduce the modern masculinist and humanist narratives of sovereignty 
which, as Saldaña-Portillo and others have repeatedly pointed out, sustain the 
colonial logic of developmentalist discourse. The Network's sacralization of human 
collectivity also produces maize as a progressive image of "decentralized decision-
making, diverse strategies and tools, diverse and even divergent aims, all of which 
will in turn allow to restore and strengthen the richness and diversity of maize" 
(32). I associate such an image of collective humanity with what I call the "genetic 
contamination" of the national text, which can also be understood as a search for 
democracy that is made possible by the fact that the national text is not self-
identical or unitary.  
By associating "genetic contamination" with democracy, I also mean that 
democracy cannot be pursued without acts of power seeking to define the tissue 
of humanity as collective in one sense or another. Yet, as a search that is not 
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merely human, democracy cannot be pursued without an acknowledgement of the 
constitutive vulnerability and dependency of "collective humanity" on something 
radically other than itself. Can these two dimensions of genetic contamination be 
made to fit together so that my contribution to the Mexican biotechnology debates 
appears as a definite political solution to the activist predicament in the face of 
capitalist hegemony? If not, is there a risk of overlooking or downplaying the 
urgent stakes of the Mexican defense of maize agriculture through a textual 
emphasis on its paradoxical nature? I would say that there is always a risk in 
questioning the assumptions of a political narrative that one might prefer to fully 
identify with, but also that taking such a risk is necessary in order to “become 
answerable for what we learn how to see” (Haraway, “Situated Knowledges” 583). 
It is not "maize itself" but rather antagonism, or the threat of time itself, that gives 
rise to the political defense of Mexican maize agriculture at the same time that it 
undermines its identitarian affirmation.110 Regarding the productive role of 
antagonism, Jeremy Valentine explains: 
 
Antagonism is a subjective experience of being incomplete being expressed as 
resentment towards the other on which the subject is dependent for completion, or 
that against which the subject defines itself. To try and make the point easier to 
understand, it is like those cases analysed by Freud when the memory of some 
traumatic experience which you do not even realise you had forgotten suddenly 
enters your thoughts, thus undermining your self-confidence. In Laclau and 
Mouffe, such moments are positive in that they are the only occurrences when 
anything happens. Things happen, not because they are grounded and complete, 
but because they are not (Valentine 61). 
 
What "happens" in response to the other is politics itself understood as acts 
of power that nevertheless remain "genetically contaminated," or dislocated, by 
their own constitutive temporality. If we understand acts of power as necessarily 
dependent on technical supplements, it becomes clear that the mark of 
nationalism is an experience of resentment against technicity. As even Stiegler 
points out, technicity unfolds today as a violent conquest of time and space, 
                                                
110 As I explain in previous chapters, the temporality of being constitutes a threat in response to 
which the subject emerges through (political) acts of spatialization. Such acts, however, can never 
be fully achieved because dislocation is "spatially unrepresentable" (Laclau, New Reflections 42). 
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"uprooting from the ground" and "corroding idiomatic differences" ("Fidelity..." 260). 
He also attributes the crisis of emancipatory discourses to the technological aspect 
of globalization, or "the media in all its guises including biotechnologies" (238). 
The latter would be responsible for the proliferation of fundamentalisms and 
nationalisms, which Stiegler sees as "ritual automatisms and reflex behavior" and 
as "compensatory reactions to the loss of the proper" (238). Yet as Stiegler 
routinely insists, technicity gives "the very possibility of idiomatic differentiation, 
that which constitutes one's home in the first place by opening it to what is other 
than oneself" (260). If a political response to "otherness" necessarily presupposes 
antagonism (that is, an experience of resentment) what about the ethical nature of 
such a response?  
As an ontological trope, the "genetic contamination of Mexican nationalism" 
does not merely seek to foreground the political (that is contingent and 
contestable) "origin" of Mexican identity but at the same time, its ethical 
predicament. From this perspective, "genetic contamination" refuses to insert itself 
transparently in a determinate political programme, such as a national project to 
protect "Mexican nature" from the threats of technology. It also refuses to operate 
as a political slogan that celebrates new technologies as instruments for progress, 
development or freedom. As an ontological trope that is also "deconstructive" in an 
ethical sense, "genetic contamination" sets out to undermine the self-righteous 
certainty that political programmes invariably demand. How can we understand the 
relationship between the ethical and the political in a deconstructive trope such as 
"genetic contamination"? 
Richard Beardsworth has pointed out that Echographies of Television, 
which is a conversation between Derrida and Stiegler, serves as a reminder of the 
ethical importance of deconstruction at a time when its political credentials are still 
suspected ("Towards a Critical..."). In that book, Derrida and Stiegler deconstruct a 
common polarization of opinion between, on the one hand, capitalist celebration of 
new technologies and on the other hand, intellectual aversion to technology as 
such. They carry out such a deconstruction by inscribing all technologies, old and 
new, within Derrida's philosophy of time and arche-writing. From this perspective, 
contemporary teletechnologies "have always been there, they [were] always there, 
even when we wrote by hand, even during so-called live conversation" (Derrida, 
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Echographies 38).111 Beardsworth identifies a tension, however, between Derrida 
and Stiegler, since for Stiegler there is an absolute specificity of contemporary 
teletechnologies which calls for a new "political will" to increase consciousness 
and open the future by bringing about "new forms of intelligibility" (Stiegler, 
Echographies 117). Whereas Stiegler calls for the elaboration of a definite "politics 
of memory," Derrida insists on the need to remain critical of any politics of 
memory. In his own words, "we are only ever opposed to those events that we 
think obstruct the future or bring death, to those events that put an end to the 
possibility of the event, to the affirmative opening for the coming of the other" (11). 
Derrida and Stiegler's discussion of the French resistance to the inclusion of 
French cinema within free trade agreements in 1993 seems particularly relevant 
for thinking about what is to be done with maize culture in the face of 
technoscientific capitalism.  
Derrida upholds the so-called "cultural exception" to the extent that it makes 
possible that a certain type of cultural innovation is not foreclosed in advance. Yet 
the cultural exception is for him merely a strategy for resisting short-term 
calculation. As soon as resistance to the market inhibits the very flexibility and 
productivity of consumption, he says, the market should be affirmed. After all, the 
historical link between democracy and the market precludes one from making any 
axiomatic opposition between the values of democracy and those of the market. 
Neither for the state nor against it, Derrida deploys here, as Beardsworth explains, 
a reflective logic that is predicated on the impossible "experience" of aporia. The 
most inventive political intervention in response to the cultural threats of 
technological globalization would be "letting time happen/take place," or 
"accompanying the taking-place of time" ("Towards a Critical..."). In other words, 
alternatives to short-term calculation must come from the future as an absolute 
horizon, that is, from the absolute futurity of time as a "promise" (Echographies 
140-3). Derrida's response could be called "political," Beardsworth says, if one 
                                                
111 As Stiegler explains, Derrida borrowed Husserl's treatment of time as a play of protentions and 
retentions when he argued that experience qua temporal synthesis is made possible and inhabited 
by "arche-writing" in the sense of traces from a nonlived past (Stiegler, "Fidelity..." 242-243). 
Derrida's theory of "arche-writing" holds together two kinds of non-lived past that are irreducible to 
each other. On the one hand, it relates to an empirical past made up of "traces" such as memory 
supports, writing systems, archives or historical legacies. On the other hand, it relates to a past that 
has never been present, an absolute past which accompanies experience in the manner of 
specters. No reactivation of the origin, Stiegler says, could fully master or awaken this absolute 
past (255). 
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understands by political imagination "the reinvention of a critical relation to 
actuality," rather than "a gesture of organization and decision shaped by a 
particular territory, by a particular temporality, by a particular subject or by 
particular rules" ("Towards a Critical..."). In Beardsworth's view, the difference 
between Derrida and Stiegler is irreconcilable. For Stiegler, the imperative of 
"letting the other be other" runs the risk of leaving actuality as it is. For Derrida, 
any call for a particular political program is a form of calculation which risks closing 
the very future that it seeks to make possible.  
As to my own trope of "genetic contamination," rather than siding with 
Derrida against Stiegler or vice versa, I want to suggest that the tension between 
them reflects an irreducible tension between politics and ethics that is played out 
in deconstructive philosophy. Politics and ethics are both inseparable and 
irreducible to each other; their relationship can only be thought as singular acts of 
mutual "contamination." In Specters of Marx, Derrida refers to deconstruction as 
an occurrence between life and death, a “learning to live” that “can only maintain 
itself with some ghost, can only talk with or about some ghost [...]” (xvii). No ethics 
or politics would be possible, Derrida argues, if we did not feel any respect and 
responsibility “for those who are no longer or for those who are not yet there” 
(xviii). How then can we develop of an ethical sense of respect and responsibility 
for the materiality of maize agriculture, for those who have lived and died in it, and 
for those who might yet depend on its continuity? Regarding deconstruction and 
ethics, Geoffrey Bennington explains that a "compromise of purity" is necessary 
for the ethical relation to avoid the absolute violence of purity itself ("Derrida and 
Politics" 70). More precisely, he suggests that ethics must "protect itself from itself 
by a necessarily risky innoculatory contamination of itself by its apparent other(s)" 
(72). I would include political power among the latter, but also technoscience and 
even the ambiguous pleasures of popular culture under capitalism.  
By contrast with familiar research methods aiming to produce accurate 
representations of the world, deconstruction seeks an “opening to freedom, 
responsibility, decision, ethics and politics” (Derrida, "Before the Law" 200). To 
affirm the "genetic contamination" of Mexican nationalism is not to celebrate the 
"transgenic contamination" of native maize; rather, it is to point out that the criteria 
for deciding how to deal with the threats of corporate biotechnology come from an 
open future rather than from a pre-determined past. Thus, rather than positioning 
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my acts of questioning maize nationalism as more truthful than the "more 
empirical" accounts of biotechnology debates, my argument is that it is ethically 
important to attend to the "genetic contamination" of all narratives of maize-based 
identity. "Genetic contamination" is not a material presence that can be verified 
empirically or transcendentally. I want to position it instead as a deconstructive 
myth the acknowledgment of which might actually help to diversify both the 
content and the orientation of the Mexican biotechnology debates. If conceived as 
a sort of genetic engineering at the philosophical level, the aim of my 
"contaminating" intervention would be to release cultural myth-making from 
calculative nationalism in order to create conditions for the emergence of as yet 
unimagined creative engagements with technoscience understood as "a form of 
life, a generative matrix" (Haraway, Modest_Witness 50). While I do not intend to 
produce political recipes for activists, it seems to me that an ethical attention to 
"genetic contamination" in a deconstructive sense might do more in the long run 
for "a life against the tide of planetary systems" than a constant rehearsal of 
moralistic recriminations for the loss of the proper. It might, for example, begin to 
reconnect the country and the city through the creation of something new and 
urgent for the world as a whole, namely, a posthumanist sense of shared 
responsibility for life as well as death. 
 
Conclusion: Contamination as a Bioethical Perspective 
 
It is not even respect, in the traditional sense of the word, for the other as human 
subject. It is the experience of the other as other, the fact that I let the other be 
other, which presupposes a gift without restitution, without reappropriation, and 
without jurisdiction (Derrida, Echographies 21). 
 
In Bioethics in the Age of New Media, Joanna Zylinska develops a critique 
of moral panics as the most frequent way in which bioethical issues tend to enter 
the public domain. By resorting to ready-made and dogmatic positions, she says, 
moral panics foreclose discussion about "the role of technology and new media in 
the changing status and nature of the human" (21). Drawing on the work of 
Emmanuel Levinas, Zylinska theorizes a suspended condition between materiality 
and language as the source for a bioethical alternative to moralistic rejections of 
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new media and technologies. She describes the bioethics of such a condition as 
being based on the assumption "of there being an alterity that exceeds the 
conceptual grasp, and the very being, of what we understand as the self" (30). For 
Zylinska, the Levinasian philosophy of difference would need to be 
"supplemented" with the acknowledgment of technicity in order to really “take 
issue with the myth of the originary self-sufficient, total man, living in the state of 
nature – a myth which is still rather potent in many contemporary articulations of 
the fears and anxieties concerning technology” (45). In Zylinska's reading of 
Stiegler, the being of the human emerges “as always already related to, and 
connected with, the alterity that is not part of him” (45). Her recognition of the 
constitutive relationality of the human does not merely "correct" anthropocentric 
residues in the philosophy of difference, but more importantly it radically expands 
the scope of bioethics beyond the clinic and into the multiple territories of everyday 
life (33). Thus, while conventional bioethics has typically been more preoccupied 
with the "raw" biological life of organisms that with social or political location, 
Zylinska's bioethics would remind us that when making decisions about life "we 
are always already situated in, and drawing on, a broader political context" (66). In 
this vein, prior to and beyond political economy at the molecular level, there exists 
agriculture as a skilled practice within a specific social and cultural context.  
Cultural anthropologist Arturo Escobar has argued that we must take 
seriously the politics of a cultural affirmation of peasant worlds, which he describes 
as a world of caring, of "intimate and ongoing dialogue between all living beings" 
(Encountering Development 169). Theirs is "above all a struggle over symbols and 
meanings, a cultural struggle" (167). In the milpa maize is not a resource used to 
top up the energies of laboring individuals, but a communal activity that produces 
communal life according to local customs and traditions. Such an activity cannot 
be reduced to a commercial contract between a single plant and an abstract 
human being, because both plant and human being are enabled and constrained 
by a wider biocultural context in which multiple reciprocities take place 
(Visvanathan 317). A bioethically oriented media and cultural studies can stress 
this point while it pushes for the recognition of the fact that technicity is “the 
condition and foundation of culture, not its opponent” (Zylinska 44). Biotechnical 
practices such as milpa agriculture gave Mesoamerican societies and their 
colonized descendants healthy and diverse diets, allowing them to survive 
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centuries of colonial and neo-colonial exploitation. Contemporary environmental 
concerns have implied a re-valorization of pre-industrial biotechnology, yet I think it 
is important to remember that maize agriculture always existed technically and 
politically rather than in an uncontaminated stat of cultural purity. It is important, I 
argue, in order to take them seriously as ethico-political alternatives to straw 
oppositions between "hard" political economy and "mere" culture and, at the level 
of theory, between "empirical" and "textual" approaches. Deconstructive versions 
of "new materialisms" prove instructive in this regard. 
In a critical version of "new materialism," feminist philosopher Karen Barad 
attempts to rethink the causal powers of materiality through an ontological 
interpretation of quantum physics as theorized by Niels Bohr. In Barad's reading of 
quantum physics, discourses amount to the local physical conditions that enable 
and constrain knowledge practices such as conceptualizing and measuring the 
behavior of electrons.112 Such practices, she says, are not authored by human 
beings, since human beings themselves emerge as already part of them, which is 
to say as "part of the world in its open-ended becoming" (Posthumanist 
Performativity 822). Barad refigures materiality as "the ongoing reconfigurings of 
the world" (818), and the world itself "a doing, a congealing of agency" (822). 
Through an informed and creative practice of scientific figuration, she takes the 
discussion beyond traditional humanist metaphysics. Significantly, she takes the 
discussion towards ethics in a deconstructive sense. Echoing Braidotti's 
"transpositions" and Haraway's "cyborgs," Barad writes: 
 
Like the diffraction patterns illuminating the indefinite nature of boundaries – 
displaying shadows in "light" regions and bright spots in "dark" regions – the 
relation of the social and the scientific is a relation of "exteriority within." This is not 
a static relation but a doing – the enactment of boundaries – that always entails 
constitutive exclusions and therefore requisite questions of accountability 
(Posthumanist Performativity 803). 
 
                                                
112 As Barad explains in more detail in Meeting the Universe Halfway, theoretical concepts (such as 
"electron," "momentum" and "position") are for Bohr indissociable from specific physical 
arrangements, that is, from specific configurations of the world that are produced by apparatuses 
qua material-discursive practices (Posthumanist Performativity 816). 
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The relation between "the social" and "the scientific," which can also be 
read as the relation between "culture" and "materiality," is for Barad fundamentally 
an ethical question. From her perspective, ethical questions in general have an 
ontological priority over the formulation of human-centered politics. Like Derrida, 
Barad frames justice as a relation to the other which is made possible by a fracture 
inherent to identity itself. From a quantum perspective, identity "is performed 
differently given different experimental circumstances" (Quantum Entanglements 
259, 261). Theoretical concepts emerge by excluding other sets of possibilities, 
calling into question identity itself and inspiring "a new sense of a-count-ability, a 
new arithmetic, a new calculus of responsibility" (251). Commenting upon the 
controversial role of quantum science in the making of the atomic bomb, Barad 
interrogates a general tendency to reduce ethical questions to questions of rights, 
calculation or blame (262). This is an epistemological reduction of ethics, as if 
ethical responsibility depended on the possibility of humans achieving theoretical 
certainty. No longer a matter of "making amends finally" (264), quantum ethics is 
necessarily "a matter of différance, of intra-action, in which no one/ no thing is 
given in advance or ever remains the same" (264). Aligning her quantum ethics 
with Derrida's hauntology, Barad declares that "being/becoming is an 
indeterminate matter: there simply is not a determinate fact of the matter 
concerning the cat’s state of being alive or dead. It is a ghostly matter!" (251)113  
A (bio)ethical framework for the Mexican defense of maize agriculture would 
require taking the issue of "contamination" beyond nationalism, juridical thinking 
and, last but not least, moral panics about technological invasion.  In this vein, 
rather than figuring maize and the human as individual agents interacting with 
each other, my bioethical trope of "genetic contamination" locates agency in the 
unstable mutual relations through which the human and the non-human constitute 
each other dynamically as they both take part in a wider technical process which it 
is impossible to calculate or appropriate as a whole or once and for all. This 
process is the world and therefore it includes everything I address throughout my 
thesis: agricultural histories, cultural nationalism, academic research disciplines 
                                                
113 Barad explains that an electron makes a quantum leap "in a discontinuous fashion," thus 
troubling "the very dichotomy between discontinuity and continuity" and indeed "the very notion of 
dicho-tomy – the cutting into two – itself (including the notion of ‘itself’!)" (246). Since any 
theoretical concept "will, by necessity, always produce its constitutive exclusion," "[e]very concept 
is haunted by its mutually constituted excluded other" (253). 
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and anti-disciplines, psychoanalysis, science policy, cultural policy, popular 
gastronomies, tourism, environmental activism, indigenous rebellion, political 
disappointment and "the deepest personal and collective experiences of 
embodiment, vulnerability, power, and mortality" (Haraway, "The Biopolitics..." 
204-205). My argument is that we do not come to terms with the constitutive 
vulnerability of the human by merely describing empirical situations or by 
denouncing human greed. Witnessing and investigating empirical causes and 
effects might be indispensable for human survival, yet the point at which we 
humans transform our ethical relation to the nonhuman (including the nonhuman in 
us) involves a deeper and perhaps unconscious aspect of our being – which I 
locate in the experience of the other. It is in this experience, neither empirical nor 
transcendental, that I trace the bioethical promise of the genetic contamination of 
Mexican nationalism. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
Life is a window of vulnerability. It seems a mistake to close it. The perfection of 
the fully defended, "victorious" self is a chilling fantasy (...) whether located in the 
abstract spaces of national discourse, or in the equally abstract spaces of our 
interior bodies (Haraway, "The Biopolitics..." 224). 
 
"Why do you want to do a PhD?" was a question that one of my supervisors 
asked me during our first meeting in 2009. I have to say that I took this question 
rather personally, which was not perhaps the most efficient strategy for dealing 
with the transnational industry that higher education has become. All I knew at the 
time was that I needed to answer another question that had been posed to me one 
year earlier in a different institution where I had already started a PhD project 
exploring the contributions of feminism to contemporary thinking around 
technology. The question had been: "It sounds interesting but specifically where 
and how does your work intervene?" The question had struck me deeply, making 
me feel vulnerable at an intellectual and a personal level. From then on, I could no 
longer read, write or speak without simultaneously asking myself: "Why am I doing 
this?" "Why this and not something else?" "Who and what am I doing this for?" 
"What is this anyway?" All these questions were already in my mind in 2009, when 
the Mexican government awarded me a grant to continue my PhD studies in 
England. A fully-funded PhD appeared to offer the time and space to find out what 
"intervention" meant. What followed was a personal effort to explicitly relate 
seemingly abstract concerns with technology, politics and subjectivity to the 
context in which I had grown up and in which I was planning to work and live. In 
the process, the feeling of vulnerability did not recede; on the contrary, it increased 
alongside my understanding of the complexity of the "case study" that I had, 
somewhat opportunistically, chosen to work on. Who was I to describe, judge, 
criticize or support –at a safe distance, from within the UK university system – 
those Mexicans who were trying to save "native maize" from the threats of global 
capitalism?  
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As I thought about this question, I came to realize that one of my deeper 
motivations in choosing maize as a topic was to understand the context in which 
my father chose to study Agricultural Engineering only to give up the plot and 
dedicate his life to promoting technoscientific links within the university. I was also 
trying to decipher the context in which my mother, a chemist specializing in soil 
fertility, decided to become an entrepreneur in ecological tourism. The fact that my 
father's father was a disappointed campesino and the fact that my mother's father 
was a modest shopkeeper with a solitary interest in birdwatching did not take me 
very far. My father's mixed feelings about the actual practice of agriculture and my 
mother's idealization of "nature" in terms of peace and harmony had to respond to 
a larger set of narratives in relation to which I wanted to elaborate my own 
position. Moreover, I wanted to situate in this way the philosophical ideas that I 
had become most interested in through my training first in the Humanities and then 
in Media Studies.  
 Of course,  I have not discovered a final explanation for the life decisions of 
my parents through my PhD research of the historical relationships between 
Mexican nationalism, maize and biotechnology. Neither have I attained any 
certainty that such a research can "intervene fully," if one understands by this to 
radically transform the dominant ways in which knowledge (including activist 
knowledge) is produced in Mexico and in technoscientific laboratories. What I have 
developed instead is a strong conviction around the ethico-political importance of 
"theory" in the broad sense of a practice of contextualization, denaturalization and 
creative interrogation of all knowledge-claims. I have also learned from my own 
attempt to show that such an interrogation can productively "contaminate" 
academic and non-academic discourses. What I have come to appreciate is that a 
theoretical "contamination" of knowledge disciplines and educational institutions 
within specific contexts cannot yield instant empirical "results" and, perhaps more 
importantly, cannot be done individually. Rather, "contamination" can only operate 
as a long-term, non-individualistic project premised on a recognition of the 
"genetic" or "originary" character of intellectual and personal vulnerability. No 
"intervention" seems to be possible without acknowledging the embodiment, the 
partiality and incompleteness of this and every intellectual enterprise and, on that 
very basis, its ethical obligations towards that which it excludes or ignores. Thus, 
"intervention" appears as an attempt to connect democratically oriented efforts to 
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unsettle epistemic boundaries set up by the family, the nation and the knowledge 
disciplines in particular contexts. 
In my own partial attempt to "intervene," I have argued for the public 
relevance of a cultural and political analysis of the Mexican debates around maize 
biotechnology. I undertook such a project originally because, personally and 
intellectually, I doubted that anything like a "Mexican" being that was represented 
or even caused by "native" maize actually existed. To be more specific, I doubted 
both the political virtues and the ethicality of asserting an identitarian link between 
maize and "Mexicanness." Soon I realized that I had to temporarily suspend my 
personal judgment of nationalism and try to understand why maize continues to be 
framed as an identitarian resource. As a hegemonic construct of very recent 
appearance and with very poor democratic credentials, the biopolitical narrative of 
maize nationalism must be distinguished from the longer and infinitely more 
complex history of maize agriculture in Mexico. There is no point for me in denying 
that such a history (which remains a contested terrain and which certainly involves 
many other life forms besides human beings and maize) includes particular human 
groups for whom maize is a sacred and essential aspect of their self-definition. By 
questioning the "naturalness" of such groups and their self-definitions I have not 
meant to undermine or harm their political struggles but rather to avoid further 
appropriations of their symbolic and material legacy by the capitalist narratives of 
the Mexican nation-state. I have not found a way to fully avoid or eradicate the 
violence of appropriation but I have tried to elaborate an alternative way of relating 
to the struggle for maize by thinking about the "the genetic contamination of 
Mexican nationalism." 
From the post-Marxist perspective I adopted in Chapter II, A Theoretical 
Approach to Mexican Nationalism, it appears that the drive to construct and 
naturalize a social identity is structurally inherent to all politics. For historical 
reasons, nationalism is in Mexico more powerful and appealing than 
environmentalism, feminism, anarchism and many other particular struggles 
against domination. It has therefore made sense for the Mexican defense of maize 
agriculture to infiltrate and re-articulate the national text as opposed to ignoring it 
or rejecting it completely. Since any social identity is inherently unstable and 
subject to contestation from a post-Marxist point of view, it is in principle possible 
to re-articulate the national text in a way that favours democratization, and this is 
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precisely the promise of grassroots movements such as the defense of Mexican 
maize. From this perspective, nationalism can be seen as "necessary" in a 
strategic rather than in an absolute sense. Still, rather than simply supporting or 
prescribing the use of nationalism as a rhetorical tool, I have emphasized that 
Mexican nationalism has historically opperated by concealing the exclusion and 
exploitation of the Mexican majorities under modernizing "development" policies. 
Since I was concerned about the consequences of "forgetting" such a history, I set 
out to expand my critique of Mexican nationalism to the ways in which it limits the 
discussion and practice of biotechnology in Mexico beyond the perspective of 
grassroots agricultural activism.  
In Chapter III, Revolutionary Science Meets Biotechnology, I addressed the 
relationship between Mexican nationalism and Eurocentric conceptions of science 
and technology. I first outlined the conceptual crisis of both sets of narratives and 
then diagnosed the response of the Mexican scientific community to the changing 
role of the nation-state in the context of global technoscientific capitalism. The 
discredited status of Eurocentric narratives of science and technology has 
impinged on the self-definition and cultural prestige of Mexican scientists as well 
as on their relationships with the state. While their resistance to technoscience 
cannot be reduced to a problem of "wrong attitudes," I have tried to show that a 
focus on cultural and political narratives does illuminate relevant aspects of the 
scientists' predicament, of their political agency and of their historical 
responsibility. Scientists (and not just Mexican scientists) are of course being 
reasonable when they warn against the extrapolation of productivist parameters to 
the field of academic knowledge. My argument was, nevertheless, that disciplinary 
defensiveness and purist contempt for technoscientific research merely frustrates 
the scientists' own desire for “effective interlocution and direct participation, with 
original projects for national development, in the broad and shared sense which 
today is missing” (Cano 166). Rather than leading us to downplay the challenges 
of technoscientific capitalism, an acknowledgment of the historical "impurity" of 
science and technology might help "us" Mexican knowledge producers to give up 
melancholy, moralism and wishful thinking in order to start valorizing the 
increasing politicization and interrogation of our role in the wider society, for it is 
society as a whole that is exposed to the transformations entailed by 
technoscientific capitalism. 
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Regarding my own intellectual contribution to the Mexican biotechnology 
debates, I have posed the question: "Can cultural studies, in alliance with post-
Marxism and feminist studies of technoscience, contribute anything to the Mexican 
biotechnology debates that is more creative than a purely negative critique of 
nationalism?" As I have explained, from such a combined perspective the task is 
not only to understand the ontological mechanisms of the political. The task is to 
investigate and make explicit “how this (each and every “this” of academic 
intellectual work) might already be ensnared within a complexly reticulated political 
context, and how it might thereby seek to make a difference to it, within it, and 
“beyond” it” (Bowman 82). As the neoliberal reorganization of social labor renders 
the divisions between "mental" and "manual" labor increasingly untenable (de Bary 
6), I have suggested that we take the opportunity to expose the metaphysical 
structure as well as the material effects of such divisions in order to clear the way 
for renewed political articulations across traditional academic boundaries. This is a 
necessary condition, I argue, for a critical imagination and a viable practice of 
different forms of biotechnology, including media and cultural studies as one form 
of biotechnology. To re-frame biotechnology beyond of “the genetic 
informationalisation of life itself” (Kember 236), I have argued, is a political 
decision that can contribute to modify what counts as the proper experience and 
practice of biotechnology. 
In Chapter IV, The People of Maize and the Technoscience of Culture, I 
analyzed the story of cultural activism that led to the recent inscription of 
"Traditional Mexican Cuisine" in UNESCO's List of Intangible Cultural Heritage 
(2010). My guiding hypothesis in this chapter was that it is necessary to undertake 
a more open-minded interrogation of the political productivity of "contamination" as 
an inescapable condition in technoscience. While the inscription of "Traditional 
Mexican Cuisine" implied a "contamination" of activist discourse by neoliberal 
discourses that reduce "culture" to an economic resource, I suggested that as an 
alternative to rejecting such a "contamination" in an oppositional way, we should 
welcome the opportunities it offers to re-articulate Mexican nationalism in 
unprecedented directions. In other words, I argued that the field of intangible 
heritage requires a subversive deployment of neoliberal and technoscientific 
vocabularies as an alternative to reactive and moralistic nationalism which might 
already be considered as a creative engagement with the challenges of neoliberal 
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biotechnology. Of course, to recommend "contamination" as a strategic operation 
within what I call "the technoscience of culture" is not to exclude further 
questioning of whether "Traditional Mexican Cuisine" actually achieves anything 
besides the reproduction of cultural capitalism. Rather, my aim has been to 
introduce a more nuanced appreciation of the possibilities and limitations of a 
cultural defense of maize under the hegemony of neoliberal capitalism.  
While attending to the many reasons why corporate biotechnology has been 
figured as a foreign invasion in Mexico, I have also re-figured "genetic 
contamination" by drawing on anti-essentialist philosophy, feminist studies of 
technoscience and media and cultural studies in order to try to imagine different 
possibilities for the thinking and doing of biotechnology in Mexico. In Chapter V, 
The Genetic Contamination of Mexican Nationalism, I argued for the ethical 
relevance of "textuality" for a materialist engagement with Mexican biotechnology 
debates. An ethical materialism would require taking the issue of "contamination" 
beyond nationalism, juridical thinking and, last but not least, moral panics about 
technological invasion. My argument in this chapter was that we do not come to 
terms with the constitutive vulnerability of the human by merely describing 
empirical situations or by denouncing human greed. While a thorough investigation 
of empirical causes and effects might be indispensable for the survival of particular 
human groups, the point at which we humans transform our ethical relation to the 
nonhuman (including the nonhuman in us) involves a deeper and perhaps 
unconscious aspect of our being – which I locate in the experience of the other. It 
is in this experience, neither empirical nor transcendental, that I trace the ethical 
promise of acknowledging the "genetic contamination" of Mexican nationalism. In 
this vein, rather than figuring maize and the human as individual agents interacting 
with each other, the trope of "genetic contamination" locates agency in the 
unstable mutual relations through which the human and the non-human constitute 
each other dynamically as they both take part in a wider technical process which it 
is impossible to calculate or appropriate as a whole or once and for all. Such a 
process is the world and therefore it includes everything I address throughout my 
thesis: agricultural histories, cultural nationalism, academic research disciplines 
and anti-disciplines, psychoanalysis, science policy, cultural policy, popular 
gastronomies, tourism, environmental activism, popular rebellions, political 
disappointment and "the deepest personal and collective experiences of 
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embodiment, vulnerability, power, and mortality" (Haraway, "The Biopolitics..." 
204-205). 
Parallel to my writing of this thesis a plurality of creative engagements with 
technoscience have been developed in Mexico. In 2012, an art exhibition called 
Sin Origen/Sin Semilla ("Without Origin/Without Seed") was mounted at UNAM's 
museum in Mexico City. Curated by two philosophers in collaboration with the Art 
+ Science collective, the exhibition included artworks that reflected on the inherent 
technicity of "life," several of which illuminated the struggle in defense of maize 
from a non-identitarian and non-moralistic perspective. In the mountains of 
Oaxaca, a project called Ojos de la Milpa ("Eyes of the Milpa") involved the use of 
mobile phones by Mexican farming communities who thereby recorded the 
complex life growing in their milpas and share it online. Food and agricultural co-
operatives have proliferated across the Mexican countryside and have reached the 
cities through a growing network of "gourmet" and "health" food shops catering to 
the urban middle classes. Global urbanite trends such as green roofs and cycling 
have been incorporated to the sense of political urgency in the face of 
environmental disaster, rising inequality and threat of social dissolution through 
violence and forced displacement. From my own temporary location the British 
university system, I edited in 2011 an online "Living Book" on Agriculture which, 
like all "Living Books," remains open to contributions, modifications and 
appropriations by readers throughout the world. By mentioning this what I want to 
highlight is the collective, heterogeneous, transnational and open-ended nature of 
process of interrogating both the history and the dominant orientation of 
technoscientific practices. My thesis presents itself as merely one among many 
contributions to this process and points towards further investigation of how they 
can be articulated in particular circumstances in order to expand and deepen the 
democratization of social life. 
I am writing this conclusion on the eve of National Independence Day in 
Mexico. Tonight, many Mexicans will gather in the main square of their cities and 
shout, after their state and city governors: ¡Viva México! ¡Vivan los Héroes que 
nos dieron patria! There will be maize-based antojitos, plenty of tequila and 
mariachi music throughout the night. Tomorrow, Mexicans will wake up to attend 
the traditional street parades in which school children play the drums and the 
Mexican military boasts its maneuvers around the main square or zócalo in Mexico 
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City. Yet the main event of the patriotic festivities remains the so-called Grito de 
Independencia, that is, the collective "shout" that celebrates Mexican sovereignty 
on the eve of National Independence Day. As I prepare to witness my first Grito 
after four years abroad, I remind myself that not all Mexicans will shout tonight. 
Many of them will prefer to keep silent out of anger, disappointment or disaffection; 
others will be unable to decide whether to shout or not because they have either 
been "disappeared" or killed by either organized crime or by the state apparatus 
itself. Others still will have to shout, if they decide to, from under shelters set up in 
response to the hurricanes "Ingrid" and "Manuel." Others will be in a situation that I 
cannot even imagine, celebrate or lament. To all of them I dedicate my own silent 
shout for the genetic contamination of Mexican nationalism.  
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